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AGENDA 
of the First Part of the Twenty-Seventh Ordinary Session 
Paris, 15th-18th June 1981 
I. Report of the Council 
Twenty-sixth annual report of the Coun-
cil to the Assembly 
11. Political Questions 
1. Political activities of the Council - reply 
to the twenty-sixth annual report of 
the Council 
2. Developments in Poland 
3. European security and events in the Gulf 
area 
Ill. Defence Questions 
1. Application of the Brussels Treaty -
reply to the twenty-sixth annual report 
of the Council 
2. European security and the Mediterranean 
3. Talks on the reduction of long-range 
theatre nuclear forces in Europe 
. 
IV. Technical and Scientific Questions 
1. Future of European space activities -
reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of 
the Council 
2. The European combat aircraft and other 
aeronautical developments 
V. Budgetary and Administrative Questions 
Revised budget of the Assembly for the 
financial year 1981 
VI. Rules of Procedure 
Revision of the Rules of Procedure 
VII. Relations with Parliaments 
Half-yearly information report - Rela-
tions between parliaments and the press 
10 
Report tabled by Mr. Page on behalf of the 
General Affairs Committee 
Report tabled by Mr. Hanin on behalf of the 
General Affairs Committee 
Report tabled by Mr. Forni on behalf of the 
General Affairs Committee 
Report tabled by Mr. Tanghe on behalf 
of the Committee on Defonce Questions and 
Armaments 
Report tabled by Mr. Bozzi on behalf of the 
Committee on Defonce Questions and Arma-
ments 
Report tabled by Mr. Mommersteeg on behalf 
of the Committee on Defonce Questions and 
Armaments 
Report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf 
of the Committee on Scientific, Technological 
and Aerospace Questions 
Report tabled by Mr. Brasseur on behalf 
of the Committee on Scientific, Technological 
and Aerospace Questions 
Report tabled by Mr. Adriaensens on behalf 
of the Committee on Budgetary A.ffoirs and 
Administration 
Report tabled by Mr. Grieve on behalf of 
the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Pri-
vileges. 
Report tabled by Mrs. Knight on behalf of 
the Committee for Relations with Parliaments 
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Morning 
ORDER OF BUSINESS 
of the First Part of the Twenty-Seventh Ordinary Session 
Paris, 15th-18th June 1981 
MONDAY, 15th JUNE 
Meetings of Political Groups. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
1. Opening of the twenty-seventh ordinary session by the Provisional President. 
2. Examination of credentials. 
3. Election of the President of the Assembly. 
4. Address by the President of the Assembly. 
5. Election of the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly. 
4th May 1981 
6. Adoption of the draft Order of Business of the first part of the twenty-seventh ordinary session. 
7. Twenty-sixth annual report of the Council: 
presentation by the Hon. Douglas Hurd, United Kingdom Minister of 'State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs, representing the Chairman-in-Office ofthe CounCil. 
8. Political activities of the Council - reply to the twenty-sixth annual repollt of the Council: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Page on behalf of the General AfYairs Committee. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
9. Application of the Brussels Treaty - reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Tanghe on behalf of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
TUESDAY, 16th JUNE 
Morning 9.30 a.m. 
Meetings of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments and of the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration. 
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lOa.m. 
I. European security and the Mediterranean: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Bozzi on behalf of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments. 
Debate. 
2. Address by General Bemard Rogers, Supreme Allied Commander Europe. 
Afternoon 2.30 p.m. 
3p.m. 
Meetings of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions and of the 
Committee for Relations with Parliaments. 
I. European security and the Mediterranean: 
Resumed debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
2. Talks on the reduction of long-range theatre nuclear forces in Europe: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Mommersteeg on behalf of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
3. Revised budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1981: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Adriaensens on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration. 
Debate. 
Vote on the revised budget. 
WEDNESDAY, 17th JUNE 
Morning 9.30 a.m. 
lOa.m. 
Meetings of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Rules of Procedure 
and Privileges. 
I. Future of European space activities - reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
2. The European combat aircraft and other aeronautical developments: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Brasseur on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
Debate. 
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Afternoon 3 p.m. 
1. The European combat aircraft and other aeronautical developments: 
Resumed debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
2. Relations between parliaments and the press: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mrs. Knight on behalf of the Committee for Relations with 
Parliaments. 
THURSO AY, 18th JUNE 
Morning 10 a.m. 
1. Developments in Poland: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Hanin on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
2. European security and events in the Gulf area: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Fomi on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
Afternoon 2.30 p.m. 
3 p.m. 
Meeting of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments. 
Revision of the Charter and of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Grieve on behalf of the Committee on Rules of 
Procedure and Privileges. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft resolution. 
CLOSE OF THE FIRST PART OF THE TWENTY-SEVENTH ORDINARY SESSION 
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Twenty-Sixth Annual Report of the Council to the Assembly 
of Western European Union on the Council's activities for the period 
1st January to 31st December 1980 
INTRODUCTION 
1st April 1981 
I. The Council of Western European Union transmit to the Assembly the Twenty-Sixth Annual 
Report on their activities, covering the period 1st January to 31st December 1980. 
2. The main questions considered by the Council are dealt with in the following chapters: 
I. Relations between the Council and the Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 
11. Activities of the Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 
Ill. Armaments Control Agency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 
IV. Standing Armaments Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 
V. Public Administration Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 
VI. Budgetary and administrative questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 
14 
DOCUMENT 869 
CHAPTER I 
RELATIONS BETWEEN THE COUNCIL AND THE ASSEMBLY 
Presenting the last annual report of the 
Council to the Assembly, Mr. van der Klaauw, 
the Chairman-in-Office, stressed the importance 
the governments of the WEU member states 
attach to the part played by this Assembly. 
Indeed, as the Council stated in their reply to 
Recommendation 347, the WEU Assembly, 
with the responsibility vested in it by the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty, constitutes the only Euro-
pean parliamentary institution empowered to 
deal with defence questions. In this capacity, 
it provides the forum where parliamentarians 
and Ministers from Western European countries 
discuss politico-military questions. 
The Council noted with satisfaction that 
the Assembly welcomed the fact that the rela-
tionship between them " rested on a sound 
basis ". Desirous of maintaining with the 
Assembly good relations which will enable the 
parliamentarians of the member countries to be 
informed of their governments' activities in the 
fields of security and defence, the Council have 
continued their dialogue with it on questions 
relating to the application of the modified Brus-
sels Treaty, including those dealt with by the 
member governments in other international 
fora, and on questions of special interest for the 
parliamentarians. 
A. Twenty-fifth annual report of 
the Council to the Assembly 
The Council transmitted their twenty-fifth 
annual report to the Assembly as early as possi-
ble. This document gave a detailed account of 
the activities of the Council and its subsidiary 
bodies during 1979. Some additional informa-
tion on armaments control was provided to the 
Assembly in accordance with the procedure 
applied since 19711. 
B. Assembly recommendations to the Council 
and written questions put to the Council by 
members of the Assembly 
The Council took careful note of the 
reports presented by Assembly committees 
during the two parts of the twenty-sixth ordi-
nary session on a number of questions concern-
ing security and European union. They 
followed with interest the debates on those 
reports. 
1. Cf. Council reply to Written Question 123. 
15 
The Council gave careful consideration to 
the nineteen recommendatilj>ns1 adopted by the 
Assembly during the second part of the twenty-
fifth ordinary session and the first part of the 
twenty-sixth ordinary session and to the nine-
teen written questions2 put by members of the 
Assembly in 1980. 
They replied in a detailed manner to all 
these recommendations and questions, which 
were more numerous thanl in previous years. 
In so doing, they also took account of activities 
in which the member states of WEU participate 
elsewhere; thus, they gave: the Assembly as 
much information as they could of the results 
of consultations in which the representatives of 
those states had taken part,' in particular in the 
framework of political co-operation of the Nine 
and in the North Atlantic Oouncil. 
With regard to the activities of the Inde-
pendent European Progr,mme Group, the 
Council, in their reply to Recommendation 
34 7, stated that each of the governments repre-
sented in that Group remll!ined responsible for 
informing the parliamentarians who are mem-
bers of the WEU Assembly, on a national basis. 
C. Meetings between the Council and 
Assembly btJdies 
1. Two informal meeti~gs took place in 
Luxembourg on 14th May 1980 after the minis-
terial session of the Council. 
In the afternoon, the Council and the 
General Affairs Committee met under the 
chairmanship of Mr. TJJ,orn, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of the Grarid Duchy of Luxem-
bourg. They discussed the subjects which had 
been proposed by the Committee: the activities 
of WEU; East-West relations; the situation in 
the Near and Middle East. 
During that meeting, the Chairman-in-
Office informed the Assembly representatives 
that the Standing Armaments Committee had 
recently completed the second, economic, part 
of its study of the armaments sector of industry 
in the member countries of WEU and that the 
Council had begun consideration of it. He 
indicated that the Council would send the 
Assembly a communication concerning this 
part of the SAC's study as soon as possible. It 
was recalled, in this connf;ction, that when the 
1. Nos. 336 to 354. 
2. Nos. 205 to 223. 
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whole study had been completed, the Council 
would consider the content and the manner in 
which the Assembly could be adequately 
informed. 
In accordance with established practice, the 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council also received 
the Chairman of the General Affairs Commit-
tee. 
In the evening of 14th May, the members 
of the Council and the Presidential Committee 
of the Assembly met at a working dinner, also 
presided over by Mr. Thorn. 
2. The President of the Assembly, in a letter 
to Mr. van der Klaauw, Chairman-in-Office of 
the Council, in mid-December, transmitted two 
requests for joint meetings in 1981, one from 
the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments, the other from the General Affairs 
Committee. He also stressed the value which 
the Presidential Committee attached to the 
meetings which, in accordance with the agree-
ment made in 1968, take place each year at the 
time of the Council's ministerial meetings. 
The Council, appreciating the wish of the 
Assembly, thus confirmed by its representative, 
to meet them periodically, immediately under-
took consideration of the practical possibility of 
meeting their requests. 
D. Speeches to the Assembly by 
the Chairman-in-Office of 
the Council and other Ministers of 
member governments 
It is customary for the Chairman-in-Office, 
each year, to introduce the Council's report on 
their activities before the Assembly. 
Moreover, the members of the Council are 
aware of the Assembly's interest in the partici-
pation of Ministers in its discussions, to enable 
them better to understand the respective posi-
16 
tions of the governments of the member coun-
tries of WEU with respect to items on its 
agenda. 
In 1980, Mr. van der Klaauw, the Chair-
man-in-Office, and other Ministers of member 
governments spoke during both parts of the 
twenty-sixth ordinary session of the Assembly. 
In June, Mr. van der Klaauw reviewed the 
main aspects of the activities of the Council and 
its subsidiary bodies during 1979 and the first 
months of 1980; then addressing the Assembly 
as Netherlands Foreign Minister, he gave his 
government's views about the repercussions of 
events in South-East Asia on prospects for the 
policy of detente with the East. Mr. Hurd, 
Minister of State for Foreign and Common-
wealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, spoke of 
the major problems affecting the international 
situation, first among them the Afghan ques-
tion, and told the Assembly what conclusions 
the British Government drew from them as to 
the policy the countries of Europe should 
follow, particularly in their relations with the 
Soviet Union. 
In December, Mr. van der Klaauw, in the 
speech he made as Netherlands Foreign Minis-
ter, dealt with European security, stressing the 
importance, in that context, of solidarity bet-
ween the European and American partners in 
the Atlantic Alliance. Mrs. Hamm-Briicher, 
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, gave the Assem-
bly her government's position on both bilateral 
and multilateral aspects of the development of 
East-West relations since the end of 1979. Mr. 
Bernard-Reymond, Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, made a 
speech in which he reviewed the various ele-
ments which made up his country's security 
policy. 
Following their speeches, Ministers answer-
ed numerous questions put to them by mem-
bers ofthe Assembly. 
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CHAPTER 11 
ACTIVITIES OF THE COUNCIL 
The Council met at ministerial level in 
Luxembourg on 14th May 1980 under the 
chairmanship of Mr. Thorn, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of the Grand Duchy of Luxem-
bourg, Chairman-in-Office of the Council. 
The permanent representatives met four-
teen times and there were twenty-two meetings 
of the working group. 
* 
* * 
Introducing the twenty-fifth annual report 
of the Council to the Assembly, Mr. van der 
Klaauw, the Chairman-in-Office, reaffirmed the 
great importance the governments of the mem-
ber countries of WEU attached to the modified 
Brussels Treaty and its Protocols and their 
determination to fulfil the obligations they have 
entered into. He specially mentioned Article 
V of the treaty, in which the member countries 
of the organisation promised each other mutual 
assistance in case of outside aggression; he 
stressed that this article remained one of the 
central elements of the security system of the 
signatory countries and its significance should 
not be belittled. 
The Council continue to ensure that the 
provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty and 
its Protocols are applied and observed. In so 
doing, they are concerned both to ensure proper 
implementation of the obligations and responsi-
bilities defined by the treaty and to avoid - as 
indeed is required by the treaty - duplication of 
activities in which the governments of the 
WEU member states participate in bther inter-
national fora. Whilst, in present circumstan-
ces, the Council's field of action is limited, in 
particular because of work being done in the 
framework of European political co-operation, 
the North Atlantic Council and the Indepen-
dent European Programme Group, their res-
ponsibilities remain unchanged as does the 
essential value of WEU as an organisation. In 
this context, the Council recall that, in replying 
to Assembly Recommendation 34 7, they stated 
that the governments of the member countries 
were keeping in mind the possibility of using 
WEU as a forum for exchanging views on 
defence problems not dealt with elsewhere ; 
they noted the Assembly's wish that organisa-
tional measures be considered for possible 
future tasks of the organisation. 
* 
* * 
17 
During 1980, various aspects and phases of 
the implementation of the Paris Agreements 
have appeared twenty-two times on the Coun-
cil's agenda. 
In Luxembourg on 14th May, the Ministers 
discussed the development of East-West rela-
tions since their previous meeting. They also 
considered the latest progress of the Standing 
Armaments Committee's study on the situation 
of the armaments sector of industry in the 
member countries of WEU. 
Finally, it is recalled that the dialogue with 
the Assembly, which constitutes an important 
part of the Council's activity, was continued on 
questions relating to the implementation of the 
modified Brussels Treaty and of its Protocols. 
A. Political qu'estions 
1. East- West re(ations 
Following the military intervention of the 
Soviet Union in Afghanistan at the end of 
1979 1, the governments of the member states of 
WEU, both individually and within various 
international bodies, made known their deep 
concern at this action and its effect on the pros-
pects for detente. 
In the declaration they made, together with 
their partners in the European Community, on 
15th January 1980, they urged the Soviet 
Union to act in conformity with the 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 
approved on 14th January. They also repeated 
that detente, which continued to be their aim, 
should be indivisible and have a global 
dimension. 
In Luxembourg, on 14th May, the WEU 
Council discussed in depth: the various aspects 
of developments in East-West relations, in the 
climate of uncertainty arising from the fact that 
Soviet armed forces corltinued to occupy 
Afghanistan. 
They noted that bilateJTal relations between 
the WEU member countries and the Soviet 
Union had suffered through the international 
crisis brought about by the latter. The Minis-
ters observed that the re-establishment of con-
structive relations with the Soviet Union, which 
was desired by their governments, could only be 
I. See also point 2 of this part of the chapter. 
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founded on dialogue and mutual trust, and, 
above all, on the adoption of concrete measures 
by the USSR resulting in the removal of the 
obstacles standing along the path to detente. 
In statements made to the Council on the 
development of bilateral relations with other 
eastern countries, various high-level contacts 
were mentioned, including: in the second half 
of 1979, visits by the President of the Italian 
Republic to Yugoslavia, by the Prime Minister 
and Foreign Minister of the Netherlands to 
Poland, by the Vice-President of the Govern-
ment and Foreign Minister of Luxembourg to 
Hungary, by the Foreign Minister of France to 
Poland and the German Democratic Republic, 
by the Netherlands Foreign Minister to the 
German Democratic Republic and to Hungary, 
by the Italian Foreign Minister to Romania, by 
the Belgian Foreign Minister to Hungary and to 
the German Democratic Republic, by the 
Minister of State at the United Kingdom 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office to Poland; 
visits by the President of Poland to Belgium, by 
the Party First Secretary of Poland, the Prime 
Minister of Hungary, the Foreign Ministers of 
Romania and Bulgaria to France, by the 
Deputy Foreign Ministers of Czechoslovakia 
and Bulgaria to the United Kingdom; during 
the early months of 1980, the visit to Romania 
by the United Kingdom Secretary of State for 
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the Chan-
cellor of the Federal Republic of Germany's 
talks with the President of the Council of State 
of the German Democratic Republic and with 
the Party First Secretary of Poland in Belgrade, 
the visit by the Deputy Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of Yugoslavia to Luxembourg. 
The Council took careful note of the 
detailed report made, as at every WEU minist-
erial meeting, by the German Delegation. 
They welcomed the progress it had been 
possible to achieve in various fields of bilateral 
relations between the member countries of 
WEU and several eastern countries. 
On the occasion of this WEU meeting in 
Luxembourg, the Ministers reaffirmed their 
respective governments' support for detente and 
their determination to work towards this end in 
consultation and jointly with their partners of 
the European Community and the Atlantic 
Alliance. 
In this spirit, the member states of WEU 
played an active part in the work within the 
framework of European political co-operation 
and in the Atlantic Council, in preparation for 
the CSCE follow-up meeting which was to open 
in Madrid in November. In their reply to 
Assembly Recommendation 351, the Council 
stated that the member states were firmly deter-
mined to enter, at that meeting, into a thorough 
and frank discussion on the implementation of 
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the principles and prov1s10ns as laid down in 
the final act of Helsinki. They added that the 
member states of WEU would ensure that the 
balance between all sections of this act was 
maintained and would work towards the adop-
tion, as part of this balanced outcome, of a 
mandate for further negotiations under the aegis 
of the CSCE - in accordance with the proposal 
made by the French Government - on milita-
rily significant and verifiable confidence-build-
ing measures, which would apply to the entire 
continent of Europe. 
The Council draw attention to the fact 
that, at the end of the exchange of views on 
developments in East-West relations, at the 
European Council meeting in Luxembourg on 
1st and 2nd December 1980, the Heads of State 
or of Government of the member countries of 
the European Community affirmed the determi-
nation of the Nine not to be content with appa-
rent results in Madrid but to achieve genuine 
and balanced progress in the various chapters of 
the final act of Helsinki. In particular, they 
confirmed with this in mind the support which 
the Nine had already expressed for a proposed 
European disarmament conference, the first 
stage of which would be the drafting of binding 
and verifiable confidence measures to apply to 
the entire European continent. 
The Council add that, at that same meet-
ing, the Nine expressed their sympathy for 
Poland. They stated that, in their relations 
with that country, they conformed and would 
continue to conform strictly to the United 
Nations Charter and to the principles of the 
Helsinki final act. They called upon all the 
signatory states to abide by these principles 
with regard to Poland and the Polish people, 
emphasising that any other attitude would have 
very serious consequences for the future of 
international relations in Europe and through-
out the world. Finally, they stated their 
willingness to meet, insofar as their resources 
allowed, the requests for economic aid which 
had been made to them by Poland. 
The positions adopted by the governments 
of the member states of WEU within the frame-
work of European political co-operation were 
confirmed by their Foreign Ministers at the 
meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in 
Brussels on 11th and 12th December. In the 
context of this part of their annual report, the 
Council wish to draw the Assembly's attention 
to points I, 2, 3 and 4 of the communique 
published by the Ministers of the allied govern-
ments at the conclusion of their session and 
also to point 8 of that document. As the first 
phase of the Madrid meeting was coming to an 
end and with the second phase in mind, it was 
noted that the allies had presented and would 
present " new and important proposals in all 
areas covered by the final act of Helsinki, 
including human rights, human contacts and 
information". On the subject of the French 
proposal for a conference on disarmament in 
Europe under the aegis of the CSCE, to which 
the Council have referred above, the allies took 
note that it had been tabled in Madrid and 
"welcomed by many delegations". 
2. Afghanistan 
As recalled by the Council in their pre-
vious annual report, all the member countries 
of WEU voted for the resolution adopted on 
14th January 1980 by the General Assembly of 
the United Nations, which appealed to all states 
to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, 
political independence and non-aligned charac-
ter of Afghanistan and to refrain from any 
interference in the internal affairs of that coun-
try. Together with their partners in the Euro-
pean Community, in the declaration of the 
Nine of 15th January, they urged the Soviet 
Union to conform with the United Nations 
resolution by carrying out an immediate and 
complete withdrawal of its troops from Afghan-
istan. 
ln the replies to Assembly Recommenda-
tion 349 and Written Question 206, the Coun-
cil referred to the efforts of their members, in 
the context of European political co-operation, 
to bring about a political settlement of the 
Afghan question. On 19th February 1980, the 
Nine, through the Presidency, gave support to 
an arrangement that would allow a neutral 
Afghanistan to be outside competition among 
the powers. They noted with satisfaction the 
positive reactions of several third world coun-
tries, particularly the ASEAN member coun-
tries, towards such an arrangement. At its 
meeting in Luxembourg on 27th and 28th 
April, the European Council proposed that the 
great powers and neighbouring states should 
undertake the necessary commitments to allow 
Afghanistan to remain outside the competition 
among the powers and to return to its tradi-
tional position as a neutral and non-aligned 
state. The Nine stated their readiness to sup-
port any initiative designed to promote such a 
solution of the Afghan crisis. The European 
Council confirmed its proposals in the declara-
tion on Afghanistan which it adopted at its 
meeting on 12th and 13th June in Venice. 
The governments of the WEU member 
states also played an active part in the consulta-
tions within the Atlantic Alliance in 1980. In 
their reply to Assembly Recommendation 351 
the Council referred to the views expressed by 
the Foreign Ministers of the allied countries at 
their meeting in Ankara on 26th and 27th 
June. In paragraph 4 of the communique 
issued after the ministerial session of the North 
Atlantic Council on 11th and 12th December, 
the Ministers again asserted that the Soviet 
occupation of Afghanistan was unacceptable. 
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They declared that a politidal settlement of the 
question, in conformity with the new resolution 
adopted on 20th November by an overwhel-
ming majority of the General Assembly of the 
United Nations, must provide for a total with-
drawal of Soviet troops and enable the Afghan 
people to exercise fully their rights of indepen-
dence and self-determination. 
The Council also wish ~o point out that the 
governments of the member countries of WEU 
are contributing to the hu~anitarian aid pro-
vided by the allied governments and a large 
number of others to alleviate the plight of more 
than one million Afghans forced by the Soviet 
occupation to flee their homeland and take 
refuge in neighbouring courttries. 
3. Iran 
As regards the occupation of the United 
States Embassy in Tehran alnd the holding of its 
staff as hostages, the Council recalled in its pre-
vious annual report the position adopted by the 
member countries of WEU in the various 
appropriate bodies following these grave events. 
They referred to the declaration adopted by 
the European Council on 30th November 1979 
in Dublin, the declaration published by the 
member countries of the Atlantic Alliance in 
Brussels on 13th Decembet 1979, and the reso-
lution adopted by the United Nations Security 
Council on 31st December 1979. 
In their reply in March 1980 to Assembly 
Recommendation 341, the Council reaffirmed 
that they condemned this action as being 
contrary to international practice and law. 
They recalled that the governments of WEU 
member states had support~d all moves, both in 
the United Nations Security Council and in the 
European Communities, to secure the release of 
the American hostages from the Iranian 
authorities. 
Replying to Recommendation 349, the 
Council recalled the consultations by the Nine 
at Foreign Minister level an 1Oth April 1980 in 
Lisbon, on 22nd April in Luxembourg, on 17th 
and 18th May in Naples, and at Head of State 
or Head of Government level on 27th and 28th 
April in Luxembourg. They also informed the 
Assembly of the steps that the member coun-
tries of WEU had taken, in unison with their 
partners in the European Community, in a 
consolidated effort, with the sole aim of freeing 
the hostages. 
A further appeal was made to the Iranian 
Government by the Foreign Ministers of the 
member countries of the Atlantic Alliance on 
27th June in Ankara. 
4. Situation in the Middle East 
The Council, in reply to Assembly Recom-
mendation 341, agreed with the Assembly that 
a just and lasting peace could be established 
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only on the basis of a comprehensive settlement 
of the Middle East conflict in accordance with 
the United Nations Security Council Resolu-
tions 242 and 338 and on the following four 
principles: the inadmissibility of the acquisition 
of territory by force; the need for Israel to end 
the territorial occupation which it has main-
tained since the conflict of 1967; respect for the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and indepen-
dence of every state in the area and their right 
to live in peace within secure and recognised 
boundaries; recognition that in the establish-
ment of a just and lasting peace account must 
be taken of the legitimate rights of the Palesti-
nians, including their right to a homeland. 
This position, which was adopted by each of 
the WEU member states, was formulated in 
agreed terms by the member countries of the 
European Community in their declaration of 
18th June 1979. The Council considered that 
all the parties involved should be called on to 
participate in working out and implementing 
such a settlement, and in particular the Palesti-
nian people who are entitled, within the frame-
work set by a peace settlement, to exercise their 
right to determine their future as a people and, 
through their representatives, to play their full 
part in the negotiations. 
The member states of WEU, in unison 
with their Community partners, have subse-
quently continued their efforts to further the 
search for an overall settlement of the Middle 
East conflict. In their reply to Assembly 
Recommendation 349, the Council referred to 
the conclusions of the examination of the 
Middle East situation by the European Council 
at its meeting in Venice on 12th and 13th June 
1980. They observed that the Nine agreed that 
the traditional ties and common interests which 
link Europe to the Middle East oblige them to 
play a special role and require them to work in 
a more concrete way towards peace. They 
then decided to entrust to the presidency the 
task of ascertaining the position of all the par-
ties concerned in order to determine the form 
which an initiative on their part could take. In 
the Venice declaration the European Council 
recalled the basic principles which, in the opi-
nion of its members, governed the search for a 
comprehensive peace settlement, namely, the 
right to existence and to security of all the sta-
tes in the region, including Israel; justice for all 
peoples, which implies the recognition of the 
legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, who 
must be placed in a position, by an appropriate 
process defined within the framework of the 
comprehensive peace settlement, to exercise 
fully their right to self-determination. 
The Council informed the Assembly of 
their position on the various points raised in 
Written Questions 218, 219, 220 and 221 
which had been put by the Chairman of the 
General Affairs Committee. 
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The Council wished to draw the Assem-
bly's attention to the conclusions which the 
European Council, at its meeting on 1st and 
2nd December 1980 in Luxembourg, had reached 
as a result of the action taken by the Nine 
since the adoption of the Venice declaration. 
The results of President Thorn's mission, which 
had made clear the great interest aroused by the 
position taken up by Europe, reinforced the 
determination of the member countries of the 
European Community to contribute to the 
search for a comprehensive, just and lasting 
settlement to be negotiated by the parties 
concerned. In this spirit, the European Coun-
cil approved the decision of the Ministers for 
Foreign Affairs to undertake consideration of 
the matter; this action has resulted in the draft-
ing of a report on the principal problems 
relating to a comprehensive settlement. The 
European Council entrusted the presidency 
with a programme of action which would pro-
vide for, on the one hand, internal reflection 
based on the report approved by the European 
Council and aimed at clarifying and giving sub-
stance to the principles stated in the Venice 
declaration, and, on the other hand, further 
contacts with the parties concerned to be ini-
tiated by the presidency in consultation with 
the Ministers for Foreign Affairs. 
B. Defence questions 
As mentioned in the introduction to this 
chapter, defence and security questions figured 
prominently in the Council's activities during 
the year under review. The Council, while 
carrying out the obligations devolving upon 
them in accordance with the terms of the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty, continued to be attentive 
to developments in the field of the western 
security situation in general and remain 
conscious, in present circumstances, of the role 
devolving upon those organisations having 
particular competence and specialist knowledge 
acquired over many years in this field. 
In the course of their various contacts with 
the Assembly in 1980, Ministers of member 
governments emphasised the value or each of 
the WEU bodies in the continuing search for 
greater co-operation between member govern-
ments in the vital area of European defence and 
security. 
1. Level of forces of member states 
(a) Forces under NATO command 
The maximum levels of ground, air and 
naval forces which member states of WEU 
place under NATO command are fixed in Art-
icles I and 11 of Protocol No. 11 to the modified 
Brussels Treaty. Article Ill of the Protocol 
provides for a special procedure, if necessary, to 
enable these levels to be increased above the 
limits specified in Articles I and 11. 
So that they may satisfy themselves that 
the limits laid down in Articles I and 11 of Pro-
tocol No. 11 are not exceeded, the Council 
receive information every year concerning the 
levels in question, in accordance with Article 
IV of that Protocol. This information is 
obtained in the course of inspections carried 
out by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, 
and is transmitted to the Council by a high-
ranking officer designated by him to that end. 
The information, as at the end of 1979, 
which was conveyed by this officer at the 
appropriate time, was considered by the Coun-
cil on 12th March. Information indicating the 
status as at the end of 1980 is expected to reach 
the Council at the usual time. 
Furthermore, the Council take the neces-
sary steps to implement the procedure laid 
down in their Resolution of 15th September 
1956, whereby the levels of forces under NATO 
command are examined in the light of the 
annual review. 
For the year 1979, at a meeting held on 
25th February 1980, in Brussels, the permanent 
representatives (or their substitutes) to the 
North Atlantic Council of the Federal Republic 
of Germany, Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom examined 
the levels of forces of WEU member states and 
reported to the Council. 
At their meeting on 12th March 1980, the 
latter noted that the abovementioned perma-
nent representatives (or their substitutes) had 
recorded that the level of forces of the member 
states of WEU, as set out in the NATO force 
plan, fell within the limits specified in Articles 
I and 11 of Protocol No. 11, as in force at that 
time, with the exception of a recommended 
increase in the force level of one member 
state. At their meeting on 12th March 1980, 
the Council authorised the state concerned to 
make this increase. At the same meeting, the 
Council took note of a declaration on French 
forces by the permanent representative of 
France. 
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The same procedure is under way for the 
year 1980. 
(b) Forces under national command 
The strength and armaments of forces of 
member states maintained on the mainland of 
Europe and remaining under national com-
mand - internal defence and police forces, for-
ces for the defence of oveliSeas territories, and 
common defence forces - are fixed each year in 
accordance with the procedure specified in the 
Agreement signed in Paris. on 14th December 
19 57, in implementation of Article V of Proto-
col No. 11. 
* 
* * 
By means of the methods set out in para-
graphs (a) and (b) above, the Council have been 
able, in 1980, to carry out their obligations 
under Protocol No. 11 to the modified Brussels 
Treaty concerning levels of forces. 
2. United Kingdom forces stationed on the continent 
of Europe 
In accordance with the Council's reply to 
Assembly Recommendation 331, the Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom have informed the 
Council that the average number of British land 
forces stationed on the m~inland of Europe in 
1980 in accordance with the commitment in 
Article VI of Protocol No. 11 of the modified 
Brussels Treaty was 56,985. The continued 
need for the presence of troops in Northern Ire-
land made it necessary for1 units of the British 
Army of the Rhine to be redeployed for short 
tours of duty there. In 1980 there were on 
average 2,480 men in Northern Ireland. As 
has been previously stated, .these units would be 
speedily returned to their duty station in an 
emergency affecting NATO. 
Furthermore, in accordance with the Coun-
cil's reply to Assembly R~commendation 348, 
the Government of the United Kingdom have 
informed the Council that the strength of the 
United Kingdom's Second Tactical Air Force in 
1980 was: 
Role 
Strike/ Attack 
Aircraft/Equipment 
Buccaneers 
Squadrons 
2 
Ground support 
Reconnaissance 
Air defence 
Air transport 
Ground defence 
Jaguars 
Harrier 
Jaguars 
Phantom 
Bloodhound surface-to-air missiles 
Rapier surface-to-air missiles 
Wessex 
RAF Regiment 
These strengths will remain unchanged in 1981. 
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DOCUMENT 869 
3. Amendment to Annex Ill to Protocol No. Ill 
At their meeting on 21st July 1980, the 
Council, following the procedure laid down in 
Article 11 of Protocol No. Ill of the modified 
Brussels Treaty, cancelled paragraph V of 
Annex Ill to this Protocol. This amendment 
was made at the request of the Government of 
the Federal Republic of Germany, and having 
regard to a recommendation to that effect by 
the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. 
As a result of this amendment, which was 
introduced in order to improve the defence 
capability of the Alliance, limitations on naval 
construction in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, as set out previously under this para-
graph, no longer apply. 
The President of the Assembly was duly 
informed of the Council's decision. 
4. Study of the situation of the armaments sector of 
industry in member countries' 
During 1980, the Council followed with 
interest the progress made by the Standing 
Armaments Committee with this important 
study. 
The SAC had earlier carried out the first 
two tasks laid down in its mandate: the defini-
tion of armaments and the legal status of firms. 
In April, the Council received the first 
section of the economic part of the study, as 
prepared by the SAC. Also in April, the Head 
of the International Secretariat of the SAC pre-
sented this part to the Council, at their invita-
tion, and the permanent representatives repor-
ted to the Council of Ministers at their meeting 
on 14th May in Luxembourg. 
The Ministers, on that occasion, expressed 
their appreciation to the Standing Armaments 
Committee for the complex and original work it 
had carried out, which would be carefully 
studied in all its aspects by member govern-
ments. 
5. Assembly recommendations and written questions 
(a) The Council gave a full reply to 
Recommendation 348 on matters connected 
with the application of the modified Brussels 
Treaty, including the level of forces of the 
Federal Republic of Germany and that of the 
United Kingdom forces stationed on the main-
land of Europe. 
Their views on force balance were set out 
in their answer to Recommendation 336 which 
I. See also Chapters I. C and IV. 
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stressed that a realistic security policy must be 
based on an objective assessment of the situa-
tion, taking into account all factors possibly 
bearing on security. At the same time, govern-
ments of member countries of WEU remain 
convinced of the importance of maintaining 
credible deterrence which continues to be the 
fundamental strategic concept of allied defence. 
(b) Problems of European armaments co-
operation were dealt with in replies to Recom-
mendations 337 and 338, where mention was 
made of the work carried out in the framework 
of the CNAD and the IEPG and also by the 
Standing Armaments Committee. The Council 
drew the Assembly's attention to the difficulties 
in devising methods suitable to the needs of 
different governments for analysing choices of 
international armaments programmes. This 
being so, to the extent that member countries 
are able to reach agreement on common require-
ments, the Council believe that the formation 
of international consortia makes a useful contri-
bution to a better organisation of armaments 
co-operation in Europe, and that these bodies 
should be encouraged in their co-operative 
projects. 
Progress made towards an Alliance-wide 
market for defence equipment, greater co-oper-
ation between the allies and a better division 
of equipment production was tabled. 
Furthermore, following the symposium 
held by the Assembly in October 1979, the 
Council stated, in answering Recommendation 
339, what they considered to be the most effec-
tive ways of concerting measures in the Euro-
pean armaments industries. 
In addition, the Council took the opportu-
nity provided by their reply to Recommenda-
tion 352 to clarify the situation regarding infor-
mation technology related to the defence field. 
(c) Defence strategy, and the impact upon 
it of new weapons, and in particular theatre 
nuclear systems, was referred to in the Coun-
cil's replies to Recommendation 345 and 
346. The directives adopted by CNAD at its 
meeting in the autumn of 1980, on the applica-
tion of new technologies to defence purposes 
with a view to improving defence-effective 
weapons systems, were welcomed. Further-
more, it was noted that the package of arms 
control measures put forward by the parti-
cipants at the meeting of 12th December 1979 
represent a serious effort to stimulate the arms 
control process in Europe. 
The Council recalled that, in each of the 
member states, the adoption of defence pro-
grammes has been subject not only to military 
but also to arms control considerations, both 
aspects being extensively discussed in parlia-
ment as well as in public. 
(d) The prospects for standardising ammu-
nition between the new generation of main 
battle tanks in Europe were referred to in the 
Council's reply to Written Question 215. 
C. Scientific, technological and aerospace 
questions 
The Council noted with interest the reports 
produced by the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions. They 
gave full replies to the recommendations adop-
ted by the Assembly and the Council provided 
the latter, as in previous years, with a number 
of details mainly regarding the policies of WEU 
member countries on scientific, technological 
and aerospace questions. 
1. Energy problems 
The governments of the member countries 
of WEU played an active part in the efforts 
made during 1980, both within the European 
Communities and in the OECD, to increase co-
operation in the field of energy policy. 
In their twenty-fifth annual report, the 
Council referred to the conclusions reached at 
the meeting of the European Council held in 
Dublin on 29th and 30th November 1979. In 
their reply to Assembly Recommendation 354, 
the Council recalled the measures taken as a 
result of that meeting in December 1979, and 
in the early months of 1980, in order to pro-
mote the development of a common energy 
policy: 
The EEC Council of Energy Ministers on 
4th December 1979 agreed on a breakdown of 
overall oil import targets 1980 and 1985 into 
individual targets of member countries. A 
regular monitoring of oil import targets was 
also decided upon. 
At the meeting on 27th and 28th April 
1980, in Luxembourg, the European Council 
pointed out that a policy of structural changes 
should be developed in order to achieve a gra-
dual reduction in the dependence of the 
Community member states on oil and a replace-
ment of oil by alternative sources of energy. 
The EEC Council of Energy Ministers sub-
sequently on 13th May 1980 adopted two reso-
lutions on energy objectives for 1990 and the 
reduction of energy consumption. In the first 
resolution the following guidelines for 1990 
were agreed upon: firstly, the ratio between the 
rate of growth of energy consumption and the 
rate of growth of the gross domestic product 
should be reduced to 0.7 or less; and secondly, 
the oil consumption in the Community should 
be reduced to about 40 % of the gross consump-
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tion of primary energy. Other points of this 
resolution refer to the increased use of solid 
fuels and nuclear energy for generating electri-
city, to the promotion of renewable sources of 
energy and to the pursuit of an appropriate 
energy pricing policy. 
The Council noted, in the reply referred to 
above, that in the light of these decisions the 
Community would keep under review the 
energy programmes of member states directed 
to achieve the medium- and long-term targets 
agreed upon. 
The EEC Council of Energy Ministers at 
their meeting on 27th November concentrated 
on the situation in the light of the reduction in 
oil supplies resulting from the conflict between 
Iran and Iraq, and identified a number of mea-
sures to minimise tension on the oil market, to 
draw on stocks, to prevent abnormal price 
rises, and to alleviate any particular problems 
that might arise. These conclusions formed 
the basis for the Community's approach to the 
lEA Energy Ministers' meeting on 8th and 9th 
December, when there were inter alia discus-
sions on improving the lEA emergency system 
to meet specific difficulties in the event of a 
crisis in oil supplies. The 27th November 
meeting also discussed studies of spot market 
transactions, agreed a draft rtecommendation on 
electricity tariff structures, and had a useful 
exchange of views on Community energy poli-
cies and objectives. 
At its meeting in Luxembourg on 1st and 
2nd December 1980, the European Council 
drew attention once more tp the pledges of all 
the Community member states to reduce their 
dependence on oil by energy saving and by 
having recourse to other energy sources, includ-
ing coal and nuclear power and to do their 
utmost to prevent artificial stresses from occur-
ring on the oil market. 
2. European aircraft industry 
Like the Assembly, th~ Council are of the 
opinion that a viable civil aircraft industry is of 
utmost importance for a strong and expanding 
industrial capability in Eurqpe. 
Replying to Assembly Recommendation 
354, the Council therefore welcomed the idea 
of well-balanced European aircraft development 
programmes in which all the available capabili-
ties in the various European companies were 
taken into account and exploited to the maxi-
mum extent possible in economically viable 
programmes. These programmes should there-
fore be pursued, both for dommercial purposes 
and for the maintenance of an advanced Euro-
pean technological capacity. The current co-
operation programmes in the aero-engine sector 
with the United States and Japan were also 
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endorsed in this context. The Council wel-
comed all efforts by member governments 
concerning joint programming among major 
aircraft manufacturers. They noted that ques-
tions regarding specific co-operative program-
mes would be considered by the governments 
concerned in the light of the general approach 
as outlined above. 
Regarding European co-operation in the 
field of military aircraft, the Council stated, in 
their twenty-fifth annual report to the Assem-
bly, that the appropriate government depart-
ments in France, the United Kingdom and the 
Federal Republic of Germany were firmly 
resolved to develop a joint European tactical 
fighter aircraft for the nineties. In their reply 
to Recommendation 354, mentioned above, 
they informed the Assembly of developments in 
this matter during 1980. 
The industries of France, the United King-
dom and the Federal Republic of Germany 
were requested on 12th February 1980, through 
the respective national armaments directors, to 
continue the studies started in the autumn of 
1979. On 3rd April 1980, the firms of Avions 
Marcel Dassault/Breguet Aviation (AMD), Bri-
tish Aerospace (BAe), and Messerschmitt-Bol-
kow-Blohm (MBB) submitted to the respective 
national authorities a European combat aircraft 
report containing the results of the studies. 
The results of the assessment, including a 
recommendation, and a joint report by the 
national armaments directors of France, the 
United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of 
Germany were submitted to the governments 
concerned for their approval. 
3. Space questions 
In their reply to Recommendation 354 on 
the state of European aerospace activities, the 
Council reminded the Assembly that the mem-
ber states of ESA were aware of the Agency's 
outstanding role in space co-operation in Eur-
ope. They pointed out that the ESA Council, 
which is the competent body to deal with this 
matter, was considering the Agency's future 
terms of reference and new programmes, and 
would take the necessary decisions in due 
course. They noted that future activities in the 
field of space travel and outer space research 
would, however, be determined not only by 
scientifically and technologically feasible and 
desirable objectives but also by the financial 
resources available. 
Having taken careful note of the considera-
tions and suggestions contained in Recommen-
dation 353 on a European earth resources 
detection satellite programme, the Council gave 
the Assembly a detailed reply to the following 
points of which they would like to draw 
attention. 
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The political will exists for the develop-
ment of a European remote-sensing programme 
to be implemented through the European Space 
Agency. The first stage of this programme 
provides for the improvement of data-process-
ing techniques at ground stations where the 
Agency will operate through Earthnet and the 
ESRIN data bank at Frascati and through the 
launching of one or two satellites developed 
within ESA. The governments of the member 
countries will do their best to provide adequate 
funds for the European Space Agency's 
programme. 
Furthermore, the governments of the majo-
rity of ESA member countries favour the conti-
nuation of the Meteosat programme and plan to 
improve arrangements for the distribution of 
meteorological data, including the use of a spe-
cial relay satellite (Sirio 11). 
Clearly, the European remote-sensing pro-
gramme will have to be suitably co-ordinated 
with NASA's existing Landsat satellite system 
and with the French Spot system now being 
developed on a national basis. The Council 
said it was to be hoped that an agreement could 
be reached by the member states of ESA on a 
European remote-sensing satellite programme 
as well as on the possible use of experiments on 
Space lab. 
Like the Assembly, the Council consider 
that the European remote-sensing programme is 
an important vehicle for European scientific 
and economic co-operation and they noted in 
their reply that it seemed likely to become one 
of ESA's major applications programmes in the 
years to come. 
The Council indicated that the European 
governments believed that ESA's remote-sens-
ing programme and the Meteosat programme 
could contribute substantially to resolving some 
of the third world's problems. 
They added that they fully shared the view 
that "co-operation is the key to Europe's 
success ", expressed by the Committee on 
Science and Technology of the Council of 
Europe on 6th June 1980. They commented 
that, in order to be effective, this co-operation 
need not be limited to the European 
Community. 
D. Secretariat-General 
During the year 1980, the Secretary-
General and his principal officers, representing 
Western European Union, attended a number 
of meetings of other international organisations, 
as observers, when questions of concern to 
WEU were under consideration. As in pre-
vious years the most frequent of these contacts 
were with authorities of the Atlantic Alliance 
and the Council of Europe. 
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CHAPTER Ill 
ARMAMENTS CONTROL AGENCY 
A. Introduction 
Under the terms of Article VII of Protocol 
No. IV, the Agency is required: 
- firstly, to control the level of stocks of 
armaments held by member countries on 
the mainland of Europe, this control 
extending to production and imports to 
the extent required to make the control 
of stocks effective; 
- secondly, to satisfy itself that the under-
takings given by the Federal Republic of 
Germany not to manufacture certain 
types of armaments on its territory are 
being observed. 
In 1980, the Agency's activities continued 
very much along the same lines and at the same 
rate as in previous years. 
Subject to the comments made under point 
B.2 below, the programme drawn up by the 
Agency for 1980, the twenty-fifth year of 
control, was carried out satisfactorily. 
B. General remarks on control activities 
I. General operating methods 
The methods used by the Agency are deter-
mined by the provisions of the modified Brus-
sels Treaty and by Council decisions on the 
subject. During the year under review they 
remained basically unchanged. 
Within the Agency's terms of reference, 
controls from documentary sources serve mainly 
for checking levels of armaments as a whole. 
They also contribute to the preparation of 
field measures for the control of levels and of 
the non-production of certain categories of 
armaments. This aspect covers all activities 
concerned with processing, for the purposes 
defined above, any useful documentary material 
including, in particular, countries' replies to the 
Agency questionnaire, and the results of field 
control measures carried out earlier. 
The execution of test checks, visits and 
inspections, and all that is linked with these 
functions, constitutes that part of control car-
ried out physically wherever there are activities 
and stocks subject to control and, more gene-
rally, wherever this is necessary to ensure that 
the information supplied is correct and that 
undertakings are observed. 
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The control system is based primarily on 
controls from documentary sources, the pur-
poses of field control measures being to verify, 
physically, the accuracy of all the information 
collected in implementation of Part Ill of Pro-
tocol No. IV. 
Documentary and field control measures 
are complementary, and equally essential for 
the accomplishment of the Agency's task. 
Traditionally, the annual report has always· 
presented documentary and field control mea-
sures separately, in the interests of both con-
venience and clarity. HoWever, it must not be 
forgotten that these measures together make up 
a single control function. 
The Agency draws great benefit from the 
continuity of the methods; by its steadily-grow-
ing knowledge of the orgartisation of the forces 
of each member state, of the progress of arma-
ments production or procurement programmes, 
the Agency develops its control activity effi-
ciently and logically, both in the fixing of levels 
and quantities of armaments and in the choice 
and assessment of its control measures. 
However, in implem~nting the methods 
outlined above, the Agency, as it is permitted, 
continued in 1980, to look for possible improve-
ments. With this in view, the Agency has 
sought to adapt its work to meet the evolution 
of force structures and logistic organisations 
whilst attempting to mak~ the best use of its 
budget by a careful ordering of its programmes 
and time-tables. 
2. Atomic, chemical and ~iological weapons 
The position described in earlier annual 
reports remained basically unchanged. 
The activities of the Agency do not extend 
to nuclear weapons. The non-nuclear compo-
nents of such weapons (namely the missiles 
themselves and other specially designed equip-
ment) are subject to control except as regards 
the weapons of one member state. 
Nor does the Agency apply any controls to 
biological weapons. 
The control activities dealt with in this 
chapter do not, therefore, concern these two 
categories of armaments. 
In the case of chemical weapons, only non-
production controls take place; no quantitative 
controls are made since the member states have 
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always declared they possessed no such arma-
ments (in this connection, for 1980, see point 
E.5 of this report). 
C. Controls from documentary sources 
In this field of control, the Agency studies 
the relevant documents with the main purpose 
of comparing the quantities of armaments held 
by the member states with the levels fixed by 
the Council and thus establishing whether these 
constitute appropriate levels within the terms of 
the modified Brussels Treaty. 
1. Information processed by the Agency 
During 1980 documentary controls were 
carried out in the normal way by studying, pro-
cessing and collating documents and informa-
tion obtained from various sources. 
The main source consists of member states' 
replies to the annual questionnaire sent to them 
by the Agency; levels are determined by proces-
sing the information supplied, taking into 
account the material supplied by NATO 
regarding in particular the forces placed under 
NATO authority. 
The second source of information is pro-
vided by national defence budgets which, exam-
ined in conjunction with the data already 
supplied by each member state in its reply to 
the annual questionnaire, enables defence 
expenditure to be evaluated and the financing 
of programmes to be followed. 
Finally, information from the media, 
assembled and circulated by the Agency's Cen-
tral Documentation Office, is a third useful 
source from which official data can be cross-
checked, developments in the situation can be 
followed and the knowledge of Agency experts 
can be kept up to date. 
(a) Annual Agency questionnaire and replies by 
member states 
Follow-up action on the replies to the 
questionnaire sent to member states as in all 
previous years was twofold. It is recalled that 
some of the facts reported are checked physi-
cally by means of field control measures. In 
addition, all the replies are studied by the 
Agency experts, and compared with the other 
sources of information available, including 
member countries' earlier replies to Agency or 
NATO questionnaires and budgetary docu-
ments. 
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(b) Request for annual information 
Control of undertakings by one of the 
member states regarding the non-production of 
certain types of armaments takes the form of 
field control measures. 
These measures are partly prepared from a 
study of documents based on the replies of the 
country concerned to the annual questionnaire 
and to the Agency's requests for annual infor-
mation. 
As in previous years, the replies received 
from the country concerned in 1980 were taken 
into consideration for selecting and preparing 
visits, inspections and agreed control measures 
for inclusion in the Agency's programme of 
control measures. 
(c) Information provided by NATO 
See point 2 (a) below. 
(d) Information provided by the United States 
of America and Canada 
(Article XXIII of Protocol No. IV) 
The Agency received, through the Council, 
information supplied by the Governments of 
the United States and Canada concerning their 
programmes of external aid in military equip-
ment to the forces of member states stationed 
on the mainland of Europe. Since 1966, these 
countries have provided no aid to the forces 
concerned. 
(e) Scrutiny of budgetary information 
(Article VII, 2 (a) of Protocol No. IV) 
The study of budgetary and financial docu-
ments is one aspect of the continuing control of 
armaments. It is an important additional fea-
ture of the procedure applied for the determina-
tion of armament stock levels. 
In 1980, as in all previous years, the Agency 
studied the defence budgets of member states 
as well as the budget section of their replies to 
its questionnaire; the emphasis, in these studies, 
is on credits for armaments production and 
more particularly, for the production of 
controllable armaments; in addition, its experts 
had consultations with the appropriate depart-
ments in the defence ministries of member 
countries. 
The study of credit forecasts and real 
expenditure confirmed the findings of the Agen-
cy's studies on armaments levels forming part 
of controls from documentary sources. 
(f) Use of published material 
By systematic study of the daily press, of 
specialised magazines and periodicals and of 
books and catalogues published in the WEU 
member countries and in the United States, the 
Agency's Central Documentation Office made 
every effort to provide the Directorate and its 
experts with information of value for their 
activities. 
In addition, special attention was again 
paid to sources of information and bulletins 
from other international organisations. 
The close co-operation which exists bet-
ween the Agency and the international staff of 
the SAC has resulted in the best use of avail-
able credits by avoiding duplication, to the 
greater benefit of both bodies. 
2. Verification of appropriate levels of armaments 
(a) Appropriate levels of armaments for forces 
placed under NATO command 
After receiving and processing the member 
states' replies to the annual questionnaire and 
studying the statistical reports furnished by the 
authorities of the North Atlantic Treaty Orga-
nisation (Article VII, 2(a) of Protocol No. IV) 
and, in particular, by the NATO international 
staff, the Agency arranged, as each year, for the 
annual consultations with the NATO military 
authorities called for by Article XIV of Proto-
col No. IV. 
As in previous years, these consultations 
included a joint study session at Casteau, on 
18th November 1980, attended by Agency 
experts and the appropriate officers of SHAPE, 
and concluded with a meeting in Paris on 12th 
December 1980; at this meeting, which was 
attended by the representatives of the Agency, 
of SHAPE and of the International Military 
Staff of NATO, it was concluded that the levels 
of armaments for the forces of member states 
placed under NATO authority and stationed on 
the mainland of Europe represented appropriate 
levels for the control year 1980 within the 
terms of Article XIX of Protocol No. IV, for 
those armaments over which the Agency has so 
far been placed in a position to exercise its 
mandate of controlling levels. 
(b) Appropriate levels of armaments for forces 
maintained under national command on the 
mainland of Europe 
The quantities of armaments declared to 
the Agency by the member states as being 
required on 31st December 1980 for their forces 
maintained under national command on the 
mainland of Europe have been accepted or 
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approved by the Council, who have taken note 
of these figures of maximum levels of arma-
ments for these forces in 1980. 
D. Field control measures 
1. Principles governing the application of field control 
measures and general meth'ods of execution 
As recalled in the introduction to this 
chapter, the treaty requires the Agency: 
- to satisfy itself that the undertakings not 
to manufacture certain types of arma-
ments are being obsettVed; 
- to control the level bf stocks of certains 
armaments. 
Field control measures continued during 
1980 on the same basis ,as during previous 
years, as an essential part of the Agency's work, 
in accordance with Article VII of Protocol No. 
IV. 
(a) Initial studies 
When drawing up its programme of control 
measures, the Agency again worked on the 
basic assumption, which is supported by the 
observations of previous years, that the under-
takings and declarations of member countries 
are being honoured. 
For non-production field control measures, 
the Agency, as usual, began by reviewing all the 
information available to it, including that 
obtained from the 1979 and earlier inspection 
programmes, its progressive analysis of budget-
ary and other data and particularly the replies 
of the country concerned to the Agency's 
requests for information. At the conclusion of 
this review, the Agency decided that a limited 
programme of control measures similar in size 
and composition to those of recent years would 
allow acceptable verification of the undertaking 
not to manufacture specified armaments. 
With regard to the control of levels of 
stocks and manufacture of armaments declared 
by member states, sampling techniques were 
again deemed to be adequate for verifying 
member countries' declarations with the requi-
site level of confidence. A limited programme 
on a similar scale to tho!le of recent years was 
considered adequate to ensure an acceptable 
level of confidence in the correctness of the 
declarations made by member states. 
There were no indications calling for signi-
ficant variations in the distribution of field 
control measures except for a need, as predi-
cated, to adjust slightly the 1980 programme to 
take account of those production schedules 
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whose planned increased outputs had reached a 
significant level. 
(b) Programme definition 
Insofar as depot and unit stocks were 
concerned, proposals for all quantitative field 
control measures were first reviewed in the light 
of known organisational changes, of declared 
re-equipment programmes and, where applic-
able, of the development of computerised stock 
accounting centres. Where it was thought 
necessary to extend such controls to factories, 
their production programmes were reviewed to 
ensure that each such inspection was planned 
to take place at the most appropriate time. 
For those factories where non-production and 
stock inspections were also indicated, all types 
of control measures were co-ordinated, so keep-
ing to a minimum consistent with its responsi-
bilities the frequency of the Agency's measures 
in private concerns. 
As the Convention for the due process of 
law' has not yet entered into force, the control 
measures carried out by the Agency at private 
concerns had, in 1980, as in previous years, to 
take the form of" agreed control measures". 
One consequence of this situation is that, 
in order to obtain the agreement of the firms 
concerned, the Agency has to give a few weeks' 
notice. This agreement has never been with-
held. The 1980 programme of control meas-
ures at privately-owned plants was therefore 
drawn up with full confidence that it could be 
implemented as in previous years. 
To avoid duplication of activities, Article 
VIII of Protocol No. IV provides that control 
measures relating to the forces under NATO 
authority shall be carried out by the appro-
priate NATO authorities. The forces subject 
to the Agency's control measures therefore vary 
in percentage and type from country to coun-
try, and this is an important factor in the Agen-
cy's programme considerations. Article VIII 
also affects depot inspections, but in a different 
manner. Since the logistic support of forces 
under NATO authority remains a wholly natio-
nal responsibility, difficulties could occur in 
defining which materiel and munitions in 
depots are, or will be, assigned to forces under 
national command. Such problems were again 
avoided in 1980 by the renewed approval of the 
system of joint Agency/SHAPE inspections 
I. Convention concerning measures to be taken by mem-
ber states of Western European Union in order to enable 
the Agency for the Control of Armaments to carry out its 
control effectively and making provision for due process of 
law, in accordance with Protocol No. IV of the Brussels 
Treaty, as modified by the Protocols signed in Paris on 23rd 
October 1954 (signed in Paris on 14th December 1957). 
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introduced in 1957. A number of the depots 
in question were therefore included in the pro-
gramme for inspection by the Agency/SHAPE 
group. 
On the basis of the foregoing considerations 
and the information already available, the 
Agency was able to define its 1980 programme 
with sufficient certainty for the Director to out-
line it to the Council in March. After subse-
quent discussions and analysis of member coun-
tries' replies to the questionnaire only a few 
changes were made to the programme. 
2. Methods, type and extent of field control measures 
In 1980, no major changes were made in 
the Agency's established procedure for the 
conduct of its field control measures. 
The teams selected for the Agency's field 
control measures all included one member of 
the nationality of the establishment visited, the 
Head of Mission and other experts all being of 
different nationalities. 
The total number of control measures was 
seventy. It should be noted, in this connec-
tion, that this pattern of control activities car-
ried out by the Agency is satisfactory: it enables 
some 80 % of existing armaments to be checked 
in four years for the air force, five years for the 
navy and six to seven years for army munitions. 
These measures fall broadly into the 
following categories: 
(a) quantitative control measures at depots; 
(b) quantitative control measures at units 
for forces under national command; 
(c) control measures at production plants: 
(i) quantitative control measures: 
In 1980, these control measures 
were carried out at plants manufac-
turing aircraft, ammunition, rockets 
and armoured materiel, and at 
shipyards; 
(ii) non-production control measures: 
These control measures related to 
chemicals and warships. 
It should be stressed that the reports on 
field control measures are protected by the most 
stringent security measures at all stages of their 
preparation, custody and analysis. 
3. Conclusions 
(a) In the fields where it is authorised to exer-
cise its mandate, the Agency was able effect-
ively to carry out its tasks of applying control 
measures. Such problems as arose in this very 
complex field of inspections were dealt with 
satisfactorily through the excellent relations 
maintained with the national authorities. 
(b) On the basis of all the field control meas-
ures carried out in 1980, the Agency was able 
to report to the Council: 
- the measures taken for the control of the 
stocks of armaments at depots, units 
under national command and production 
plants amply confirmed the data obtain-
ed from documentary control measures; 
- the measures taken for the control of 
non-production revealed no production 
contrary to undertakings. 
E. State and problems of control in certain 
particular fields 
1. Armaments for land forces 
(a) Current production and purchases 
In 1980, all the member countries have 
continued to modernise their land armaments 
in accordance with previously established long-
term programmes. 
- Armoured materiel 
The production of tanks and their 
derivatives has continued, in particular AMX 
in France, Leopard I in Italy, Leopard 11 in the 
Federal Republic of Germany; the Federal 
Republic of Germany has continued to moder-
nise its M-48-US tanks. 
As regards armoured vehicles, Belgium has 
started production of M-113 APCs under licence 
at the end of the year. Italy is putting the 
M-548 cargo vehicle into series production and 
France is doing likewise with armoured vehicles 
of the AMX-10 family and VABs. Germany is 
building armoured transport vehicles (Trans-
portpanzer 1). The Netherlands are equipping 
their mechanised troops with YPR-765 arm-
oured vehicles and their derivatives imported 
from the United States. 
- Artillery materiel 
The final phase of the trilateral eo-produc-
tion of a considerable number ofFH-70 155 mm 
howitzers by the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Italy and the United Kingdom has begun. 
All member countries holding American-
type self-propelled artillery material of 15 5 
mm, 175 mm and 203 mm calibre have adop-
ted a modernisation programme of these wea-
pons. France is modernising its artillery with 
the production of 155 mm GCT self-propelled 
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howitzers and the development of a new 155 
mm towed howitzer. 
In the countries concerned, the Lance sys-
tem has now replaced the Honest John and Ser-
geant weapons systems. 
- Anti-tank materiel 
In their production and equipment pro-
grammes, all member countries have given high 
priority to the production or purchase of anti-
tank weapons. Weapons of the so-called 
second generation of anti-tank missiles such as 
Tow, Hot, Swingfire and Milan are now opera-
tional everywhere. 
The ground forces of most of the member 
countries are, or soon will be, equipped with 
anti-tank helicopters fitted 'with either SS-11, 
Hot or Tow missiles. 
- Anti-aircraft materiel 
Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands are 
now in possession of the Guepard gun tank, 
production of which is now coming to an end. 
The construction programme for an anti-
aircraft tank equipped with Roland missiles in 
two versions, fine-weather for France and all-
weather for Germany, is progressing in those 
two countries. 
- Ammunition 
The member countries have made major 
efforts to improve stocks of both current and 
new types. 
(b) Control activity in 1980 
Quantitative control measures have been 
carried out at a number of depots, at several 
units under national command and at plants 
manufacturing armaments for land forces. 
2. Guided missiles and other self-propelled missiles 
(a) Current production and purchases 
During 1980, the majority of the member 
states of WEU continued to modernise and 
increase their guided missile stocks. All coun-
tries participating in the Htlip programme with 
the exception of Belgium, received their final 
deliveries of improved surface-to-air Hawk mis-
siles. Belgium, however, should have its require-
ments met from French production in spring 
1981. In the anti-tank guided weapon field, 
both France and the Federal Republic of Ger-
many have increased their stock levels of Milan 
and Hot missiles whereas the Netherlands has 
added to its supply of Tow missiles. With 
regard to air-to-air weapons, France has added 
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to its inventory of Matra Magic R-550 (short-
range) weapons and has started to take delivery 
of the Matra Super R-530 (medium-range) 
missiles. The Federal Republic of Germany 
has received its initial stock of Sidewinder 
AIM-9L weapons (short-range) and the United 
Kingdom has introduced its Skyflash (medium-
range) weapon into service. Finally, France 
has begun introduction of its Roland surface-to-
air missiles while also adding to its Cro-
tale weapon systems and the United Kingdom 
has increased the number of its man-portable 
Blowpipe short-range surface-to-air weapon. 
The following guided missiles were manu-
factured in the member countries during 1980: 
Milan and Hot anti-tank missiles (produced 
jointly by the Federal Republic of Ger-
many and France), SS-11 (France) and Sistel 
Indigo (Italy); the surface-to-air missiles Roland 
(produced jointly by the Federal Republic of 
Germany and France), Hawk (Helip) (produced 
jointly by France and Italy), Matra R-440, Cro-
tale and Masurca (France); the sea-to-sea miss-
iles Exocet MM-38 (France), Otomat and Sistel 
Seakiller MK-2 (Italy); the air-to-sea missile 
Sistel Marte (Italy); the air-to-surface missiles 
Exocet AM-39 and AS-12 (France) and Kormo-
ran (Federal Republic of Germany); the air-to-
air missiles Matra Magic R-550, Matra R-530 
and Matra Super R-530 (France); the air-to-
air/surface-to-air missiles Aspide (Italy); Mala-
fon anti-submarine rocket motors (France). 
In addition to the guided weapons listed 
above, other self-propelled weapons were pro-
duced: Zuni air-to-ground rockets (Belgium), 
110 mm Lars rockets (Federal Republic of 
Germany) and ASM-375 rockets (France). 
(b) Control activity in 1980 
Quantitative control measures were carried 
out at a number of depots, at units under natio-
nal command and at one plant. 
3. Air force armaments 
(a) Current production and purchases 
Deliveries of new combat aircraft to the 
forces of the member countries of WEU have 
continued during 1980. 
With regard to the Tornado programme, a 
number of series production aircraft have been 
manufactured. Deliveries have been made to 
the Manching Trials Centre in the Federal 
Republic of Germany and to the Practica di 
Mare Trials Centre in Italy. A prototype of 
the air defence version (ADV) has almost com-
pleted its trials. The training of instructors has 
begun at Manching. In the United Kingdom, 
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the Trinational Tornado Training Establish-
ment (TTTE) is being set up at Cottismore 
where a number of series production aircraft 
have already been deployed. 
The manufacture in France and the delive-
ries of Jaguar and Mirage F-1 aircraft have 
continued as planned; the Mirage 2000 pro-
gramme has similarly advanced. 
The Federal Republic of Germany has 
taken delivery of Alpha Jet aircraft and Bel-
gium has received the last of those which it had 
ordered. 
Deliveries of F-16 aircraft have continued 
in Belgium and the Netherlands. 
(b) Control activity in 1980 
Control measures were carried out at seve-
ral depots, at a number of units under national 
command and in several factories. 
4. Naval armaments 
(a) Current production 
In France the first unit of the Provence 
submarine has begun its trials. The next two 
ships of this class have been laid down. 
Dupleix, the second ship of the Georges 
Leygues class of corvettes, should be opera-
tional in early 1981; the third and fourth ships 
are under construction. The aircraft carrier 
Foch had a major refit to allow it to operate 
Super Etendard aircraft; the replenishment ship, 
the Meuse, the second one of the Durance class, 
became operational in 1980. Deliveries of 
Super Etendard attack aircraft have continued. 
In the Federal Republic of Germany the 
mid-life modernisation programme for the Lut-
jens class US-built destroyers began in 1980 
with the Rommel; construction continued of 
the F-122 class frigates as well as the fast attack 
craft of the 143-A class, which are intended to 
replace the Zobel craft. The modernisation 
programme for the maritime patrol aircraft 
Atlantique has also continued. 
In Italy, the third Sauro class submarine 
was launched at the end of 1979, and construc-
tion of the fourth of this class began in 
1980. Construction of the helicopter carrier 
Garibaldi continued. Orsa, the last of the fri-
gates of the Lupo class, was delivered in 
1980. The ships of the Maestrale class are 
under construction. Half of the hydrofoil 
missile craft of the Sparviero class have become 
operational. 
In the Netherlands, construction of sub-
marines of the Walrus class to replace Dolphyn 
and Zeehond has continued. Several frigates of 
the Korternaer class have become opera-
tional. Half of the frigates of the Van Speyk 
class have completed their MLM. 
(b) Control activity in 1980 
Quantitative control measures were carried 
out at naval shipyards. One was combined 
with a non-production control measure con-
ducted in April, before the Council had taken 
their decision cancelling paragraph V of Annex 
Ill to Protocol No. Ill on 21st July 1980. 
5. Chemical weapons 
(a) List of chemical weapons subject to control 
As in previous years, the Agency asked 
member countries whether they wished to 
renew in 1980 the list of chemical weapons 
subject to control. 
The member countries agreed to this rene-
wal. This was reported to the Council who 
noted the fact. 
The Agency therefore continued to use this 
list for its control activities during 1980. 
(b) Control activity in 1980 
In application of Article Ill of Protocol No. 
Ill, which lays down conditions to enable the 
Council to fix the levels of chemical weapons 
that may be held on the mainland of Europe by 
those countries which have not given up the 
right to produce them, and in accordance with 
the Council decision of 1959, the Agency asked 
the countries concerned in its questionnaire 
whether production of chemical weapons on 
their mainland territory had passed the experi-
mental stage and entered the effective produc-
tion stage. 
All the member countries concerned once 
again gave an explicit negative reply in 1980. 
In addition, in the covering letter to its 
questionnaire, the Agency reminded the mem-
ber states that chemical weapons, if held, 
should be declared in the same way as other 
armaments, whatever their origin. In reply to 
this questionnaire no country reported holding 
any chemical weapons and because of this the 
quantitative control of weapons of this nature 
raised no problems in 1980. 
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As in each year, in aqcordance with the 
resolution approved by the Council in 1959 
and in application of the · Council directive 
extending to chemical weapons the provisions 
laid down for the control o( non-production of 
the armaments listed in Annex Ill of Protocol 
No. Ill, the Agency sent to the country con-
cerned a "request for annual information to faci-
litate the Agency in its task of controlling the 
non-production of chemical weapons". A pre-
cise and detailed reply was received promptly in 
answer to this request. In' addition, the tem-
porary procedure applied with these authorities 
since 1973 was again used with success in 
1980. All the information supplied in this way 
was a major factor in selecting chemical plants 
at which to carry out agre~d control measures 
in 1980. 
For each control measure carried out, a 
delegation from the national authorities was 
present. 
None of these measures revealed any indic-
ation of production of chemical weapons within 
the terms of Annex 11 to Protocol No. Ill. 
6. Biological weapons 
All member countries 'reported their agree-
ment to renew in 1979 the list of biological 
weapons subject to control. The Council 
noted the fact. 
I 
However, it will be recalled (see point B. 2 
of the present chapter) that the Agency exer-
cises no control in the field of biological 
weapons. 
Since the situation remained the same as in 
previous years, the Agency is unable, as stated 
in point B. 2 of this chapter, to exercise any 
control in the atomic field.' 
F. Technical information visits and other 
means of improving the efficiency of the 
experts 1 
At the invitation of the national autho-
rities, technical information visits were arranged 
in 1980 as in previous years to enable the 
Agency's experts to bring their knowledge up to 
date in the fields of armaments research, deve-
lopment and production. 
Land force experts visited the British Army 
Weapons Exhibition at Aldershot (United King-
I. See also point C. I (fj. 
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dom). Next there was a visit to the Military 
Vehicles and Engineering Establishment (MVEE) 
where, after a detailed briefing on the 
development of armoured combat vehicles, they 
were taken around the laboratories and trials 
facilities. They also visited the Proof and 
Experimental Establishment at Shoeburyness, 
where they were shown round a modem experi-
mental firing range and witnessed a series of 
on-going trials. 
The naval experts visited the naval exhibi-
tions at Genoa (Italy), Rotterdam (Netherlands) 
and Le Bourget (France). They were also invi-
ted by the United Kingdom authorities to the 
Surface and Underwater Weapons Establish-
ments, where they were briefed on current 
trends of studies and research in the United 
Kingdom relating to naval weapons systems and 
the development of counter-measures. 
The aeronautics and guided missile experts 
visited the air shows at Hannover (Federal 
Republic) and at Farnborough (United King-
dom). They were also invited by the United 
Kingdom authorities to the Preston plant, 
where they were given a full briefing on the 
T omado programme, and to the two British 
Aerospace factories at Stevenage and Hatfield, 
where they learned of the latest developments 
in the field of missiles; they were also received 
at the RAF Logistics Centre at Hendon where 
they were shown a data-processing system. 
They were invited by the French authorities to 
visit the Bretigny Flight Trials Centre. 
The experts in chemistry and biology visited 
government and private establishments of a 
scientific or industrial nature. In Italy they 
visited a modem chemical plant and in Belgium 
they visited the Army Technical Applications 
Establishment where they were briefed on the 
latest developments in the field of NBC. In 
addition, whilst visiting the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Italy and Belgium, they obtained 
information on procedures for manufacturing 
vaccines for veterinary use and the production 
of viro-vaccines on a massive scale. Finally, 
one of the experts attended a course at the Pas-
teur Institute in Paris. 
G. Contacts 
1. On 26th March 1980, the Director of the 
Agency presented the Agency's report on its 
activities in 1979 to the Council. 
2. For the satisfactory conduct of its mission, 
the Agency must carry out its duties in an 
atmosphere of trust and close co-operation with 
the national authorities. To this end, the 
Director and the principal members of his staff 
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in 1980, as in previous years, maintained fre-
quent contacts with these authorities. 
3. As laid down in the modified Brussels 
Treaty, the Agency has maintained close 
contacts with the appropriate NATO autho-
rities. 
In this connection, mention should be 
made in particular of the two meetings held to 
fix the level of armaments of the forces under 
NATO command, already referred to in point 
C. 2 (a) of this chapter and of the implement-
ation of the system of combined Agency/ 
SHAPE inspections mentioned in point D. 1 
(b). 
In addition, the Director of the Agency and 
the principal members of his staff have made 
the usual contacts with the Office of the Secre-
tary-General, the International Military Staff of 
NATO, with SHAPE, on the occasion of SHA-
PEX 80, during the North Atlantic Treaty 
Assembly and in the course of liaison visits. 
4. The Director of the Agency met person-
ages from military civilian and scientific circles 
at the Genoa and Le Bourget naval exhibitions 
and at the Farnborough air show. 
H. General conclusions 
In accordance with Articles VII and XIX 
of Protocol No. IV, the Agency was able to 
report to the Council that, as a result of the 
control exercised in 1980, the figures obained in 
accordance with Article XIII of Protocol No. 
IV: 
- for armaments of forces under NATO 
command under the terms of Article 
XIV of Protocol No. IV; and 
- for armaments of forces maintained 
under national command under the 
terms of Articles XV, XVI and XVII of 
Protocol No. IV and the Agreement of 
14th December 1957, concluded in exe-
cution of Article V of Protocol No. II, 
represented for the control year 1980 and for 
each of the member states, the appropriate 
levels of armaments subject to control for these 
categories of armaments over which the Agency 
has so far been enabled to exercise its mandate. 
As required by Article XX of Protocol 
No. IV, the Agency confirmed that, in the 
course of field control measures at production 
plants, it did not detect for the categories of 
armaments which it controls: 
- either the manufacture of a category of 
armaments that the government of the 
member state concerned had undertaken 
not to manufacture; 
- or the existence, on the mainland of 
Europe, of stocks of armaments in excess 
of the appropriate levels (Article XIX of 
Protocol No. IV) or not justified by 
export requirements (Article XXII of 
Protocol No. IV). 
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In 1980, the Agency again applied 
controls effectively in those fields which 
are open to it. In this connection, as in 
the past, the help and co-operation of 
national and NATO authorities, and of 
heads and staff of both the private firms 
and military establishments visited played an 
important part. 
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CHAPTER IV 
STANDING ARMAMENTS COMMITTEE 
A. Activities of the Standing Armaments 
Committee 
The Standing Armaments Committee met 
six times in plenary session, on 18th January, 
22nd February, 19th March, 13th June, 
19th September and 28th November 1980. 
The first four meetings were accompanied by a 
session of the ad hoc group devoted to the 
second part of the study of the armaments 
sector of industry in the member countries ; 
another meeting was held by this group for the 
preparation of a declassified version of the 
economic part of the study. 
In addition to this study, the main items on 
the SAC's agenda were the WEU Agreement 
4.FT.6 and the activities of the Committee's 
two working groups concerned respectively with 
operational research and the evaluation of mili-
tary equipment. 
1. Study of the situation of the armaments sector of 
industry in the member countries of WEU 
The first section of the economic part of 
the study of the situation of the armaments 
sector of industry in the member countries of 
WEU was approved by the Standing Arma-
ments Committee at the end of the first quarter 
of 1980. 
The International Secretariat, using its own 
resources, carried out in the shortest possible 
time the very considerable work involved in 
printing and circulating all the copies of this 
document in the organisation's two official 
languages. 
The study was forwarded to the Council at 
the beginning of April 19801• 
Following the Council's decision to ask the 
SAC to prepare a declassified version of the 
economic study1, the Committee, with the assis-
tance of the International Secretariat, prepared 
a draft which it forwarded to the Council for 
examination. 
2. WEU Agreement ti.FT.6 
The annual report on the updating of 
WEU Agreement 4.FT .6 was drawn up by the 
co-ordinator of the pilot country (United King-
dom). 
I. See Chapter I, C. I and Chapter 11, 8.4. 
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The SAC considered the proposals put 
forward in the report of the pilot country co-
ordinator and offers of co-operation with the 
United States aimed at the co-ordination of the 
trials methods for military wheeled and tracked 
vehicles in the United States and in WEU. 
The SAC decided to convene the Group of 
National Experts on Agreement 4.FT .6 who 
would study the American offer, bearing in 
mind the work carried out in NATO, and 
submit a report to the Committee containing 
proposals for updating Agreement 4.FT .6 and 
for the future activities of the group. 
B. Activities of the working groups 
1. Working Group No. 8 on operational research 
At the invitation of the Federal German 
authorities, Working Group No. 8 on oper-
ational research held its spring meeting, which 
was coupled with a visit to the Dornier firm, at 
Friedrichshafen on 24th and 25th April. 
In the course of the visit, seven illustrated 
talks on operational research studies relating to 
the army and navy were given by officers and 
experts from the Ministry of Defence, Dornier, 
and the IABG (from MBB at Ottobrunn) and 
were afterwards discussed by those taking part 
in the symposium. 
During the visit to Dornier, the experts 
were shown some of the firm's developments 
(which are all carried out in co-operation with 
other companies) including the CL 289 recon-
naissance drone, the simulator for training 
Roland crews, and the HSL guidance and 
control system for helicopters. The visitors' 
attention was also drawn to the satellite and 
Spacelab programmes in which Dornier was 
participating. 
At the April meeting of the Working 
Group the exchanges of information continued 
with the presentation of several new forms of 
operational research. 
Working Group No. 8 held its autumn 
meeting, coupled with a symposium on method-
ology, in Paris on 23rd and 24th October. 
New forms on operational research studies were 
presented by the Federal Republic of Germany 
and France. 
At the end of 1980, the total number of 
studies proposed by the various countries came 
to: 155 for the Federal Republic of Germany, 
73 for France, 31 for the United Kingdom, 30 
for Belgium, 25 for the Netherlands and 14 for 
Italy. A new revised and completed edition of 
the existing recapitulatory document is being 
prepared by the Secretariat. 
The five-language glossary of operational 
research terms was edited and distributed with 
help from France in the preparation and 
printing. Delegations asked for a period of 
reflection to consider a possible programme for 
correcting, updating and supplementing the 
glossary for submission to the SAC in 
1981. The latter agreed, on the basis of 
reciprocity, to forward a copy of the glossary to 
NATO for internal use in the Secretariat. 
The sixth symposium organised by the 
group was held on 24th October, after the 
autumn meeting, on the following subject: 
" The use of forecasting models for determining 
logistic requirements". France, the Nether-
lands and the Federal Republic of Germany 
gave six talks (two per delegation) which were 
followed by very interesting comments and 
discussions. 
The group plans to hold a seventh sympo-
sium in early May 1981 on the subject of" War 
Games". At its end-of-year meeting the SAC 
also approved Working Group No. 8's plans to 
go to The Hague to visit the RVO/TNO 
Physics Laboratory at the invitation of the 
Netherlands authorities. 
2. Group of experts on the evaluation of military 
equipment 
The group of experts is still awaiting a 
decision by the SAC regarding the second stage 
of its work, i.e. the evaluation, using different 
methods, of new equipment which has not yet 
been evaluated. 
At its meeting on 28th November 1980, 
the SAC decided that although the question of 
the evaluation of military equipment would no 
longer be on its agenda, it could be retabled at 
the request of any government wishing to sub-
mit a work proposal. 
C. International Secretariat 
1. Contacts with the Council 
The Assistant Secretary-General presented 
to the Permanent Council at their meeting on 
18th April 1980 the economic part of the SAC 
study on the armaments sector of industry in 
the member countries. 
2. WEU Assembly 
Extracts from speeches, reports, debates 
and recommendations from the two parts of the 
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twenty-sixth ordinary session . of the Assembly 
were brought together by the International 
Secretariat in documents which were circulated 
to the members of the SAC. 
3. Relations with NATO 
The Assistant Secretary-General was pre-
sent, as observer, at the North Atlantic Assem-
bly, which was held in Brussels in November. 
A member of the International Secretariat 
went, as observer, to the Conference of Natio-
nal Armaments Directors (CNAD) in April and 
October and another member went to the 
meetings of the NATO Naval Armaments 
Group in June and December. In accordance 
with the usual practice, the International Secre-
tariat informed the SAC of these contacts. 
4. Relations with FINABEL 
In accordance with the liaison established 
in 1973 between the SAC and FINABEL Secre-
tariats, a representative of the International 
Secretariat of the SAC was present at the 
meeting of the FINABEL Co-ordinating Com-
mittee, which was held in Brussels on 25th and 
26th November 1980. In the course of this 
meeting, the updating of a s~ries of agreements 
drawn up by WEU and transferred to 
FINABEL in 1973 was reported. 
On 28th November 1980, the Head of the 
FINABEL Secretariat was present at the SAC's 
last meeting of the year in the course of which 
he confirmed that a study on a future family of 
logistic vehicles 'Vould be undertaken by the 
FIN AB EL Working Group E (fighting and 
transport vehicles). He pointed out that this 
study would probably lead the SAC to revise 
Agreement 4.FT.6, for which WEU was still 
responsible. 
In addition to working contacts, the present 
liaison enables the International Secretariat of 
the Standing Armaments Committee to make a 
regular study of the documents drawn up by 
FINABEL in order to present subjects to the 
SAC which might offer possibilities of concer-
ted action in WEU without the risk of dupli-
cation. 
5. Visits 
The Assistant Secretary-General, accompa-
nied by one of his colleagues, visited the mili-
tary electronics exhibition held in Wiesbaden in 
October. 
In October and November he had talks 
with the Belgian authorities in Brussels and 
with the Italian authorities in Rome. 
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CHAPTER V 
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE 
A. Meetings of the Committee 
In 1980, the Public Administration Com-
mittee held its two annual meetings at Norwich, 
from 23rd to 25th April and at Lecce, from 
1st to 3rd October. 
As is customary, these two meetings were 
devoted mainly to discussion of important 
administrative developments in the member 
countries during the preceding six months and 
the preparation of the multilateral course for 
government officials to be held towards the end 
of the year. 
The following paragraphs summarise the 
main subjects raised during the Committee's 
meetings. 
Inflation and unemployment, which for 
some years have been matters of major concern 
to the governments of the member countries, 
affect the administrative machinery of the states 
to an increasingly noticeable extent, although 
these effects are different, and contradictory, 
depending on which of these phenomena the 
emphasis is placed. In a number of countries, 
efforts to reduce unemployment have led to the 
recruitment of young trainees, on a temporary 
basis, into certain ministries. Opportunities for 
early retirement have been made available. 
Elsewhere, there has been a drive to fill all 
vacant posts on the establishment. At the 
other end of the scale, their concern to beat 
inflation has led most of the governments to 
adopt a policy of reducing public expenditure, 
the effects of which have been felt on the per-
sonnel front: limitation of appointments, even a 
standstill on recruitment or reduction of staffs 
to a greater or lesser extent. 
In the administrative field, the need to 
economise public funds is also apparent in 
other areas, depending on the country: meas-
ures designed to increase the efficiency of the 
administrative machine, efforts to limit the field 
and extent of state intervention, decentralisation 
policies bringing possible reductions in the 
apparatus of central government. 
One subject in the forefront in several 
member countries is connected with the record-
ing and storage of computerised data. In this 
field, the aim of governments is to take advan-
tage of modern methods of automatic data pro-
cessing, whilst introducing a set of strict provi-
sions to protect the data banks against misuse. 
On a more general level, governments are 
turning their attention to the problem of rela-
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tions between the ctttzen and the administra-
tion, although there have been no startling 
developments. On the positive side, there has 
been an effort to simplify administrative pro-
cedures and work has been done to harmonise 
legislation and render it easier to understand. 
On the other hand, the movement towards 
more open governments has not been developed 
in all countries. The Parliamentary Commis-
sioner (Ombudsman), where one exists, consi-
ders his powers inadequate. 
The Committee also continued its tradi-
tional exchanges of views and information on 
training and refresher courses for senior civil 
servants both at national and international level 
as well as on conditions of service within the 
administration (transfer from one employment 
category to a higher one, etc.). Finally, the 
Committee discussed some of the administrative 
reforms which had taken place in the member 
countries during the preceding months. 
B. 1980 course for government officials 
The twenty-ninth multilateral course for 
government offici~ls, sponsored by the Public 
Administration Committee, was held in the 
United Kingdom (Wilton Park European Dis-
cussion Centre), from 24th November to 
4th December. 
The course was designed to provide partici-
pants with a general introduction to the admi-
nistrations of the member countries, and a 
better personal understanding of each other's 
tasks and methods by looking at specific 
problems faced by these countries in a fast-
changing world; and to compare, through case-
studies and international negotiations, the way 
their administrations respond to these problems 
of change. 
Each participant was required to submit 
before the course, a brief case-study concerning 
a specific administrative or policy problem 
chosen within the following general areas of 
change: 
- Social: the effect of demographic trends 
and migration on the provision of services, and 
methods of organising and reforming national 
health services. 
- Economic: energy sources, production, 
and conservation; and pay and prices. 
- Technological: effect on industry, employ-
in data transmissiOn; and the implications for 
efficiency and individual rights of developments 
in data storage and processing. 
The organisers therefore, after a brief intro-
ductory plenary session, divided the course par-
ticipants into four multinational groups. 
These groups were left to organise their own 
work and appoint their own rapporteur, but 
were given the remit of using the case-studies 
which each participant had prepared to build 
up to a comparative view of the ways the 
various administrations worked. 
The second element in the course was a 
negotiation exercise based on the United 
Nations Law of the Sea Conference. After an 
introductory talk participants entered into their 
roles with enthusiasm. The exercise was 
however curtailed in response to requests from 
a majority of course-members for more time to 
exchange views on their national situations. 
There were three lectures of general 
interest during the course. They were concerned 
with the institutions of the WEU member 
countries, the adaptation of administration to 
the computer, and data-protection. 
One and a half days, at the end of the 
course, were given to further informal 
exchanges in plenary sessions. These exchan-
ges were organised under four headings: the 
disengagement of the state; the civil service; the 
environment of administration; and involve-
ment with international organisations (princi-
pally the European Communities). 
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The course brought together twenty partici-
pants, fairly high-level officials, from the 
administrations of the member countries. 
National delegations' comments have not yet 
been received, since the course was held fairly 
late in the year, but from impressions obtained 
at the end of the course, it may be concluded 
that it was a complete success. 
C. Study visits 
Each year, the Public Administration 
Committee arranges, under the responsibility of 
its own members, study visits which are pre-
pared with great care and the results of which, 
in the form of a report on each one, are sent to 
the Committee and, of course, to the adminis-
tration visited. These visits enable an official 
to spend one or two weeks in the administra-
tion of one of the other member countries, 
studying his own speciality. 
Consequently these visits cover a wide 
variety of subjects as is shown by the following 
few examples of visits carried out during 1980: 
tax liabilities of large companies; inter-library 
lending (subjects studied in the Federal 
Republic of Germany); implementation of state 
aid to industry (subject studied in Belgium); 
energy conservation in transport (subject 
studied in Belgium and France); defence pro-
curement (subject studied i:p. Italy); role of 
government in trade development; policing 
ethnic minority communities (subjects studied 
in the Netherlands). 
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CHAPTER VI 
BUDGETARY AND ADMINISTRATIVE QUESTIONS 
A. Budget 
A summary of the revised budgets for 1980 
is shown in the Appendix to this report. The 
proposed budgets for 1981 have not yet been 
approved and are still a matter of discussion in 
the Council; the delay is due to the need which 
has arisen to revise the various budgets in order 
to achieve, wherever possible, maximum eco-
nomy. 
The outstanding problem of social security 
for WEU staff working in the United Kingdom 
was still unresolved. A special meeting of 
national experts was held in October 1980 to 
discuss, in relation to general social security 
principles, the situation of staff members who 
may be exempted from contributing to the 
United Kingdom social security scheme. In 
this event, the problem will arise of the break 
in availability of benefits for staff leaving the 
organisation and who wish to join a national 
scheme. The transfer from one national sys-
tem to another is satisfactorily regulated by the 
relevant EEC rules and special bilateral agree-
ments, but the transfer procedure from an inter-
national organisation to a national system 
reveals gaps and delays in providing benefits 
and cover. This necessitates the introduction 
of temporary measures. 
In addition, after the conclusion of any 
agreement, the option for staff members having 
provisionally retained their provident fund affi-
liation will have to be reopened. 
This means that figures showing the results 
of the pensions option can still not be finalised 
and the preliminary figures given in the Appen-
dix to Chapter VI of the twenty-fifth annual 
report of the Council to the Assembly are still 
valid. 
The contributions to the United Kingdom 
social security scheme, by both staff members 
and the organisation, are still being held in a 
suspense account pending the final outcome of 
the negotiations. 
An agreement, having due regard to the 
vested rights of staff members concerned, has 
been reached to adapt the existing supplemen-
tary insurance for the cases of death and perma-
nent total invalidity to take account of the pen-
sion scheme. In this way the two systems are 
complementary and double benefits are avoided. 
A saving in the share of the contribution 
to be paid by governments has therefore been 
effected. 
38 
B. WEU administrative meetings 
Officials of the Secretariat-General, the 
Agency for the Control of Armaments, the 
Standing Armaments Committee and the Office 
of the Clerk, responsible for administrative mat-
ters, met periodically during the year thus 
ensuring co-ordination between all WEU agen-
cies as well as the Assembly while at the same 
time reviewing administrative matters of com-
mon concern. The experience gained in 
operating the pension scheme, the coming into 
operation of the Joint Pensions Administrative 
Section from 1st January 1980 and the exami-
nation by experts of the implementing instruc-
tions to the pension scheme rules, have obvi-
ated the need for frequent meetings. 
The Joint Pensions Administrative Section 
is not only assisting considerably in the proper 
administration of the organisation's pensions 
but by the comparison and verification of pen-
sions calculations and allocations, contributes 
greatly to the uniform application of the pen-
sion scheme rules in the co-ordinated organi-
sations. 
The close co-operation with the WEU 
Staff Association has continued. 
C. WEU provident fund 
The monies that have become due to 
governments as a result of the validation pro-
cess have now been completely reimbursed to 
governments. However, as explained above 
under A, extra validations may again be expec-
ted in 1981 as the result of signing an agreement 
on United Kingdom social security and the 
subsequent reopening of the option for the staff 
members serving in the Secretariat-General who 
have provisionally remained in the provident 
fund. 
The short-term policy of investment in 
French francs has been continued, and will be 
at least until the outstanding issues described 
above have been decided. This has however 
not reduced profitable gain as the interest on 
French currency investment is advantageous. 
D. Activities in the framework of the 
co-ordinated organisations 
The Co-ordinating Committee held nine 
meetings in 1980, each lasting two days. In 
addition, seven meetings were held by the 
working groups, eleven by the Committee of 
Heads of Administration, nine joint meetings of 
the Standing Committee of Secretaries-General 
and the Standing Committee of the Staff Asso-
ciations and two by the Committee of Secreta-
ries-General. 
The main problems discussed during these 
meetings and of which the majority have resul-
ted in reports by the Co-ordinating Committee, 
are: 
- the periodical revision and adjustment of 
salaries and allowances; 
- the establishment of a new system for the 
rules and amounts of the education 
allowance; 
- the examination of the principles and 
modalities of the expatriation allowance; 
- the admissibility of leaving balances in 
the provident fund after validating for 
the pension scheme; 
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- the comparison of gr~de equivalencies 
with one member country; 
- the problems associated with any form of 
extension of co-ordination to other inter-
national organisations; 
- the examination of the implementing 
instructions to the pension scheme rules 
with the assistance of, two independent 
experts; 
- an amendment to Article 6 of the pen-
sion scheme rules; 
- the raising of the age limit for a depen-
dent child and education allowances 
from 25 to 26 years; 
- the introduction of a language allowance 
for certain C grade staff members; 
- the progress in the functioning and ope-
ration of the Joint Pensions Adminis-
trative Section. 
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APPENDIX 
Summary ofrevised WEU budget for 1980 
A* B* C* Total B+C 
£ Frs Frs Frs 
Salaries and allowances ................. 1,080,760 7,901,284 16,691,800 24,593,084 
Pensions .............................. 89,830 703,000 2,250,334 2,953,334 
Travel ................................ 36,885 102,700 412,900 515,600 
Other operating costs ................... 155,575 427,620 613,520 1,041,140 
Purchase of furniture, etc. 0 0. 0 ••••• 0 0 0. 0 11,565 15,075 28,935 44,010 
Buildings 0 0 •••• 0 0 0 •••• 0 •• 0. 0 ••••• 0 0. 0 0 - 68 000 123.000 191 000 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE ••• 0 0 0 0 0 0 0. 0. 0. 0 0. 1,374,615 9 217 679 20.120.489 29 338,168 
WEU tax • 0 ••••• 0. 0 •• 0 •••• 0 •• 0 0 0 •••••• 383,210 2,763,292 5,684,808 8,448,100 
Other receipts •••••• 0 0 0 0 0. 0 0 ••• 0 0 0 0 0 0 •• 49,590 83,150 180,800 263,950 
Pension receipts 0 •••• 0 •• 0 ••••••• 0 0 ••• 0 0 25,365 277 248 613.157 890,405 
TOTAL INCOME 0 0 •••••• 0 0. 0 ••••••••• 0. 458,165 3 123 690 6 478,765 9 602 455 
NET TOTAL .......................... 916,450 6,093,989 13,641,724 19,735,713 
National contributions called/or under the revised WEU budget/or 1980 
600ths 
Belgium •• 0 0 0 0 0 0 ••• 0. 0 0. 0 0 •••••••••••• 59 
France ................................ 120 
Germany ••••••••••••••• 0 ••••• 0. 0 •• 0. 0 120 
Italy .................................. 120 
Luxembourg •••••••• 0 •• 0 0 •••• 0 •• 0 •• 0 •• 2 
Netherlands 0 0 ••• 0 •••••••••••••• 0 0. 0. 0. 59 
United Kingdom ....................... 120 
ToTAL ••• 0 •• 0 0 •• 0 0 •••••••••••• 0. 0 0 0. 600 
*A Secretariat-General. 
B International Secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee. 
C Agency for the Control of Armaments. 
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£ F. frs. 
90,117.58 1,940,678.45 
183,290.00 3,947,142.60 
183,290.00 3,947,142.60 
183,290.00 3,947,142.60 
3,054.84 65,785.70 
90,117.58 1,940,678.45 
183 290.00 3 947 142.60 
916,450.00 19,735,713.00 
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Draft Recommendation 
on developments in Poland 
The Assembly of WEU, 
(z) Considering that the final act of the conference on security and co-operation m Europe, 
adopted in Helsinki on 1st August 197 5, constitutes the charter of detente in Europe; 
(ii) Recalling that this text stipulates that: 
" The participating states will refrain in their mutual relations, as well as in their international 
relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United 
Nations and with the present declaration. No consideration may be invoked to serve to 
warrant resort to the threat or use of force in contravention of this principle. 
No such threat or use of force will be employed as a means of settling disputes, or questions 
likely to give rise to disputes, between them. "; 
and that 
" The participating states will refrain from any intervention, direct or indirect, individual or 
collective, in the internal or external affairs falling within the domestic jurisdiction of another 
participating state, regardless of their mutual relations. 
They will accordingly refrain from any form of armed intervention or threat of such inter-
vention against another participating state. 
They will likewise in all circumstances refrain from any other act of military, or of political, 
economic or other coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by 
another participating state of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure 
advantages of any kind. "; 
(iii) Considering that the events in Poland in 1980 concern only the internal affairs of that country; 
(iv) Considering consequently that any external intervention designed to impose on Poland 
measures which it has not freely decided upon would be a flagrant violation of the Helsinki final act 
and would therefore terminate any process of detente; 
(v) Recalling that in Order 53 the Assembly requested its President: 
"To convene an extraordinary session forthwith should the independence and sovereignty of 
Poland be jeopardised by an armed foreign intervention", 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Announce without delay the principles which will guide its reactions in the event of Soviet 
intervention in Poland, and in particular declare that it would consider that such intervention would 
make every aspect of the Helsinki final act null and void; 
2. Proceed forthwith to hold consultations with a view to planning what measures all member 
countries should take in application of these principles; 
3. Draw up proposals for member states to submit to the North Atlantic Council in order to 
extend application of these measures to all member countries of the Atlantic Alliance; 
4. Examine what proposals member states might submit and jointly support in the Council of 
Europe so as to associate all free European states with whatever measures it may take; 
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5. Ask member states to foresee, in the framework of the European Communities, the diplomatic, 
economic, financial and commercial measures which the Communities would then have to decide 
upon and which should necessarily include an embargo on the transfer of advanced technology to the 
Soviet Union; 
6. Request member states to respond as favourably as possible, under present circumstances, to 
any requests for credit facilities which the Polish Government has made or may rpake insofar as they 
are destined to improve living conditions for the Poles. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Hanin, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
I. The question 
1. The question raised by events in Poland 
is whether it is possible for the people of an 
eastern country to gain a sufficient degree of 
independence in decision-making to adopt an 
internal form of political and social organisa-
tion which differs significantly from the type 
which the Soviet Union has adopted for itself 
and has imposed on the countries behind the 
iron curtain. 
2. More particularly, the question facing 
western nations is how far and in what way 
- excluding armed intervention - can they help 
Poland to gain and retain this independence 
without provoking armed intervention from the 
Soviet Union and its satellites. 
2. The framework 
3. There is no question of making a theore-
tical study of the situation. 
4. This is WEU and it has to be seen what 
contribution, however small, the WEU Assem-
bly can make to assist the Polish nation in its 
struggle. 
5. It can help by: 
- the impact of the position it adopts on 
the international scene; 
- its influence on the policies of WEU 
member countries; 
- the positions adopted, if need be, under 
its aegis in other organisations grouping 
western nations, such as the European 
Communities and the Council of 
Europe. 
3. The de facto situation 
6. Since the second world war, there has 
been a fundamental misunderstanding about the 
nature of the relationship between the Soviet 
Union and European countries with communist 
regimes. Since this misunderstanding is the 
basis of peace, no one has any interest in 
dispelling it, but events which occur from time 
to time in the eastern countries show that, 
because of the very ambiguity of the East-West 
relationship, peace is still fragile. 
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7. Indeed, on the one hand, the Soviet side 
acts as if Europe, if not the world, had been 
divided up at the end of the second world war 
(some even specify that this was done at the 
Yalta conference in February 1945) assuming 
that the United States and the United Kingdom 
had given the Soviet Union the right to control 
all the countries which were then recognised as 
being occupied by the Red Army in the imme-
diate post-war period, in exchange for which 
the Soviet Union agreed not to reach for more 
in Western Europe. The West has never for-
mally recognised such a division. The Yalta 
Conference merely divided German territory 
into military occupation zones, inherently tran-
sitory, and made an approximate definition of 
Poland's frontiers; it did not divide Europe into 
areas of influence. The text of the Yalta 
Agreements, published in full by the United 
States Government in 1955, even affirms, in its 
"Declaration on liberated Europe", "the right 
of all peoples to choose the form of government 
under which they will live". 
8. But the establishment of an area of 
influence by the Soviet Union has been con-
stantly tolerated. After the invasion of Cze-
choslovakia by Soviet forces in 1968, the divi-
sion was defined in the so-called Brezhnev doc-
trine, according to which the Soviet Union was 
entitled to intervene in the internal affairs of 
countries with communist regimes if the 
communist nature of their governments was 
threatened. 
9. On the other hand, by subscribing to the 
United Nations Charter and then, in 1975, to 
the Helsinki final act, the Soviet Union recog-
nised the principle of sovereignty of states and 
renounced interfering in their internal affairs. 
10. There is a clear contradiction between 
these texts and the principle of limited sove-
reignty implied by the Brezhnev doctrine. 
When the West subscribed to the Helsinki final 
act, it was well aware of this contradiction and 
of the fact that a few years after the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia the Soviet Union had not 
effectively given up the Brezhnev doctrine. 
But the West also knew it was not in the inte-
rests of what it intended to be a resolutely 
peaceful policy to encourage the destabilisation 
or even the dismemberment of Eastern Europe 
since any disturbance could not be acceptable 
to the Soviet Union since it might endanger the 
maintenance of the regime in the Soviet Union 
itself. Thus the West - which has always 
refused to recognise the Yalta division and the 
Brezhnev doctrine - has deliberately closed its 
eyes to Soviet policy except when it has caused 
a serious crisis. Everything under the heading 
of detente or, in the case of the Federal Repu-
blic, Ostpolitik, is based on the de jure denial 
and the de facto recognition of the doctrine of 
limited sovereignty. 
11. The case of Poland 
11. Poland for its part, more than any other 
European country, has always started from the 
position that the international status quo was 
not and should not be called in question. On 
several occasions in the last twenty-five years it 
has shown a desire to achieve true internal 
autonomy without jeopardising the status quo 
or the international balance. For instance, one 
aim of the Rapacki plan for denuclearising 
Central Europe submitted by Poland in the 
United Nations in 1957 was to consolidate the 
status quo. The same concern was to be found 
in the Polish plan for disarmament in Europe 
submitted at the Madrid conference in 
1980. Poland is pushed in this direction by 
the very nature of its underlying interests which 
are determined by its geography, history and 
relations with its neighbours. 
12. Poland, which has no natural frontiers in 
either East or West, lies at the heart of Eastern 
Europe. Its membership of the Warsaw Pact 
seems essential for maintaining the cohesion of 
the eastern bloc, particularly because most lines 
of communication between the Soviet Union 
and the German Democratic Republic and Cze-
choslovakia cross Polish territory. Hence, 
control over Poland appears essential for the 
Soviet Union's own security and Poland is 
compelled to maintain close contacts with the 
Soviet Union and with the other people's 
democracies. Consequently, the latter cannot 
turn a blind eye to the situation in Poland, just 
as the Soviet armed forces need Polish territory 
to operate the whole Warsaw Pact defence sys-
tem. In early summer 1980, there were two 
Soviet armoured divisions in Poland, plus one 
air force, but there were twenty Soviet divisions 
in the German Democratic Republic, six in 
Czechoslovakia, four in Hungary and at least 
thirteen on Soviet territory near the Polish 
frontier. 
13. In the absence of natural frontiers, the 
Polish people has throughout its history been 
inextricably mingled with the Russian, Lithua-
nian and Ukrainian peoples to the East, Slovaks 
to the South and Germans to the West, which 
resulted, when Prussia, Austria and Russia 
became great powers, in a series of partitions of 
Poland at the end of the eighteenth and the 
beginning of the nineteenth centuries. These 
partitions in no way detracted from the exis-
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tence of a Polish national identity which, more 
than any other European nationality, has been 
forged in resistance to foreign oppression. 
Even today, its history is deeply imprinted on 
the Polish people who know better than 
anyone how to resist oppression and maintain 
their national identity in ,the direst circum-
stances. 
14. This national element is accompanied by 
a religious element since Poland has remained a 
bulwark of catholicism between a mostly pro-
testant German people anp orthodox Russia. 
The history of Poland has strengthened the 
influence of a religion which emerges almost as 
a national religion. The election of a Pope of 
Polish nationality in 1978 for the first time in 
history further strengthened the feeling that 
catholicism is part of the Polish heritage, and 
John Paul Il's triumphal visit to Poland in June 
1979 was seen as a major event in national his-
tory. Throughout the period following the 
second world war and until today, catholicism 
seems to have formed a protection for the 
Polish people against communist oppression. 
The state has had to deal qn a power-to-power 
basis with the catholic authorities which were 
anxious to avoid leading Poland and Europe 
into dangerous adventures, yet sought to main-
tain the maximum of freedom and the best 
possible economic and social living standards 
for the Polish people. 
15. In general, the whole Polish nation has 
understood the church's attitude. It has not 
tried to terminate Soviet hegemony but when it 
has been the victim of over-flagrant excesses by 
the communist regime it has shown unequivo-
cally that it was not prepared to put up with 
them. This was the case in June 1956 when 
there was an outbreak of rioting in Poznan over 
economic claims. The following October, Mr. 
Gomulka, a former communist leader who had 
been dropped from power and imprisoned, had 
to be called back to the !?arty leadership. He 
promised liberal measures and then squashed 
the uprising. In December 1970, serious eco-
nomic difficulties again led to unrest, parti-
cularly in the Gdansk and Gdynia areas. This 
led to the fall of Mr. Gomulka and his replace-
ment by Mr. Gierek who, abandoning the 
policy of repression pursued by his predecessor, 
chose to embark upon a policy of concessions 
to dissident movements. In 1976, Mr. Gierek's 
government had to face further serious unrest 
due to economic difficulties and a sharp rise in 
food prices and he had to make major conces-
sions and close his eyes to the formation of a 
social self-defence committee. It may be noted 
that on every occasion demonstrations and 
unrest have revealed remarkable national unity 
and the same feeling of national unity allowed 
Mr. Gomulka or Mr. Gierek to prevent unrest 
degenerating to the point where the regime 
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might be threatened. Thus, in 1956 Poland 
was able to avoid a fate comparable to that of 
Hungary and in 1970 a fate comparable to that 
just experienced by Czechoslovakia. Polish 
Governments have never called on Soviet forces 
to restore order and disturbances have never 
been such as to leave the government no alter-
native but to call on the Soviet Union. This 
appears to be due to a remarkable awareness of 
the possibilities enjoyed by Poland because of 
its special situation and also of the limits of this 
situation. Events in the early months of 1981 
testify to the same wisdom among the leaders of 
the Unified Workers' Party and the state and 
the Catholic Church and the leaders of Soli-
darity. 
Ill. The 1980 crisis 
16. In September 1979, agitation started in 
Poland with the publication of a "workers' 
charter" in the Workers' Defence Committee's 
journal calling for the right to strike, wage 
increases and better working conditions. Intel-
lectuals warned the government of the dangers 
inherent in the situation and there were 
demonstrations in Warsaw in November, 
followed by numerous arrests in December. 
These repressive measures were the cause of the 
first strike at the Lenin shipyards in Gdansk in 
February 1980. 
17. But the serious economic difficulties from 
which Poland was then suffering were the 
immediate cause of the widespread strike move-
ment which broke out in Warsaw and Gdansk 
in July 1980. In spite of remarkable agricul-
tural possibilities and ample coal resources, 
because of bad harvests and the rising cost of 
oil imports from the Soviet Union the country 
experienced a very sharp rise in prices and a 
serious food shortage which it could not remedy 
for lack of foreign currency. 
18. Mr. Gierek's policy since 1970 had been 
to borrow large sums abroad to finance 
industrial development. However, agricultural 
yields were very inadequate and coal-mines and 
industrialisation were falling far short of the 
progress expected by the Polish planners. 
Inflation had reached very high levels, which 
did not prevent the shortage making itself felt 
with increasing severity. 
19. Finally, external debts had gone beyond 
reasonable limits. At the beginning of 1980, 
they amounted to $ 19,000 million and the cost 
of repaying the debt (interest and repayment of 
capital) would have amounted to $ 7,600 mil-
lion, i.e. 70% of the country's external revenue, 
if Poland had been in a position to pay. To do 
so, it would have had to borrow more money 
abroad which was impossible in view of the size 
of the Polish foreign debt. At the end of 
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December, this debt is said to have amounted 
to$ 23,000 million. 
20. Thus the workers' claims were first 
economic and social. Increased wages and 
improved working conditions were in no way 
political claims. But soon were added claims 
relating to individual and trade union freedom, 
since the system of single trade unions 
controlled by the communist party did not 
allow normal expression to be given to these 
claims. Workers' organisations therefore 
sprang up spontaneously in firms where there 
had been strikes in summer 1980 and one of 
the main claims of the strikers was the right to 
form trade unions separate from the official 
ones. Here the strikers were calling in 
question a fundamental element of the Soviet 
doctrine that the communist party had to be 
the voice of the working class. Insofar as the 
latter felt the need to express itself outside the 
communist trade unions and challenged their 
right to represent them, it was the regime itself 
that was, in a way, being called in question. 
Finally, the workers' claims led to a twenty-
one-point claims programme, the main points 
being: 
- guaranteed right to strike and security 
for all strikers ; 
- respect for the freedom to speak and 
write guaranteed in the constitution ; 
abolition of censorship and hence 
termination of the repression of 
independent publications ; 
- liberation of all political prisoners ; 
- respect for Convention 87 of the 
International Labour Organisation on 
trade union freedom, ratified by the 
People's Republic of Poland ; 
- mass media access to representatives of 
churches of all creeds; 
- abolition of interference by government 
bodies in trade union activities; 
- adoption of concrete measures to 
overcome the crisis by: 
- (a) the publication of full information 
about the social and economic 
situation; 
- (b) the possibility for all to take part in 
the discussion on the programme of 
reform; 
- wage increase of 2,000 zlotys for each 
worker to compensate for the rise in 
the cost of living in recent years; 
- payment of wages while on strike, as 
for holidays ; 
- guaranteed automatic rise in basic 
wages in the light of price increases 
and the falling currency value ; 
- publication in the press and on radio 
and television of authorised informa-
tion on the strikes and on the establish-
ment of the joint strike committee. 
21. At the beginning of August, the strike 
movement, which had started in Gdansk, 
spread to all the Baltic ports, Warsaw and the 
Silesian mines, finally affecting the whole coun-
try and a large number of branches, particularly 
naval shipbuilding, mines and public transport. 
The policy of limited concessions launched 
by Mr. Babiuch's government, formed in 
February 1980, produced no results and 
growing unrest among the workers led to the 
fall of the government on 24th August, when 
Mr. Josef Pinkowski was called upon to replace 
Mr. Babiuch. At the same time, changes were 
made in the party leadership, where members 
who had been dropped at the beginning of the 
year reappeared. 
22. The new government set itself the task of 
stopping the strike movement. It was helped 
by the Catholic Church which had hitherto 
shown its solidarity with the strikers but which, 
as soon as it saw that the situation was deterior-
ating too seriously and that the government was 
prepared to make major concessions, encour-
aged a return to work. It was clearly 
concerned, as may be understood from the 
words of Cardinal Wyszynski, for instance, on 
26th August, not to provoke a brutal reaction 
from the Soviet Union. 
23. After several days of very high tension, 
negotiations began between the government and 
the striking workers, first in Gdansk and then in 
the other regions. Finally, most of the strikers' 
claims were met in the Gdansk agreements of 
31st August, subject to an undertaking not to 
undermine the "party's leading role". Similar 
agreements were concluded with strikers in 
other regions, particularly Silesia, where the 
miners obtained special advantages. 
24. However, on 6th September, a few days 
after the Gdansk agreements, the Central 
Committee of the Polish Unified Workers' 
Party announced the departure for health 
reasons of its First Secretary, Mr. Gierek, who 
was replaced by Mr. Stanislaw Kania, known 
moreover for his liberal tendencies. This 
change at the head of the party was accom-
panied or followed by the replacement of a 
number of other Polish leaders, indicating a 
wish to start a new policy and no doubt also in 
response to the accusations about party leaders 
often made by the strikers, in particular that 
they took undue advantage of their duties to 
improve their material position. 
25. But since the person responsible for the 
Gdansk agreements was replaced just when the 
Soviet press was increasing its warnings to the 
Polish leaders, it was to be wondered whether 
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the new party leaders would apply the agree-
ments loyally. There were disconcerting signs, 
particularly the reluctance with which the 
tribunals registered the statutes of the new trade 
unions, deleting certain provisions outright. 
Another trial of force was' in fact required, 
backed by the threat to nesume the strike, 
before the trade unions, whose confederation 
adopted the name of "Solidarity", could obtain 
full application of the Gdansk agreements. 
26. The fact was that, in view of Poland's 
economic situation, the application of certain 
economic parts of the agreements did not 
depend on the authorities of that country 
alone. Large-scale financial and food assis-
tance from the eastern countries, and particu-
larly the Soviet Union and the GDR, was far 
from being able to redress the financial situa-
tion and Poland therefore had again to turn to 
the western countries in spite of criticism from 
the Soviet Union. Mr. Gierek had already 
obtained a loan of DM I ,2100 million from a 
consortium of German banks, two-thirds of 
which were to pay off the debt and one-third to 
be invested in the Polish coal industry. Mr. 
Kania obtained further loans from the United 
States and various other western countries, plus 
food assistance from the European Commu-
nity. But this western assistance added further 
to the Polish national debt and displeased the 
Soviet Union, just as the n<red to assist Poland 
appears to have roused suspicion in the 
German Democratic Republic. In short, in 
such conditions it was difficult to consider wage 
increases, shorter working hours or higher 
consumption, and the Poli$h Government had 
to negotiate with the Solid,rity trade union in 
order to obtain a delay in introducing the 
economic advantages granted in principle to 
Polish workers in the Gdansk agreements. 
2 7. In this matter too the Solidarity trade 
union showed remarkable wisdom and realism 
and had the backing of the catholic church. A 
working class which had, just realised what 
power could be wielded by using strikes as an 
instrument had to be made to understand that it 
could not continue to make use of this means 
of improving its standard of living without 
endangering the country. Until December, the 
most stubborn elements were kept in a minority 
and the domestic situation remained calm while 
the Polish Government , started distributing 
ration cards. 
28. The government and party for their part 
showed that they truly sought appeasement. 
On 16th December, the st~te and party author-
ities, side by side with the workers, took part in 
the unveiling of a monument erected in Gdansk 
in memory of the victims of the 1970 repres-
sion, which was a remarkaJble demonstration of 
national unity, discipline and moderation. 
However, there were still many causes for 
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anxiety, first of all because of the seriousness of 
the economic situation which has obviously not 
been improved by two months of an almost 
general strike, and second, and above all, 
because one can but wonder about the true 
wish, perhaps not of the Polish leaders, but at 
least of leaders in the Soviet Union and other 
people's democracies, to tolerate a truly free 
trade union system, i.e. the coexistence with the 
communist party and the government it 
controls of a "counter power" to which the 
possibility of recourse to strikes gives undenia-
ble strength. 
29. During the first fortnight of January 
1981, in fact, two matters of concern came to 
the fore. One was the delay called for by the 
Polish Supreme Court in authorising farmers 
and students to set up a free trade union organi-
sation whose legality the government contested ; 
the other was the government's refusal to apply 
immediately the provision of the Gdansk agree-
ments limiting the working week to five 
days. While in the first case it is difficult to 
imagine how a legal discrimination between 
workers and peasants can be maintained, in the 
second case Poland's economic situation 
provides sufficient explanation for the govern-
ment's determination to tolerate nothing which 
might reduce national production. 
30. It is equally understandable that Solidar-
ity for its part is hesitant to condone anything 
that might appear to fall short of the Gdansk 
agreements, particularly as, in other areas such 
as freedom of information, the government 
seems to have adopted a very restrictive 
approach to the agreements. The result was a 
further clash between trade unionists and the 
state since, on Saturday, lOth January, many 
Polish workers refused to go to work. This 
matter is not without consequences since within 
Solidarity itself there seems to be opposition 
between a more realistic tendency, prepared to 
make concessions on matters where government 
requirements appear justified by the situation 
and represented by the man who has become 
Solidarity's principal leader, Lech Walesa, and 
a more intransigent element, ready to face up to 
another conflict with the country's authorities 
rather than back down even slightly on what 
was gained at Gdansk and perhaps even 
prepared to use the force it obtains from its 
very wide audience in the new trade union to 
obtain still further advantages, without flinching 
at the prospect of another trial of force. 
31. This means that the unchanging wish of 
the government, the church, the strikers or their 
union to keep the crisis within Poland's 
frontiers has encountered very serious difficul-
ties which Mr. Pinkowski's Government 
seemed incapable of overcoming, and at the 
beginning of February the situation seemed to 
be very seriously jeopardised. Strikes again 
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increased, claims, particularly in the economic 
field, surpassed the capabilities of the Polish 
economy and Poland again faced a major crisis. 
32. Meeting on 9th February, the Central 
Committee plenum decided to place at the head 
of the government General Jaruzelski, hitherto 
Minister of Defence, who had managed to avoid 
the army being involved. A communist and 
patriot, untouched by the corruption of which 
certain party leaders were accused, the new 
Prime Minister seems to have lost no time in 
finding terms for a compromise acceptable to 
the moderate elements of Solidarity at least. 
The provisions of the Gdansk agreement 
relating to public and trade union freedom, 
including farmers and students, were to be 
applied unreservedly but at the same time there 
was to be an energetic economic policy 
designed to stem the country's debt and ensure 
the best conditions for economic recovery. 
This policy of austerity, which included 
rationing sugar, butter and meat, appears to 
have been understood by Solidarity's leaders 
who shared with the government, party and 
church the concern to maintain national 
independence at all cost, since they fell in with 
the government's request for a three-month 
truce in their claims. 
33. The recovery manreuvred by General 
Jaruzelski has been facilitated by Mr. Walesa's 
improved position within his trade union 
following the welcome he was given abroad and 
in particular at the Vatican, where he was 
received at the beginning of February. For the 
immediate future, at least, his success may ward 
off the threat of Soviet intervention and offer 
Poland a last chance to escape economic and 
political collapse, which would be in no one's 
interests, be it in the East or the West. 
34. But it is hardly likely that three months 
will be enough to straighten out such a difficult 
situation and it may be wondered whether 
beyond then further dangers will not be lying in 
wait. Cracks are already showing in the three-
month truce: within Solidarity, an opposition is 
emerging which has little patience for relin-
quishing, even temporarily, economic claims 
which they consider to be the lever which 
allowed Polish workers to be mobilised in order 
to obtain reforms. Sanctions by certain firms on 
some of the autumn 1980 strikers maintain 
local tension leading to threats of further 
strikes. Finally, it is still hard to see how the 
Polish people will react to food restrictions, 
however essential a policy of greater austerity 
may be. One of the major drawbacks of the 
single-party system is of course that it associates 
the regime itself with any errors which its 
leaders may make in running the country's 
affairs. 
35. Although a viable compromise between 
the country's leaders and Solidarity need not be 
ruled out entirely, it obviously depends on the 
government being allowed sufficient freedom of 
movement by pressure exerted from outside -
by the Soviet Union in particular. 
36. In fact, in the second half of March, two 
new events brought the state and party author-
ities to grips with Solidarity. 
3 7. First, in Radom on 17th March, the 
Polish authorities had to yield to the demands 
of local Solidarity leaders backed by a strike 
threat calling for the replacement of certain 
administrators accused of being responsible for 
the repressive measures taken during the events 
in June 1976. The action taken against party 
leaders, who had presumably merely carried out 
instructions, was probably very disturbing for 
all the party and state leaders. 
38. Second, this reaction no doubt largely 
explains the events which occurred two days 
later in Bydgocsz where, on 19th March, 
several local members of Solidarity were 
manhandled by the police who evacuated the 
hall in which a meeting of Solidarity was being 
held. 
39. These two events gave a new slant to the 
dispute between Solidarity and the party, since: 
(i) the Solidarity leaders were accused 
by some members of the movement 
of being too weak in face of tM 
state's demands and too inclined to 
respond to the catholic clergy's 
untiring calls for moderation; 
(ii) it transpired that local party author-
ities were particularly responsive to 
Solidarity's demands because they 
were based on deep-rooted uneasi-
ness of a political and economic 
nature which affected a large number 
of party members; 
(iii) however real may have been the 
concerns of the Polish leaders about 
the country's economic situation and 
the threat of a Soviet invasion, they 
were therefore often interpreted as 
arguments designed to convince the 
Solidarity leaders to abandon their 
claims and threats of strike. 
40. At the end of March and the beginning of 
April, there was thus a threefold crisis: inside 
the party, inside Solidarity and in relations 
between Solidarity and the state. In all three 
cases, the stake was the continuation of the 
three-month social truce. 
41. The plenum of the Party Central 
Committee met on 29th March, when hard-
liners and moderate elements came face to 
face. The former thought that the " right-
wing" tendency in Solidarity had now trium-
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phed and that the union had embarked on a 
fight for power against the party and against 
communism. However, sinct:J at the same time 
Solidarity demonstrated an undeniable spirit of 
concession, the moderate party elements were 
able to show that it was in the national interest 
to reach agreement. Finally, the plenum, 
without altering the balance l)etween the trends 
at the head of the party and! state, decided on 
an inquiry into responsibilit~ for the Bydgocsz 
affair, followed by sanctions and democratic 
changes within the party, whose congress is to 
be held in July, including free elections and a 
limit on the length of terms of office. Thus 
there are still conservative elements at the head 
of the party, but the desire to pursue the dialo-
gue continues to prevail. 
42. This is also so in Solidarity which, at the 
party plenum, made a major concession by 
reversing its decision to call a general strike for 
31st March. This decision was challenged by 
the more intransigent elements but was finally 
confirmed, just as the leaders remained in 
office. 
43. The fact that on both sides those who 
were most aware of econom~c and international 
realities and their political consequences were 
able to maintain the dialogue between Solidar-
ity and the party allowed the crisis in March 
and April 1981 to be overcome, but certainly 
not without leaving deep marks. The return to 
the compromise policy pursued since the 
Gdansk agreements had already proved parti-
cularly difficult, especially because of the st'rong 
pressure exerted by the Soviet Union to tip the 
scales in favour of the party's hard-liners. 
There is no guarantee that 'Wisdom and moder-
ation will continue to win the day in the 
coming months. 
IV. Soviet policy 
44. It is clear that the caution and moder-
ation shown by every sector of Polish public 
life is essentially due to the fear felt by all Poles 
of having the forces of the Soviet Union and its 
allies occupy Poland and impose a government 
and repressive measures by force. So far, the 
Soviet army, which has had forces on Polish 
territory since the second world war, has not 
intervened directly. It has probably been 
deterred from doing so on the one hand by the 
unanimity shown by the Polish people and on 
the other hand by the fact that the Soviet army 
was already involved in a deadlock in Afghan-
istan and that the conference on security and 
co-operation in Europe · was being held in 
Madrid. The Soviet Union has always set 
great store by the pursuit of certain aspects of 
detente, particularly in the economic field, and 
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the West has made it quite clear that military 
intervention in Poland would put an immediate 
end to the Madrid negotiations. 
45. It is equally clear that the Soviet Union 
considered events in Poland to be a threat to 
itself and its influence in Eastern Europe. The 
allies of Poland and the Soviet Union, 
including Czechoslovakia and above all the 
German Democratic Republic, appear to have 
brought strong pressure to bear on the Polish 
Government to ensure that it did not go too far 
in its concessions to the strikers and perhaps on 
the Soviet Government not to allow the Polish 
Government to yield too much. In fact, the 
Czechoslovak and East German leaders had 
every reason to fear that their own societies 
might be contaminated by Poland. 
46. Until August 1980, the member countries 
of the Warsaw Pact were very discreet about 
the Polish affair, which was referred to in their 
press only after the conclusion of the Gdansk 
agreements. Even on 28th August, Mr. Brezh-
nev delivered a long general policy speech in 
Alma Ata, but made no mention of Poland. 
But from then on the Soviet press began to refer 
to the Polish strikes, attributing to western 
agents responsibility for "subversive action by 
anti-socialist elements" trying "to combine 
their efforts to move the country away from the 
socialist system". It took the opportunity of 
issuing warnings or hardly-veiled threats to 
Polish leaders, putting them on their guard 
against the dangers for the regime of the strikes 
and unrest, debts to foreign countries and exces-
sive concessions to so-called anti-socialist 
elements. Among these concessions, recogni-
tion of trade unions outside party control was 
the most strongly and constantly condemned, 
even if it was explained by the shortcomings of 
the policy of Mr. Gierek who, having cut 
himself off from the working class, was respon-
sible for this result. Similar warnings were 
issued in October by Hungary, Czechoslovakia, 
Bulgaria and the German Democratic Repu-
blic. Finally, for the first time, on 19th 
September Mr. Muskie, United States Secretary 
of State, announced that the United States had 
noted Soviet troop movements close to the 
Polish frontier and, at the end of October, the 
GDR and Czechoslovakia "closed" their fron-
tiers with Poland. 
4 7. The tension which had been growing 
throughdut the month slackened with the 
impromptu visit by Mr. Kania and Mr. Pin-
kowski to Moscow on 30th October. All was 
as if the Soviet and Polish leaders had managed 
to reach an agreement, at least provisional: on 
the Soviet side, it was recognised that relations 
between the government and trade unions in 
Poland were "a purely Polish matter", which 
allowed Mr. Pinkowski later to make major 
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concessions to the leaders of Solidarity: libera-
tion of political prisoners and acceptance by the 
Supreme Court of the statutes of the new trade 
union. 
48. Conversely, while the Soviet Union 
granted financial assistance to Poland, the 
Polish leaders appear to have had to undertake 
to put their economy in order without delay 
and Mr. Walesa and the leaders of Solidarity 
were made to understand that it would not be 
possible to meet the economic undertakings 
entered into at Gdansk. There is no doubt 
that Mr. Walesa's friends understood that they 
would have to give in on this point since they 
then cancelled a strike order and since the 
beginning of November have sought to tone 
down differences between Polish workers and 
the state. 
49. The indications are that the governments 
of the other people's democracies did not take a 
favourable view of this respite Moscow allowed 
Warsaw, on the one hand because they were 
afraid contestation might spread to their own 
countries, particularly with denunciations of 
excesses committed by communist leaders such 
as provided material for criticism of Mr. 
Gierek, and on the other hand because they had 
to provide Poland with material assistance to 
ensure that it did not receive all the economic 
aid it needed from the West. 
50. Thus, in December 1980, the German 
Democratic Republic adopted a series of mea-
sures designed to aid Poland economically, 
including a financial contribution in western 
currencies intended to allow it to overcome the 
crisis. But at the same time the Government 
of the German Democratic Republic showed its 
displeasure at having to make such a contribu-
tion to refloating the Polish economy when it 
was not receiving the supplies of Polish coal it 
so greatly needed. 
51. But alongside these economic assistance 
measures everything indicates that serious mili-
tary steps have been taken by the Soviet Union 
and its allies to ensure that they could intervene 
quickly and massively in Poland if develop-
ments made this necessary. A large number of 
divisions have been .concentrated all round the 
Polish frontiers and at the end of November 
they were placed in a state of alert, which made 
western observers wonder whether Poland was 
not about to be invaded. 
52. At present, the pointers are that the 
Soviet Union and its allies still hope by threats 
to deter the Polish Government from making 
too many concessions to the protest movements 
and the movements themselves from going too 
far in their claims. At the same time, the 
utmost is being done to avoid the worst, i.e. 
armed intervention. It is quite clear that such 
deterrence can be effective only if based on very 
credible threats of intervention and that escala-
ting threats might lead to action even though 
this may not be the wish of the Soviet Union. 
53. The question is therefore not only 
whether the Soviet Union intends merely to 
deter or whether finally it intends to intervene. 
The situation alone implies a true danger of 
intervention. But intervention could not be a 
large-scale, brutal invasion as in Czechoslovakia 
in 1968. It may be a series of political 
pressures, accompanied by the deployment of 
forces along the frontiers, the strengthening of 
Soviet garrisons in Poland and economic 
measures designed to make the Polish Govern-
ment go back on the Gdansk agreements. This 
means that the West must not merely foresee 
what it would do in the event of Poland being 
invaded. It must hold continuing consultations 
on how to analyse the situation in Poland and, 
if necessary, how to react to developments that 
cannot be anticipated. 
54. The change of government in Poland in 
February 1981 had no immediate effect on the 
situation. The Soviet authorities, particularly 
Mr. Brezhnev at the Twenty-Sixth Soviet 
Communist Party Congress, solemnly asserted 
their confidence in the new Polish leaders to 
maintain a socialist regime in the country and 
restore calm. 
55. However, on 4th March 1981, at the 
close of the Twenty-Sixth Party Congress, there 
was a meeting between Soviet and Polish 
leaders. The final communique is important 
enough for your Rapporteur to quote the main 
part of it: 
" ... The Polish comrades spoke about the 
situation in their country and the mea-
sures taken to overcome the serious 
threat to the Polish people's socialist 
gains. The Polish United Workers' 
Party and the Government of the Polish 
People's Republic, in accordance with 
the decisions of the eighth plenary 
meeting of the PUWP central committee, 
relying on the working class, the working 
people and on all the conscious forces of 
society, will steadfastly press for the 
complete overcoming of anarchy and 
disarray and for the strengthening of the 
socialist system. 
Those taking part in the talk pointed out 
that imperialism and internal reaction 
hoped that the economic and political 
crisis in Poland would result in a change 
in the alignment of forces in the world 
and in a weakening of the socialist 
community and of the international 
communist movement and the entire 
liberation movement. This made a firm 
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and resolute rebuff to such dangerous 
attempts a particularly urgent matter. 
The socialist community is inseparable 
and the defence of that community is the 
cause, not only of each state, but also of 
the entire socialist coalition. 
The Soviet leaders stated that the USSR, 
together with the othelr fraternal coun-
tries, had given and Would continue to 
give, all the necessary sppport to socialist 
Poland and to the Polish communists in 
their tense work to bring about a major 
improvement in the situation in the 
country. That approach had received 
the full approval of the 26th Congress of 
the CPSU and was shared by all Soviet 
communists and the Soviet people. 
Confidence was expressed that the Polish 
communists had the possibilities and 
strength to turn the course of events and 
to eliminate the dangers hanging over the 
socialist gains of the Polish people. 
Soviet people have faith that Poland has 
been, and will continue to be, a reliable 
link of the socialist community, as has 
again been confirmed by the Polish 
leaders at the meeting. 
Those taking part in · the meeting were 
unanimous in pointing out that the com-
plex international situation and the big 
tasks that must be solved in the interests 
of continuing and deepening the process 
of detente, call with still greater force for 
the strengthening of the unity and cohe-
sion of the fraternal countries of socia-
lism. The meeting took place in a 
cordial atmosphere ._nd confirmed the 
common approach of the two sides to the 
questions under discussion ... ". 
56. Two points call fo~ attention in this 
text. The first is the statement that the course 
of events in Poland should be turned. What 
does that mean ? Is it merely a matter of 
rectifying an economic situation which was 
considerably worsened by events during the 
summer and autumn or even a political situa-
tion marked by the weakness of both state and 
party? Conversely, does it mean going back on 
the Gdansk and subsequent agreements ? 
57. The second point is the statement that 
the protection of the socialist community is the 
cause of the entire socialist
1 
coalition, i.e. where 
Poland is concerned, it is a reminder of the 
Brezhnev doctrine. 
58. This twofold statement may portray two 
different intentions : to strengthen the authority 
of the government and the moderate Solidarity 
leaders to ensure respect for the truce and a 
continuation of the compromise, or to indicate 
that the Soviet Union considered this corn-
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promise as a temporary means and its intention 
is to have the Polish Government revert to a 
stricter application of communist orthodoxy. 
Should the second interpretation prove to be 
correct, it would very probably mean that the 
crisis which began in the summer of 1980 is far 
from at an end and that the invasion of Poland, 
whether or not at the request of the Polish 
Government, would be the likely outcome of 
the crisis. The tone of the communique issued 
on 4th March, adopted at a time when joint 
manreuvres by Soviet and Polish forces on 
Polish territory could but recall the military 
threat, points strongly to the fear that this 
interpretation may be the right one, particularly 
as Pravda of 6th March referred to the collec-
tive responsibility of the socialist countries for 
maintaining party authority in Poland and 
strongly criticised the errors of the Polish 
leaders. This means that at the time of writing 
the threat of Soviet intervention again seems to 
be on the cards. 
59. In these circumstances, the measures 
taken by the Polish Government in March 1981 
against a few contestants and splinter groups 
almost breached the front formed with such 
difficulty between party and government on the 
one hand and Solidarity and the Catholic 
Church on the other to keep trade union claims 
within reasonable limits without, however, 
giving the Soviets satisfaction or, as a conse-
quence, averting the threat of armed interven-
tion hanging over Poland. This shows there-
fore what risks the West would be taking by 
intervening in Poland's internal affairs and 
what responsibility it would bear if it failed to 
warn the Soviet Union of all the inevitable 
consequences of intervention in Poland. 
60. Developments during the crisis in March 
and April 1981 showed clearly on the one hand 
that the Soviet Union is anxious to do its 
utmost to avoid intervening directly in a 
dispute which it knows, if it acts overtly, would 
inevitably bring it into opposition with almost 
the entire Polish people, and at the same time 
most free countries, and, on the other hand, 
that it is determined to make every effort to 
prevent the communist regime being called in 
question by the Polish people. 
61. The Soviet Union has acted on two 
levels: threatened military intervention and 
propaganda. As soon as the Bydgocsz affair 
occurred, official Soviet bodies indicated clearly 
that they approved all measures which might be 
taken by the Polish authorities to restore order 
in the country. They laid responsibility for the 
incidents at the door of Solidarity, whose more 
intransigent elements they accused of being 
manipulated by foreign countries, particularly 
the American CIA, which they claimed was 
financing Solidarity through the intermediary of 
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the ICFTU, the international confederation of 
free trade unions, and they quite openly and 
clearly encouraged the Polish Party and 
Government to be uncompromising and repres-
sive. This propaganda has been relayed by the 
press in most of the peoples' democracies which 
sometimes claimed that Solidarity was deter-
mined to use violence to overthrow the com-
munist regime in Poland. 
62. Agreed, it cannot be asserted that police 
brutality in Bydgocsz was demanded by the 
Soviet Union, but it is more than probable that 
the Soviet Party leaders were disturbed at the 
administrative purge measures taken by the 
Polish authorities to quell public discontent. It 
would not be the first time that there were 
signs of solidarity of interests between leading 
circles who, in the Soviet Union as in the 
peoples' democracies and until 1980 Poland, 
are kept in power in the name of a revolution-
ary ideology. However, the firmness demon-
strated by the Polish communist leaders in their 
desire to avoid calling on a foreign power, and 
the wisdom shown by Solidarity, have ensured 
that no Polish authority has appealed to the 
Soviet Union. 
63. The latter has therefore confined itself to 
sabre-rattling in the form of manoeuvres by the 
armed forces of several Warsaw Pact countries 
in Poland and the concentration of troops along 
Poland's frontiers. This is not a chance inter-
pretation of facts whose political nature is not 
evident. Indeed, concomitantly with the Soyuz 
81 manoeuvres, which were prolonged beyond 
the date planned for their completion at the 
beginning of April and whose theme was the 
assistance to be afforded to a friendly country 
whose communist regime was in danger, the 
Soviet press repeatedly announced that the 
Soviet Union was prepared to answer any call 
from the Polish authorities, and at the same 
time the Soviet threat was invoked by the 
Polish Party to convince Solidarity to moderate 
its demands. 
64. There was thus both threat and pressure 
from the Soviet Union. So far, neither had led 
to direct intervention, although obvious results 
have not been achieved thanks to the funda-
mental agreement which seems to exist between 
the Polish Party and Solidarity that nothing 
should be done which might justify Soviet 
intervention. There is no guarantee that either 
side will adhere to this position in the event of 
another crisis. 
V. The West's attitude 
65. The West has followed the whole Polish 
question with the closest attention but has been 
careful to do nothing which might be taken for 
intervention in Poland's internal affairs. So 
far, the only fact the Soviet Union has been 
able to invoke to support the idea of such inter-
vention is the financial assistance afforded by 
western trade unions to Solidarity. However, 
the deterioration of detente which began with 
the Afghanistan affair, information about the 
deployment of Soviet and East German forces 
on Poland's frontiers and the quite special rela-
tionship between certain western countries, 
particularly Belgium, and Poland mean that the 
West could not remain indifferent to that coun-
try's fate. There are many Polish immigrants 
throughout the western world and two of them, 
Mr. Muskie and Mr. Brzezinski, held key posts 
in the United States Democratic Administra-
tion. Finally, memories of the second world 
war, which was actually started because of the 
invasion of Poland, meant that no one could 
remain indifferent to the fate of a country for 
whose independence the world had fought for 
five years. 
66. The West therefore took seriously the 
Polish claims and the threats to Poland's inde-
pendence. But all the western countries have 
shown themselves keenly alive to the implica-
tions of the prevailing military situation. 
Soviet preponderance in conventional weapons 
in Europe precludes the use of conventional 
forces by the West. Moreover, the West can-
not entertain - and the treaties of alliance 
would not allow it - recourse to force for mat-
ters not directly affecting the independence of 
the western countries, a fortiori in conditions 
where the only chance of attaining its aims 
would be to use or at least threaten to use 
nuclear weapons. 
67. It was from the United States that word 
first came of concentrations of Soviet troops on 
Poland's frontiers at the beginning of Septem-
ber, and further troop movements were repor-
ted in the same areas at the end of November 
and beginning of December. On 9th Decem-
ber, the United States Government announced 
that four aircraft equipped with the A W AC sys-
tem had been sent to the Federal Republic to 
monitor Soviet military activities. In an inter-
view on 9th December, Mr. Muskie, then 
Secretary of State, described the American 
position: 
(i) With regard to Soviet intentions 
towards Poland, he said: " We do not 
know that they have made a deci-
sion. On the other hand, the prepa-
rations for intervention have been 
extensive and expensive. And one 
must conclude... that these prepara-
tions have been made in order to 
influence events ... " 
(ii) This remark was accompanied by a 
warning: " The Soviets of course 
53 
DOCUMENT 870 
must balance the objectives which 
would suggest intervention of one 
kind or another against the costs of 
such an interventioh. And there are 
costs that could flow: diplomatic, 
economic, political, ... violence in 
Poland ... the continuation of detente 
and its benefits ... world reaction ... " 
but he made no mention of direct 
military intervention by the United 
States. 
(iii) He appealed to the United States' 
European allies as follows: "It is 
important ... for aN concerned coun-
tries ... to seek by every means possi-
ble to deter the actlion which we seek 
to prevent: ... in direct communica-
tions with the Soviet Union, in 
public statements, and in every 
diplomatic channel available to 
them." 
68. From then on diplomatic deterrence was 
used by the West as never before, be. it before 
the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 or of 
Afghanistan in 1979. 
69. The United States' European allies for 
their part demonstrated their solidarity and 
desire to terminate any sigq of detente should 
Poland be invaded by postponing a number of 
planned official visits to Eastern European 
countries last autumn. The most spectacular 
measure was Chancellor Schmidt's decision not 
to meet leaders of the German Democratic 
Republic at the end of August. Similarly, Pre-
sident Giscard d'Estaing's visit to Poland was 
postponed. Western diplomatic contacts conti-
nued with the eastern countries, however, 
including Poland, at the level of ambassadors or 
Ministers for Foreign Affairs. For instance, 
Mr. Nothomb, Belgian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, visited Warsaw a~ the beginning of 
December. 
70. At its meeting on 2nd December, the 
European Council was able to adopt a text 
defining the position of the Nine towards events 
in Poland, as follows: 
" 1. In their relations with Poland, the 
Nine conform and will conform strictly 
to the United Nations Charter and to the 
principles of the Helsinki final act. 
2. In this context, they would point out 
that in subscribing to. these principles, the 
states signatory to the final act have 
undertaken in particular to: 
- respect the right of every country to 
choose and freely develop its own poli-
tical, social, economic and cultural sys-
tem as well as to determine its own 
laws and regulations ; 
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- refrain from any direct or indirect, 
individual or collective intervention in 
internal or external affairs which fall 
within the national competence of ano-
ther signatory state regardless of their 
mutual relations; 
- recognise the right of all people to pur-
sue their own political, economic, 
social and cultural development as they 
see fit and without external interfe-
rence. 
3. The Nine accordingly call upon all 
the signatory states to abide by these 
principles with regard to Poland and the 
Polish people. They emphasise that any 
other attitude would have very serious 
consequences for the future of internatio-
nal relations in Europe and throughout 
the world. " 
71. The convergence between European and 
American positions was shown at the ministe-
rial meeting of the North Atlantic Council on 
11th and 12th December by the adoption of a 
communique specifying that: 
" 
Detente has brought appreciable benefits 
in the field of East-West co-operation and 
exchange. But it has been seriously 
damaged by Soviet actions. It could not 
survive if the Soviet Union were again to 
violate the basic rights of any state to 
territorial integrity and independence. 
Poland should be free to decide its own 
future. The allies will respect the prin-
ciple of non-intervention and strongly 
urge others to do likewise. Any inter-
vention would fundamentally alter the 
entire international situation. The allies 
would be compelled to react in the man-
ner which the gravity of this development 
would require. Therefore, the Council 
will keep the situation under close and 
continuous review. At the same time, 
genuine Soviet efforts to restore the confi-
dence necessary for detente will meet 
with a ready response from the allies. 
" 
72. Thus, while warning the Soviet Union 
and its allies of the serious repercussions an 
intervention in Poland might have, the West 
did not wish to spell out the measures 
it considered taking in that event since knowing 
what its reaction might be would weaken the 
deterrent effect of the threat. Perhaps too the 
western countries wished to reserve the possibi-
lity of graduating their response according to 
the nature of the Soviet intervention. One way 
or another, it is to be expected that the western 
response would in any event include a radical 
economic boycott of the Soviet Union and its 
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allies, the breaking off of the Madrid conference 
and of all disarmament negotiations and mili-
tary equipment programmes would be strength-
ened throughout the West. 
73. The western countries did not confine 
themselves to measures of deterrence; they also 
wished to afford the Polish Government econo-
mic assistance as quickly and effectively as. 
possible. Thus, meeting in Brussels on 5th 
December 1980 in implementation of the 
decision taken at the summit meeting on 2nd 
December, the nine Ministers for Foreign 
Affairs decided to send Poland large consign-
ments of sugar, butter, meat, powdered milk, oil 
and various grains at prices well below those of 
the world market and a fortiori far less than 
prices on the European market. According to 
provisional calculations, the EEC's gift to 
Poland is believed to be equivalent to about 
300 million European currency units. 
74. It should be added that the Polish 
Government was allowed generous credit facili-
ties for obtaining these consumer goods, such 
facilities being a matter for bilateral negotia-
tions between Poland and each of the Nine. 
Thus, following Mr. Nothomb's visit to War-
saw, Belgium granted a moratorium on pay-
ments which Poland should have made in 
respect of earlier loans, and a western consor-
tium is being set up to arrange a very large loan 
to Poland in addition to the one made by the 
Federal Republic. 
75. Therefore, like the German Democratic 
Republic and the Soviet Union, the western 
countries have shown that they were determin-
ed to do everything in their power to help the 
Polish Government to overcome the crisis. 
This convergence between the positions adopt-
ed by the social partners in Poland, the mem-
ber countries of the Warsaw Pact and the West-
ern European countries shows that, in spite of 
present difficulties in the world economic situa-
tion there is general determination to do as 
much as possible to avoid recourse to force, and 
there is no reason to think that the Soviet posi-
tion is different, even if it is not at all sure that 
the Soviet Union and its allies are prepared to 
let the Gdansk agreements operate. 
76. Hence, measures taken by the West to 
help Poland solve its problems make sense only 
insofar as they are accompanied by an extre-
mely firm policy towards the Soviet Union: a 
passing convergence of interests on the need to 
avoid a serious international crisis must not be 
allowed to restrict progressively the freedom 
gained last summer by the Polish people, who 
are already relinquishing economic concessions 
granted at the height of the crisis but which are 
probably beyond Poland's reach. 
77. It is naturally impossible to assess the 
impact of western warnings on Soviet decisions 
during the crisis in March and April 
1981. They probably had some effect and 
possibly they helped to deter the Soviet Union 
from using force to impose its own solution in 
the Polish affair. 
78. It is also difficult to foresee the possible 
effects of the measures taken to help the Polish 
economy. Recent statements by Mr. Kania 
indicated that Poland's foreign debt amounted 
to $ 27,000 million. Servicing this debt is 
believed to cost about $ 10,000 million in 1981 
and new loans contracted by Poland in recent 
months are therefore mainly to allow it to meet 
the payments which are due, leaving little for 
major productive investments. Moreover, the 
Polish Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Jagielski, 
has visited several western capitals to ask 
for significant postponements of payments. 
Poland's twelve main western creditors met in 
Paris in February and decided to give a favour-
able response to his requests, provided, how-
ever, as Mr. Giscard d'Estaing explained on 
30th March, Poland manages to reorganise its 
economy without external intervention or 
internal violence, which would infringe upon 
the gains of the Polish people. Also in 
February, the Soviet Union for its part granted 
a moratorium until 1985 on major loans 
contracted by Poland in 1976 and 1980. 
79. It should nevertheless be noted that 
the West cannot be expected to grant loans 
without security to Poland indefinitely. Help-
ing Poland to emerge from a serious economic 
crisis is an aim worth sacrifices, but Poland 
must initiate an economic policy to adapt its 
structures accordingly. So far, the measures 
taken by the Polish Government, particularly 
the plan adopted in January by the committee 
responsible for economic reforms, hold promise 
of an early recovery of the Polish economy, 
although some liberalisation, particularly in the 
agricultural sector, should be beneficial, in the 
medium term at least. But the Polish economy 
is so compromised that a protracted effort is 
called for to achieve the necessary recovery. 
This aspect of the problem cannot be over-
looked by those who set great store by Poland's 
independence. 
VI. Conclusions 
80. Among the concerns expressed by the 
General Affairs Committee in its discussion on 
events in Poland on 2nd December 1980 was 
first the need to show the solidarity of Euro-
pean public opinion for the declaration made at 
the Luxembourg summit meeting and its deter-
mination to oppose a possible Soviet interven-
tion in Poland. At the same time nothing 
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should be done to give the impression that the 
West might intervene militarily in Poland, the 
aim being not to encourage excessive resistance 
on the part of the Polish workers and to pre-
serve detente as much as possible and insofar as 
it serves the Eastern European nations, as was 
the case of the Helsinki final. act. Finally, the 
WEU Assembly emphasiseq that it had no 
intention of interfering in any way in Poland's 
internal affairs. 
81. This course seems as justified now as it 
was at the time. It is most important for west-
em solidarity to remain firm in face of the 
Soviet threat to Poland. 
82. For these reasons your Rapporteur put 
the following two questions to the General 
Affairs Committee: 
(i) Is it enough, as the General Affairs Com-
mittee thought on 2nd December, to consider 
that any retaliatory measures by the West 
should be planned and spelled out, or should 
proposals be made on the subject? 
(ii) Is it necessary to remain in the strict 
framework of WEU or should action be taken 
in other western organi1>ations (European 
Communities, Council of Europe)? 
83. The Committee discussed these questions 
on 16th February 1981 and your Rapporteur 
considers there was a consensus in favour of the 
following two answers: 
1. Measures to be taken in tfle event of foreign 
aggression against Poland 
84. If WEU's debates are to have sufficient 
impact, it seems essential fdr concrete measures 
to be proposed. 
85. So far, there has beep. no indication that 
the western governments have agreed on the 
joint retaliatory measures they would take in 
the event of aggression against Poland. 
86. There is no doubt ·about what is not 
wanted: armed intervention is not wanted, nor 
must the Poles be encouraged to adopt inflexi-
ble positions, ideologically or in alliances, 
which might provoke Soviet intervention. 
87. This must be said in order to support the 
moderate faction among the Polish leaders and 
remove any justification ·for a Soviet inter-
vention. 
88. But at the same time it must be said that 
any coercive action by the 1 Soviet Union and its 
allies would induce the western powers to take 
a series of measures on which they have already 
agreed. 
89. A moot point is whether the measures to 
be taken in such an event should be made 
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known, particularly since the Soviet Union 
could intervene in many different ways. But 
there is no disputing the usefulness of agreeing 
on the measures that should be taken. When 
the " accident " occurs, it is too late to seek 
agreement on measures that have to be taken 
urgently. 
90. If the Assembly of WEU is to have any 
influence, it should examine what measures 
might be taken so as to be able to discuss them 
with the Council. 
91. It emerged from the discussion in 
Committee that the latter did not intend to list 
measures to be taken in specific cases but 
thought a solemn warning should be addressed 
to the Soviet Union, which was not done in the 
case of Czechoslovakia, nor of Afghanistan. 
The substance of any such warning could but 
be to record that the Soviet Union, by invading 
Poland, would bring to an end all that came 
under the heading of " detente ", one key ele-
ment of which being the Helsinki final act, the 
other being all the measures taken for the limi-
tation of armaments. 
92. Thus, it would not be the West which 
decided to terminate detente but the Soviet 
Union which, by such action, would be tearing 
up the Helsinki final act, making the whole text 
null and void, including: 
(i) the recognition of states and fron-
tiers; 
(ii) non-interference in the internal 
affairs of states; 
(iii) the free circulation of persons and 
ideas; 
(iv) economic co-operation. 
93. The West could not lightly relinquish the 
advantages it too draws from detente, but if this 
were to be nothing but a manoeuvre to cover a 
Soviet policy to make use of the Helsinki text 
only insofar as it was of direct advantage and to 
violate its undertakings once this was no longer 
so, the West might no longer feel bound by this 
text. 
94. The enumeration of these four essential 
points clearly shows the areas in which the 
West might take action to convince the Soviet 
Union that it is embarking on a course which is 
incompatible with detente. It is not necessary 
to go into the details of how the measures 
should be applied if the West agreed on these 
principles which obviously are such as to chal-
lenge the very foundations of the system of 
Soviet domination in Europe. Indeed, Euro-
pean opinion would not understand that, in 
face of a challenge to the essential principles on 
which the Helsinki final act is based, nationals 
- diplomatic or other - of the eastern countries 
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in the West should continue to benefit from the 
freedom denied to western diplomats or natio-
nals in the East. Nor would it understand why 
the Soviet Union and its allies should enjoy 
particularly advantageous price and credit 
conditions in their contracts with western coun-
tries or why internal subversion in countries 
with which they claim to maintain normal rela-
tions should be their exclusive prerogative. 
95. Moreover, an invasion of Poland would 
be a demonstration of imperialism in face of 
which a policy of arms limitation, as defined 
inter alia in the SALT 11 agreement, which 
ensures overwhelming military preponderance 
for the Soviet Union, in the European theatre 
at least, would be a dangerous sign of weakness. 
Such an invasion could but preclude ratifica-
tion of SALT 11, the start of SALT Ill and the 
pursuit of all other negotiations on disarma-
ment so as to allow the West as a whole, 
following the example just given by the new 
United States Administration, to make the 
armaments effort which circumstances would 
force upon them. Such an effort would admit-
tedly call for heavy sacrifices at the present 
world economic juncture, but the threats to 
balance and hence to peace would then be such 
that absolute priority would have to be given 
without fail to a return to the balance of forces 
in Europe. 
2. Framework for action 
96(a) The Assembly's interlocutor is the WEU 
Council of Ministers. 
97. It is to the Council that Assembly recom-
mendations must be addressed. 
98. It should be added that in order to be 
effective a true dialogue should be instigated 
between the Assembly and the Council on the 
latter's proposals. 
99. Such a dialogue should be started as soon 
as possible if it is to have any significance. 
IOO(b) However, it might be very worthwhile to 
foster concerted action between the various 
assemblies, at least in matters of general interest 
like the case in point. 
- European Parliament: 
The European Parliament has already 
adopted a position on the general atti-
tude to be taken by the Community 
countries. If the WEU Assembly goes 
further and, as has just been suggested, 
makes specific proposals on possible 
retaliatory measures, these proposals 
might be communicated to the Euro-
pean Parliament. 
- Council of Europe: 
Your Rapporteur considers it would 
carry considerable weight if an Assem-
bly representing twenty-two countries 
were to endorse proposals made by 
WEU. 
101 (c) Where governmental action is concern-
ed once it is established that the Soviet Union 
has put an end to detente, all frameworks in 
which European policy is worked out should be 
used to define, as soon as possible, the measures 
to be taken jointly with the United States, 
Canada and other countries wishing to be asso-
ciated with them. 
102. Naturally, the first organisation concer-
ned would be NATO, an emergency meeting of 
whose Council at the highest level would be 
essential. But neither the EEC, for the com-
mercial implications, nor the OECD or the 
Council of Europe, for associating non-member 
countries of the Alliance with these measures, 
could be left out. The WEU Council's specific 
role might be to promote these consultations 
and, provided it met often enough, to encourage 
Western Europe to play its due role in such 
circumstances and to ensure co-ordination of 
the measures its members would have to take in 
order to be effective and set an example. If in 
these circumstances the WEU Council did not 
react, those who showed no faith in Europe by 
seeking a bilateral relationship with the United 
States or by raising the question of a directorate 
of the leading members of the Atlantic Alliance 
would be proved right. 
VII. Final remarks 
103. One may question: 
(i) The WEU Assembly's aptitude to take 
effective action on matters of this kind with its 
present procedure. 
104. A crisis such as the one in Poland is 
generally acute for a relatively short period, a 
few months at the most. 
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105. Is it imaginable that uncertainty about a 
Soviet intervention - in one form or another -
will last several months longer? Perhaps, but 
something might happen at any time to force 
the West to take steps immedjately. 
106. This means that if the Committee appro-
ves this report on 27th April, as planned, the 
Assembly would adopt a position at its June 
session, by which time the problem may no 
longer be topical. 
107. This drawback can be avoided in various 
ways: 
- convocation of the Assembly in extra-
ordinary session, as foreseen in Order 
53; 
- delegation granted by the Assembly to 
the General Affairs Committee for 
urgent matters; 
- transmission of the General Affairs 
Committee's proposals to the Council 
of Ministers and dialogue with the 
latter on this basis, for instance at the 
joint meeting to be held in the spring. 
108. These procedures are moreover not 
exclusive, but it should be underlined that there 
is a great danger of ineffectiveness if urgent 
matters are handled in accordance with proce-
dure which is ill-suited. 
(ii) The procedure for a dialogue with the 
Council of Ministers. 
1 09. A dialogue with the Council of Ministers 
is impossible at Assembly level since the dialo-
gue has to be in the form of questions and ans-
wers which is conceivable only between a small 
number of persons, which would not prevent 
the Assembly from taking it up again, on the 
contrary, since debates would in that event 
have been prepared by prior talks and the 
results obtained. However this may be, the 
General Affairs Committee is entitled to hope 
that the joint meeting planned for 3rd June 
1981 will help it to start a dialogue which is 
clearly necessary and thus, at the session of the 
Assembly, present a reali$tic picture of the 
situation and of the means at Europe's disposal 
for making an effective contribution to over-
coming the difficulties created by the Polish 
crisis. 
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Amendments 1 and 2 
Developments in Poland 
AMENDMENTS 1 and 21 
tabled by Mr. Portheine and others 
15th June 1981 
1. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from " Poland " to the end and 
insert: 
" which would constitute a flagrant violation of the principles laid down in the Helsinki final 
act and would have consequences for the future CSCE process ; ". 
2. In paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "in 1980 ". 
Signed: Portheine, Vohrer, Blaauw 
I. See 6th Sitting, 18th June 1981 (Amendment I withdrawn; Amendment 2 agreed to). 
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Amendments 3, 4, 5 and 6 
Developments in Poland 
AMENDMENTS 3, 4, 5 and 61 
tabled by MM. Blaauw, Vohrer and the Liberal Group 
17th June 1981 
3. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "planning what measures all 
member countries should take in application" and insert "implementation". 
4. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "application ,of these measures " 
and insert "implementation". 
5. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph 4. 
6. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out paragraph 5. 
Signed: Blaauw, Vohrer and the Liberal Group 
I. See 6th Sitting, 18th June 1981 (Amendment 3 negatived; Amendment 4 not moved; Amendments 5 and 6 agreed to). 
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Amendment 7 
Developments in Poland 
AMENDMENT 71 
17th June 1981 
tabled by Mr. Hanin, Sir Frederic Bennett and Mr. Miiller 
7. In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from " Poland " to the end and 
insert: 
" which would be a flagrant violation of the Helsinki agreements and call in question their 
content ; ". 
Signed: Hanin, Bennett, Muller 
1. See 6th Sitting, 18th June 1981 (Amendment agreed to). 
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Document 871 27th April 1981 
European security and events in the Gulf area 
REPORT1 
submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee2 
by Mr. Forni, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
on European security and events in the Gulf area 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Fomi, Rapporteur 
I. Introduction 
11. The situation in Afghanistan 
Ill. The Iranian-Iraqi conflict 
IV. The southern shore of the Gulf 
V. Conclusions 
I. Adopted unanimously by the Committee. 
2. Members of the Committee: Sir Frederic Bennett 
(Chairman); MM. De Poi, Portheine (Vice-Chairmen); MM. 
Ahrens, Berrier, Mrs. Boniver, MM. Brugnon (Alternate: 
Form), Conti Persini, Deschamps, Druon, Gessner (Alter-
nate: Vohrer), Hanin, Hardy, Jung, Lagneau (Alternate: 
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Miche[), Lord McNair (Alternate: Atkinson), MM. Mangel-
schots, Mommersteeg, Muller, Lord Reay, MM. Redde-
mann, Thoss (Alternate: Berchem), Urwin, Valiante, 
Vecchietti, V oogd. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are 
printed in italics. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on European security and events in the Gulf area 
The Assembly, 
Recalling its Recommendation 361; 
Noting that the situation brought about by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has not changed 
since then but that the consequences for the Afghan people have become considerably worse; 
Considering that this invasion also constitutes a direct threat to the security of all southern 
Asian countries as well as to peace in the world; 
Recognising that the lack of progress towards peace between Israel and its neighbouring 
countries makes it impossible to restore stability throughout the Middle East; 
Deploring the prolongation of the armed conflict between Iraq and Iran; 
Considering that it is of vital interest to Europe to maintain good relations with all the Arab 
countries but not to intervene in any way in the internal affairs of any of these countries, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Demonstrate the will of its members to oppose any intervention by the Soviet Union in the 
Middle Eastern countries; 
2. Concert its efforts with the United States to afford assistance to the Afghan resistance 
movement; 
3. At the same time express Europe's determination to oppose Soviet military intervention and its 
will not to intervene in disputes which remain confined to the area; 
4. Actively and jointly seek agreement between all countries likely to supply weapons to Iraq and 
Iran with a view to halting arms supplies to the two belligerents; 
5. With a view to making Europe less dependent on Middle Eastern oil producers, propose 
consultations with the governments of other oil-consuming countries designed to promote an energy 
policy aimed at a progressive reduction in world oil consumption. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Forni, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. The Gulf area has little unity and is 
rather isolated. It is surrounded on both sides 
by desert regions which are difficult to cross, 
particularly as they are mountainous in the 
north, in Iran, and in the South-West, in 
Oman. Only at its western end does the Meso-
potamian plain, where conditions are suitable 
for human settlement, bring the Gulf into 
contact with the wealthy inhabited areas of the 
"fertile crescent". In all, about 80 million per-
sons live between Afghanistan and Yemen, but 
not surprisingly they are rather scattered. 
Apart from a few areas suitable for agriculture 
or stockbreeding in the mountainous regions of 
Afghanistan, North-West Iran and the south-
east of the Arabian peninsula and the Mesopo-
tamian plain, Arabia and inland Iran had had, 
until recently, only a scattered nomadic popul-
ation. 
2. A few ports of minor importance led to 
the establishment of very small towns. How-
ever, the discovery and exploitation of oil in 
the twentieth century gave considerable impetus 
to the growth of some of these towns. Today, 
the southern shore of the Gulf has a number of 
relatively highly-populated centres, separated 
from each other by vast expanses of desert. 
Because of this very rapid urbanisation, the 
population of the area is far from homoge-
neous. Migration has been such that the popu-
lation of most of these states, particularly the 
smaller ones, includes far more foreigners than 
original inhabitants. For instance, there are 
only some 562,000 nationals in Kuwait for a 
population of a million and a half. These 
foreigners are of course Bedouins who have 
settled but there are also Arab-speaking peoples 
from Egypt, Lebanon and Palestine as well as 
Iranians, Pakistanis and Indians who mix little 
with the indigenous population but who in 
many cases settle in the area without it ever 
being possible for them to take root perma-
nently. 
3. The principal unifying factor throughout 
the region is Islam, which, starting in the 
seventh century, spread to all the shores of the 
Gulf, but it is not the same Islam every-
where. Shiism dominates on the northern 
shore of the Gulf, but also has a strong foothold 
on the southern shore, whereas all the states 
except Iran are ruled by Sunnites. Shiites are 
not considered full-ranking citizens in most sta-
tes south of the Gulf where, as in Iraq where 
they are in the majority, they constitute an 
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unreliable faction for the · governments in 
power. 
4. Moreover, there has been tension in 
Islam since the beginning of this century and it 
has been particularly serious in the regions sur-
rounding the Gulf. In fact the tradition where-
by the head of the tribe was a religious leader 
who ensured that the people respected Bedouin 
traditions has been maintaindd in a number of 
states. This has inevitably been called in ques-
tion by the very rapid development of an indus-
trial-type economy and a society in which the 
circulation of money occupies a large place and 
where the middle- and working-class elements 
have developed considerably whereas the 
nomads have become margtnal. The conse-
quence has been, on the one hand, the emer-
gence of a new elite, westernised or sensitive to 
communist propaganda, which questions both 
the political regime and the influence of tradi-
tional Islam, and, on the other hand, an Islamic 
reactionary movement which has been making 
itself felt for a number of years. It rejects 
outright any change in society and attacks local 
dynasties and also the western influence with 
which it accuses them of being in compli-
city. Events in the great mosque at Mecca in 
November 1979 may be COID!pared with the Ira-
nian revolution and a number of demonstra-
tions emanating from fundamentalist move-
ments to be found in nearly all the Arab 
countries. 
5. In face of this funda:Q').entalism, the Baa-
thist policy in Iraq and in Syria represents an 
attempt to associate a strict Islam with the 
development of a modern civilisation, but at 
the cost of a dictatorship which is sometimes 
called "Arab socialism". So far, it has 
managed to take hold only .in countries with a 
long-standing urban tradition and naturally 
meets the strongest hostility in traditionalist 
circles and among the Emirs. 
6. Hence, while Islam is a diversifying as 
much as a unifying factor, the feeling of belong-
ing to a great Arab nation concerns only some 
of those living round the Gulf. It is not the 
case for the majority of Iranians, the Iraqi 
Kurds or the Indians and Pakistanis who have 
settled in Oman or the Emirates. Even for 
most of those who consider themselves Arabs, 
Arabism today does not represent a true factor 
of political unity but only a rather vague yearn-
ing. In particular, it runs counter to the inte-
rests of local rulers who are not very anxious to 
see subversive forces estabLishing themselves in 
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their states in the guise of Arabism and ques-
tioning their authority or the stability of the 
traditional social system. 
7. The whole region extending, on both 
sides of the Gulf, from the Red Sea to the fron-
tiers of the Soviets Union may therefore be 
considered unstable, over-rapid accession to 
vast wealth due almost solely to the exploi-
tation of oil making it an area of frequent 
change and unrest now and probably for a long 
time to come. 
8. The fact that the region is somewhat 
removed from the great international lines of 
communication and the major areas of 
confrontation might allow the West to let natu-
ral developments settle since over the years 
they should lead to progressive adaptation to 
the political and social requirements of a 
modem economy. But the Gulf area contains 
about one-third of world oil reserves and since 
the countries of the area are not heavy consu-
mers, it supplies more than three-quarters of 
the oil on the world market. 
9. Consequently, the West cannot ignore 
what happens there since, as in October 1973, a 
decision by a few major oil producers to stop 
exports or to raise their prices sharply is 
enough to trigger off a major crisis in Europe 
and throughout the world. Western Europe 
imports about 80 % of its oil requirements from 
the Middle East and stocks in consumer 
countries cannot in present circumstances 
represent more than three or four months' 
consumption. Western industry is so depen-
dent on oil that it would soon grind to a halt if 
Europe no longer had access to the Middle East 
production. It may be hoped that by the end 
of the century oil will play only a secondary 
role in Europe's economy but, in the meantime, 
access to the Gulf is vital for Europe. The 
same is true for Japan and, to a lesser extent, 
the United States. 
10. The Soviet Union for its part is constan-
tly tempted to take advantage of tension prevai-
ling in the Gulf area to improve its own posi-
tions. It is probably not trying to extend its 
direct influence as far as the Red Sea but far 
more probably, on the one hand, to prevent the 
effects of the Islamic revival spreading to Soviet 
Moslems and, on the other hand, to use the 
control of oil production as a means of pressure 
on the western world. The situation in the 
Gulf area must be viewed from this twofold 
standpoint. 
11. The year 1980 was rich in events in that 
area: it opened with the invasion of Afghanistan 
by Soviet forces and the repression of the rebel-
lion in the great mosque at Mecca in Saudi 
Arabia, while Iran, following the revolution 
which brought the Shiite clergy to power, took 
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the members of the United States Embassy in 
Tehran hostage. The year came to an end 
without the slightest sign of a solution to the 
Afghan affair, and new and serious fighting 
started between Iraq and Iran in November 
1980 leading to further anxiety about stability 
in the area and oil supplies passing through the 
Strait of Hormuz. 
12. Obviously Europe cannot ignore such 
events, which may have direct or indirect reper-
cussions on its activity and security. The aim 
of the present report is to examine the situation 
with a view to defining a number of principles 
which your Rapporteur believes should govern 
the preparation of a policy for the Western 
European countries which, to be effective, must 
be concerted. 
11. The situation in Afghanistan 
13. Since last November, when the General 
Affairs Committee adopted Mr. Hardy's report 
on the political implications for Europe of the 
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, there have 
been few developments on the spot. Your 
Rapporteur can therefore be brief about this 
nevertheless essential matter. Information re-
ceived indicates that the Soviet Union has an 
armed force of about 110,000 men in the coun-
try who are finding it difficult to control the 
large towns (although according to recent infor-
mation Kandahar, the country's second town, is 
almost in the hands of the insurgents). These 
forces find it extremely difficult to move 
convoys about in daytime on the country's few 
main roads and they have absolutely no control 
over the territory. Frequent punitive raids 
carried out with large numbers of troops and 
modem weapons have led to the destruction of 
a few villages and the massacre of the inhabi-
tants of a few valleys but the Soviets - and still 
less what remains of the Afghan army - are 
unable to hold ground. 
14. The number of Afghan refugees in neigh-
bouring countries has apparently increased 
considerably. It is particularly tragic that the 
figure has now reached about one and a half 
million, i.e. more than 1 0 % of the Afghan 
population, more than two-thirds of whom are 
settled along Pakistan's frontier with Afghanis-
tan. Since the Soviets have no means of 
controlling the frontiers, there is a steady 
exchange between refugees and rebels. 
15. It is certain that the Afghan people are 
almost unanimous in their resistance to the 
Soviet Union and the government it maintains 
by force in Kabul. However, there is unani-
mity only in face of a foreign invader and what 
is known of Afghan resistance movements 
allows it to be feared that it might be very diffi-
cult to set up a government in exile capable of 
bringing together all the tendencies and also all 
the tribal forces participating in the resistance 
movement. The present conflict may therefore 
be long drawn-out. Military victory by the 
resistance movement seems out of the question, 
but occupation of the whole country by a regu-
lar army seems equally impossible. 
16. However, the conflict may well not 
remain localised. At present, the main risk of 
extension seems to come from the vast area of 
Baluchistan, situated on Iranian, Afghan and 
Pakistani territory between Kabul and the 
Indian Ocean. Pakistan's defeat by India in 
1974, followed by the 1975 coup d'etat, the Ira-
nian revolution in 1979 and the outbreak of 
war in Afghanistan seem to have helped to revive 
national feelings in Baluchistan. From 1973 to 
1977, there was in effect civil war in the Pakis-
tani section of the area. In 1979, the fall of 
the Shah led to serious unrest in the Iranian 
section, and the problem of the future of the 
Baluchi people now seems to have arisen. 
17. Precise details of the number and geogra-
phical distribution of the Baluchi people vary 
widely according to the source of information: 
there are in fact Baluchi minorities throughout 
the Middle East, particularly in the Gulf Emira-
tes, and Baluchi nationalists often take ethnic 
concepts as a basis for claiming that there are 
up to thirty million Baluchis. In fact, using 
linguistic criteria, about five million persons 
speak Baluchi, a language which resembles 
Kurdish, and consequently the languages spo-
ken in Mede in ancient times. They form 
most of the population in a vast territory of 
mountains and steppes covering 600,000 
sq.km., i.e. larger than France, divided between 
three sovereignties and with outlets on the 
Indian Ocean, the Strait of Hormuz and the 
Gulf with a 1 ,500 km. coast along which there 
are several small ports, at present very badly 
equipped. Little is known of the area's natural 
resources but they include natural gas and ores, 
including copper. 
18. All this shows the interest Baluchistan 
represents for the Soviet Union: situated bet-
ween Afghanistan and the coast, to a depth of 
some 600 km., control of it would allow air and 
naval bases to be established along the Strait of 
Hormuz for action throughout the Middle East 
and the Gulf area. Certain observers wonder 
whether the Soviet Union's true aim in inter-
vening in Afghanistan was not to gain a hold on 
Baluchistan. 
19. There is no proof of this, but the growth 
of Baluchi nationalist movements in recent 
years and the fact that they are prepared to lean 
on any ally to further their national cause may 
incite the Soviet Union to help them in order 
to destabilise Iran and Pakistan and extend its 
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influence as far as the Indian Ocean. Such a 
policy would obviously mean keeping the 
Soviet army in Afghanistan. · 
20. Pakistan for its part seems to be torn bet-
ween two contradictory requ~rements since its 
government, contested in the country (as further 
shown by the hijacking of a Pakistani airliner 
by supporters of the former President, Zulficar 
Ali Bhutto, in March 1981}, <1:annot turn down 
appeals for help from refugees who are the reli-
gious brethren of the Pakistani people living in 
the frontier areas and often qf the same ethnic 
and cultural group. In particular, this is so for 
the Pathans and the Baluchis. But nor can 
General Zia ul-Haq's government grant the 
Afghans the military assistance they request lest 
it give the Soviet Union a pretext for interven-
ing against Pakistan. Thus,. in March 1981, 
the government announced that it was not pre-
pared to serve as an intermediary for the arms 
supplies which President Reagan was consider-
ing for the Afghan resistance movement. 
Hence it is now clear that there is a twofold -
internal and external - threat to Pakistan, in 
face of which it cannot rely on the American 
alliance alone, particularly because of the 
strength of the Islamic revival in Pakistan 
itself. It prefers to turn to Western Europe, as 
being less compromising in the eyes of the fun-
damentalists, and above all to China to provide 
it with the assistance needed for its faltering 
economy and arms for resisting any possible 
attack from abroad. Clearly, and in accor-
dance with its interests, its fitst aim is to restore 
peace in Afghanistan, but this does not mean 
that it will be able to escape increasingly dange-
rous threats both at home and abroad. In 
some respects, Pakistan has already replaced 
Afghanistan as the buffer state between the 
great Asian powers - the Soviet Union, China 
and India - but there is no guarantee that it can 
fulfil all the internal and external conditions 
demanded by this difficult role. 
21. This aspect of the situation is an addi-
tional reason for wanting peace to be restored 
in Afghanistan, which wouM obviously imply 
the withdrawal of Soviet forces, the subsequent 
formation by the Afghans. themselves of an 
appropriate regime with, in particular, the par-
ticipation of all ethnic, linguistic and religious 
factions of the population. 
22. The Soviet Union has no choice but to 
seek a relatively honourable way out of the hor-
nets' nest it has fallen into by invading Afgha-
nistan. Military and political failures on the 
spot are evident. Diplomatic damage has also 
been considerable, for the Soviet Union has 
been condemned not only by the West but also 
by the third world countries it has always tried 
to court. In September 1980, the great inter-
national Islamic conference organised in Tash-
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kent to commemorate the fifteenth centenary of 
the Hegira was a fiasco for the Soviet 
Union. Two-thirds of the countries invited 
refused to attend and the others showed their 
hostility to the policy of the Soviet Union 
which failed to obtain the adoption of a final 
communique. Similarly, the conference of 
non-aligned countries held in New Del,hi in 
February 1981 came to an end on 13th Febru-
ary with a "consensus" condemning foreign 
intervention in Afghanistan and Cambodia and 
implying a refusal to recognise the regime 
imposed on these countries by the Soviet 
Union. 
23. In these circumstances, the West's pros-
pects of action are relatively clear. It must 
help to restore peace on the basis of the right of 
nations to self-determination. This means that 
it cannot remain neutral or refuse assistance to 
the resistance movement, but nor should it 
humiliate the Soviet Union; it should help it 
rather, if it accepts, to find a way out. This is 
said to have been the sense of the proposals 
made by Lord Carrington in November 1980 
mentioned in Mr. Hardy's report. 
24. In January 1981, in a message to Mr. 
Brezhnev, the contents of which were revealed 
on 28th January, the President of the French 
Republic proposed the convocation of a confe-
rence on non-interference in Afghanistan bet-
ween all Afghanistan's neighbouring countries, 
the five permanent members of the Security 
Council and certain Islamic countries in order 
to try to find solutions to the problem. 
Although sometimes reticent, most of these sta-
tes agreed to the proposal, which was endorsed 
by the United States and most Western Euro-
pean countries. But the Afghan Government 
refused any interference in what it considered 
an internal matter, thus indicating that the 
Soviet Union is not likely to agree to such a 
conference being held either. 
25. In adopting the recommendation in the 
report by Mr. Hardy, the WEU Assembly asked 
the Western European governments to provide 
the Afghanistan rebellion: 
full financial assistance and, if 
necessary, supplies of military equipment 
... until the USSR proves it is ready to 
negotiate the withdrawal of its forces 
from Afghanistan." 
There was obviously no question of the Assem-
bly encouraging the continuation of a conflict 
with no way out; its aim was to ask govern-
ments to show clearly that they cannot remain 
neutral in an affair of such gravity and still less 
bow down to the Soviet show of strength. Any 
act of solidarity towards the Afghan rebellion is 
a serious warning to the Soviet Union, which 
cannot ignore its self-inflicted isolation, and it 
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is already more than probable that Poland has 
benefited from a degree of Soviet patience in 
recent months which could not have been 
expected without the backlash of the Afghan 
resistance movement, because the Soviet Union 
had no wish to find itself committed on two 
fronts at the same time and to arouse too strong 
an international reaction. 
Ill. The Iranian-Iraqi conflict 
26. Relations between Iran and Iraq have 
always been difficult. There has been terri-
torial or ethnic rivalry between Mesopotamia 
and the nomadic peoples of the Iranian plateau 
throughout history, but it assumed a new 
dimension in the twentieth century with the 
emergence of national states whose territories 
correspond neither to ethnic groups nor to the 
different Islamic persuasions. One aspect is 
the fact that the Kurdish people is divided bet-
ween Iraqi, Iranian and Turkish territories and 
all three countries have been tempted to unify 
this people to their own advantage. In rebel-
lion against Iraq until 1975, the Kurds then had 
the support of Iran which supplied them with 
money and weapons. Since 1979, they have 
been in rebellion against Iran and it is more 
than likely that Iraq has supplied them with the 
assistance they require. 
27. Moreover, in the Shatt al-Arab region the 
frontiers between Iraq, Iran and Kuwait are 
constantly being contested. Indeed, this is the 
area containing the world's largest oil resour-
ces. The distance between Abadan, Basra and 
Kuwait is no more than 200 km. There is a 
large population, almost entirely Arab even in 
Iranian Khuzistan. Consequently, Iraq has 
never been satisfied with a division which it 
considers too favourable to Iran and Kuwait. 
Its sole outlet to the sea is extremely narrow 
and easily threatened. It believes it represents 
Arabism in the region, whereas the Khuzistan 
Arabs form only a minority in the Iranian state, 
and it questions the legitimacy of the Emirate 
of Kuwait. 
28. The Iranian revolution in 1979 seriously 
worsened the situation. Most Iraqis are Shiites 
and could not disregard the establishment of a 
regime in Iran dominated by Shiite clergy. 
Moreover, under the 1975 Algiers Agreements, 
the Shah was powerful enough to impose on 
Iraq a particularly unfavourable settlement to 
outstanding issues. In exchange for Iran stop-
ping its assistance to the Kurdish rebellion, Iraq 
had to relinquish control of the Shatt al-Arab 
and certain territories on the left bank of the 
estuary. Even the few portions of territory 
which Iran should have given it in compen-
sation were never handed over either by the 
Shah or by Ayatollah Khomeini. 
29. In 1980, however, conditions seemed par-
ticularly propitious for Iraq to take its revenge. 
The Iranian Government still refused to 
apply the provisions of the Algiers Agreements 
which were not to its own advantage, but the 
position of the Iranian state had become much 
weaker: there were rebellions in many regions, 
particularly Kurdistan, the invasion of Afgha-
nistan made it improbable that Iran would 
appeal to the Soviet Union and the affair of the 
American hostages made American assistance 
to Iran even more unlikely. It was therefore 
possible to gamble on Iran's isolation, a weak-
ening of its army, whose principal leaders had 
been exterminated during the revolution, and a 
weakening of national feeling. This probably 
explains the Iraqi offensive in November 1980. 
30. The aims of the war declared by Iraq 
were limited. It wanted to move the frontier 
back to the left bank of the Shatt al-Arab and 
obtain the return of the territories promised by 
Iran under the Algiers Agreements and the res-
titution by Iran to the Sultanates of Ra's al 
Khaymah and Shaijah of three islands seized on 
30th November 1971, in peacetime, by the 
Shah's Government (Abu Musa, Tomb al-
Koubra and Tomb al-Soughra) which are of no 
economic importance but of potentially consi-
derable strategic importance because they are 
close to the Strait of Hormuz and could be used 
to control it. Finally, Iraq demanded that Iran 
renounce intervention in the internal affairs of 
Iraq and any other Arab state. 
31. In fact, Iraq's underlying motives prob-
ably far exceed these aims. Sadam Hussein's 
Government probably hoped for a total collapse 
of the Iranian state, thus allowing Iraq to exer-
cise effective control over all the shores of the 
Gulf. Inter alia, Iraq could have hoped that 
the Arab population, the great majority in the 
province of Khuzistan (which Iraq calls Arabis-
tan), would revolt against the Iranian regime, 
either to attach themselves to Iraq or at least to 
obtain a large degree of autonomy which, by 
depriving Iran of its oil resources, would have 
led to that state's complete collapse. Among 
other advantages, such a success would have to 
some extent discouraged agitation in Iraqi 
Shiite circles and strengthened the power of the 
Baathists. 
32. After some initial success, the Iraqi offen-
sive achieved no decisive result. Iraq seems to 
have had three unpleasant surprises. First, the 
Iranians proved far more united than might 
have been expected in defending their national 
territory. Instead of encouraging dissidence, 
the war strengthened unified reaction. Second, 
the army proved far more determined to fight 
and far more capable of using its modern wea-
pons than had been generally thought. In par-
ticular, it was seen that Iran was capable of 
using the Phantom aircraft which the United 
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States had delivered to the Shah. Third, 
without calling on either the' United States or 
the Soviet Union, Iran received the support of a 
number of Arab countries, including Libya, 
Algeria, South Yemen and , Syria, while the 
sympathy with Iraq expressed by other Arab 
states - particularly the Gulf states - was not 
without reservation since they were not very 
anxious to have Iraq replace Iran as the pro-
tecting power in the region. Only Kuwait and 
Jordan granted it apparently unreserved sup-
port. 
33. The result was that the conflict stagnated 
and became position warfare which was not 
noticeably changed by the opening of a third 
front to the north in January 1981 in addition 
to those of Dezful and Khorramshahr. Such a 
situation could lead to economic disaster for 
the two belligerents. Iraqi oil terminals on the 
Gulf have been at least partly destroyed, as 
have the Abadan refinery and port. The 
amount of oil which can be brought out of Nor-
thern Iraq through Syria or Turkey is far from 
sufficient and Iranian oil can no longer reach 
the international market. This was one of the 
causes of the considerable rise in oil prices in 
1980 and Western Europe would have been 
short of oil if Saudi Arabia had not made a very 
valid effort to offset the absence of Iranian and 
Iraqi oil on the international market. In 1980, 
of the 957 million tons produced by the Middle 
East as compared with 1,100 million in 1974, 
Saudi Arabia supplied 49 5' million tons, Iraq 
138 million, Kuwait 86 million and Iran 74 
million, which, in relation to 1974, represented 
a considerable reduction in output for Iran (300 
million tons in 1973) and Kuwait (128 million 
tons), whereas Iraqi and Saudi Arabian output 
rose (96 million and 422 million tons respecti-
vely). Yet the effects of the Iranian-Iraqi war 
were not felt until the last two months of the 
year. 
34. It is difficult to assess the damage already 
caused by the conflict: there was certainly 
considerable destruction in the area close to the 
battlefield, but so far neither Iran nor Iraq 
seems to have wanted to take the risk of all-out 
war. According to information published at 
the beginning of March, 22,000 sq.km. of Ira-
nian territory had been occupied by Iraqi forces 
and Iranian losses were said to be 60,000 dead 
and 100,000 wounded. One and a half million 
refugees are reported to have left the battlefield 
and Iran's foreign currency reserves are said to 
have fallen from $11,000 million to $4,000 
million. Iraq appears to be better placed. It is 
believed to have lost far fewer men and its 
foreign currency reserves of some $30,000 
million at the outbreak of the conflict have 
allowed it to procure new weapons and order 
others for the coming months, particularly from 
Italy (for its navy) and France (for its air force 
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and anti-aircraft missiles). Oil installations in 
the Abadan area seem to have been spared by 
Iraq, nor has it initiated naval operations in the 
direction of the islands of the Strait of 
Hormuz. Iran for its part has not carried out 
its threats to bomb Kuwait and close the Strait 
of Hormuz. In other words, although the 
consequences of the war have so far been 
limited, the situation may deteriorate seriously 
if one or other of the belligerents sees no way 
out other than resorting to extreme methods. 
35. However, it is clear that even if Iraq's 
military successes are decisive it would not be 
able to control the whole territory of Iran 
which has a population of 35 million spread 
over an area of 1,600,000 sq.km., as compared 
with 12 million over 400,000 sq.km. in the case 
of Iraq. The Iraqi Government must therefore 
do its mmost to take even limited advantage of 
a particularly favourable war situation rather 
than allow itself to be bogged down in a war 
which it cannot win. This is no doubt the 
explanation for the repeated overtures by Mr. 
Sadam Hussein for starting negotiations. Con-
versely, although the Iranian Government must 
fear a prolongation of the conflict because of its 
economic consequences and the threat to natio-
nal unity, its ground is not firm enough for it to 
be able to make major concessions to the 
enemy. A rapprochement of the points of 
view of the two sides does not therefore seem 
impossible but it cannot be achieved immedia-
tely. It would consequently make sense to try 
to call a truce during which negotiations might 
be held. 
36. From Western Europe's point of view, 
the pursuit of this war involves very serious 
dangers and may become catastrophic. In fact, 
there is little likelihood of the war being conti-
nued without the two great powers being invol-
ved. The release of the American hostages by 
Iran in January 1981 made it possible for the 
United States and Iran to draw closer together, 
and this would inevitably lead, despite the 
Afghanistan affair, to Iraq drawing closer to the 
Soviet Union from which it had kept its dis-
tance in recent years, in spite of the 1972 treaty 
of friendship and co-operation between the two 
states. Such a process does not yet seem to 
have started, since the Iraqi Communist Party 
Congress, held in Moscow towards the end of 
February 1981, clearly condemned the "war of 
aggression" being waged by Mr. Sadam 
Hussein. Feeling threatened whether Iraq or 
Iran wins, the Emirates, which already rely on 
the West to supply them with modem weapons, 
may well demand more effective protec-
tion. Oman has already authorised the United 
States to set up a military base on Masirah, an 
island in the Indian Ocean, to balance the 
Soviet base on the island of Socotra, which 
belongs to the People's Republic of Yemen. 
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Six airports are being made ready in Oman 
for United States air force C-130 heavy trans-
port aircraft for use in case of need, while the 
Soviet Union has built submarine shelters in 
Aden. Finally, destabilisation of the Moslem 
world would have extremely serious consequen-
ces for the entire relationship between Europe 
and the third world. 
37. Western Europe's interests are therefore 
clear. The conflict must be contained as far as 
possible and then negotiations held between the 
two belligerents. Iraq's officially-announced 
demands might provide a basis for negotiations 
because they are not exaggerated, but the state 
of mind prevailing in both Iran and Iraq makes 
any concession by either government extremely 
difficult. Only when fighting ability declines 
will it be possible to negotiate, which means 
that deliveries of weapons to one or other side 
run counter to Europe's true interests. The 
interests of peace call for an international 
agreement banning all arms deliveries and it is 
to be regretted that the French Government has 
started delivering some sixty Mirage F-1 air-
craft, admittedly ordered by the Iraqi Govern-
ment before fighting started, particularly since 
France has placed an embargo on the delivery 
of patrol boats ordered during the Shah's 
regime now being demanded by the new 
regime. But the Soviet Union is also delivering 
weapons to Iraq through Saudi and Jordanian 
ports. If, as some maintain, France had also 
supplied Iraq with means of acquiring nuclear 
weapons, it would have assumed extremely 
grave responsibilities, the consequences of 
which make one's mind boggle. 
38. Of course, a unilateral decision by one 
country or another not to deliver arms to a 
Middle Eastern country would be pointless if 
others took its place. But in the present inter-
national situation the fact that neither of the 
two great powers has yet become involved in 
the conflict makes it urgent to conclude an 
agreement between the principal arms produ-
cers to ensure respect for a firm embargo on 
deliveries to Iran and Iraq. 
39. Your Rapporteur considers Western 
Europe can do little more to help to restore 
peace between these two countries. Memories 
of the colonial era are so close, national feelings 
so sensitive and Islamic convictions so strong in 
both Shiite Iran and Sunnite Iraq that any unti-
mely action might well result in more being lost 
than may be gained. Mediation in whatsoever 
form would inevitably be seen as interference 
and any peace in which the West had played a 
part would be seen as a demonstration of impe-
rialism and hence be suspicious from the out-
set. Probably all Europe can allow itself to do 
to help to restore peace is to circumscribe the 
conflict, oppose interference and prevent deli-
veries of arms. 
IV. The southern shore of the Gulf 
40. There is only one large state on the sou-
thern shore of the Gulf: Saudi Arabia, whose 
coast is almost entirely desert apart from oil 
installations round Jiddah. But there are a 
number of small states - Kuwait, the island of 
Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and 
the Sultanate of Oman - which all have Arab-
type dynastic regimes, i.e. power is in the hands 
of a family from among whose members the 
dynasty is appointed and who exercise power 
collectively, at the same time providing the 
only opposition with any chance at all of acce-
ding to power. This means that, although 
crises are frequent, they take place within the 
reigning family. 
41. These dynastic states conform to the old 
social structure of the Bedouins and no longer 
correspond at all to the reality of the extremely 
cosmopolitan societies which sprang up thanks 
to the oil economy. "Foreigners" make up 
90% of the population of Abu Dhabi and 
Dubai, 70% in Qatar, almost as much in 
Kuwait and 40 % in Saudi Arabia, Oman and 
Bahrein, and they represent an even higher per-
centage of the working population and the 
army. 
42. Most Emirs have tried to allow the whole 
indigenous population to share the benefits 
derived from oil, but the move from a nomadic 
civilisation to wealth has encountered many 
social, economic, political and psychological 
difficulties to which no solution seems to have 
yet been found. In the best of cases, they have 
established a more or less enlightened despo-
tism, although attempts at a constitution, with 
the establishment of an elected parliament, 
were made in Kuwait in 1962 and Bahrain in 
1973. In fact, in both cases the constitution 
had to be suspended in 1976 and 1975 respecti-
vely, and in any event it did not meet the aspi-
rations of a population, the foreign or Shiite 
majority of which had no political rights. 
There was no political campaign for the new 
elections in Kuwait in February 1981. Only 
42,000 persons were asked to vote. In fact, 
Emirs everywhere have had to set up what 
amount to dictatorships to protect themselves 
against Islamic revolutionary movements, whe-
ther of a traditional or "socialist" nature. Stri-
kes are banned everywhere: the fact that the 
great majority of workers are foreign allows 
mass expulsions if necessary. This is what 
happened in 1979 to 5,000 Indians employed in 
Kuwait. 
43. The Emirates have formed armies with 
the most up-to-date equipment procured in 
western countries, composed mainly of merce-
naries who are hence insensitive to the various 
currents flowing through the Arab world. For 
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instance, 80% of the armed forces of the Arab 
Emirates are of Baluchi orig~n with Jordanian 
officers. Furthermore, there are groups of 
South Korean or Taiwanese "workers" quar-
tered and organised on military lines so that 
they may serve if necessary as auxiliaries with 
the "national" armed forces in the event of 
trouble. 
44. In March 1981 repn~sentatives of six 
Arab countries in the Gulf area, Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrein, Oman and the United 
Arab Emirates, meeting in Muscat, decided to 
take measures for their common security. 
These measures are directed against Soviet 
expansion towards the Gulf 'and any steps the 
West might take to safeguard its oil sup-
plies. They decided to set up a joint co-
operation council in the political, economic, 
cultural and social fields. However, the forces 
they are capable of mustering to defend a total 
area of 2,200,000 sq.km., including the world's 
largest oil reserves, number only 110,000 men, 
admittedly equipped with the most sophistic-
ated weapons, but they qave no personnel 
trained to use them. These weapons are 
moreover of various origins. The 4 7,000 Saudi 
Arabian troops - to whom should be added 
35,000 national guards- are equipped with 130 
aircraft and 360 tanks, all of American or 
French origin, and 76 warships. Kuwait's 
14,000 men have 280 tanks, 50 combat aircraft 
and 43 warships, all of American or French ori-
gin, like the tanks, aircraft and 38 warships 
with which the 5,000 m~n from Qatar are 
equipped and those of the 3,000 men from Bah-
rein, whereas the Omani army, which has 
15,000 troops, has mainly British equip-
ment. Finally, the United Arab Emirates' 
27,000 men have 24 combat aircraft, 45 
armoured vehicles and 15 warships of various 
origins. 
45. There should however be no illusions 
about the relative importance of these forces: 
the fact that they are scattered and the inade-
quate maintenance and diverse origins of their 
weapons give them only limited effective-
ness. They would not be in a position to offer 
any effective resistance to a Soviet advance 
towards the Strait of Hormuz and it is to be 
feared that they are me"nt to meet internal 
threats rather than external dangers. 
46. However, in the last decade there has 
been an increase in the number of incidents and 
rebellions in this area. A:fter a long civil war, 
the southern part of Yemen broke off from the 
Sultanate to become the Democratic Republic 
of Yemen, supported and armed by the Soviet 
Union for which it provides a military 
base. It has become a centre of subversion 
whose effects are felt throughout the Arabian 
peninsula and in East Africa. A permanent 
military installation on the island of Socotra 
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allows the Soviet Union to be present at the 
entrance to the Red Sea. In Oman, two rebel-
lions broke out, one supported by South 
Yemen in the west of the country and the other 
in Dhufar. The Shah's army had to intervene 
before Sultan Qaboos managed to stifle this 
twofold insurrection. Demonstrations claiming 
to be in the name of Arab unity have taken 
place in several Emirates and have been seve-
rely repressed. But since the Iranian revolu-
tion the Shiites have also been taking part in 
disturbances in Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrein and Saudi 
Arabia. Everywhere they have been cruelly 
repressed. Finally, the affair of the great mos-
que at Mecca showed that the Saudi regime was 
also contested by certain fundamentalist 
circles. Although the Koran is the constitution 
of the Saudi state, here too there is a break bet-
ween political power and religious autho-
rities, apparently coupled with rivalry between 
the inhabitants of the Hedjaz and the ruling 
family who are Wahabites. The feeling of 
unity prevailing in the Arab world is better 
defended today by "Arab socialist" factions or 
even by fundamentalists than by the Emirs' 
supporters. The main obstacle to Arab unity 
in this area is the evolution of the Emirates 
towards a European-type dynastic system, i.e. 
towards monarchical states and the creation of 
nations, and the Emirs would probably have to 
be removed before any deep-rooted change 
could be introduced. 
47. So far, the West has found its best 
contacts and its best allies in the Arabian 
peninsula among the Emirs. In particular, 
they are the most understanding when there are 
differences over oil prices, and it is quite natu-
ral for the western countries to try to come to 
terms with the established authorities and not 
to favour rebel forces. However, it is probably 
not in Europe's true interest to join its cause 
with that of a political system which may soon 
become obsolete. If the Emirs are threatened, 
they may try to outbid the opposition in natio-
nalism at the expense of western inte-
rests. There are many pointers to this already, 
particularly in the wording of the Muscat 
Agreement in February. 
48. Europe's policy in the region must there-
fore be most cautious. It must not seem too 
closely linked with that of the United States 
which, rightly or wrongly, has been denounced 
by the pan-Arab movements as being the prin-
cipal opponent of Arabism. It must certainly 
not anticipate events but observe them and 
draw the consequences. Only a more equitable 
sharing of wealth and a balanced development 
of economies and societies can make the Ara-
bian peninsula a reliable partner. Since the 
countries in the region need Europe for their 
equipment and transformation, they may prove 
to be prepared to negotiate long-term agree-
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ments for the exploitation and sale of their oil 
and for lasting economic co-operation. Endor-
sing political structures which are condemned 
by an already well-advanced development of 
society can but lead to disturbances such as the 
West encountered in Iran and they might be 
even more serious if the Soviet Union, already 
present, proves more skilful at taking advantage 
of the situation. 
V. Conclusions 
49. At the close of this too brief analysis of 
an extremely complex situation involving forces 
about which we still know little and which our 
systems of reference and assessment cannot 
manage to grasp, it seems very difficult to draw 
real conclusions, i.e. to define a possible Euro-
pean policy. Nevertheless, a few principles 
may be defined which might govern such a 
policy. 
50(i) Any intervention in the affairs of the 
region, whether direct or indirect, may have 
repercussions of a magnitude impossible to 
foresee. It is not for Europe to endorse or 
oppose any political forces within the Arab or 
Islamic world. Any permanent military pre-
sence also involves dangers. For the immedi-
ate security of the area it may be necessary for 
the states to set up bases there, but it is prob-
ably not in the interests of the West as a whole 
for Europe's cause to be too obviously linked 
with that of the United States, both where 
Pakistan is concerned and with regard to Iran, 
Iraq or the Gulf countries, although, in view of 
the Soviet threat and the invasion of Afghanis-
tan, a concerted European-United States policy 
seems essential. 
5l(ii) Conversely, any intervention by outside 
countries in the countries round the Gulf would 
affect Europe's security and call for an extre-
mely firm reaction from the Western European 
countries. 
52(iii) This is at present the case for the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan. It is in line with 
Europe's vocation to assist resistance by the 
Afghan people by every available means, whe-
ther diplomatic or economic, or even by sup-
plying appropriate weapons, until the Soviet 
Union consents to start negotiations leading to 
the total withdrawal of its forces from Afghanis-
tan. The fact that in February 1981 President 
Reagan announced his intention to supply arms 
to the Afghan resistance movement is no reason 
for Europe not do to the same. Quite the 
reverse, it would be even more necessary to 
demonstrate common action in face of Soviet 
aggression if Europe maintains a cautious and 
reserved stand in regard to the area's internal 
affairs. This would clearly indicate that Soviet 
intervention, and not the struggle for power in 
Afghanistan, is the sole reason for Europe's 
reaction. 
53(iv} Hostilities between states in the region 
threaten Europe's security, indirectly at least, 
and if it cannot avoid them it must do its 
utmost to contain them, prevent them leading 
to intervention by third powers and encourage 
anything which may help to restore peace. 
54(v) This applies in particular to the conflict 
between Iran and Iraq. While diplomatic 
action for an early cease-fire must remain dis-
creet so as not to offend the national feelings of 
the belligerents, it is essential for Europe to ini-
tiate negotiations between arms exporting coun-
tries with a view to banning all supplies of arms 
and military equipment to the belligerents. 
55(vi) While Europe should seek to develop its 
trade with the oil-producing countries in order 
to help them to obtain the agricultural, indus-
trial or commercial equipment they need, it 
must avoid encouraging the accumulation of 
armaments in countries close to the Gulf. 
56(vii)While it is in the interests of each Euro-
pean country to concert its policy in the Gulf 
area with that of its partners, it is probably not 
desirable for the West to present itself to the 
countries in the region as a political or military 
bloc, and this therefore precludes the establish-
ment of any kind of integrated intervention 
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force by the western countries. In this respect 
there seems to be more to be lost than gained 
from President Reagan's proposals in this sense 
to certain European countries in February 
1981. Indeed, they might lead to the European 
countries being involved in a policy with which 
they disagreed without thereby improving 
consultations. 
57(viii) Conversely, close consultations between 
Western Europe and the new United States 
Administration seem essential on two matters 
directly relating to peace in the Gulf area: 
(a) a rational energy policy should be 
worked out by the whole western 
world with a view to !imitating fluc-
tuations in oil prices and achieving a 
reduction in the use of oil by the wes-
tern economies at an early date so 
that Europe does not remain over-
dependent on the Middle East; 
(b) the process for establishing the condi-
tions for a true ~eace in Palestine 
should be revived, account being 
taken of the right$ of all concerned. 
Until peace is achieved, the West 
will have the utmost difficulty in 
avoiding involvement in the conflict 
in spite of itself and maintaining a 
relationship of conflict-free co-ope-
ration with the Arab world. 
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Amendments 1, 2, 3 and 4 
European security and events in the Gulf area 
AMENDMENTS 1, 2, 3 and 41 
tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett 
1. After the fifth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert: 
17th June 1981 
"Deploring, in condemning Israel's air attack on Baghdad, the resultant increase in tension 
throughout the whole Middle East which reduces the credibility of the West, especially of the 
United States, in seeking to provide compromise solutions to intractable problems in the 
area;". 
2. After paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, insert: 
" Furnish substantial economic aid to Pakistan in order to help it to receive refugees on its 
territory without unacceptable social and economic damage to its own economy and also pro-
vide that country with the armaments it urgently needs for its own security ; ". 
3. After paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, insert: 
" Offer active support to all efforts made by the countries of the area to assume collectively 
their own security and envisage giving them a unilateral European or western guarantee for 
their independence, if so requested ; ". 
4. After paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, insert: 
" Express its condemnation of any aggression against countries in the area, and propose that 
the United Nations use appropriate sanctions against any aggressor whatsoever. ". 
Signed: Bennett 
I. See 6th Sitting, 18th June 1981 (Amendments I and 4 agreed to; Amendments 2 and 3 amended and agreed to). 
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Amendment 5 
European security and events in the Gulf area 
AMENDMENT 51 
tabled by MM. Blaauw and Vohrer 
17th June 1981 
5. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, after "assistance" insert "in particular in 
the political and humanitarian field". 
l. See 6th Sitting, 18th June 1981 (Amendment withdrawn). 
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Document 871 Addendum 17th June 1981 
European security and events in the Gulf area 
ADDENDUM 
submitted by Sir Frederic Bennett, 
Chairman of the General Affairs Committee 
I. Foreword 
1. Mr. Forni was authorised by the Presi-
dential Committee of the Assembly to make a 
journey in the Gulf area in order to obtain the 
information necessary for up-dating the report 
for which he had already been made respon-
sible. The Chairman of the Committee was 
also planning to accompany Mr. Forni on his 
own behalf. However, the French elections of 
April, May and June made it impossible for 
Mr. Forni to fulfil his proposed mission. 
Consequently, the Presidential Committee 
agreed that the Chairman of the General Affairs 
Committee should be responsible for collecting 
information about the situation in the area and 
report to the Assembly. He is thus now 
r~quir~d to present his own views on the ques-
tiOn smce the report by Mr. Forni has already 
been adopted by the General Affairs Commit-
tee. For these reasons the present report deal-
ing with the most recent aspects of the situation 
is being presented by the Chairman of the 
Committee in addition to Mr. Forni's report. 
2. The short time available allowed the 
Chairman of the Committee to visit only three 
countries, chosen for their involvement in 
recent events in the Middle East and South-
West Asia: Pakistan, Kuwait and Jordan. He 
was able, with the kind assistance of the natio-
nal authorities of those countries, to meet a 
broad spectrum of persons who provided him 
with much relevant and direct information. In 
addition to officials of the three countries visit-
ed, he also met a number of Afghan refugees. 
3. In the context of Mr. Forni's report, 
members of WEU are invited to recall previous 
reports on the situation in the Middle East and 
South-West Asia, namely Documents 820 844 
and 8 55, since some parts of these in substance 
and in regard to the adopted recommendations 
have much relevance to the present state of 
affairs in these areas and some are highly topi-
cal as revealed in the following extracts from 
Document 820 presented by Sir Frederic 
~ennett before the Soviet invasion of Afghan-
Istan: 
"5. Western Europe cannot remain 
indifferent to developments in the Middle 
East. Any growth in the Soviet military 
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presence in that area would be liable to 
endanger the southern flank of the Atlan-
tic Alliance system and help to isolate 
Turkey. The security and economy of 
~estern Europe, the world's leading oil 
Importer, depend on supplies of oil 
which can come only from the Middle 
East, which produces 35 % of the world's 
oil and is by far the leading exporting 
region. The 1973 crisis showed the close 
relationship which exists between peace 
and stability in that area and world prices 
for oil, on which the West's economy and 
security largely depend. Finally, the 
situation in the Middle East and its role 
in the world economy make it a parti-
cularly sensitive area in which there is a 
risk of any tension having unforeseeable 
repercussions on peace and balance 
throughout the world. " 
and from Mr. Hardy's report, Document 
855, after the invasion of Afghanistan: 
" 68. The invasion of Afghanistan may 
be viewed from two standpoints: increas-
ing Soviet power and the Soviet threat in 
Asia. The deployment of Soviet forces 
closer to the Strait of Hormuz and the 
Indian Ocean makes it materially possi-
ble for the Soviet Union to intervene in 
the Near and Middle East, at least by 
air. However, the invasion of Afghanis-
tan has many worrying repercussions for 
the Soviet Union, both in the East and in 
Europe. In. fact, all the Moslem coun-
tries, including those which are not at 
present on friendly terms with the West, 
have become extremely sensitive to the 
Soviet threat and are anxious not to come 
under the Soviet area of influence, having 
seen clearly from the Afghanistan affair 
that their independence would be endan-
gered if they came under Soviet protec-
tion or even had communists participate 
in their governments since such partici-
pation seems liable to make these coun-
tries subject to the Brezhnev doctrine, as 
was the case in Afghanistan. " 
4. Except insofar as socially and domesti-
cally, in political and economic terms there are 
some improvements to record, e.g. 'Pakistan's 
internal economic situation, and limited but 
significant steps towards a more democratic 
regime than a couple of years ago (elections at 
municipal level have taken place and the civi-
lian element in the Cabinet has been much 
strengthened - now fifteen out of twenty, plus 
three retired army officers and only two on the 
active list) and also national elections albeit 
with a restricted voting electorate have been 
held in Kuwait, it is a sad fact that overall in 
international terms the situation throughout the 
whole area concerned has markedly, indeed 
dangerously, deteriorated. 
11. Consequences of the invasion of Afghanistan 
5. It is now possible to assess more accura-
tely than last year the true nature of Soviet 
policy in Afghanistan. Your Rapporteur refers 
you to previous General Affairs Committee 
documents on that question, especially his own 
reports (Documents 820 and 844) and the 
report submitted by Mr. Hardy at the last ses-
sion of the Assembly (Document 855) since the 
views expressed there are more than confirmed, 
and indeed highlighted, by what he has seen 
now. He especially reminds you of the follow-
ing paragraphs, presented to the Assembly in 
Document 820, adopted in November 1979, 
one month before the massive Soviet invasion 
in December: 
" 149. Afghanistan long preserved a 
precarious independence as a buffer state 
between Russia and Imperial British 
India. When Britain left the scene 
Pakistan was too weak to take over 
the United Kingdom's role. Indeed, 
because of large numbers of Pathans 
living on both sides of a frontier only in 
name, Pakistan has had all its work cut 
out to hold on to its own territorial 
integrity along the famous North-West 
Frontier. The United States attempted 
to take Britain's place both by supporting 
Pakistan and affording direct aid, mostly 
economic, to the Kabul Government. 
However, as to the latter, it was never a 
full commitment and never approached 
the extent of Russian assistance. As to 
the former, because of successive lndo-
Pakistan conflicts, the United States 
decided that it was not worth offending 
India, even to maintain, let alone in-
crease, its protective role in regard to 
Pakistan. That position obtains today 
and Rawalpindi now looks to Peking as 
its chief ally. But China is neither 
strong enough nor near enough to act as 
a counterweight against Soviet interven-
tion in Afghanistan. So this small coun-
try, despite strong resistance by a major-
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ity of its fiercely proud and independent 
Muslim tribesmen, is facing (unless the 
Soviet Union as some commentators pre-
dict, finds it has bitten ofT more 
than it can chew, except at disproportio-
nate cost) ultimate subjection by, and 
absorption into, the Soviet Empire, as yet 
another so-called " autonomous people's 
republic". 
150. If this should happen, the next step 
would be dangerous indeed to western 
and most especially E4ropean vital inte-
rests. It is known that within a decade 
the Soviet Union will need to become a 
net importer of oil on a considera-
ble scale. 
151. Only a weak and divided Pakistan 
now stands between Russia and direct 
access to the Gulf ar:ea. With a huge 
and growing naval fleet in being, espe-
cially if by then the " festering sore " in 
Arab-western relations - the fate of the 
Palestinians - has not been satisfactorily 
dealt with, it would not be too long before 
a predominant Soviet presence in the 
area would exercise a decisive influence 
on the supply of oil that Europe so 
desperately needs to maintain let alone 
increase the standard of living of 
its own peoples. 
153. However, the Americans and the 
Europeans could do much to delay if not 
altogether to halt them by increasing not 
only economic aid but also defensive 
arms to Pakistan, and - no less impor-
tant - showing greater understanding for 
that unhappy country's many diffi-
culties. The excuse used in the past to 
curtail support for Pakistan - namely 
that this posed a threat to India with the 
risk of the latter turning to the Soviet 
Union for help - is certainly not 
valid today. The thought that a nation 
of four distinct ethnic groups, Punjabis, 
Sindis, Baluchis and Pathans, rift with 
internal divisions and living with the loss 
of half its original nation-state, now Ban-
gladesh, taking on India, a country many 
times its size, about twenty times 
its population, wrth greatly superior 
armed forces in numbers and equipment 
and infinitely greater industrial resources 
is laughable. " 
6. It is now clear that the Soviet invasion 
was not the result of an immediate reaction to 
the troubles under the Taraki regime, but one 
move in a long-term plan to bring a large part, 
if not all, of South-West Asia under Russian 
control. A special single military command 
has been created in the southern part of Soviet 
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Asia, including an air force and 44 divisions, 
nine of which are involved in Afghanistan. 
The resistance of the Afghan population forced 
them to afford increasing support to the Afghan 
army which lost two-thirds of its numbers, 
especially through mass desertion, for the 
control of the mainland. They are deployed 
towards the frontiers of Afghanistan, two of 
them westwards, at the Iranian border, seven 
eastwards, along the 1 ,800 km border of Pakis-
tan, with a large number of forces in the north-
east in the strip of Afghan territory between 
China and Pakistan. The 35,000 men remain-
ing in the Afghan army are used for internal 
operations with the assistance of Soviet aircraft, 
helicopters and tanks. 
7. The two divisions deployed along the 
south-west border of Afghanistan in the direc-
tion of Baluchistan and the Indian Ocean for-
med a very important base in the territory they 
occupied. It is crystal-clear that their aim was 
not to bolster up the Communist regime in 
Afghanistan, but to threaten the Hormuz Strait 
and ultimately to invade Baluchistan. 
8. It seems that the Soviets have now given 
up the hopeless task of controlling the popu-
lation of mountain villages and they use all 
possible means, including gas and napalm, for 
destroying the villages and compelling people 
to abandon their homes and land in order to 
concentrate them, if they are not able to cross a 
frontier as refugees, around the cities where it 
is less difficult to control them. Large parts of 
the Afghan mainland are thus fast being turned 
into desert. 
9. Your Rapporteur was unable to obtain 
reliable information about the situation on the 
Iranian border. Estimates of the number of 
Afghan refugees in that country have given 
figures between 500,000 and 1,500,000 which 
makes it difficult to form an accurate view of 
the situation there. In Pakistan, 2,100,000 
refugees are living along the border. This 
number increases on average by 80,000 to 
100,000 each month. This is a very heavy 
economic and financial burden for the Pakistani 
government and nation since Pakistan is still a 
poor country although its economy has develo-
ped at a remarkable rate in recent years. 
10. There appear to be two kinds of refugees, 
many of them homeless peoples whose villages 
have been destroyed by Soviet missiles and 
napalm. Others are the families of the Muja-
heddin fighting on Afghan territory. They 
crossed the border to escape terrible retaliation 
by the Afghan army. This means that, even if 
the Soviet troops evacuate Afghan territory 
which for the time being seems highly unlikely, 
the first category of refugees would not be able 
simply to return to their former villages and 
would continue to be a heavy burden for both 
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Pakistan and Afghanistan. Whereas much wel-
come humanitarian aid in foodstuffs, tents, etc. 
has come on a continuing basis from external 
sources, UNHCR, Red Cross, the EEC and 
bilateral grants from friendly countries, Pakis-
tan needs more help now since necessary aid 
was calculated on an assumption of 600,000 to 
a maximum of 1 ,000,000. The figure is now 
more than double the latter total. Moreover 
Pakistan itself has taken on the burden of cash 
aid for incidental living expenses of $ 5 a 
month per refugee equalling now some 
$ 12,600,000 per annum, a huge sum for a new 
and poor country. 
11. The presence of refugees, generally 
speaking well-accepted by the tribes on both 
sides of the frontier, also presents a political 
and military danger for the stability of Pakistan 
since the Soviets are constantly exerting pres-
sure on the Pakistani authorities for them to 
seal their frontier with Afghanistan in order to 
isolate the refugees from the Mujaheddin fight-
ing inside Afghanistan. On seven occasions, 
Pakistani territory has been violated, shelled 
and bombed in order to increase that pressure. 
The Pakistani army is not strong enough to 
exercise effective control along a 1 ,800 km 
frontier and at the same time ensure the secu-
rity of the country. Men are available but the 
Pakistani government can only equip and arm 
about 500,000. Much of their armament is 
becoming obsolete since Pakistan does not 
receive military aid from other countries and 
does not have the financial means necessary to 
modernise its army. 
12. Account should also be taken of the fact 
that most of the refugees belong to tribes living 
partly on Pakistani territory. This makes it 
impossible for any Pakistani government to use 
its armed forces against the refugees it unwillin-
gly received since they merge with its own citi-
zens in the border regions. All it can do to 
ease Soviet pressure is to deny the use of its ter-
ritory for the transport of armaments sent by 
other countries to the Afghan Mujaheddin. 
13. In the short term the Pakistanis do not 
consider a Soviet invasion very probable. 
Their fear is far more that Soviet pressure may 
leave them in a very weak position in face of 
Indian claims. The Indian army is being 
steadily increased and modernised and has 
recently signed contracts for United States guns 
and anti-tank missiles, French Mirage 2000 air-
craft and German submarines, but for the time 
being it is mainly equipped with weapons pur-
chased from the Soviet Union. The Indian 
army has 38 divisions, 33 of them deployed 
westwards against Pakistan and 5 northwards 
against China. · Military intervention by India 
against Pakistan may be possible in the near 
future but this would have to be before the 
Pakistan army improves its armaments and 
before the United States rapid deployment force 
re-establishes a balance in the Indian Ocean or 
the Gulf area. This will probably be achieved 
in 1983. Until then, and especially between 
September 1981 and May 1982, when the 
Himalaya passes will be closed by snow and 
India will be protected from any Chinese reta-
liation, Pakistan's security and independence 
will be passing through a period of potential 
crisis on its western and/or eastern frontiers. 
14. Pakistan well knows that it cannot hope 
for any military intervention by western forces 
and that its security is in its own hands. It also 
knows that the neutralisation of Pakistan 
would constitute a new and decisive step in the 
Soviet advance towards the Indian Ocean and 
the Gulf which would also place the Soviets in 
a position where they might be able to cut 
Europe and the western world off from their 
sources of oil and to intervene directly in the 
Arab world. Pakistan also very much needs 
assistance from the European countries as 
follows: 
(i) humanitarian aid for the Afghan 
refugees; 
(ii) economic aid to improve its econ-
omy so as to sustain the cost of the 
refugees in consumer items, especi-
ally extra grazing, if further hardship 
is not to be inflicted on the local 
people; 
(iii) very urgent military aid, especially 
modern anti-tank and anti-aircraft 
missiles, in order to hold out during 
their two years of potential crisis 
without suffering the consequences 
of rising interest rates in all the west-
ern world. 
15. As the British Foreign Secretary, Lord 
Carrington, recently underlined " Pakistan, 
together with the other Islamic countries, has 
worked tirelessly to promote a solution in 
accordance with the principles endorsed by the 
international community. The role has often 
been a rather lonely one. I admire the way in 
which Pakistan has played it, under difficult 
circumstances. " 
16. On the other hand, insofar as western 
countries consider that the Afghan Mujaheddin 
" will not abandon their determination to be 
free " they have the moral obligation to give 
them the means to pursue their heroic resis-
tance. Recent accounts of events in Afghanis-
tan are a list of victories by the Mujaheddin, 
now able to destroy Soviet helicopters and 
tanks on the battlefield, burn Russian aircraft 
on the Kabul airport and win battles against 
armed forces of one or two thousand men in 
the Afghan valleys. Those victories have been 
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won without yet receiving any substantial help 
from foreign countries, but, in the main, with 
Soviet arms confiscated on the battlefield or 
brought by deserting Afghan units. Even if 
Pakistan refuses, understandably, to be used as 
a base for the Afghan resistant::e, there are other 
ways of providing the Mujaheddin the means 
they have requested. Your Rapporteur recalls 
that in both 1981 and 1979, when he asked 
refugees who received from the Pakistani 
government a subsidy of about $ 5 per month 
what more they needed, they. unanimously ans-
wered that they only needed arms for fighting 
again. 
Ill. The Gulf area 
17. If we now consider recent events in the 
Gulf area and the neighbouring Arab countries, 
it appears that uncertainty about their near 
future has never been so great. Indeed the 
Russian invasion of Afghanistan and the 
deployment of Soviet forces1 and especially air 
forces at a relatively short distance from the 
Indian Ocean creates a new situation in which 
it is more likely that the USSR will now be 
able to intervene·directly in the region. 
18. But, at the same time Israel's evolution 
seems to give it more opportunities than ever 
to do so. 
19. Another political uncertainty is how the 
Tudeh communist party is playing an increa-
singly significant, even a decisive, role in the 
internal struggles in Iran and to take under its 
control, albeit indirectly, the administration, if 
not yet the army, is one clear aim. 
20. Paradoxically, Tudeh has used as its 
machinery the most fanati<~:al Islamic elements 
to infiltrate all organs of government and des-
troy any coherence in President Bani-Sadr's 
effective rule that threatens the ultimate deve-
lopment of yet another Soviet satellite. 
21. These Islamic elements, theoretically 
anti-communist, do not seem yet to realise how, 
through organisational ap.d financial covert 
support, they are being manipulated by strongly 
anti-religious communists who at any time will 
discard their strange bed·fellows and stage a 
classic Soviet-pattern takeover. 
22. The stalemate in the war between Iraq 
and Iran also creates a situation where external 
intervention is increasingly likely to become the 
follow-up of a long drawn-1out war. 
23. For the time being; the initiatives taken 
by the Secretary General of the United Nations 
as well as by the Islamic nations for building 
foundations for negotiations between the two 
countries are progressing very slowly, if at all, 
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and neither of the two regimes seems to be 
strong enough to survive the political setback 
involved in what could be popularly exploited 
as a defeat. 
24. Western countries are in neither a mili-
tary nor a political position to allow them to 
become possible mediators. Only the USSR 
has enough political and military strength in 
the area to allow it to impose its views. 
25. Moreover, the Israeli attack against the 
nuclear reactor Osirak near Baghdad has 
created a new situation in the area, because no 
country can now feel secure against becoming · 
the next victim of such aggression. It is espe-
cially so in the case of Pakistan where the deve-
~opment of nuclear plants is still under way. It 
ts also true for every Arab country in the 
area. Even in the most moderate Arab coun-
tries like Kuwait or Jordan your Rapporteur 
has been told by representative and reliable per-
sonalities that the Israeli threat was considered 
as more immediate and dangerous than the 
Soviet one. It means that all the countries in 
the area are now inclined to deal with the 
USSR if this holds out some hope of thus 
obtaining the guarantees they need against the 
Israeli aggression they fear. 
26. Western nations are not yet in a position 
to offer those countries any alternative. They 
have not and are not likely soon to have 
enough forces in the area to deter Soviet action 
directly. Their only means would be to 
announce the globalisation of their reaction in 
the event of Soviet intervention. This means 
retaJi.ating. by taking advantage of their stronger 
posttlon m other regions, e.g. in regard to 
Cuba. For obvious reasons, the future Ameri-
can rapid deployment force for some conside-
rable time ahead cannot become a real counter-
weight to the Soviet divisions and air forces 
deployed in the south of the Soviet Union even 
if it ultimately finds countries which welcom~ it. 
2 7. The Israelis used against Iraq aircraft 
recently purchased in the United States without 
suffering more than an expression of disappro-
val f~om the United States, even after having 
promtsed not. to use those aircraft, except for 
purely d~fenstve actions. This arouses among 
all Islamtc countries suspicions that there is full 
complicity between the American administra-
tion and Israel. The postponement of the deli-
very of four more aircraft of the type used 
agamst Iraq has not affected the critical Arab 
point of view and appears to be a minuscule 
response to the act of war committed by Israel. 
~t means that for the time being no country 
1~ the area, not .even Pakistan, is able to nego-
tiate any defenstve agreement with the United 
States, and even more explicitly to admit the 
presence of American forces on their soil. 
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This fact obviously restricts considerably the 
possibility of maintaining an American force in 
the area. 
28. For the time being, European nations can 
take advantage of much greater confidence on 
the part of the Islamic countries of the region. 
The fact that the Nine acted unanimously in 
the past year for the restoration of a general and 
balanced peace agreement between Israel and 
the Arab nations, including the Palestinians 
even if it did not produce many concret~ 
results, has given the countries in the area the 
feeling that Europeans understand their prob-
lems better than Americans and that we at 
l~ast .genuinely. try to re-establish peace and jus-
tice m the regwn. It may be of some interest 
to remember that our Assembly played a subs-
tantial role in persuading the European govern-
ments to initiate such an action, especially 
when it adopted in December 1979 a recom-
mendation urging the Council to " Use its best 
endeavours ... to promote a broader-based confe-
r~nce than Camp David including representa-
tiOn from all countries directly involved in the 
Palestinian dispute. " 
29. This does not mean that the Arab coun-
tries, and Pakistan, hope that the European 
~ount~ies may use their military forces for fight-
mg etther the Israelis or Soviet-inclined for-
ces. What they hope to obtain from Europe 
far more is a moral, political and even also 
some material support. On the moral level 
they feel themselves terribly frustrated by thei; 
helpless situation in face of Israel's military 
capabilities and deeply insulted by the recent 
aggression against Iraq. They hope that Euro-
pean countries will contribute not only to 
condemnation of the aggressor but also to more 
practical measures to deter future action of the 
same sort. On the political level, they want 
the Europeans discreetly to help their efforts for 
opening peace negotiations between Iran and 
Iraq. On the material level, they need Euro-
pean technology to improve their economic 
capabilities as well as modern defensive arma-
ments to enable them to resist any aggression. 
~0. Thus _is not in J?urope's interest to appear 
m that regwn as bemg too closely identified 
with American policy-making. This does not 
of course mean that European countries should 
dissociate themselves from the United States. 
Consultation and co-operation between the 
NATO countries is more necessary than ever, 
even on t~e Middle East issues, in order to pro-
mote not JUSt effective but objective action. 
31. However, insofar as the United States is 
involved in policies which do not contribute to 
a just, peaceful solution of the actual conflicts 
in the area and to the deterrence of Soviet 
intervention, it is up to the Europeans to pro-
mote such policies, if possible in consultation 
with their American allies but not constrained. 
For they can neither alienate their own inte-
rests and their goals because of an American 
policy of which they would not approve, nor 
can they afford to support a military enterprise 
able definitively to alienate the Arab countries 
as it is presently likely to be the case in regard 
to an American rapid deployment force entail-
ing the use of land forces on their soil. 
32. In Pakistan as well as in the Gulf area, it 
appears that the countries of the region are 
more and more inclined to take full responsibi-
lity for their own destiny, with western help 
welcomed but not uninvited intervention. The 
creation of a Council of the Gulf countries, 
even if it deals mainly with economic affairs, 
consolidates one demonstration of that will. 
Pakistan's determination to resist aggression 
and wishes expressed by them and by different 
countries to purchase in Europe a larger part 
than hitherto of the armaments they need for 
their security, because European countries are 
not likely to intervene in the area, are other 
signs of these tendencies. The best way to 
encourage such an evolution would of course be 
for the West to give separate and/or collective 
guarantees for the stability of the area but not 
on a pact basis. For mutual pact arrangements 
of the past completely collapsed and countries 
of the Middle East would not and could not 
afford to revive such treaties, at least not as 
long as they do not share the same views about 
priorities as the West. Unilateral guarantees 
from the West would give significance to their 
efforts to unite their forces and resist external 
intervention. No outside country can force 
them not to deal with the USSR in order to 
safeguard their security, but pledges of western 
support if called upon can help to convince 
them that flirtations with the USSR may be a 
very dangerous way to achieve their security 
goals. Such policies as outlined that do not 
constitute an intervention in their own affairs 
would strengthen their resolution to deal with 
the problems in the area and to resist outside 
pressure. 
33. Your Rapporteur's recent journey in that 
region has convinced him that there is now an 
urgent need to restore the confidence in the 
West that the Middle East and Gulf countries 
have lost. At present only Europeans are in a 
position to play the role and thereby contribute 
to deterring the obvious expansionist moves the 
Soviets have initiated with their invasion of 
Afghanistan and apparently are prepared to 
follow up in other directions, e.g. in the south-
east by the disintegration and eventually the 
disappearance of Pakistan as an independent 
state, and in the south-west by penetrating poli-
tically the Gulf countries and profiting from the 
present disqualification of the Americans 
because of their current apparent unconditional 
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support for Israel's expansionist policies, thus 
taking advantage of Arab frustrations, which are 
now socially explosive. · 
IV. Conclusions 
34. There has long existed, on a continuing 
trend, a misunderstanding in Washington, and 
to a lesser extent, too, in certain circles in 
Europe, about the basic attitudes of not only 
the governments but also the peoples of most 
if not all the countries of th~ Middle East and 
the Gulf area, including Pakistan, in their 
assessment of the multifold dangers that exist 
today threatening both their political and terri-
torial integrity. 
35. It is said over and ovet again by those on 
both sides of the Atlantic to whom the wish is 
father to the thought firstly that whatever 
" moderate " Arab leaders may say in public 
their chief anxieties arise in the context of 
Soviet communist expansionism and that fears 
of Israeli imperialism are much less present in 
their minds. 
36. This has never been so since the first 
Arab-Israeli military conflict in 1949, irrespec-
tive of the responsibility for the beginning of 
the still-continuing hostility ibetween Israel and 
its Arab neighbours and the latters' associates 
throughout the Middle East and indeed further 
afield. 
37. Israel's recent attack on Iraq has not 
created, only accentuated, a widespread belief 
throughout Arab countries that in fact, while 
apprehensions about Soviet intentions in the 
area are real, the chief preoccupations of Arab 
leaders, moderate and immoderate, and their 
peoples concern Israeli and not Soviet ambi-
tions. Similarly, although to a much lesser 
extent, Pakistani determination to resist Soviet 
encroachments on their independence does not 
alter the reality of their fears and doubts about 
Indian intentions. 
38. Former Indian Foreign Minister Mr. 
Desai has honestly admitted that when in office 
he was invited to " manufaqture " a pretext for 
an Indian attack on Pakistan to force the adop-
tion of policies, in Islamabad, less strongly 
committed to resistance of Soviet expansionism 
in South-West Asia. 
39. To his credit Mr. Desai said "no" but 
no one is certain whether the same question has 
more recently been put to Mrs. Gandhi and if 
so what her answer has been. 
40. In any case the fact today is that Pakistan 
feels constrained to keep 14. of its total 18 divi-
sions on its eastern border facing 33 Indian 
divisions (5 only of the latter army being 
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deployed on their border with China) leaving 
only 4 Pakistani divisions to guard its long 
frontier - 1,800 kms - with Russian-occupied 
Afghanistan. 
41. Reverting to the situation in Arabia, Mr. 
Forni indicates in his report and Lord earring-
ton freely admitted in the speech already quot-
ed that Europe's Middle East policies should be 
complementary to but not identical with that of 
the United States. Your Rapporteur found the 
countries he visited attributed such a special 
role to Europe. Israeli aggression against Iraq 
with aircraft furnished by the United States, 
which occurred during your Rapporteur's visit 
to those countries, and the United States' reac-
tion to this event, generally regarded as inade-
quate, after this act of war against an Arab 
country, contribute to making it even more 
difficult if not impossible for any Arab country 
for the foreseeable future to co-operate with the 
United States and hence to receive on its natio-
nal territory any American military force. 
42. To summarise, it appears to your Rap-
porteur that all those he met considered that 
the security of the area could be assured only 
by the area's own forces. It does not mean 
that they do not need or desire help but it does 
mean that no external country or group of 
countries is able to take global responsibility for 
the defence of the region. The grouping of the 
Gulf states in an economic community is pro-
bably a first significant step towards the people 
of the region taking over responsibility for their 
own destiny. The role of European countries 
could be to persuade the United States, by tak-
ing initiatives themselves, not to intervene in 
the area but to give useful assistance to the 
countries concerned, especially if they try to 
join forces to assume the most effective respon-
sibility for their collective security. In that 
case, the western countries could be able to give 
a guarantee to the stability of the region that 
they could not give to separate states, each of 
them possibly pursuing differing national aims. 
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43. To consider a situation such as was 
created by the conflict between Iraq and Iran, it 
is obvious that no direct intervention by any 
western country can help to find a reasonable 
solution. Useful action can be taken only by 
other Islamic countries. If western countries 
fail to recognise that reality, perhaps the Soviets 
will find an opportunity to exploit the Arab 
countries' feeling of frustration, especially after 
their most recent humiliation at the hands of 
the Israelis, in order to put themselves forward 
as the peace-restoring country in the Middle 
East, with all the political and economic advan-
tages they could obtain in that event. 
44. Insofar as American policy in the Middle 
East seems to be essentially influenced by 
concern for the security of Israel, as has been 
made clearer than ever by the United States' 
mild reaction to the use of American aircraft 
for the air attack on Baghdad, the role of the 
European countries should be to remind them 
that such a policy may be self-defeating. This 
applies even to Israel, because the West is in no 
position to resist direct Soviet intervention, sus-
tained by people of the area, even with an 
American rapid deployment force based in 
reluctant host countries. The security of Israel 
can be secured only by the establishment of 
real, i.e. negotiated and mutually-accepted, 
peace between the Arab nations, including the 
Palestinians, and this must mean giving them a 
homeland in Palestine. 
45. In regard to Pakistan and Afghanistan, 
the need to reinforce the former's economic sta-
bility intrinsically and because of the appalling 
burden of sustaining well over 2,000,000 refu-
gees - a number which is growing daily - and 
to reinforce Pakistan's ability to defend itself 
militarily against aggression from any source 
has been stressed already in the substance of 
this report and only needs now to be re-empha-
sised as a matter of urgency. 
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DRAFT REVISED BUDGET OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE 
OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1981 1 
submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration2 
by Mr. Adriaensens, Chairman and Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Summary of revised estimates for the financial year 1981 
Allocation of expenditure under heads and sub-heads 
Explanatory Memorandum 
Summary of revised estimates for the financial year 1981 
Details Initial Difference 
estimates 
Head I : Expenditure for staff .................. 6,883,000 (-) 84,000 
Head II : Expenditure relating to temporary per-
sonnet ............................... 1,920,000 -
Head Ill: Expenditure on premises and equipment 383,000 -
Head IV: General administrative costs ........... 1,526,000 (+) 17,000 
Head V : Other expenditure .................... 1,000,000 -
Head VI : Pensions ............................. 106,000 -
TOTAL EXPENDITURE 0 •••••• 0 0 •• 11,818,000 (-) 67,000 
TOTAL RECEIPTS • 0 0 0 0 ••• 0 ••• 0. 0 460,000 -
NET TOTAL ................... 11,358,000 (-) 67,000 
Revised 
estimates 
6,799,000 
1,920,000 
383,000 
1,543,000 
1,000,000 
106,000 
11,751,000 
460,000 
11,291,000 
1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee and approved 
by the Presidential Committee. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Adnaensens (Chair-
man); Mr. Jager (Vice-Chairman); MM. Ahrens, Althammer, 
Depietri, Fletcher (Alternate: Urwin), Lord Hughes, MM. 
Jeambrun, Krieps (Alternate: Berchem), Martino, Orione 
(Alternate: Vallante), Peeters, Petrilli (Alternate: Conti 
Persinz), Schleiter, Schulte, Smith, Sprung, Stainton 
(Alternate: Lord Reay), Tripodi, Tummers, Mrs. van der 
Werf-Terpstra. 
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N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are 
printed in italics. 
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Head I- Expenditure/or Staff 
Sub-Head I 
SALARIES OF PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT 
Revised estimate: F 5,051,000 
(a) Basic salaries Revised estimate: F 5,029,000 
Initial estimate: F 5,172,000 
Net decrease: F 143,000 
Rank WEU No. Total' Grade F 
The Clerk .............................................. . Hors cadre 1 354,0002 
Senior Counsellors ...................................... . 
Counsellors ............................................ . 
First Secretaries ........................................ . 
Secretary ............................................... . 
Secretaries-Translators/Publications ...................... . 
Administrative Assistant/ Assistant Translator 
Chief Accountant ....................................... . 
Personal Assistants ...................................... . 
Bilingual Shorthand Typists ............................. . 
Switchboard Operator ................................... . 
Head Roneo-Storekeeper ................................ . 
Messengers ............................................. . 
(b) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades B and C), 
including travelling expenses and insurance 
I. Scale 1st July 1980 + 9.80% estimated rise in the cost of living in 1981. 
A6 3 2 629,000 
AS 3 903,000 
A4 2 516,000 
A3 24 407,000 
A2 3 517,000 
B6 1 171,000 
B4 4 518,000 
B3 6 638,000 
B3 1 111,000 
C6 1 103,000 
C45 2 162,000 
28 5,029,000 
Estimate: F 22,000 
2. Basic salary Grade A7.6 + I% (approved by the Council on 27th November 1980) plus an entertainment allowance of 
F 7,700. 
3. Regrading of two Grade A5 posts to Grade A6. 
4. Creation of a new Grade A3 post. 
5. Regradings already requested in the initial 1981 budget. 
82 
DOCUMENT 8 72 
Sub-Head 2 
ALLOWANCES, SOCIAL CHARGES, ETC. 
(A) ALLOWANCES 
Revised estimate: F 941,000 
(a) Household allowance Revised estimate: F 185,000 
Initial estimate: F 194,000 
Net decrease: F 9,000 
Rank WEU No. Total Grade F 
Clerk .................................................. . Hors cadre 1 21,000 
Senior Counsellor ....................................... . A6 1 19,000 
Counsellors ............................................ . A5 3 54,000 
First Secretary .......................................... . A4 1 15,000 
Secretary ............................................... . A3 2 24,000 
Personal Assistants ...................................... . B4 2 16,000 
Bilingual Shorthand Typists ............................. . B3 3 20,000 
Head Roneo-Storekeeper ................................ . C6 1 6,000 
Messengers ............................................. . C4 2 10,000 
16 185,000 
(b) Children's allowance Revised estimate: F 181,000 
Initial estimate: F 193,000 
Net decrease: F 12,000 
F 7,850 per year per child . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 181,000 
(c) Expatriation allowance Revised estimate: F 448,000 
Initial estimate: F 410,000 
Net increase : F 3 8 .000 
Rank WEU No. Total Grade F 
Senior Counsellors ...................................... . A6 2 113,000 
Counsellors ............................................ . A5 1 61,000 
First Secretary .......................................... . A4 1 51,000 
Secretary ............................................... . A3 2 85,000 
Secretary-Translator/Publications 
Administrative Assistant/ Assistant Translator .............. . A2 2 57,000 
Personal Assistants ...................................... . B4 2 47,000 
Bilingual Shorthand Typists ............................. . B3 2 34,000 
12 448,000 
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(d) Compensatory rent allowance 
(e) Overtime 
(f) 
(g) Education allowance 
(h) Allowance for language courses 
(a) Social Security 
28 officials 
(b) Supplementary insurance 
(c) Provident fund 
14 % of basic salaries x 7 4 7,000 
(B) SOCIAL CHARGES 
Estimate: F 15,000 
Estimate: F 30,000 
Revised estimate: F 80,000 
Initial estimate: F 60,000 
Net increase: F 20,000 
Estimate: F 2,000 
Revised estimate: F 716,000 
Estimate: F 441 ,000 
F 441,000 
Revised estimate: F 170,000 
Initial estimate: F 175,000 
Net decrease: F 5,000 
Revised estimate: F 105,000 
Initial estimate: F 13 7,000 
Net decrease: F 32,000 
(C) EXPENSES RELATING TO THE RECRUITMENT, ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE OF PERMANENT OFFICIALS 
(a) Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates not 
residing in Paris who are convened for examina-
tions and interviews and cost of marking examina-
tion papers 
(b) Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrival 
and departure of staff and dependent persons 
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Revised estimate: F 91 ,000 
Revised estimate: F 10,000 
Initial estimate: F 1,600 
Net increase: F 8,400 
Revised estimate: F 6,500 
Initial estimate: F 1,500 
Net increase: F 5,000 
(c) Removal expenses 
(d) Installation allowance 
(e) Biennial home leave for non-French officials 
{f) Medical examination 
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Revised estimate: F 20,000 
Initial estimate: F 3,400 
Net increase: F 16,600 
Revised estimate: F 36,000 
Initial estimate: F 7,000 
Net increase: F 29,000 
Estimate: F 10,000 
Estimate: F 8,500 
Head IV- General administrative costs 
Sub-Head 10 
OFFICIAL CARS 
- Purchase of an official car and cost of servicing 
- Hire of an official car for the President 
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Revised estimate: F 1,543,000 
Revised estima~e: F 67,500 
Initial estimaie: F 50,500 
Net increase: F 1 7,000 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Adriaensens, Chairman and Rapporteur) 
1. At its December 1980 session, the Assembly adopted the draft budget for the financial year 
1981 with a reservation regarding any decisions which might be taken concerning the status of the 
Clerk and possible changes in the table of establishment of the Office of the Clerk. 
2. After considering the table of establishment of the Office of the Clerk, the Bureau voted in 
favour of the following changes: 
- Regrading of two Grade A5 posts to Grade A6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cost: F 13,000 
- Creation of a new Grade A3 post (including installation allowance, 
removal expenses, etc.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cost: F 320,000 
3. The two Grade A6 posts are for two officials who, because of their seniority and duties 
(co-ordination of committees in one case; administration and finance in the other), have, in their 
respective fields, to replace the Clerk if he is absent. 
4. The Grade A3 post is to allow a young official to be recruited to assist committee officials in 
their work. The fact that only one Grade A official is assigned to each committee makes it difficult 
for the Office of the Clerk to fulfil its tasks. 
5. The entertainment allowance of F 7,700 for the Clerk of the Assembly, included in Head I, 
Sub-Head 1 (a)- Basic salaries- is the same amount as has been available to the Clerk heretofore. 
6. The Assembly has never had an official car. Chauffeur-driven cars have been hired for the 
Clerk. 
7. The Bureau felt that an official car should be made available to the Clerk, who now lives 
permanently in Paris. The estimate under Head IV, Sub-Head 10, which has been increased by 
F 17,000, includes the following items: 
- Purchase of a car ......................................... . 
- Petrol, insurance, garage, servicing ......................... . 
- Hire of a car for the President for the two part-sessions of the 
Assembly ............................................... . 
- Hire of a car for the President when visiting other countries on 
Assembly business ....................................... . 
F 37,000 
F 14,000 
F 12,500 
F 4,000 
Estimate in the initial 1981 budget ........................................ . 
F 51,000 
F 67,500 
F 50,500 
F 17,000 
8. It should be pointed out that the additional expenditure would arise only in the financial year 
1981 since Sub-Head 10 of the budget for subsequent financial years would not include the item for 
the purchase of a car. Estimates under this sub-head would then amount to a total of only about 
30,000 French francs in constant terms, i.e. a saving of 16,000 French francs in constant terms 
compared with the amount initially foreseen for the hire of official cars in 1981. 
The Assembly's initial budget for 1981 as adopted by the Assembly was 
The revised budget is ................................................... . 
The draft budget for 1980 was ........................................... . 
The difference therefore is .............................................. . 
i.e. 16.38% 
F 11,358,000 
F 11,291,000 
F 9,701,477 
F 1,589,523 
9. In accordance with the decision taken by the Assembly at its December 1980 session, the 
revised budget maintains the two regradings from C3 to C4 and the sum of F 250,000 under 
Sub-Head 17 - Expenditure on information - and Sub-Head 18 - Expenses for groups of the 
Assembly. 
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SECOND REVISION OF THE BUDGET OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE 
OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1981 1 , 
submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
by Mr. Adriaensens, Chairman and Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Summary of second revised estimates for the financial 
year 1981 
Allocation of expenditure under heads and sub-heads 
Explanatory Memorandum 
Appendix: Exchange of letters on the revised WEU Assembly 
budget for 1981 
Summary of second revised estimates for the financial year 1981 
Details 
Head I : Expenditure for staff ..... 
Head// : Expenditure relating to 
temporary personnel • 0. 0 
Head Ill : Expenditure on premises 
and equipment 0 0 0 •• 0 •• 0 
Head IV: General administrative 
posts 
Head V : Other expenditure ....... 
Head VI : Pensions ............... 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE ••.. 0. 
TOTAL RECEIPTS .......... 
NET TOTAL .............. 
I. Document 851. 
2. Document 872. 
1. Adopted by the Presidential Committee. 
I 
Initial 
estimates 1 
-
6,883,000 
1,920,000 
383,000 
1,526,000 
1,000,000 
106,000 
11,818,000 
460,000 
11 358 000 
11 
Difference Revised Difference between 
estimates 2 between I and 11 11 and Ill 
(-) 84,000 6,799,000 -285,000 
- 1,920,000 -
- 383,000 -
(+) 17,000 1,543,000 -
- 1,000,000 ' -140,000 
- 106,000 -
(-) 67,000 11,751,000 -425,000 
- 460,000 -
(-) 67 000 11291000 -425 000 
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Ill 
Second 
revised 
estimates 
6,514,000 
1,920,000 
383,000 
1,543,000 
860,000 
106,000 
11,326,000 
460,000 
10 866 000 
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Allocation of Expenditure under Heads and Sub-Heads 
Details 
Head [-EXPENDITURE FOR STAFF 
Sub-Head I : Salaries of permanent establishment ............ . 
Sub-Head 2 : (A) Allowances .............................. . 
(B) Social charges ........................... . 
(C) Expenses relating to the recruitment, arrival 
and departure of permanent officials ....... . 
TOTAL OF HEAD I .................... . 
Head 11- EXPENDITURE RELATING TO THE SESSIONS OF THE ASSEMBLY 
Sub-Head 3 : I. Temporary staff ............................ . 
2. Linguistic staff ............................. . 
3. Insurance for temporary staff ................ . 
4. Installation of equipment during sessions ..... . 
5. Miscellaneous expenditure during sessions .... . 
ToTAL oF HEAD 11 .................... . 
Head /11- EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT 
Sub-Head 4: I. Premises .................................. . 
2. Work on the building Goint areas) ........... . 
Sub-Head 5 : Capital equipment ............................ . 
ToTAL oF HEAD III ................... . 
Head /V- GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS 
Sub-Head 6: Postage, telephone, telegraph charges, transport of 
documents ................................... . 
Sub-Head 7: Office supplies and hire of machines ............ . 
Sub-Head 8: Printing and publishing of Assembly documents .. 
Sub-Head 9: Purchase of documents, reference works, etc. . ... . 
Sub-Head 10: Official cars .................................. . 
Sub-Head 11: Bank charges ................................. . 
ToTAL oF HEAD IV ................... . 
Head V- OTHER EXPENDITURE 
Sub-Head 12 : Travel and subsistence allowances and insurance 
for the President of the Assembly, Chairmen of 
Committees and Rapporteurs .................. . 
Sub-Head 13 : Expenses for representation and receptions ...... . 
Sub-Head 14: Committee study missions ..................... . 
Sub-Head 15 : Official journeys of members of the Office of the 
Clerk ........................................ . 
Sub-Head 16 : Expenses of experts and the auditors ............ . 
Sub-Head I 7 : Expenditure on information ................... . 
Sub-Head 18 : Expenses for groups of the Assembly ........... . 
Sub-Head 19 : Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere 
provided for .................................. . 
Sub-Head 20: Non-recoverable taxes ......................... . 
Head VI - PENSIONS 
Sub-Head 21 : (A) 
(B) 
(C) 
(D) 
ToTAL OF HEAD V .................... . 
Pensions ................................ . 
Allowances ............................. . 
Severance grant .......................... . 
Supplementary insurance ................ . 
ToTAL oF HEAD VI ................... . 
Estimate for 1981 
F 
4,921,000 
867,000 
694,000 
32,000 
609,000 
979,000 
5,000 
270,000 
57,000 
283,000 
83,000 
17,000 
325,000 
210,000 
910,000 
30,000 
67,500 
500 
85,000 
132,000 
3,000 
215,000 
50,000 
180,000 
180,000 
3,000 
12,000 
104,000 
2,000 
6_,514_,000 
1,920,000 
383,000 
I ,543,000 
860,000 
106,000 
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Head I- Expenditure for Staff 
Sub-Head 1 
SALARIES OF PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT 
Revised estimate: F 4,921 ,000 
Second revision: F 4,856,000 
(a) Basic salaries Revised estimate: F. 5,029,000 
Net decrease: F 173,000 
Rank WEU No. Total
1 
Grade F 
The Clerk .............................................. . Hors cadre 1 354,0002 
Senior Counsellors ...................................... . A63 2 629,000 
Counsellors ............................................ . AS 3 903,000 
First Secretaries ........................................ . A4 2 516,000 
Secretary ............................................... . A3 1 234,000 
Secretaries-Translators/Publications ...................... . A2 3 517,000 
Administrative Assistant/ Assistant Translator 
Chief Accountant ....................................... . B6 1 171,000 
Personal Assistants ...................................... . B4 4 518,000 
Bilingual Shorthand Typists ............................. . B3 6 638,000 
Switchboard Operator ................................... . B3 1 111,000 
Head of Reproduction Department ....................... . C6 1 103,000 
Assistants in Reproduction Department ................... . C44 2 162,000 
27 4,856,000 
(b) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades A, Band C), 
including travelling expenses and insurance 
l. Scale 1st July 1980 +9.80% estimated rise in the cost of living in 1981. 
Revised estimate: F 65,000 
Initial estimate: F 22,000 
Net increase: F 43,000 
2. Basic salary Grade A 7.6 + 1 % (approved by the Council on 27th November 1980) plus an entertainment allowance of 
F 7,700. 
3. Regrading of two Grade AS posts to Grade A6. 
4. Regradings already requested in the initial 1981 budget. 
89 
DOCUMENT 872 ADDENDUM 
Sub-Head 2 
ALLOWANCES, SOCIAL CHARGES, ETC. 
(A) ALLOWANCES 
(a) Household allowance 
Revised estimate: F 867,000 
Second Revision: F 17S,OOO 
Revised estimate: F 18S,OOO 
Net decrease: F 10,000 
Rank WEU No. Total Grade F 
Clerk .................................................. . Hors cadre 1 21,000 
Senior Counsellor ....................................... . A6 1 19,000 
Counsellors ............................................ . AS 3 S4,000 
First Secretary .......................................... . A4 1 1S,OOO 
Secretary ............................................... . A3 1 14,000 
Personal Assistants ...................................... . B4 2 16,000 
Bilingual Shorthand Typists ............................. . B3 3 20,000 
Head of Reproduction Department ....................... . C6 1 6,000 
Assistants in Reproduction Department ................... . C4 2 10,000 
1S 17S,OOO 
(b) Children's allowance Second revision: F 16S,OOO 
Revised estimate: F 18'1 ,000 
Net decrease: F 16,000 
F 7,8SO per year per child . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 16S,OOO 
(c) Expatriation allowance Second revision: F 410,000 
Revised estimate: F 448,000 
Net decrease: F 38,000 
Rank WEU No. Total Grade F 
Senior Counsellors ...................................... . A6 2 113,000 
Counsellors ............................................ . AS 1 61,000 
First Secretary .......................................... . A4 1 S1,000 
Secretary ............................................... . A3 1 47,000 
Secretary-Translator/Publications 
Administrative Assistant/ Assistant Translator .............. . A2 2 S7,000 
Personal Assistants ...................................... . B4 2 47,000 
Bilingual Shorthand Typists ............................. . B3 2 34,000 
11 410,000 
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(d) Compensatory rent allowance 
(e) Overtime 
(f) 
(g) Education allowance 
(h) Allowance for language courses 
(a) Social Security 
2 7 officials 
(b) Supplementary insurance 
(c) Provident fund 
14 % of basic salaries x 7 4 7,000 
(B) SOCIAL CHARGES 
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Initial estimate: F 15,000 
Initial estimate: ,F 30,000 
Second revision: F 70,000 
Revised estimate: F 80,000 
Net decrease: F 10,000 
Initial estimate: F 2,000 
Revised estimate: F 694,000 
Second revision: F 426,000 
Revised estimate: F 441 ,000 
Net decrease: F 15,000 
Second revision: F 163,000 
Revised estimate: F 170,000 
Net decrease: F 7,000 
Revised estimate: F 105,000 
(C) EXPENSES RELATING TO THE RECRUITMENT, ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE OF PERMANENT OFFICIALS 
(a) Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates not 
residing in Paris who are convened for examina-
tions and interviews and cost of marking examina-
tion papers 
(b) Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrival 
and departure of staff and dependent persons 
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Revised estimate: F 32,000 
Second revision: F 1 ,600 
Revised estimate: F 10,000 
Net decrease: F 8,400 
Second revision: F 1 ,500 
Revised estimate: F 6,500 
Net decrease: F 5,000 
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(c) Removal expenses 
(d) Installation allowance 
Second revision: F 3,400 
Revised estimate: F 20,000 
Net decrease: F 16,600 
Second revision: F 7,000 
Revised estimate: F 36,000 
Net decrease: F 29,000 
(e) Biennial home leave for non-French officials 
(f) Medical examination 
Initial estimate: F 10,000 
Initial estimate: F 8,500 
Head V - Other expenditure 
Revised estimate: F 860,000 
Sub-Head 17 
EXPENDITURE ON INFORMATION 
Sub-Head 18 
Revised estimate: F 180,000 
Initial estimate: F 250,000 
Net decrease: F 70,000 
EXPENSES FOR GROUPS OF THE ASSEMBLY 
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Revised estimate: F 180,000 
Initial estimate: F 250,000 
Net decrease: F 70,000 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Adriaensens, Chairman and Rapporteur) 
1. Document 872, which has been transmitted to the Council for an opinion, sets out the changes 
to the Assembly's initial budget which have been adopted by the Committee on. Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration and the Presidential Committee following decisions taken by tire Bureau. 
2. In his letter of 29th May 1981 (see Appendix), the Secretary-General informed the President of 
the Council's conclusions on this matter. 
3. In response to that letter, the President of the Assembly submits the following proposed 
amendments: 
Head I (A): 
Head I (B): 
Withdrawal of the request for the creation of a new Grade A 3 post. 
Increase in the estimates under Sub-Head 1 (b) "Recruitment of 
additional temporary staff" F 43,000 
Head V: Limiting to 12% compared with 1980, the increase in estimates for infor-
mation purposes and political groups, i.e. for each of these two sub-
heads: 
Initial estimate: 
Revised estimate: 
Decrease: 
4. Estimates for the following sub-heads have been maintained: 
Sub-Head 1 : Regrading of two AS posts to A6 ; 
Regrading of two C3 posts to C4. 
Sub-Head 10: Purchase of a car. 
F 250,000 
F 180,000 
F 70,000 
5. The 1981 budget would consequently be increased by 12% compared with the 1980 budget. 
6. It should be pointed out that the inflation rate recorded in France in the first months of 1981 
was in fact more than 12 %. A ceiling of 12% in the rise in estimates therefore represents a 
reduction in real terms compared with the 1980 budget. 
7. The initial budget of the Assembly for 1981, as adopted by 
the Assembly, amounted to . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 11,358,000 
The first revised budget amounted to ................... . F 11,291,000 
The second revised budget amounted to ............................... . 
The draft budget for 1980 amounted to ................................ . 
The difference is therefore 
i.e. 12 %. 
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F 10,866,000 
F 9,701,477 
F 1,164,523 
DOCUMENT 872 ADDENDUM 
Mr. President, 
APPENDIX 
Exchange of letters on the revised 
WEU Assembly budget for 1981 
(a) Letter from Mr. E. Longerstaey, Secretary-General of 
WEU to Mr. Fred Mulley, President of the Assembly 
Revised WEU Assembly budget/or 1981 
Document AIWEUIBA (81) 2 
29th May 1981 
The Council today considered the Assembly's revised budget for 1981 and have asked me to 
inform you as follows: 
It is with the deepest regret that they find themselves unable to accept· the Assembly's revised 
budget which has been considerably increased in spite of both previously expressed appeals for 
economies such as have already been applied to all other sections of the WEU budget for 1981, and 
of present well-known economic circumstances. The Council remain of the opinion that, as stated 
by the Chairman-in-Office of the Council of Ministers in a letter sent to you on 27th November 1980 
by the Netherlands Ambassador, and also repeated in the Council's preliminary opinion on the 
Assembly's budget, the WEU budgets must not exceed in real terms the 1980 budget and should 
result in savings. 
This means that they could accept as a maximum an increase over the 1980 Assembly's budget 
of 12 %, the figure which has been accepted by the Council as the foreseeable inflation rate for 
France. 
The Council are fully aware that the suggestions contained in the Ambassador's letter of 27th 
November have been followed as regards the appointment of a full-time Clerk at the recommended 
grade. They note, however, that the proposed reorganisation of the Office of the Clerk of the 
Assembly (promotion of two A5 posts to A6 and creation of an A3 post) brings about a marked 
increase in expenditure, whereas it would seem possible to restructure the Office in a different way 
and at considerably less cost. Other expenditure, such as the purchase of a car, also appears some-
what incompatible with the Council's concern to achieve savings. Finally, the Council also note that 
their initial suggestions, discussed in the first instance by the Budget and Organisation Committee, 
concerning expenditure on information and expenses for political groups have not been adopted. 
The Council hope that the Assembly will be able to take the above remarks into consider-
ation. They are put forward in a spirit of co-operation and are simply intended to facilitate the 
proper running of the Assembly in the context of increasing financial constraints. 
Mr. C. van der Klaauw 
Yours sincerely, 
(signed) E. LONGERST AEY 
(b) Letter from Mr. Fred Mulley, President of the Assembly, 
to Mr. C. van der Klaauw, Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs 
9th June 1981 
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands 
May I express my warmest thanks for the hospitality you extended to the Presidential Committee 
and to two other Committees of the Assembly during their stay in The Hague. Our talks with 
members of the Council will provide useful material for the work of the Assembly. I should also 
like you to know how much I have appreciated the keen interest you have taken in our work during 
your year as Chairman-in-Office. 
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During the excellent luncheon which you gave for the Presidential Committee in the magnificent 
setting of the Trevezaal, I had the impression that the Assembly might be allowed some degree of 
latitude in the allocation of its financial resources provided its total budget does not exceed that of 
the previous financial year, plus 12% to be allowed for inflation. 
The " envelope " approach, for this year at least, may help avoid friction bet;ween the Council 
and the Assembly, and assist us both to make economies, if the Council does not, seek to follow its 
previous practice of minute supervision of minor administrative decisions by the Assembly and its 
Committees. I propose to ask the Presidential Committee at a meeting I hope to convene before the 
Assembly begins to consider a revised budget on this basis. I cannot, of course, predict the outcome 
as I know there will be disappointment in having a proposed staff reduction, which seems unavoid-
able, and smaller allocations for information and political groups, if we are to meet the smaller figure. 
If, as I would wish, we can agree a budget on this basis at the Presidential Committee, I would 
hope it will also be approved by the Assembly. Questions concerning next year's budget can then be 
considered but I hope we may not, with costs, etc. being so uncertain, have to produce a budget for 
the Council's consideration quite as early as in previous years- particularly as we seem only to get a 
response from the Council on the eve of our Assembly meetings. 
I am sending copies of this letter to your successor, as Chairman-in-Office, to the Secretary-
General and to your Ambassador in London. 
My colleagues join me in expressing their warm appreciation of your welcome in The Hague and 
to your parliamentary colleagues for all the trouble taken to provide us with facilities and assistance. 
Mr. President, 
Your sincerely, 
(signed) FRED MULLEY, President 
(c) Letter from Mr. Hurd, United Kingdom Minister of State 
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, to Mr. Fred Mulley 
11thJune1981 
In thanking you for kindly sending me a copy of your letter of 9th June addressed to my 
predecessor as Chairman-in-Office of the Council, I can inform you that the Permanent Council at 
their meeting yesterday considered your proposal. 
They will be pleased to study at the earliest opportunity an Assembly budget for 1981 revised in 
accordance with the terms of and following the suggestions contained in the letter sent to you by the 
Secretary-General on 29th May: within this framework the Assembly might be allowed some degree 
of latitude in the allocation of resources, provided that a maximum increase of 12% over the 1980 
budget is respected. 
With regard to next year's budget, the Council can agree that, as has happened on certain 
previous occasions, the draft could if necessary be discussed at a later stage in the year than was the 
case for the 1981 budget. I may remind you that under the procedure adopted in 1960 for the 
approval of the Assembly's budget, the Council are required to express an opinion on the draft before 
the second part of the Assembly's annual session. This should however not create insuperable 
problems provided of course that the Assembly, in their draft budget for 1982, continues to bear in 
mind the need for strict economy. 
(signed) DOUGLAS HURD 
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Information Report 
(submitted by Mrs. Knight, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. Your Rapporteur will consider as estab-
lished the facts already given in the report 
which she presented to the Assembly on 4th 
December 1980, both where information recei-
ved from national parliaments and the reference 
to press matters are concerned. She has 
appended to the present report the additional 
information received from the French Senate in 
January 1981. Consequently, she will delve 
further into the problems raised in her Decem-
ber report and, above all, in her speech presen-
ting the report to the Assembly, the broad lines 
of which she had already mentioned in Com-
mittee. Among other things, she said: 
"Without publicity, I submit that we are 
a sterile body. We get little publicity 
because we are so ineffective. We are 
ineffective because nothing that we do is 
of importance. Like Mr. Truman's 
' buck ', it just stops here. My report 
seeks to bring this to the notice of all 
members and to invite them to consider 
ways of improving the situation. " 
2. Since then, a number of factors have 
come to her attention which largely confirm 
what she said. 
11. Factors for making a diagnosis 
A. Press coverage of the Assembly's work 
3. Your Rapporteur asked the Office of the 
Clerk of the Assembly to obtain as much infor-
mation as possible about the number of press 
articles on recent Assembly sessions. The 
incompleteness of press reviews received by the 
Office of the Clerk, the assortment of subjects 
dealt with in many articles and the diversity of 
the opportunities which the press have of refer-
ring to the Assembly unfortunately do not 
allow a strict comparison to be made between 
press coverage of each session. Moreover, 
WEU press archives are kept for only one year 
and it was at the specific request of your Rap-
porteur that those relating to 1979 were 
kept. It was too late to refer to earlier years. 
4. Moreover, certain events other than ses-
sions have sometimes attracted the attention of 
journalists. For instance, the Brussels sympo-
sium in October 1979 was the subject of 82 
references in October and 41 in November, 
whereas the December 1979 session was refer-
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red to only 79 times, but the!: press conference 
by Mr. von Hassel, then Pr~sident of the As-
sembly, in Bonn at which hq set out the ideas 
he was to include in his 1980 report enabled 
the WEU Assembly to be m~ntioned 93 times 
in the press in September 1979, which means 
that the Press Department of the Office of the 
Clerk noted 434 articles relating to WEU in 
1979, a figure which very pre~>bably is not com-
plete. There were fewer outside events in 
1980, so that the Office of the Clerk noted only 
295 articles, although those written in months 
when sessions were held were not less than in 
1979 (87 in June, 55 in Dcecember compared 
with 61 and 79 respectively). Further details 
are given at appendix to the present report. 
5. Although your Rapporteur was not able 
to compare the number of articles on WEU 
published in 1979 and 1980 with those pub-
lished in earlier years, available information 
confirms that the effort made by the Assembly 
and the Council of WEU as from 1979 to en-
courage the press to pay more attention to their 
work has not been ineffectual. Mr. von Hassel 
deserves particular praise for his efforts which 
were largely responsible for the Council 
agreeing to a substantial increase in appropria-
tions for information. The amount available is 
still very little if compared with the sums avail-
able to comparable assemblies such as the 
Council of Europe or, a fortiori, the European 
Parliament. 
6. For 1980, sums available for information 
amounted to 161 ,500 francs, representing the 
WEU information budget (not including the 
salaries of two members of the Office of the 
Clerk: one Grade A and one Grade B official). 
7. As a comparison : 
(a) the information budget of the assem-
bly of the Europ~n Communities for 
1981 amounts to 2,800,000 European 
currency units (i.e. 14 million French 
francs), not including the salaries of 
149 officials, 50 of whom are in 
Grade A, 40 in Grade B and 59 in 
Grade C; 
(b) the information budget of the Council 
of Europe for 1981 amounts to about 
3,300,000 French francs, not inclu-
ding the salaries .of 41 officials, 12 of 
whom are in Grade A and 29 in 
Grade B. 
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8. For the reasons mentioned above, it has 
not been possible to make a comparative study 
of the funds available to these assemblies and 
the number of press reports on their 
work, but it is certain that any such 
comparison would be extremely favourable to 
the WEU Assembly. 
9. It will thus be seen that the results of the 
enquiry by your Rapporteur have made her 
moderate slightly the opinions she expressed in 
her previous report without however thereby 
changing her views on the problem as a whole. 
Miracles cannot be expected of an informa-
tion policy pursued at the level of the Assembly 
alone. Public opinion's interest in our work 
depends largely on our own interest in it and, 
above all, on the effect our work has on the 
policy of our governments. 
IO. Individual members and national delega-
tions have means of making known the work of 
the Council which your Rapporteur considers 
are not always used. In the difficult times 
which our countries are now experiencing, 
there is no question of suggesting that addi-
tional funds be allocated to the Assembly. On 
the contrary, a greater response to the work of 
the Assembly might be obtained by more 
sustained individual efforts. 
B. The part played by parliamentarians in 
the work of WEU 
II. In its November I980 issue, a German 
review, the Zeitschrifi for Parlamentsfragen, 
published a most interesting article about the 
WEU parliamentary Assembly 1• It was an 
extremely rigorous study by an author of un-
questionable standing and impartiality. Some 
of the facts were known to us because they in 
fact originated in our Committee but others 
coming from the German Delegation, are mor~ 
revealing. 
I2. Our German colleagues will appreciate 
that your Rapporteur has absolutely no inten-
tion of accusing the delegation. She greatly 
regrets that, to her knowledge, comparable stu-
dies have not been made in other countries, but 
she has every reason to think that similar stu-
dies in other parliaments would produce equi-
valent results. 
13. For anyone wishing to take the work and 
iJ?fluence of the WEU Assembly seriously, the 
signs that emerge from this study are rather 
depressing. 
I. Lutz ~einert: Die Parlamentarische Versammlung der 
Westeuropatschen Unwn - Parlamentarische Legitimations-
probleme transnationaler Militiirpolitik - Zeitschrifi for 
Parlamentsfragen, Jahrgang 11 (1980) Heft 3 pages 
386-396. , , 
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I4. It should be noted that the enquiry was 
conducted on the basis of a questionnaire ans-
wered by I9 out of 36 members of the German 
Delegation (i.e. 52%) during the Seventh 
Legislature of the Bundestag. To a question 
a_bout the effect WEU Assembly recommenda-
tions had on the Bundestag's decision-taking 
proc~ss, 8 parliamentarians answered that they 
considered they had none, 9 that they had little 
effect and 2 did not answer. When asked whe-
ther. the work of the WEU Assembly occupied 
an Important place in their political work 2 
said yes and I7 no. On the place occupied' by 
th_eir work for the WEU Assembly compared 
With that for the Bundestag, I2 answered that it 
represented less than I 0 %, 3 that it represented 
between IQ% and 20%, I that it represented 
more than 20 % and 3 did not answer. It 
should be noted however that this proportion is 
not disastrous since on average the WEU 
Assembly sits for no more than seven days a 
year. 
I5. Asked what importance being a member 
of the Assembly had for their political career, 3 
parliamentarians said it had considerable im-
portance, 2 that it was a useful beginning and I 
that it was a meaningful way to end a career 
but 7 felt it was of no importance and 6 did not 
answer. Furthermore, I 0 parliamentarians said 
they preferred the Assembly of the Council of 
Europe compared with 2 who preferred the 
WEU Assembly and 5 who placed the two 
assemblies on an equal footing; 2 did not 
answer. Eleven believed the Assembly of the 
Council of Europe carried out more effective 
work than the WEU Assembly, I thought the 
opposite, 2 that they were equally effective and 
5 did not answer. Finally, only 4 parliamenta-
rians out of I9 quoted their knowledge of 
defence questions as a decisive reason for their 
appointment to the German Delegation to the 
WEU Assembly. 
I6. The results of this enquiry clearly illus-
trat~ what your ~apporteur indicated when pre-
sentmg her previous report, i.e. that the WEU 
Assembly is not of sufficiently significant inte-
rest for the members themselves, in her view 
because there is no common measure between 
the effort it demands and the results one is enti-
tled to expect. She said on that occasion: 
" ... At present, the Assembly of WEU is 
an extraordinarily useless body. So 
~uch of its work is completed only to be 
Ignored. Reports are compiled with infi-
nite care and with the profuse burning of 
midnight oil. They are argued about, 
amended, talked over and discussed and 
~nally they appear in cherished print, 
h~e a much wanted child after a long and 
difficult labour. Alas, their fate is only 
to live in the proud memory of the 
Rapporteur. .. 
Yet many, perhaps even most, reports are 
very good and their recommendations are 
well worth implementing. " 
17. On this point, it can be seen that, to say 
the least, the information obtained since draf-
ting the preliminary report is not likely to make 
her change her mind. 
Ill. The prospects of an improvement 
A. What the Assembly can do 
18. As noted, there is little with which to 
reproach members of the press assigned to the 
Assembly. We know they all work very cons-
cientiously and that it is often their agencies or 
papers which prefer all kinds of other informa-
tion to that concerning the WEU Assembly, 
which is quite understandable when it is borne 
in mind that members of the Assembly them-
selves make the work of WEU take second 
place to many other concerns. At most it 
might be pointed out that they attach so:Ue-
times exclusive importance to action by or 
speakers from their own country at the expense 
of the representatives of the other six countries. 
This is quite a natural phenomenon, but 
may conceal from public opinion one of the 
essential virtues of our institution, that of being 
international. 
19. For its part, the Assembly itself does 
what it can as regards the standard of the 
reports it prepares and of its debates. Never-
theless, as your Rapporteur pointed out in 
December, the organisation of these debates 
might be improved if an effort was made not to 
split debates up, for reasons which cannot 
always be grasped, so that journalists present 
may follow a debate with interest but not hear 
its conclusion, thus further lessening any im-
portance which their editors may attach to the 
work of the Assembly. Thus, your Rapporteur 
said in December: 
" I may be sticking my neck out, but I 
believe that we could run our procedures 
much more effectively. Occasionally, we 
start a debate on one topic, something 
else intervenes and we may or may not 
return to the original subject. There is 
considerable mystique about when a 
report is to be concluded. I appreciate 
the difficulties. We never know how 
many members may wish to speak, but 
can we say that we cannot improve our 
procedures ? I believe that we could. If 
W(t did so, that would reflect much grea-
ter credit on our activities. " 
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These remarks are addressed not so much to 
the Committee on Rules of Procedure as to the 
Presidential Committee which draws up the 
order of business of sessions and, finally, to the 
President who applies this order of business. 
20. Moreover, it is for members of the 
Assembly to make a greater· effort when they 
return to their countries and their work in their 
parliaments to make more ofithe reports, deba-
tes and recommendations of the WEU Assem-
bly by every means available to them, among 
which written questions are probably not the 
most important. Last December, your Rap-
porteur said: 
"All members of the Assembly have a 
duty to influence their own member 
governments to take ndte of, and consider 
action on, reports pasSed by the Assem-
bly. We have all been to blame. We 
have ways of alerting member govern-
ments to reports and recommendations 
and we could do much more as indivi-
duals. We all have a duty in that 
regard. All members must consider and 
weigh their actions \\lith immense care, 
particularly when recommendations 
urging that WEU's a~tivities should be 
transferred to other organisations are 
before us. " 
B. What the Council should do 
21. The modified Brussels Treaty set up the 
WEU Assembly to provide a parliamentary 
interlocutor for the CounciL By ensuring that 
the implementation of the treaty was supervised 
by representatives of public opinion, the WEU 
Assembly helps to strengthen the Alliance. 
But in recent years the Council has not been an 
effective interlocutor for the Assembly. A par-
liamentary assembly can in fact carry out useful 
work only if its votes are implemented, and, in 
the framework of WEU, the Council is respon-
sible for doing so. 
22. But the way the Co\}ncil now functions 
prevents it from fulfilling this role. It now 
only meets once a year and for a very short 
time at ministerial level, With junior Ministers 
often taking the place of cabinet Ministers, thus 
removing some of the impact of its discus-
sions. If its own reports are to be believed, its 
agendas at these meetings are very sparse. 
23. When, on the other land, the Council 
meets at ambassadorial level, it never takes the 
initiative of tackling any political question 
whatsoever but merely tries to reply to Assem-
bly recommendations. 
24. This almost total laak of initiative on the 
part of the Council is skilfully concealed by the 
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absence of contact between it and public opi-
nion. At the close of ministerial meetings, it is 
customary for the Chairman-in-Office of the 
Council to hold a press conference. But this is 
the only occasion on which the Council com-
municates any information whatsoever on its 
activities to public opinion, except for the 
annual report it addresses to the Assembly. 
Hence, where the press is concerned, there is a 
contradiction between the policy pursued by 
the Council when it is a question of its own 
affairs and the policy it allows the Assembly to 
pursue. 
25. By granting the Assembly a substantial 
increase in its press budget in 1979, it showed 
that it attached some importance to our deba-
tes. But by taking no action in areas within its 
responsibility, by constantly and systematically 
relying on other organisations to exercise its 
responsibilities and by not keeping the press 
informed of its own activities, the Council is 
pursuing a policy diametrically opposed to that 
which it apparently wishes the Assembly to 
pursue. While it is not the responsibility of 
the Committee for Relations with Parliaments 
to examine the Council's policy, it should 
underline that the Assembly cannot hope to 
acquire authority of its own fundamentally dif-
ferent from that of the Council, and the absence 
of dialogue between the two principal WEU 
bodies is one of the essential causes of the lack 
of public interest in our work and the lack of 
credibility of any texts which the Assembly 
may adopt. 
26. No true recovery is possible if the Coun-
cil does not decide to pursue a real policy of 
informing both the Assembly and public opi-
nion in general. It is clear that the officials of 
which the Council is composed at most of its 
meetings are not encouraged by the nature of 
their responsibilities to take initiatives or a for-
tiori to inform public opinion of any action 
which it may by chance take. Nevertheless, 
the fact that under the treaty these officials 
have to answer to a parliamentary assembly 
should encourage them to take more initia-
tives in this field. The Council's secretariat 
might instruct one of its members to be perma-
nently in contact with representatives of the 
press as in the Assembly. At the close of each 
Council meeting, a communique could be 
issued by the Secretary-General, taking the 
chair when the Council meets at ambassadorial 
level. Surely its agenda is not so devoid of 
interest that it is not worth while! We are 
especially entitled to ask this question and to 
make these suggestions since issuing such com-
muniques and maintaining contacts with the 
press are constant practice in all the other 
European institutions. 
27. Not only are all meetings (whether minis-
terial or not) held in the framework of the 
lOO 
European Community the subject of press com-
muniques and frequently even of press con-
ferences, but Community officials are also often 
called on by the European Parliament to come 
and inform it of the progress of their work. 
This practice is totally unknown in the WEU 
Council, which seems to consider itself not as 
one element of a democratic Europe but as a 
left-over from that secret diplomacy which the 
Versailles Treaty already claimed to have elimi-
nated from international practice but which in 
any event should no longer have a place in 
relations between European states. 
28. In order to show the nature of this policy 
of secrecy practised systematically by the Coun-
cil towards the Assembly, reference might be 
made to the example of the Standing Arma-
ments Committee. In 1976, that body was 
instructed by the Council to carry out an in-
quiry into the European armaments industries. 
It was learned that it had handed the first 
chapter of its report, on the juridical aspects, to 
the Council in June 1978 and that it had 
completed a study on the economic aspects 
which it handed to the Council in June 
1980. The Assembly has never been informed 
that other chapters were to be prepared. Fur-
ther, the Council has always refused to give 
either the public or the Assembly the actual 
text of this report, although it has stated that it 
is prepared to keep the Assembly informed by 
what it considered to be the most appropriate 
means. 
29. But to date nothing has been done in this 
respect. Admittedly, at the request of the 
Assembly Mr. Plantey, Head of the SAC Secre-
tariat, made an important and interesting state-
ment on the juridical problems raised by inter-
national armaments co-operation at the sympo-
sium held in Brussels in October 1979. But he 
did this on a personal basis and the Council has 
never indicated whether or not it considered 
this statement to be information supplied by 
the Council to the Assembly. 
30. Moreover, it implied that it would not 
communicate the report transmitted to it by the 
SAC to the Assembly before it was complete. 
But since June 1980 it has had in its hands 
a version of the report which there are many 
reasons for considering final and complete and 
it has communicated nothing to the Assem-
bly. Admittedly, such a report may contain 
military information which the Council does 
not wish to divulge although it is hard to see 
how the juridical aspects of the problem could 
involve such information. But where the eco-
nomic chapter is concerned it is hard to 
imagine that this can amount to more than 
details which could easily be removed from the 
published text and it seems incredible that in 
democratic countries where information is 
widely circulated, as is the case of the seven 
WEU member countries, a large amount of the 
information obtained by the SAC should not be 
published. 
31. It is particularly unbelievable since the 
Commission of the European Communities for 
its part asked Professor Greenwood of Aberdeen 
University to carry out an inquiry on the same 
subject. The inquiry was carried out carefully 
and competently by this well-known expert and 
his colleagues and was paid for by the Commu-
nity. Your Rapporteur notes that Mr. 
Davignon, member of the European Commis-
sion responsible for industrial questions, handed 
the text of Professor Greenwood's report to the 
European Parliament in January 1981 accom-
panied by a commentary which was published 
by a press agency. It may be noted in passing 
that this commentary proposed the creation of 
" a defence procurement analysis unit " which, 
according to Mr. Davignon, " might be estab-
lished in the framework of Western European 
Union", and in no event in that of the Euro-
pean Community. Thus, our seven govern-
ments, which are all members of the European 
Community, agree to a major report on the 
European armaments industries being transmit-
ted to the European Parliament which has no 
responsibilities in this field by the Commission 
of the European Communities but refuse to 
make the inquiry carried out in the framework 
of WEU, which does have responsibilities in 
this field, known to the members of the WEU 
Assembly. What then is the meaning of the 
words used each year by the Council in its 
annual report according to which we are " the 
only European assembly with defence responsi-
bilities "? 
32. One should therefore not be surprised if 
the press seeks the information which it is its 
duty to pass on to European public opinion 
outside WEU. The only logical way for our 
Assembly to react would be for it in turn to 
commission an expert to prepare a report on 
armaments problems. It can be seen how 
much waste of money, energy and time this 
would involve. But the example shows to 
what extent the attitude constantly adopted by 
the Council helps to discredit the Assembly and 
prevent it playing the role assigned to it in the 
treaty. 
IV. Conclusions 
33. In examining relations between the WEU 
Assembly and the press, your Rapporteur 'can-
not confine herself to purely technical con-
siderations. The fact that she has to note the 
press's lack of interest in the Assembly's work 
compels her to underline an obvious fact, i.e. 
that WEU is a single institution within which 
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one cannot deal with only one' of its component 
bodies. · 
34. The Assembly cannot be hoped to hold 
the attention of public opinion unless the 
Council co-operates in its work. It must grant 
the Assembly the information it needs. It must 
also follow up the recommendations the 
Assembly transmits to it. · 
35. The Assembly may improve the organisa-
tion of its debates and invite journalists, but it 
will be credible only if the Council behaves like 
a true interlocutor, first through its own activi-
ties, second by raising the curtain of secrecy 
with which it surrounds itself and third by the 
active participation of Ministers from the seven 
WEU countries in the work of the Assem-
bly. It is remarkable and scandalous that, with 
the one notable exception of Mr. Scholten, 
Netherlands Minister of Defence, in June 1979 
in the last three years no defence minister fro~ 
any member country has been able to address 
"the only European assembly with defence 
responsibilities ". 
36. Study of Appendix I shows that each 
time a decision, even a minor one, has been 
taken by the Council the press has duly noted 
the fact. Addresses by Ministers always draw 
the attention of public opihion to our work. 
Their answers to our oral questions rarely go 
unnoticed. But if the executive deliberately 
ignores the parliamentary element of the insti-
tution, why should the press pay it more 
attention? 
3 7. Hence, it is at the level of the WEU 
Council that the two major problems arise and 
it will have to solve them if'it effectively wishes 
the Assembly to fulfil its obligations under the 
modified Brussels Treaty. One relates to the 
nature of the Council's activities and it is for 
the other Assembly Committees, particularly 
the General Affairs Committee and the Com-
mittee on Defence Questions and Armaments, 
to study the matter. The other relates to the 
importance and seriousness of the information 
with which the Council provides the Assembly, 
the press and public opinion. This matter 
concerns us all and justifies your Rapporteur's 
remarks. She may seem bitter. She is in fact 
being too moderate. 
38. Being without powers and having consul-
tative status, the three European assemblies 
(Assembly of the Communities, Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe, WEU 
Assembly) find it hard to make themselves 
heard. The WEU Assembly has the further 
fundamental handicap that; it is the only one of 
three whose speeches give rise to no correspon-
ding action by its Council, member govern-
ments having until now not considered it expe-
dient to use WEU or to make it do some-
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thing. This inaction enormously reduces the 
Assembly's credibility in face of the events 
which daily jostle for the attention of the press 
and too often justifies accusations sometimes 
made by the press that our work is academic. 
* 
* * 
39. The Committee for Relations with Parlia-
ments examined this report at its meeting on 
28th April and instructed your Rapporteur to 
present it at the Assembly's next session. 
Noting that the problem in question concer-
ned not only the Assembly but also the Council 
of WEU, the Committee regretted that it was 
not in a position to adopt a draft recommen-
dation for transmission to the Council. It 
therefore decided to overcome this difficulty by 
communicating its conclusions to the General 
Affairs Committee, which is responsible for 
dealing with the question of relations between 
the Council and the Assembly in its reply to 
the annual report of the Council, to· be pre-
sented at the June session. 
40. The discussion in the Committee for 
Relations with Parliaments was especially posi-
tive and produced a series of proposals which 
develop and complete those suggested by your 
Rapporteur. She believes she can draw atten-
tion to the following points : 
(i) The Assembly should make an effort 
to attract more visitors to its ses-
sions, particularly schoolchildren 
and students. Appropriate informa-
tion material should be prepared for 
these groups. 
(ii) The Presidential Committee should 
ensure that the reports of the Com-
mittee for Relations with Parlia-
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ments are debated at a time when it 
is certain that a large number of 
members of the Assembly will be 
present since this Committee's activi-
ties form an essential link between 
the work of the WEU Assembly and 
that of the parliaments of WEU 
member countries. 
(iii) The Committee for Relations with 
Parliaments should be brought into 
the dialogue between the Council 
and the Assembly for matters within 
its purview under the procedure for 
joint meetings. 
(iv) The Presidential Committee should 
ask the Council to ensure the pre-
sence of a cabinet Minister each day 
of the session and to propose that 
each Minister address the Assembly 
in the framework of the debate on a 
report, as far as possible expressing 
the views of the Council and not 
only those of his government on 
matters relating to the report in ques-
tion. 
(v) More representatives of governments 
of countries which are not members 
of WEU but which are concerned by 
Assembly reports and non-govern-
mental speakers should be invited if 
their views may be of interest for the 
Assembly's work. 
(vi) The dates of sessions should be fixed 
at times which suit all delegations. 
41. Your Rapporteur is gratified that the 
Committee was able to make such specific pro-
posals, thus demonstrating its wish to make the 
work of the Assembly more effective in the 
interests of Europe. 
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APPENDIX I 
Articles in the international press partly or wholly relating to WEU received by the Office of the Clerk 
of the Assembly in 1979 and 1980 
Month 1979 1980 
January 6 5 
February 12 7 
March 6 11 
April 3 16 
May 17 
June 75 1 87 1 
July 292 535 
August 8 5 
September 93 3 14 
October 824 14 
November 41 4 11 
December 79 1 55 1 
TOTAL 434 295 
1. Assembly session. 
2. Belgian decision on the procurement of armoured vehicles. 
3. Debate in the parliamentary assembly of the European 
Communities on the oral question put by Mr. Fergusson and Mr. von 
Hasse1 on Community programmes for arms supplies in the frame-
work of industry policy. 
4. Brussels symposium on a European armaments policy. 
5. Removal of restrictions on naval shipbuilding in the Federal 
Republic. 
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APPENDIX 11 
Addendum to Document 865 
France 
Relations between the Senate and the press 
Journalists wishing to follow the work of 
the Senate either in public sitting or in commit-
tee may be accredited by the Office of the 
Sergeant-at-Arms on the authorisation of the 
Parliamentary press association. About one 
hundred journalists are accredited in this way 
and enjoy the following facilities: 
- access to the press gallery in the chamber 
during public debates; 
- access to the press room near the cham-
ber where they may work, telepfione and 
listen to the retransmission of debates; 
- certain other rights to use the Senate pre-
mises, the car park and restaurant. 
In the press room, certain documents are 
communicated automatically to journalists : 
- summary reports of sittings half an hour 
after speeches have been made; 
- parliamentary reports and documents; 
- press communiques issued by commit-
tees, whose meetings are not open to the 
public but about which the press is thus 
kept informed by decision of their res-
pective Chairmen, or by political groups 
or Senators acting in a personal capacity. 
In 1971, the Bureau of the Senate set up 
the Information Division. It is under the 
responsibility of the Secretariat-General of the 
Presidency and its task is to assist journalists in 
their work: 
- first, by issuing a weekly information 
bulletin while parliament is in session 
describing the work of the Senate during 
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the previous week and announcing the 
programme for the following week; 
- by organising press conferences on the 
principal texts debated and the principal 
reports published; 
- by providing, with the assistance of spe-
cialised staff from the committees and 
other departments concerned, notes sum-
marising matters of particular interest; 
- by answering as quickly and fully as 
possible their requests for specific infor-
mation or documentation. 
Relations with radio and television 
Radio and television journalists accredited 
to the Senate enjoy the same facilities as other 
journalists plus a few others specifically 
connected with the techniques they use and 
their methods of work : 
- the retransmission of all or part of a tele-
vised debate by one of the three tele-
vision companies is subject to the autho-
risation of the President of the Senate; 
- for such coverage, the television com-
pany is installed in a special gallery but 
must of course bring its own equip-
ment. This also applies to radio ser-
vices for which there are separate 
recording studios. 
Information on the work of the Senate is 
included in various news casts or magazines, as 
are interviews with individual Senators. But 
the four companies, TF1, Antenne 2, FR3 and 
Radio France, are also obliged to reserve a 
number of broadcasts each year for the 
National Assembly and the Senate, which 
decide on the content. 
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The European combat aircraft and 
other aeronautical developments 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions2 
by Mr. Brasseur, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
on the European combat aircraft and other aeronautical developments · 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Brasseur, Rapporteur 
Introduction 
I. Requirements of the three European air forces 
11. Harmonisation of requirements 
Ill. Industrial aspects 
IV. Budgetary aspects 
V. Organisational problems 
VI. Export possibilities 
VII. Other aeronautical developments 
VIII. Alternatives 
30th April 1981 
1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Valleix (Chairman); 
MM. Lenzer, Wilkinson (Alternate: Jessel) (Vice-
Chairmen); MM. Adriaensens (Alternate: Brasseur), 
Amadei, Antoni, Cornelissen (Alternate: Portheine), 
Fiandrotti, Forma, Garrett, Hawkins, Konings, McGuire, 
Malvy (Alternate: Bizet), Manning, Peronnet, Prussen 
(Alternate: Thoss), Spies von Briillesheim, Topmann, van 
Waterschoot. 
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The Assembly, 
Draft Recommendation 
on the European combat aircraft and 
other aeronautical developments 
Considering that several European countries will need to procure a new combat aircraft in the 
early nineties to replace, inter alia, fighter aircraft which will then be obsolete; 
Considering that this aircraft must be designed in the light of the then prevailing threat to 
European states; 
Considering therefore that this aircraft will involve the use of very advanced technology and 
will have to meet a wide range of requirements (air-to-air, air-to-surface, ease of handling, short take-
off, etc.); 
Considering further that the time available for the study and design of this aircraft will thus 
allow detailed technical studies to be made (new designs) and the necessary financial means to be 
provided; 
Considering that the standard of industrial activity, employment and technological know-how 
in the European states is directly linked with the future of the civil and military aeronautical sector 
and hence to the maintenance of its order books, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Ask the British, French and German Governments to tackle their present study in greater detail 
and harmonise the specifications required by the staffs of the three air forces so that the development 
of a European combat aircraft may be undertaken; 
2. Ask the governments of the other WEU member states, in the framework of the Standing 
Armaments Committee and of the Independent European Programme Group, to show their interest 
in the development of this aircraft which should be available for procurement in about fifteen years' 
time; 
3. Recall the need to design a multi-purpose aircraft adaptable to the specific requirements of the 
various WEU member countries; 
4. Insist on such co-operation being organised flexibly and efficiently, drawing on the lessons of 
twenty years of European experience of co-operation; 
5. Consider extending European co-operation to other types of aircraft (helicopters, transport 
aircraft, etc.). 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Brasseur, Rapporteur) 
Introduction 
1. The need for a future combat aircraft was 
already mentioned at the symposium on a 
European armaments policy, held in Brussels 
on 15th- I 7th October 1979. The Committee 
on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace 
Questions asked Air Marshal Sir Denis Small-
wood, Military Adviser to British Aerospace 
Aircraft Group, to submit a paper on this 
subject. In his paper he did not discuss the full 
range of future combat aircraft requirements in 
Western Europe but the combat aircraft require-
ment for operations in the battlefield area. 
He considered this issue vital and a priority 
requirement for Western Europe. He believed 
that allied ground forces in Central Europe 
would be grossly outnumbered and that the 
only possibility of redressing the local im-
balance of ground forces was to make use of air 
power and its flexibility and quick reaction 
capabilities in space and time. As General 
Haig said when he was Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe (SACEUR), the only 
" masse de manceuvre " available on the central 
front is the air arm and it seems that this is 
likely to remain so in the foreseeable future. 
2. The Air Marshal also believed the 
aircraft should become an international collabo-
rative project in view of the importance of the 
requirements as this would reduce costs both 
directly, as a result of shared costs, and indi-
rectly since it would result in increased sales. 
3. This opinion was shared both by Admiral 
Sir Raymond Lygo, the Rapporteur who drew 
the conclusions on this question, and by a 
representative of the German aeronautical 
industry, Mr. Forster-Steinberg. Admiral Lygo 
stated that the threat to low-flying aircraft 
would increase considerably, which meant 
developing aircraft equipped with systems 
offering the maximum ability to withstand the 
threat. 
4. Mr. Forster-Steinberg said that as an 
industrialist he was convinced of the need for 
government support. Europe could not increase 
its competitiveness in the civil and military 
aerospace field if it failed to pool its technolo-
gical knowledge. A minimum of collaboration 
was essential, otherwise Western Europe would 
become economically dependent on the United 
States and vulnerable in addition. 
5. In its reply to Recommendation 329 on 
the industrial bases of European security, the 
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Council recognised the usefulness of identifying 
weapons systems which could be produced in 
collaboration, of achieving improved operabi-
lity where appropriate, and of seeking areas 
where European effort needed to be particularly 
concentrated. In its reply to a further 
recommendation (339) on the industrial bases 
of European security - guidelines drawn from 
the symposium on 15th, 16th, 17th October 
1979, the Council named one of these areas 
when it said that the Independent European 
Programme Group was currently examining 
problems connected with the future combat 
aircraft, which was also the subject of intense 
tripartite discussions betw~en the French, 
German and United Kingdom Governments. 
The Council shared the Assembly's concern 
that these efforts to co-operate should produce 
European successors for the Jaguar, Harrier and 
Phantom F-4F. In this reply, dated 30th April 
1980, it also considered that the framework and 
form of such co-operation should be the 
existing machinery for concerting measures in 
the armaments field, in particular the Inde-
pendent European Programme Group (IEPG) 
and the conference of national armaments 
directors in the NATO framework. 
6. The air staffs of France, Germany, and 
the United Kingdom have therefore been dis-
cussing the possibilities of a successor to the 
F-4F Phantom for the German air force, the 
F.ranco-British Jaguar for the French and Royal 
mr forces and the Harrier for the Royal Air 
Force. Three types of national specifications 
have been drawn up: the AST -403 (air staff 
target for the Royal Air Force), the ACT -92 
(avion de combat tactique for 1992 for the 
French air force), and the TKF-90 (Taktisches 
Kampjjlugzeug for the 1990s for the German 
air force). The national industries involved 
are British Aerospace, Dassault-Breguet and 
MBB. 
7. Some of the requirements of the three air 
forces are more or less parallel as they all want 
great manoeuvrability and the ability to fly at 
supersonic speed at an altitude of less than 150 
metres. It should have air-to-air and air-to-
ground capabilities to be able to destroy air-
fields and tank units. 
8. On other requirements, however, the 
three air forces are still far from agreement. 
For instance, the Royal Air Force sees no justi-
fication for the additional costs of developing a 
new engine when there is already the RB-199 
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which is a Turbo Union engine developed in 
co-operation between MTU, Fiat and Rolls-
Royce. A new aircraft will require both the 
use of composite materials and new avionics. 
The German air force wants a new aircraft with 
modern technology but allowing the adaptation 
of existing engines and avionics. The French 
air force, to be equipped with the Mirage 
F-2000 in the early 1980s, will not order the 
F-4000. 
9. The question will arise as to whether 
European industry alone will be able to pro-
duce an aircraft which fulfils all the require-
ments of the three air staffs, not only in 
engines, airframes or avionics, but also with 
fittings for the necessary weapons systems that 
will give the aircraft its offensive and defensive 
capabilities. In this connection acceptance of 
the cruise missile as a weapons system may be 
of great importance. But as long as require-
ments are not harmonised, industry will have to 
stand on the side-lines until the air staffs reach 
their decisions. 
10. Several billion dollars will be needed to 
develop a new manned combat aircraft for 
which every major European country wishes to 
acquire the technological know-how. It is 
agreed that it should be a twin-engine aircraft, 
highly manoeuvrable, and with a very short 
landing and take-off capability. Research and 
development would certainly be extremely 
costly, but could be considered an insurance for 
future employment and the industrial products 
of advanced technology. Such huge sums will 
be involved that European collaboration will be 
essential. Furthermore, co-operation still does 
not allow large enough savings to be made in 
programme costs. 
I. Requirements of the three European 
air forces 
11. Air power will remain the key factor in 
any defence effort because of its flexibility and 
ubiquity. In order to have local air superiority 
and a wide range of action into the second and 
third echelons behind the enemy lines it is 
necessary to have manned aircraft. They can 
not only reach but also search for targets. 
Missiles, whether cruise missiles or any other 
kind, can be used against fixed targets such as 
airfields. Helicopters have great manoeuvrabi-
lity in the immediate front line but are extre-
mely vulnerable. There is no doubt that 
manned aircraft will remain necessary in the 
future. 
Royal Air Force 
12. At the end of 1970s the Royal Air Force 
originally set an air staff target for one aircraft 
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to replace both the Jaguar and Harrier aircraft, 
which would considerably facilitate front-line 
supply. At the time the RAF was open-
minded about the configuration of the aircraft. 
The requirement was based on the one hand 
on the state of Soviet defences and on the 
other on required technological improvement. 
When it became clear that neither France nor 
the Federal Republic of Germany wanted to 
include vertical take-off and landing charac-
teristics in any potential collaborative European 
combat aircraft, the RAF altered its target 
requirements to include one aircraft as a Jaguar 
replacement and another as a Harrier replace-
ment. 
French air force 
13. French requirements for a combat aircraft 
in the 1990s will be for a multirole aircraft 
whose main role will be air-to-ground as it will 
have to replace the Jaguar. For the air-to-air 
role the French air force has ordered the Mirage 
2000, a successor to the Mirage Ill, and this 
will be brought into service from 1983 onwards. 
14. Some 300 European combat aircraft 
might be ordered. The aircraft should have all 
the new technical characteristics which staffs 
now know it should be possible to incorporate 
in aircraft for the early 1990s. The French 
name for the aircraft is ACT -92 (avian de 
combat tactique, for 1992 onwards). As it 
takes some ten years to develop such an air-
craft, the time is therefore right to take a 
decision. 
15. The Mirage 4000, developed as a private 
venture by Dassault without financial assistance 
from the state, is in the same class as the F -15 
or F-18. Since an enormous amount of 
money, perhaps some F 60 billion, will be 
required to start actual production, the French 
air force has no programme for the Mirage 
4000. 
16. The existence of the Mirage 4000 proto-
type has not changed French opinion on the 
need to go ahead with common research and 
development of the European combat aircraft. 
German air force 
17. The staff of the German air force wants 
and needs to replace its Phantom F -4s at the 
end of the 1980s. According to the German 
air staff targets, the primary role of their new 
combat aircraft should be air-to-air, whereas 
that of the French and British version should be 
air-to-ground. There is therefore a difference 
in the air staffs' requirements but, on the other 
hand, the three countries concerned now 
require their new aircraft at about the same 
time, i.e. the early 1990s, and the harmonisa-
tion of the time-tables could therefore be 
assured. 
18. The European combat aircraft will have 
to be based on new concepts; it does not seem 
realistic to build a derivative of an existing 
aircraft if the new aircraft is to be used for some 
twenty years as from the early 1990s. How-
ever, a compromise has to be found as no mili-
tary budget can be stretched far enough to 
satisfy all the requirements of the three air 
staffs. 
19. The basic German requirements for the 
TKF (Taktisches Kampjjlugzeug) with its main 
role being in air-to-air capabilities is as follows: 
- thrust/weight ratio: 1.3-1.4, 
- battle weight: 11 ,000-12,000 kg, 
- maximum speed: < 1.6 Mach, 
- take-off and landing distance: approx. 
500 m, 
- specific excess power: 380-450 m/s, 
- modern guided missiles: 6-10, 
- radius of action according to mission: 
300-1 ,000 km, 
- high carbon fibre content in the 
structure, 
- use of direct force modes, 
- high performance manoeuvrability. 
11. Harmonisation of requirements 
20. The three countries concerned should be 
able to harmonise their requirements not only 
on the same type of aircraft but also on engines 
and armaments. It would, of course, be possi-
ble for certain parts of the avionics to differ 
from one another insofar as the air staffs require 
different types of armaments. This could alter 
the performances of these aircraft without 
greatly increasing the development cost. . 
21. In 1978, the three ministers of defence 
concluded an agreement to start work on the 
aircraft's common characteristics. They instruc-
ted their armaments directors to set up 
working groups in the three national defence 
ministries and asked British Aerospace, Das-
sault-Breguet and MBB to prepare a joint report 
on the industrial possibilities of them combi-
ning to build a European combat aircraft. In 
the summer of 1980 this report was sent to the 
national defence ministries. The ministries 
considered it very useful, but the solution 
suggested by industry meant in fact that the 
three air forces were united only on the air-
frame requirement; otherwise they wanted 
three different weapons systems as well as two, 
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or possibly three, different engines. France 
favours a new engine to be developed by 
SNECMA, whilst both the United Kingdom 
and Germany have an interest in the further 
use of the European Turbo Union RB-199 
engine, which they have developed in associa-
tion with Italy. Germany wishes to consider 
existing United States engines as well. 
22. The governments were unable to accept 
such an expensive solution and invited the air 
staffs to try to align their requirements in order 
to make the aircraft cheaper., A further report 
has been requested for March or April 1981. 
23. With regard to the airframe, there is 
agreement on short take-off and landing and 
multirole characteristics and it is also agreed 
that powerful engines will be needed. 
24. The choice of the type of aircraft to be 
manufactured is extremely important as the 
new aircraft will have to last for at least twenty 
years. With only one type of aircraft, the 
logistics and supply of the aircraft over the 
twenty-year period will automatically be much 
cheaper. 
25. The armaments systems need to be more 
closely co-ordinated and simplified. However, 
this is not all that easy as all three air forces 
now use markedly different systems, whether 
they be air-to-air or air-to-ground. The most 
up-to-date technology will have to be used to 
withstand the Soviet threat. The Harrier and 
Jaguar, for instance, have very attractive low-
level ground attack possibilities but not enough 
manoeuvrability in aiming and firing their 
weapons to be used for dog-fighting. 
26. There is no doubt that Soviet industry is 
progressing rapidly and will be able to build 
high-performance new aircraft. Developments 
there are similar to those in Europe and the 
United States: all air forces want great agility 
for air-to-air combat, and Soviet developments 
are certainly keeping pace with those in Europe 
or America. 
27. Where weapon developments are concer-
ned, all weapons will eventually have a multi-
target capability. 
28. The three defence ministers have there-
fore ordered the air staffs to align their weapons 
systems to a greater extent. The German 
requirements in particular are very ambitious 
and therefore very expensive. It would cer-
tainly be possible to harmonise the require-
ments of France and the United Kingdom with 
regard to the air-to-ground role with those of 
Germany for the air-to-air role. This would 
mean changes in firing methods, avionics and 
armaments systems and there would probably 
be other technical changes, but the experts 
believe it could be done. 
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Ill. Industrial aspects 
29. There is a general feeling in all three 
countries that the European aircraft industry 
now has a chance of joining together to build a 
European combat aircraft and that it would be 
a disaster not to take advantage of this opportu-
nity, the more so since the European industry 
now needs this type of order. The defence 
ministers are keenly conscious of this situation 
and have already met three times since 1978 to 
discuss possibilities for this new aircraft. Apart 
from the ministers' meetings, there have also 
been many meetings on particular issues 
between armaments directors and working 
groups. Other countries could participate in 
this venture if they so wished and have a share 
in production. 
30. The question as to whether other Euro-
pean countries, members of NATO, should 
participate has not yet been decided upon at 
this stage. Interested countries are of course 
aware of the situation through the Independent 
European Programme Group. 
31. Whether a new engine is required specifi-
cally adapted to the new type of aircraft is still 
a point of discussion. Although Rolls-Royce 
and the French firm SNECMA have both colla-
borated with MTU in Germany, and Rolls-
Royce has also collaborated with the French 
firm Turbomeca, there was only collaboration 
between Rolls-Royce and SNECMA on the 
development of the engine for Concorde, the 
Olympus 593. For a new engine further colla-
boration would be necessary. In view of the 
fact that the first planes will not have to be 
delivered until after 1992, there might be ample 
time to build a completely new engine for this 
new aircraft. 
IV. Budgetary aspects 
32. The German Ministry of Defence is not 
seeking a national replacement for the Phantom 
F-4 and would in fact much prefer a European 
replacement. However, for budgetary reasons 
it is unlikely that a new aircraft will be ordered 
in 1981 or 1982. All plans will therefore have 
to take account of the fact that no definite 
financial commitment can be given by the 
government before 1983. However, a solution 
might be found if industry could finance the 
preparatory studies and designs in order to 
maintain the possibility of the joint manu-
facture of such an aircraft. In recent years the 
Federal Government has given considerable 
financial- aid to the German aeronautical 
industry and it should therefore be able to 
bridge the gap in the Federal budget. 
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33. In all three countries the situation is 
extremely complicated as major problems face 
each defence minister, particularly regarding 
cost. For instance, in 1981, the United King-
dom will have £200 million less to spend on 
defence; the German defence budget is also very 
restricted as the minister has to find extra 
money to assure normal development in the 
Tornado production. Five prototypes of the 
Mirage 2000 are now being flown by the 
French air force, but developments have still to 
be made regarding the SNECMA M-53 engine 
which should have a thrust of some 9. 7 tonnes, 
and it has taken longer than was foreseen to 
develop the radar. 
V. Organisational problems 
34. In the field of helicopters a certain divi-
sion of work on different types is possible, thus 
giving each country a leadership role. Europe, 
however, cannot manufacture series of different 
types of combat aircraft and a common solution 
satisfying the countries and the industrial part-
ners is therefore a necessity. The European 
part of NATO is just as capable of producing 
first class combat aircraft of a certain type as 
the United States, but only by collaborative 
effort and this requires ingenuity and fore-
bearance. 
35. Problems of design and industrial leader-
ship have been satisfactorily solved in the past. 
Tlte basic requirement is for every country to 
set aside considerations of prestige and fulfil its 
role as a eo-producer to the best of its ability in 
accordance with the financial contribution it 
has to make. The workload is of course shared 
in proportion to the financial contributions. 
Many countries have now participated in 
several collaborative projects and know that the 
type and size of the programme as well as its 
complexity require a certain kind of manage-
ment. There is no particular model according 
to which one should set up an organisation to 
assure the best possible execution of the pro-
gramme with harmony and co-operation. 
There should be the political will to develop 
decision-making machinery and this should be 
set up before the actual programme starts. 
36. Participants in the Tornado project 
consider the programme a good exercise in 
European collaboration and a series of more 
than 800 aircraft could be produced. Now-
adays this number is necessary in order to 
amortise the research and development costs. 
The Americans have such a tremendous mili-
tary domestic market that they are able to 
produce whole series of different types of 
aircraft, whereas no one European country is 
able to achieve acceptable costs, even for one 
type of combat aircraft. Only an association of 
countries can provide enough possibilities. 
This is the reason why the trilateral European 
combat aircraft has to succeed, not only to 
provide the aeronautical industry with work, 
but also to keep it up-to-date technologically. 
3 7. In an organisation like Panavia, the 
industrial consortium for producing the 
Tornado, extra cost of course stems from the 
need to collaborate internationally and the need 
for responsible military budget supervision by 
parliament. There is therefore some duplica-
tion of work in the Panavia framework and at 
the defence ministries. However, a price has 
to be paid in any collaborative effort. 
38. On the type of organisation required to 
handle production of the combat aircraft, some 
would prefer a very light structure which would 
be cheap and efficient with clearly-defined 
responsibilities. Such an organisation, similar 
to that for the Alpha-Jet, would be possible if 
the political will to establish it existed. How-
ever, once the governmental organisation and 
the industrial base have been set up, there 
should be little interference on the political 
side, apart from overall control of the pro-
gramme's execution. 
VI. Export possibilities 
39. The combat aircraft may, of course, be 
exported to other countries outside NATO once 
it is built in series, but this question has not yet 
arisen. However, if three major countries 
agree on the same type of combat aircraft this 
will do much to promote its export possibili-
ties. For this reason too, ways and means 
should be sought to make a cheaper version of 
the aircraft than that on the project which has 
now been submitted by industry. 
40. In the Independent European Programme 
Group discussions have already taken place on 
the possibility of other NATO countries acqui-
ring this aircraft in the 1990s. However, it is 
hardly probable that Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Norway and Denmark, the four countries which 
bought the F-16, will agree to buy the Euro-
pean combat aircraft. In military terms they 
might need it but, in view of the cost of the 
F-16 programme, they will probably not have 
enough money to start a new programme so 
soon after purchasing the F-16. There is no 
doubt that the F-16 deal has considerably 
weakened the European aeronautical industry 
and has been prejudicial to the building of an 
aeronautical Europe for many years, which is to 
be regretted. 
41. The Italian air force has the same require-
ments as the German air force and it is 
understood that for the Italians too the main 
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role of the European aircraft would be air-to-
air. This would facilitate Italian participation, 
but the Italian Government has taken no deci-
sive steps to associate itself with this European 
venture. 
42. Other European NATO countries may 
wish to buy this aircraft but this will depend 
mainly on the type of missions to be fulfilled by 
their air forces, on the cost iof the aircraft and 
the budgetary possibilities of the countries 
concerned. In this connection account should 
be taken of the fact that publications giving the 
prices of aircraft hardly ever quote the price of 
the whole system; for the most part they omit 
the price of armaments. Costs for the latter 
are of course increasing, but 1the aircraft itself is 
also becoming more sophisticated and therefore 
requires enormous sums for !research and deve-
lopment to attain the sophistication required by 
the air forces. 
43. Exporting aircraft to non-NATO coun-
tries would be very difficult for the Federal 
Republic of Germany as it has agreed not to 
export weapons to areas where there might be 
confrontation. However, as in the case of the 
Alpha-Jet, a solution could probably be found 
if the export problem arose. This is now the 
subject of much official discussion in the 
Federal Republic. 1 
VII. Other aeronautical developments 
44. Further collaboration should be promo-
ted not only on the European combat aircraft 
but also regarding helicopters and transport 
aircraft. 
45. In the helicopter field, co-operation 
between France, Germany and the United 
Kingdom is good. This might continue under 
the declaration made by these three countries, 
together with Italy, to build series of helicopters 
of different tonnage, i.e. a naval helicopter of 
some 10 tons, a transport helicopter of 6 to 8 
tons, and anti-submarine and anti-tank helicop-
ters of 4 tons. The field here is vast and many 
programmes are being consi4ered or are already 
at the development stage. ·European industry 
is able to produce very good helicopters at a 
reasonable price. 1 
46. As far as transport planes are concerned, 
France has relaunched the Transall production, 
which for the moment is sufficient. The 
French are not thinking of building a military 
Airbus1, although this could be a future possi-
bility. 
1. This plane was considered briefly as a substitute for 
the Boeing for the AWACS (airborne warning and control 
system) function but because of its cost the idea was not 
pursued further, at least provisionally. 
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47. The Federal Republic may have a 
surplus of military transport aircraft. It is 
taking part in the production of the new series 
of Transall aircraft but has not ordered any. 
48. With transport aircraft one has to 
consider the movement of both men and heavy 
equipment. For men, the Boeing 747 could 
perhaps be used. For transporting heavy 
equipment the United Kingdom has the 
Hercules, a good transport aircraft. It is 
interesting to note that the origin of the Boeing 
747 was the American requirement for a large 
military freighter. Lockheed was given the 
order and Boeing made the civil 747 from the 
prototype. It might well be possible for the 
European countries to build a military Airbus, 
but for the moment there is no need for such an 
aircraft. The Americans might develop a new 
C-XX long-range transport aircraft. 
49. The American military airlift command 
is planning to develop a long-range, heavy-lift, 
inter-theatre aircraft that could be operational 
by the mid-1990s. The aircraft should provide 
enough space for the transport of large, 
unwieldy equipment, armoured personnel 
vehicles and tanks. 
VIII. Alternatives 
50. When the British air staff decided to 
make preliminary enquiries regarding a combat· 
aircraft it first held talks with the Tornado 
partners - Germany and Italy - in order not to 
waste the experience of the NATO MRCA 
(Tornado) Management Agency (NAMMA) and 
Panavia as the aircraft would have to replace 
the Tornado and Jaguar. Italy withdrew from 
the talks as it was planning to develop a much 
less sophisticated aircraft, but France joined in 
and thus the trilateral discussions began. 
51. If agreement cannot be reached on a 
European combat aircraft, other solutions will 
have to be found. For example, the United 
Kingdom might then consider collaboration 
with the United States on a follow-up to the 
Harrier. This might be a joint programme 
with McDonnell Douglas using the modified 
British Aerospace A V -8A Harrier. The Amer-
ican marine corps is now spending some $700 
million to develop and buy the A V -8B Harrier 
jump-fighter. This could mean the Royal Air 
Force again having two aircraft instead of one 
as then an advanced version of the Tornado 
might also have to be ordered. 
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52. The United States air force will also 
develop a new fighter aircraft to come into 
service in the early 1990s. A design decision 
will be taken by 1985. $10 million has been 
included in the 1982 budget request to Congress 
for the advanced tactical fighter programme 
leading towards a new aircraft. The selection 
of a new advanced tactical fighter will be open 
to both air-to-air and air-to-ground aircraft. A 
new version of the F -16 is also being developed, 
called the F-16XL. This will be a two-seater 
aircraft but might later be transformed into a 
single-seat fighter configuration. 
53. For the French air force an alternative 
might be found in the prolonged use of the 
Mirage 2000 and possibly the ordering and 
buying of the Mirage 4000, which may be 
developed in a joint Franco-American pro-
gramme. 
54. The development of the Mirage 2000 has 
taken seven years, i.e. since 1974, and the 
development of its weapons systems, especially 
the radar, is still not complete. After 1985 its 
present radar system will be r,eplaced by a new 
system called RDI (Radar Doppler with Impul-
sions). The Mirage 2000 will be equipped 
with tactical nuclear missiles for its penetration 
role. It should be noted that the operational 
life of an aircraft is some twenty-five years, 
which would normally mean that the Mirage 
2000 - the first of which will come off the 
production line in 1983, continuing in produc-
tion for at least ten years - should be expected 
to be still in operation well after the year 2000. 
55. It is equally normal, however, to plan the 
development of a new generation of combat 
aircraft for about ten years later (1992-95) to 
replace aircraft older than the Mirage 2000. 
56. Alternatives for the German air force 
might be a modified version of the Tornado 
multirole combat aircraft, but even with modifi-
cations the Tornado could not fulfil the dual 
role required by the German air staff, i.e. it 
could not fulfil the highly manoeuvrable air-to-
air role. Another option, the McDonnell-
Douglas-Northrop F-18L, might be bought 
" off-the-shelf", and other possibilities would 
be the F-15 or perhaps the F-16. However, 
the "off-the-shelf" purchase of an American 
aircraft might disrupt the assembly lines of the 
German aircraft industry. Should this happen, 
it might have serious political consequences 
since the German Government has invested a 
great deal of money in its aircraft industry to 
bring it up to a level where it could usefully 
collaborate with the French and British aircraft 
industries. 
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Amendments 1, 2 and 3 
The European combat aircraft and other aeronautical development$ 
AMENDMENTS 1, 2 and 31 
tabled by MM. Antoni, Bernini and Martino 
16th June 1981 
1. In paragraph 1, line 1, of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " British, French and 
German Governments" and insert "governments of the WEU countries"; consequently, in line 2 
leave out " three ". 
2. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "other". 
3. In the draft recommendation proper, alter the order of the paragraphs so that 3 becomes 1 ; 4 
becomes 2; 1 becomes 3; 2 becomes 4. 
Signed: Antoni, Bernini, Martino 
1. See 4th Sitting, 17th June 1981 (Amendment 1 withdrawn ; Amendments 2 and 3 agreed to). 
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Amendments 4 and 5 
The European combat aircraft and other aeronautical developments 
AMENDMENTS 4 and 5 1 
tabled by MM. Forma and Maravalle 
16th June 1981 
4. In paragraph 1, line 1, of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " British, French and 
German Governments" and insert "interested governments"; consequently, in line 2 leave out 
"three ". 
5. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " other ". 
1. See 4th Sitting, 17th June 1981 (Amendments agreed to). 
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Draft Recommendation 
on the application of the Brussels Treaty 
The Assembly, 
(i) Considering that the fundamental provlSlons of the Brussels Treaty, particularly those in 
Articles IV, V and VIII.3 1, have retained their full value and are one of the key factors in the 
security system of the signatory countries ; 
(ii) Noting however that for greater effectiveness the material organisation of collective defence is 
undertaken in the wider framework of the North Atlantic Council and the Independent European 
Programme Group ; 
(iii) Considering that a continuing and tangible activity in the framework of the treaty is essential to 
its credibility and that at the present time this activity is chiefly ensured by the Assembly and by its 
dialogue with the Council ; 
(iv) Considering further, for the abovementioned reasons, that at a time of economic difficulty for 
member countries the resources they make available to the WEU organs should be redeployed to 
adapt the latter to present conditions ; 
(v) Congratulating the Council for its response to paragraphs 1 to 6 of Recommendation 348 of the 
Assembly, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Conduct an investigation into: 
(a) the extent of the controls provided for in Protocols Nos. IU and IV that should be 
maintained and the decisions the Council should take under Articles 11 and V of Protocol 
No. Ill; 
(b) the appropriate allocation of financial resources and staff among all the WEU organs in the 
light of the present scope and importance of their respective activities ; 
(c) the possibility of extending to the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly the current practice 
of close co-operation between the international secretariat of the Standing Armaments 
Committee and the Agency for the Control of Armaments ; 
2. Entrust the international secretariat of the SAC with the research necessary for the report on 
the role and contribution of armed forces in the event of natural or other disasters in peacetime 
which is referred to the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments ; 
3. Communicate to the Assembly the completed chapters of the Standing Armaments Committee's 
study on the European armaments industry. 
I. Text at Appendix. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Tanghe, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1.1. In application of Rule 27 (2) of the Rules 
of Procedure, the Presidential Committee refer-
red to the Committee Chapters 11. B. Activities 
of the Council - defence questions ; Ill. Agency 
for the Control of Armaments and IV. Standing 
Armaments Committee of the annual report of 
the Council. The present report replies to 
these three chapters. 
1.2. As the last chapters of the annual report 
did not reach the Office of the Clerk of the 
Assembly until the last week of March, the text 
was not communicated to members of the 
Assembly until the beginning of April. The 
Committee therefore postponed consideration 
of the present report until its meeting on 
4th May. 
II.B.Activities of the Council- defence questions 
2.1 In its report, the Council reaffirms, as it 
does each year, " the great importance the 
governments of the member countries of WEU 
attached to the modified Brussels Treaty and its 
protocols ", recalling Article V of the treaty 
"in which the member countries of the organi-
sation promised each other mutual assistance in 
case of outside aggression; ... this article remai-
ned one of the central elements of the security 
system of the signatory countries and its signifi-
cance should not be belittled". The report 
adds: " Whilst, in present circumstances, the 
Council's field of action is limited, in particular 
because of work being done in the framework 
of European political co-operation, the North 
Atlantic Council and the Independent Euro-
pean Programme Group, their responsibilities 
remain unchanged as does the essential value of 
WEU as an organisation". 
1. Level of forces of member states -forces under NATO 
command 
2.2. Under Protocol No. 11, the Council ensu-
res each year that the level of forces of member 
states respects the limits laid down in that pro-
tocol. Where forces under NATO command 
are concerned, the annual report of the Council 
states that the traditional meeting of the seven 
permanent representatives of the WEU govern-
ments to the North Atlantic Council held on 
25th February 1980 noted that for 1979 the 
level of forces of member states "as set out in 
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the NATO force plan, fell within the limits spe-
cified in Articles I and 11 of Protocol No. 11, as 
in force at that time, with the exception of a 
recommended increase in the force level of one 
member state. At their meeting of 12th March 
1980, the Council authorise? the state concer-
ned to make this increase ". 
2.3. The Committee asks the Council to 
supply details of the state boncemed and the 
increase in the forces in question. The Assem-
bly has already had occasion to call for an 
increase in forces assigned to NATO; the 
increase in question would probably be wel-
come if details were known. 
2. United Kingdom forces stationed on the continent of 
Europe 
2.4. Under Article VI of Protocol No. 11, the 
United Kingdom initially UJ.ildertook "to main-
tain on the mainland of Europe ... the effective 
strength of the United Kingdom forces which 
are now assigned to the Supreme Allied Com-
mander, Europe, that is to say four divisions 
and the Second Tactical Air Force, or such 
other forces as the Supreme 1Allied Commander, 
Europe, regards as having . equivalent fighting 
capacity ... not to withdraw these forces against 
the wishes of the majority of the high contrac-
ting parties ... ". Following successive decisions 
of the Council, the level of this commitment is 
now down to 55,000 men plus the Second Tac-
tical Air Force. 
2.5. The Committee notes with great satisfac-
tion that the information concerning this 
commitment given in the Council's annual 
report for 1980 fully meets, for the first time, its 
wishes as expressed inter alia in the Assembly's 
Recommendations 331 and 348. The report 
states in fact that the average number of British 
land forces stationed on the mainland of Eur-
ope in 1980 in accordance with the commit-
ment in Article VI of Protocol No. 11 was 
56,985. However, it continues: " The conti-
nued need for the presence of troops in Nor-
them Ireland made it necessary for units of the 
British Army of the Rhine to be redeployed for 
short tours of duty there. In 1980 there were 
on average 2,480 men in Northern Ireland. As 
has been previously stated, these units would be 
speedily returned to their duty station in an 
emergency affecting NATO. " For the first 
time, it may be deduced from the report to the 
Assembly that the average number of British 
forces stationed in Germany was 54,505 men, 
whereas the commitment is for 55,000 men. 
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2.6. Also for the first time, the annual report 
gives the following details on the strength of the 
United Kingdom's Second Tactical Air Force: 
" Furthermore, in accordance with the Council's reply to Assembly Recommendation 348, the 
Government of the United Kingdom have informed the Council that the strength of the United 
Kingdom's Second Tactical Air Force in 1980 was: 
Role Aircraft/Equipment Squadrons 
Strike/ Attack Buccaneer 2 
Jaguar 4 
Ground support Harrier 2 
Reconnaissance Jaguar 
Air defence Phantom 2 
Bloodhound surface-to-air missiles 1 
Rapier surface-to-air missiles 4 
Air transport Wessex 
Ground defence RAF regiment 
These strengths will remain unchanged in 1981. " 
2.7. As far as aircraft are concerned, it may 
be deduced that British forces stationed on the 
mainland of Europe include eleven squadrons 
of tactical aircraft of all kinds plus a squadron 
of W essex helicopters. 
2.8. The Committee welcomes the strength of 
British forces stationed on the mainland of 
Europe and in particular the standard of the 
aircraft, which include the Harrier, the first ver-
tical take-off aircraft to become operational in 
the world. The deficit of 505 men shown in 
the average strength of land forces is not over-
important in itself, although it is to be feared 
that with leave and other force movements the 
"average " of 54,505 men may conceal a true 
figure which is at times slightly lower. Much 
more important are the various pieces of infor-
mation according to which the level of British 
troops stationed on the mainland of Europe 
might soon be reduced. For instance, speaking 
in Bonn on 6th April 1981, Mr. Nott, United 
Kingdom Secretary of State for Defence, said : 
" Some of us are trying to spread our efforts too 
thinly over too many tasks and we are going to 
have to concentrate our efforts to achieve a 
more effective output. " The Secretary of State 
recalled that the United Kingdom not only had 
troops in Germany but contributed 70 % of 
NATO naval forces in the eastern Atlantic, in 
addition to maintaining an independent nuclear 
force. " Our commitment to the forward 
defence of Germany is not in doubt... but the 
outputs may need to be varied within a NATO 
context. " The newspapers also reported on 
13th April that the number of British divisions 
in Germany would shortly be cut from four to 
three, although the divisions would be larger. 
However, the withdrawal of a divisional head-
quarters would abolish more than I ,000 posts. 
Treaty, the United Kingdom undertook" not to 
withdraw these forces against the wishes of the 
majority of the high contracting parties". The 
Committee proposes that the Assembly ask the 
Council to consult it fully before authorising 
any reduction the United Kingdom may request 
in the level of its forces stationed on the main-
land of Europe. 
3. Amendment to Annex Ill to Protocol No. Ill 
2.10. In Recommendation 348 adopted last 
year on the Committee's report, the Assembly 
recommended that the Council " delete para-
graph V of Annex Ill to Protocol No. Ill of the 
modified Brussels Treaty". The paragraph V 
in question defined the warships which Ger-
many was not allowed to produce; the Assem-
bly strongly recommended that the provisions 
relating to these restrictions be cancelled enti-
rely. 
2.11. The Committee is, therefore gratified to 
note that, as the Assembly was informed at the 
time, the Council cancelled the provisions of 
paragraph V at its meeting on 21st July 1980. 
5. Assembly recommendations 
2.12. The Committee can but express satisfac-
tion at the Council's detailed reply to most 
points in Recommendation 348 adopted by the 
Assembly last year on the Committee's report 
replying to the annual report of the Council. 
For instance, the Council reports on decisions 
taken by the NATO Ministers of Defence and 
Foreign Affairs on 14th May 1980 to strengthen 
the Alliance's defence capability and to mitigate 
2.9. The Committee recalls that under Article "any military weaknesses arising from the 
VI of Protocol No. 11 to the modified Brussels possible deployment in South-West Asia of 
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United States reinforcement forces originally 
intended for Europe ". At the same time, the 
reply endorses the decision taken by the NATO 
Defence Planning Committee in December 
1980 on individual measures in certain sectors. 
2.13. In paragraph 3 of the recommendation, 
the Assembly asked that German naval forces 
be assigned to SACLANT as well as to 
SACEUR with the aim of making the best use 
of them. In its reply, the Council reports to 
the Assembly on the decision by the Federal 
Security Council of 19th June 1980 expressing 
Germany's " willingness to let German naval 
and naval air forces henceforth be deployed 
also outside the area limits at present existing 
for the German navy in the northern flank 
command ... the German government will make 
this offer to the competent NATO bodies ". 
2.14. The Council's reply to paragraphs 4 and 
6 of Recommendation 348 is wholly satisfac-
tory. (See paragraphs 2.10 and 2.4 et seq.). 
2.15. In paragraph 7 of the recommendation, 
the Assembly asked that the situation as regards 
stocks of chemical weapons held by member 
countries be clarified. In its reply, the Council 
recalls that the Agency for the Control of 
Armaments asks all member states to indicate 
whether they hold stocks of chemical weapons 
and that they all replied in the negative. The 
Council's present report is moreover clearer on 
this question. However, the Assembly's recom-
mendation asked that the Council publish in its 
report " the list approved by the Council, cur-
rently in force, of chemical products to be 
controlled by the Agency". The Council did 
not reply to this paragraph of the recommen-
dation and the annual report publishes no 
list. The Committee considers this omission 
regrettable since the list in question, marked 
"Unclassified", has been communicated by the 
Agency for the Control of Armaments to any-
body wishing to receive it, and the details are 
given inter alia in the publications of the Stock-
holm International Peace Research Institute 
(SIP RI). 
2.16. Otherwise, the Council reports fully on 
the activities of NATO and the Independent 
European Programme Group, the bodies where 
commitments stemming from the Brussels 
Treaty are effectively carried out. In this 
connection, the Committee notes the Council's 
remarks, which deserve special attention: 
" the formation of international 
consortia makes a useful contribution to 
a better organisation of armaments co-
operation .. . and . . . these bodies should 
be encouraged in their co-operative 
projects. " 
With regard to the standardisation of munitions 
for the new generation of main battle tanks, it 
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can be seen from the Council's answer to Writ-
ten Question 215 that a smooth-bore gun is 
envisaged for the tank and is the object of 
Franco-German studies, while the United King-
dom continues to favour a riijed gun. In these 
circumstances, the standardisation of arma-
ments would unfortunately not be possible and 
the Council can see no advantage in asking the 
Standing Armaments CommiUee to investigate 
the matter. 
Ill. Agency for the Contro,l of Armaments 
3.1. When the Brussels Treaty was modified 
in 19 54, certain provisions concerning the 
control of member states' armaments were 
incorporated; they are contained in Protocols 
Nos. Ill and IV. These provisions may be 
summarised as follows: 
(i) Germany undertook not to manufac-
ture atomic, biological or chemical 
weapons on its tertritory; 
(ii) Germany also undertook not to 
manufacture certain conventional 
weapons, the list of which may be 
amended or cancelled in accordance 
with a special procedure, the Coun-
cil deciding by a two-thirds majority; 
(iii) the Council determines the level of 
stocks of atomic, biological and che-
mical weapons which countries man-
ufacturing them may hold on the 
mainland of Europe 1; 
(iv) atomic, biological and chemical wea-
pons and certain conventional wea-
pons held by member countries on 
the mainland of !Europe 1 are subject 
to verification by the WEU Agency 
for the Control of Armaments. The 
list of such ato,nic, biological and 
chemical weapons and of conventio-
nal weapons may be modified by a 
unanimous decision of the Council; 
(v) The Agency for the Control of Arm-
aments verifies that the above pro-
visions are respected, except for the 
weapons of forces assigned to 
NATO, which are verified by the 
latter. 
(a) Non-application of controls 
3.2. As the Committee has pointed out in its 
reports since 1978, the usefulness of these 
controls is now disputed. 1 The Committee has 
always underlined the major shortcomings in 
1. The expression " on the IDi!inland of Europe " exclu-
des British weapons on British metropolitan territory. 
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their application by the Council and the 
twenty-sixth annual report of the Council indi-
cates no change. 
3.3. Like earlier reports, the Council's present 
report refers to fields where the Agency does 
not exercise its activities: 
"Atomic, chemical and biological wea-
pons 
The position described in earlier annual 
reports remained basically unchanged. 
The activities of the Agency do not ex-
tend to nuclear weapons. The non-
nuclear components of such weapons 
(namely the missiles themselves and 
other specially designed equipment) are 
subject to control except as regards the 
weapons of one member state 1• 
Nor does the Agency apply any controls 
to biological weapons. 
The control activities dealt with in this 
chapter do not, therefore, concern these 
two categories of armaments. 
In the case of chemical weapons, only 
non-production controls take place ; no 
quantitative controls are made since the 
member states have always declared they 
possessed no such armaments. " 
3.4. The Council's report goes on to say: 
" As the convention for the due process 
of law 2 has not yet entered into force, the 
control measures carried out by the 
Agency at private concerns had, in 1980, 
as in previous years, to take the form of 
' agreed control measures '. 
One consequence of this situation is that, 
in order to obtain the agreement of the 
firms concerned, the Agency has to give a 
few weeks' notice. [This agreement has 
never been withheld.] ... " 
3.5. The annual report also specifies that: 
" In application of Article Ill of Protocol 
No. Ill, which lays down conditions to 
I. In its report last year, the Committee noted that the 
state in question was France and that Pluton tactical 
nuclear missiles had been withdrawn from Agency control 
as from 1979. The accuracy of this interpretation was 
confirmed by the French Minister of Defence in answer to 
questions put by the press (AGEFI, 28th May 1980). 
2. Convention concerning measures to be taken by mem-
ber states of Western European Union in order to enable 
the Agency for the Control of Armaments to cariy out its 
control effectively and making provision for due process of 
law, in accordance with Protocol No. IV of the Brussels 
Treaty, as modified by the Protocols signed in Paris on 23rd 
October 1954 (signed in Paris on 14th December 1957 but 
ratified by only six states: Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom). 
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enable the Council to fix the levels of 
chemical weapons that may be held on 
the mainland of Europe by those coun-
tries which have not given up the right to 
produce them, and in accordance with 
the Council decision of 1959, the Agency 
asked the countries concerned in its ques-
tionnaire whether production of chemical 
weapons on their mainland territory had 
passed the experimental stage and entered 
the effective production stage. 
All the member countries concerned once 
again gave an explicit negative reply in 
1980. 
In addition, in the covering letter to its 
questionnaire, the Agency reminded the 
member states that chemical weapons, if 
held, should be declared in the same way 
as other armaments, whatever their ori-
gin. In reply to this questionnaire no 
country reported holding any chemical 
weapons and because of this the quanti-
tative control of weapons of this nature 
raised no problems in 1980. " 
3.6. Having paid particular attention to che-
mical weapons in last year's report, the Com-
mittee is pleased to note that the Council consi-
ders that the control of chemical weapons raises 
no problems .. Although the former British 
Secretary of State for Defence, Mr. Pym, 
showed some interest in chemical weapons, the 
Under-Secretary of State, Mr. Goodhart, decla-
red on 2nd March 1981 in answer to a question 
in parliament: "We have no plans for research 
and development directed towards an offensive 
chemical warfare capability. ". 
3.7. However, the Committee regrets that the 
Council's report to the Assembly did not 
contain the list of chemical weapons subject to 
control, although it has been communicated to 
the Swedish institute (see paragraph 2.15). 
(b) A.ctMties of the Agency for the Control of A.rnuunents 
3.8. Although the usefulness of WEU control 
is no longer evident and the Agency's true areas 
of activity remain limited solely to conventio-
nal weapons, the number of inspections carried 
out by the Agency each year shows that gene-
rally speaking there has been no reduction in its 
activities, as may be seen from the following 
table. 
3.9. Once again, the Committee finds particu-
larly useful the lists of armaments currently 
being produced, set out in parts I to 4 of Sec-
tion E " State and problems of control in cer-
tain particular fields " which is a summary of 
all current armaments production programmes 
in member countries. 
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Numbers and types of inspections 
carried out by the Agency for the Control of Armaments 
Control Control 
Control measures Total measures (of which Total Control measures at quantitative at non- control 
measures at units under production plants production plants production 
at depots national (quantitative control (non-production of chemical measures 
command control measures control weapbns) (all categories) 
measures) measures) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1961 29 15 12 66 7 (2) 63 
2 26 20 11 57 7 (2) 65 
3 35 13 13 61 10 (4) 74 
4 39 19 13 71 9 (4) 80 
5 26 16 11 53 7 n.a. 60 
6 * * * * * n.a. 78 
7 * * * * * n.a. 70 
8 * * * * * n.a. 79 
9 * * * * * (3) 77 
a b a b a b a b a b a b 
1970 * * * * * * * * * * n.a. 82 72 
1 * * * * * * * * * * n.a. 82 72 
2 * * * * * n.a. 66 
3 * * * * * n.a. 66 
4 * * * * * n.a. 71 
5 * * * * * n.a. 72 
6 * * * * * m.a. 71 
7 * * * * * Jll.a. 70 
8 * * * * * n.a. 68 
9 * * * * * ~.a. 70 
1980 * * * * * n.a. 70 
Note a, b: From 1971 onwards the Agency adopted a new system of presenting its summary table of inspections, thence-
forth counting inspections of several small grouped ammunition depots as a single inspection. An apparent reduction in num-
bers of inspections in fact reflects no reduction in the activities of the Agency. For comparison, the Council reported both sets 
of figures (old and new style- a and b) for the years 1970 and 1971. 
n.a.: Information not available. 
Sources: Figures for total control measures (all categories) given in column 7 are derived from published annual reports of 
the Council. With regard to the various categories of controls (columns 1 to 6), figures for 1961-6!5 are also derived from the 
published annual reports of the Council. Those for 1966 to 1969 have never been made available to the Committee. 
Those for 1970 to 1980 have been communicated to the Assembly by the Council in response to'Recommendation 213, but 
permission to publish them has been withheld. Minor discrepancies in some totals result from differences of definition of visit 
and are without significance. 
* Confidential information available to the Committee deleted from the published report. 
Conclusion on the control of armaments 
3.10. The annual report of the Council stresses 
the limited nature of the field control pro-
gramme, particularly visits to private firms. In 
connection with controls from documentary 
sources, it states: " The close co-operation 
which exists between the Agency and the inter-
national staff of the SAC has resulted in the 
best use of available credits by avoiding dupli-
cation, to the greater benefit of both bodies. " 
In spite of this wish to be economical, 
the number of technical information visits 
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seems to have continued at the same rate in 
1980. 
IV. Standing Armaments Committee 
4.1. The study of the armaments industries in 
member countries which the Council instructed 
the WEU Standing Armaments Committee to 
prepare in 1977 has been completed as far as 
the economic part is concerned, a declassified 
version of which is being prepared. This part 
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is before the Council together with the parts 
completed earlier. In spite of the undertaking 
which the Council repeats each year that 
" when the whole study had been completed, 
the Council would consider the content and the 
manner in which the Assembly could be ade-
quately informed", the latter has still received 
nothing. 
4.2. In 1980, as in the recent years, the SAC's 
other activities were practically limited to a few 
information meetings of the Working Group on 
operational research. 
V. Conclusions 
5.1. Having examined the chapters of the 
annual report of the Council on the defence 
activities of the organisation, the Committee 
concludes, in agreement with the Council, that 
the basic provisions of the Brussels Treaty, par-
ticularly those in Article V 1 which concern 
mutual defence, are still just as valid and im-
portant as they were in 1948 when the treaty 
was signed. Like the Council, the Committee 
notes that at present implementation of the 
commitments and responsibilities of the organi-
sation as defined in the treaty is ensured in the 
wider frameworks to which the seven member 
countries belong, i.e. European political consul-
tations, the North Atlantic Council and the 
Independent European Programme Group, 
quoted by the Council. These activities are 
conducted outside WEU with the twofold aim 
of efficiency and avoiding duplication of work 
in accordance with the provisions of the Brus-
sels Treaty itself. By meeting their commit-
ments in this way, the seven member countries 
still reserve the right, in case of need, to consult 
each other on a seven-power basis in the WEU 
Council under Article VIII of the treaty on 
threats to peace. It should be noted that, by 
their very existence, the Brussels and North 
Atlantic Treaties have been so effective that 
this article does not appear ever to have been 
invoked since the treaty was signed. 
5.2. However, if a treaty, particularly a 
mutual defence treaty, is to be credible, it is 
essential for there to be visible continuing 
activity within its framework. For many years 
now, the work of the Assembly, its studies of 
defence matters and the dialogue between the 
Assembly and the Council have been the 
principal activities in the framework of the 
treaty. This highly political activity is the best 
way of ensuring the credibility of the Brussels 
Treaty. At the same time, the continuation for 
I. The text of Articles IV, V and VIII.3 of the treaty 
referred to in the first paragraph of the preamble to the draft 
recommendation are at Appendix. 
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narrowly legalistic reasons of activities that no 
longer serve any political or practical purpose 
is not only a waste of public money - it may 
bring the organisation as a whole into disrepute 
and undermine the credibility of the funda-
mental provisions of the treaty. 
5.3. It has sometimes been considered that the 
automatic nature of Article V of the Brussels 
Treaty, which provides that "if any of the high 
contracting parties should be the object of an 
armed attack in Europe, the other high contrac-
ting parties will... afford the party so attacked 
all the military and other aid and assistance in 
their power ", has an advantage over Article 5 
of the North Atlantic Treaty which merely 
makes it binding upon the partners to consult 
each other. In this connection, it is interesting 
to quote the answer Mr. Fran~ois-Poncet, 
French Minister for Foreign Affairs, gave on 
26th February 1981 to a written question put in 
the Senate on France's nuclear force and the 
Brussels Treaty. Mr. Fran~ois-Poncet said: 
" The WEU treaty is not automatic in 
the way the honourable member would 
wish in that it is for each high contrac-
ting party to decide whether the condi-
tions of casus foederis exist. " 
However this may be, Article IV of the Brussels 
Treaty makes it incumbent on the parties and 
any organs established by them to work in close 
co-operation with NATO and provides that the 
Council and its Agency will rely on the appro-
priate military authorities of NATO for infor-
mation and advice on military matters. At 
present, the Brussels Treaty may be considered 
as something of a safety net stretched under the 
North Atlantic Treaty. 
5.4. For some time, the Committee, in the 
chapters of its reports on the application of 
arms controls provided for in Protocols Nos. Ill 
and IV of the Brussels Treaty, has pointed out 
that the usefulness of these controls is now dis-
puted. The Council has never authorised the 
application of what might have been considered 
the most essential controls, i.e. of nuclear and 
biological weapons. Controls on the non-
production of chemical weapons apply - very 
symbolically, moreover - only to Germany. 
There remain the controls on the non-
production of certain conventional weapons in 
Germany, the list of which has been progressi-
vely reduced, and the quantitative controls of 
certain conventional weapons in all member 
countries on the mainland of Europe. Under 
Article V of Protocol No. Ill, however, the 
Council may vary the list of armaments subject 
to quantitative control "by unanimous deci-
sion ". So far no use has been made of this 
provision. As for the list of conventional wea-
pons the production of which is forbidden in 
Germany, it may be modified by the Council 
by a two-thirds majority if Germany so requests 
and if recommended by the NATO Supreme 
Commander. 
5.5. Regarding the work of the Standing 
Armaments Committee - a body set up not by 
the Brussels Treaty or its protocols but by sim-
ple Council decision on 7th May 1955 - the 
Council has informed the Assembly that arran-
gements for co-operation in the field of arms 
production are the subject of work in the Inde-
pendent European Programme Group, and that 
any duplication of work with that body must be 
avoided. The Standing Armaments Committee 
has completed the two chapters of a study of 
the European armaments industry that do not 
duplicate the work of the IEPG, and as in the 
past the Committee recommends that these 
chapters be communicated to the Assembly. 
5.6. In view of the difficult economic position 
of all the member countries, they are at present 
trying to make economies in the budgets of 
international organisations including WEU. 
Answering a question put in the House of 
Lords, the United Kingdom Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs, Lord Carrington, said on 
2nd March 1981: 
"All member governments of the Wes-
tern European Union are. aiming at limi-
ting the 1981 budget to zero growth in 
real terms at most. Her Majesty's 
Government believe that it will be possi-
ble to accommodate this without loss of 
efficiency, and that it will not affect the 
continued implementation of the tasks 
required of the WEU under the modified 
Brussels Treaty. " 
The Committee therefore considers that a new 
allocation of the resources which member 
governments make available to WEU is neces-
sary in view of the present scale and impor-
tance of the activities of the various WEU 
bodies. The Committee notes with satisfaction 
that according to the annual report of the 
Council there is already close co-operation bet-
ween the Agency for the Control of Armaments 
and the international secretariat of the Standing 
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Armaments Committee. This flexible staff 
policy should be extended to the Office of the 
Clerk of the Assembly, which is always short of 
staff in view of the work the Assembly calls 
for. Moreover, since most of the staff of the 
ministerial organs of WEU are retired officers 
who on average spend only the last five years of 
their careers in WEU, shOuld the Council 
consider it necessary to make: some reduction in 
the staff of these organs, this aim could be attai-
ned in a few years merely by suspending 
recruitment without jeopardising staff interests. 
5.7. In the draft recommf!ndation submitted 
for the consideration of the Assembly, it is 
recommended that the Council examine the 
functioning of WEU in the 1980's in the light 
of circumstances today. Inter alia, this study 
should cover: 
(a) the extent to which the controls pro-
vided for in Protocols Nos. Ill and IV 
should be maintained and the corres-
ponding decisions called for in accor-
dance with Articles 11 and V of Pro-
tocol No. Ill; 
(b) the appropriate allocation of financial 
resources and staff between all the 
WEU organs in the light of the pre-
sent scope and importance of their 
respective activities; 
(c) the possibility of extending to the 
Office of the Clerk of the Assembly 
the current practice whereby staff of 
the international' secretariat of the 
SAC may assist the Agency for the 
Control of Armaments. 
5.8. The Council has already asked the 
Assembly to propose studies which might be 
entrusted to the Standing Armaffi:ents Commit-
tee. The Committee proposes that the assis-
tance of the international secretariat of the SAC 
be made available to the Office of the Clerk of 
the Assembly to conduct the research necessary 
for the report on " the uole and contribution 
of armed forces in the event of natural 
or other disasters in peacetime " which has 
been referred to the Committee. 
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APPENDIX 
Articles IV, V and Vll/.3 of the modified Brussels Treaty 
ARTICLE IV 
In. the exe~ution of the Treaty, the High 
Contractmg Parties and any Organs established 
by Them under the Treaty shall work in close 
co-operation with the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation. 
Recognising the undesirability of duplica-
ting the military staffs of NATO the Council a~ d. its Agenc~ . will rely on th~ appropriate 
mthtary authonties of NATO for information 
and advice on military matters. 
ARTICLE V 
If any of the High Contracting Parties 
should be the object of an armed attack in 
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~urope, the other High Contracting Parties will, 
m accordance with the provisions of Article 51 
of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the 
Party so attacked all the military and other aid 
and assistance in their power. 
ARTICLE VIII 
3. At the request of any of the High 
Contracting Parties the Council shall be imme-
diately convened in order to permit Them to 
cons~lt with regard to any situation which may 
constitute a threat to peace, in what-
ever area this threat should arise, or a 
danger to economic stability. 
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Introductory Note 
In preparing this report the Rapporteur had interviews as follows: 
22nd February 1981- Istanbul, Turkey 
General Muhsim Batur, former Chief of Staff, Turkish Air Force, former Senator. 
16th March 1981- Toulon, France 
Vice Admiral Jean Accary, Commander-in-Chief, French Mediterranean Fleet. 
29th April1981 -Paris 
H.E. Mr. Miguel Solano Aza, Spanish Ambassador; 
H.E. Mr. Hedi Mabrouk, Tunisian Ambassador. 
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The Committee as a whole was addressed by, and discussed the theme of the report with, the 
following persons: 
16th February 1981- Headquarters Allied Forces Southern Europe, Bagnoli, Naples, Italy 
Lieutenant General James M. Thompson, US Army, Chief of Staff, HQ AFSOUTH; 
Colonel Pringle, US Air Force, AFSOUTH; 
Admiral Buchanan, Chief of Staff, Headquarters Allied Naval Forces Southem Europe; 
General Viagio Cacciola, Italian Army, Deputy Chief of Staff, HQ AFSOUTH; 
Brigadier General Lombardi, Assistant Chief of Staff, Training, HQ AFSOUTH; 
Brigadier General Tsougannis, Greek Army, Assistant Chief of Staff, Personnel and Adminis-
tration, HQ AFSOUTH; 
Brigadier General Imer, Turkish Army, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, HQ AFSOUTH; 
Rear Admiral Duvigier, Chief of French Liaison Mission; 
Commander Conder, Royal Navy, Staff Officer, Operations, HQ NA VSOUTH; 
Admiral Monassi, Commander, NA VSOUTH; 
Brigadier General Tezel, HQ AIRSOUTH, and staff. 
18th February 1981- Athens, Greece 
Ministry of Defonce: 
Brigadier General Nicholas Baltas, Hellenic General Staff; 
Mr. Evangelos A veroff Tossizza, Minister of Defence; 
Mr. George Roviou, Secretary of State for Defence; 
Ambassador Tsamados, Head of NATO Department, Greek Ministry for Fo!ieign Affairs. 
Chamber of Deputies: 
The following members of the Greek Parliamentary Defence Committee: 
Admiral John Mineos, Chairman 
MM. Denis Karvelos 
Alexander Mantzoulinos 
Constantine Kallios 
Alexander Papadogonas 
Mrs. Julia Tsirimokou 
MM. Alexander Zaimis 
P. Gerakis 
A. Koutsogeorgas 
John Stakiopoulos 
Dimitrios Kaloudis 
John Artonopoulos 
P. Klis 
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20th February 1981- NATO missile firing installation, Crete, Greece 
Major General Constantinos Polyzos, Commander, NAMFI. 
21st February 1981- Athens, Greece 
Mr. Costas Mitsotakis, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
23rd February 1981- Ankara, Turkey 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs: 
Ambassador Sahinba~, Under-Secretary General for Mutual Security Affairs, Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs; 
Mr. Gunalta~, Political Planning Department, Ministry for Foreign Affairs; 
Dr. Tiirmen, Ministry for Foreign Affairs; 
Colonel Ozalp. Turkish General Staff; 
Admiral lsik, Turkish General Staff. 
24th February 1981- Ankara, Turkey 
Turkish General Staff: 
General Kenan Evren, Head of State; 
General Necdet Ozturun, Deputy Chief of the Turkish General Staff; 
General Necip Torumtay. 
Ministry of Defonce: 
Mr. Omit Hah1k Bayiilken, Minister of Defence. 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs: 
Mr. Ilter Tiirkmen, Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
Anadolu Club: 
Mr. Siileyman Demirel, President of the Justice Party. 
(The following former parliamentarians, members of the Justice Party, were also present: 
MM. Nahit Mente~e (Secretary-General) 
Ihsan Sabri <;aglayangil 
Necmeddin Cevheri (Vice-President) 
Yigit Koker (Vice-President) 
Ali Naili Erdem (Vice-President) 
Dr. Saban Karata~ 
MM. Halit Evliya 
Sitki Yircali 
Ekrem Ceyhun 
Dr. Nuri Bayar 
MM. Bahri Dagda~ 
Ahmet Topaloglu 
Cahit Dalokay 
Ilhan Ersoy 
Dr.- Miinif Iscamoglu 
MM. Aydin Menderes 
lbrahim Kirazogl u 
General Faik Tiiriin 
General Siileyman Tuncel) 
The following former parliamentarians, members of the Republican People's Party: 
MM. Mustafa Ostiindag (Acting President, Secretary-General) 
Turan Giine~ 
Altan Oymen 
Hikmet <;etin 
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Irfan Oz<1;ydinli 
Giindiiz Ok<;iin 
Metin Tiiziin 
Besim D stiinel 
Hasan Esat Isik 
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25th February 1981 - Headquarters Allied Land Forces South-East Europe and 6th Allied Tactical 
Air Force 
General Sedat Guneral, Turkish Army, Commander, LANDSOUTHEAST; 
Lieutenant General Serafettin Ugur, Commander, 6 ATAF, and other members of the 
staff; 
Major General Philip Kaplan, United States Army, Deputy Commander LANDSOUTHEAST; 
Captain Gunay, COMNA VSOUTH Representative; 
Captain Pippin, COMSTRIKFORSOUTH Representative; 
Lieutenant Colonel Gregson, United Kingdom Army; 
Lieutenant Colonel Richards, United States Air Force. 
The Committee met at the seat of the Assembly, Paris, on 6th April fur a first reading 
of the draft report, and met there finally on 4th May 1981 when it adopted the report as a 
whole. 
The Committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the Ministers, officials and 
senior officers and experts who received the Rapporteur or addressed the Committee and 
replied to questions. 
The views expressed in the report, unless expressly otherwise attributed, are those of 
the Committee. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on European security and the Mediterranean 
The Assembly, 
(i) Noting the continuous growth of Soviet military power and the strategic advantages enjoyed by 
the Soviet Union, and considering however that these factors have not led to any significant increase 
in the last three years in the direct conventional military threat from the Warsaw Pact countries in 
the Mediterranean region; 
(iz) Condemning the invasion of Afghanistan and the continued occupation of that country by 
Soviet forces; 
(iii) Concerned at the growing risk in parts of the eastern and southern Mediterranean region of 
conflicts or crises arising which can directly or indirectly involve the interests of allied countries; 
(iv) Drawing particular attention to the unprecedented levels of modern armaments in those areas, 
supplied both by the Soviet Union and certain countries of the Alliance, and which exceed in quan-
tity and quality those of local NATO countries; 
( v) Welcoming the return of Greek forces to the NATO integrated military structure; 
(vi) Considering that as long as the process which should lead to the creation of new democratic 
parliamentary institutions in Turkey is not placed in doubt, the interests of that country and of the 
Alliance presuppose the maintenance, even the strengthening of the links which now exist between 
Turkey and the various Atlantic and European institutions; 
(vii) Believing however that European security depends also on diplomatic efforts to reduce the 
many local causes of tension, and on arms control measures, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL, 
Call for concerted action, where appropriate, in tbe North Atlantic Council or other bodies: 
1. To establish more clearly the indivisibility of the Alliance and the will of all members to 
maintain security in the Mediterranean area; 
2. To increase mutual assistance for the modernisation of the military potential of Greece, and 
even more urgently Turkey, for the purpose of fulfilling their contribution to NATO with particular 
regard to the quality and level of armaments of neighbouring countries; 
3. To improve communications and air defence installations in the Mediterranean area; 
4. To take diplomatic action to deter non-member countries of NATO from allowing bases or 
other military installations on their territory to be used by Warsaw Pact armed forces; 
5. To develop reasonably flexible defence arrangements to counter rapidly any unexpected threats 
to peace in the area, and to diversify the ability to bring in reinforcements to replace those currently 
earmarked that may prove to be required outside the NATO area; 
6. To encourage Greece and Turkey to reach an early settlement of their disputes and to expedite 
the command reorganisation in the Aegean area; 
7. To consider arrangements to permit Spain to participate in NATO exercises and defence 
planning pending a possible completely independent decision by Spain to apply to accede to the 
North Atlantic Treaty; 
8. To promote diplomatic efforts with a view both to endeavouring to reduce local causes of 
tension, and to expediting the convening of the Conference on Disarmament in Europe. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Bozzi, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1.1. It is three years since the Committee last 
reported specifically on security in the Mediter-
ranean area1• In the interval there have been 
many significant political changes in the area, 
which are described in the various sections 
below. 
1.2. Despite the continuous increase in the 
overall Soviet defence effort, manifested most 
visibly in the continued deployment of the 
SS-20 missile and the Backfire bomber, and the 
introduction of several new types of large 
ocean-going naval vessel, the direct military 
threat from the Soviet Union in the Mediterra-
nean area has not significantly increased - it is 
still less in relative terms than in the 1960s 
when important air and naval bases were avail-
able to the Soviet Union in Egypt. 
1.3. On the other hand, the danger of conflict 
breaking out in the area, conflict that could 
directly involve allied interests, has increased in 
the last three years. With its invasion of 
Afghanistan, the Soviet Union has demonstra-
ted its readiness to employ its own military 
forces to secure political aims beyond its own 
boundaries and beyond those of the Warsaw 
Pact countries. The pro-western regime of the 
Shah has fallen and Muslim fundamentalism 
offers Iran an uncertain future. CENTO, the 
mutual defence organisation linking Iran, Pakis-
tan, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the 
United States, has finally ceased to exist. 
Conflict has broken out between Iraq and Iran; 
relations between the Soviet Union and Syria 
have improved, and the level of armaments of 
these countries, all with a common frontier 
with Turkey, a NATO country, has risen consi-
derably ; they all have more modem equipment 
than Turkey. The Israeli-Arab dispute remains 
unsettled arid a -permanent source of potential 
conflict. Lebanon, struggling for its survival, 
has again become an area of dangerous insta-
bility. In Libya, the unpredictable Colonel 
Kadhafi is a cause of deep concern to all his 
neighbours and has succeeded for the time 
being in dominating Chad with Libyan military 
forces. 
1.4. There are, however, positive develop-
ments for the Alliance, particularly the Greek 
decision to reintegrate its forces into NATO, 
and the improved prospects of Greek-Turkish 
I. Security in the Mediterranean, Document 776, 31st 
May 1978, Rapporteur: Mr. Grant. 
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negotiations to settle outstanding differences 
which were a long-standing source of weakness 
to the Alliance. The prospects of a resolution 
have improved rather than djminished with the 
Generals' seizure of power in Turkey. In 
Yugoslavia, the succession tq Marshal Tito has 
been in accordance with the ~onstitution, which 
the Committee described in some detail in its 
previous report, and there has been no change 
in the orientation of that country or any 
attempt at outside interference. Malta, another 
country with unpredictabl~ leadership, has 
concluded a mutual security agreement with 
Italy. Finally, in the Western Mediterranean, 
since the last report of the Committee, Spain 
has adopted its new constitution providing for 
parliamentary government, and its government 
continues from time to time to allude to the 
possibility of joining NATO. 
1.5. These and other changes are reported on 
by the Committee in the following chapters, 
and conclusions finally drawn, the principle 
ones of which are embodied in the draft 
recommendation. 
11. The Soviet Union and threats to 
security in the Mediterranean 
(a) General 
2 .1. The Soviet military presence in the 
Mediterranean itself exists only in the form of 
the Soviet Mediterranean naval squadron. It is 
not large in comparison with the combined 
fleets maintained by NATO countries in the 
sea. Moreover, apart from limited facilities in 
Tartus, Syria, it has no proper base in the 
Mediterranean itself. But a study of security in 
the Mediterranean must consider the security of 
all NATO countries in the area and the inte-
rests of the whole Alliance in freedom of 
passage for ships and aircraft. Thus, in addi-
tion to the study in this chapter on the status of 
Soviet forces and those of other Warsaw Pact 
countries in the area, the report considers also 
in Chapter IV the situation in the other ripa-
rian countries and those which are neighbours 
of the NATO countries, iqcluding the extent of 
Soviet influence in certaip. of these countries, 
the facilities they may provide for Soviet forces, 
and the armed forces and equipment of the 
countries themselves, some of which could be a 
potential threat to certain allied countries if the 
pattern of alignment changed as it has done so 
often and abruptly in the past. 
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(b) Present Soviet military effort 
2.2. The Committee has recently devoted a 
report to an analysis of the trends in the mili-
tary balance of the last twenty years•. The 
pres~nt report devoted particularly to the 
Mediterranean area does not therefore examine 
in detail the overall Soviet defence effort but 
its continued growth must be borne in mi~d as 
the latest NATO communiques have stressed: 
"6. The enormous growth over a num-
ber of years of Warsaw Pact and in parti-
cular Soviet military power gives rise to 
legitimate concern in Europe and 
throughout the world. This build-up 
contradicts the frequent assurances by the 
Warsaw Pact countries that their aim is 
not military superiority. "2 
"4. Ministers noted that in spite of the 
slow-down in economic growth and 
increasing difficulties in the energy sec-
tor, Soviet defence expenditure still 
amounted to 11-13 % of its GDP and was 
growing annually at 4-5% in real terms. 
It continued to receive top priority des-
pite the needs of the civil economy. In 
the past year the Soviet nuclear and 
conventional posture has been enhanced 
markedly by continuing deployments 
of many sophisticated systems. These 
developments cover the strategic nuclear 
field; the theatre nuclear field ... ; and all 
aspects of conventional forces at sea, on 
land and in the air. No abatement of 
these programmes was foreseen in future 
years. Ministers expressed concern over 
the implications of this unabated growth 
of Warsaw Pact capability for the balance 
of forces between NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact. " 3 
2.3. The most spectacular advance in the 
Soviet defence effort is the very recent launch-
ing of large naval vessels belonging to several 
entirely new classes. The new battle cruiser 
Kirov deployed last year is variously reported 
to be between 32,000 and 25,000 tons, equip-
ped with guided missiles. The follow-on ship, 
the Sovremenny, has been reported already 
launched. Four new anti-submarine warfare 
ships of an 8,500 ton class and a 12,500 ton 
1. State of European security, Document 858, 17th 
November 1980, Rapporteur: Mr. Brown. 
2. Final communique of the Ministerial Meeting of the 
North Atlantic Council, 12th December 1980. 
3. Final communique of the Ministerial Meeting of the 
NATO Defence Planning Committee, lOth December 
1980. (France participates in meetings of the North Atlan-
tic Council, but not of the DPC.) 
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missile cruiser are reported building in the 
Black Sea and a new cruise missile submarine 
with the NATO code name Oscar, of 10 000 
tons is nearing completion at Severodvinsk on 
the White Sea. This large-scale new naval 
construction is undoubtedly intended to enable 
the Soviet Union to operate in any of the 
oceans of the world. The existence of a much 
larger class of supply vessel, the Berezina of 
40,000 tons supports this hypothesis. Al-
though these new and larger vessels will not be 
available in substantial numbers for another 
seven or eight years, they will then provide the 
Soviet Union with a capability of operating in 
oceans of the world in a way in which only the 
major NATO naval powers have been able to 
hitherto. This is a new fact of real strategic 
significance. 
2.4. It is unlikely that these new and larger 
vessels have been specifically designed for ser-
vice in the Mediterranean but of course the 
mobility of naval power w~uld always provide 
the Soviet Union with this option. 
(c) Warsaw Pact land forces 
2.5. In previous reports, the Committee has 
considered Warsaw Pact land forces which are a 
potential threat to NATO countries of the 
region or to non-aligned countries such as 
Yugoslavia, whose continued non-alignment is 
vital to the peace and security of the area. 
Taking the southern region of NATO as a 
whole, the Warsaw Pact land forces to be taken 
into account are those of Hungary, Romania 
and Bulgaria and the Soviet forces stationed in 
Hungary and in the Odessa, North Caucasus 
and Trans-Caucasus military districts of the 
Soviet Union. No Soviet forces are stationed 
in Romania or Bulgaria. 
2.6. In reviewing the force balance in the 
present report, the Committee has at its dispo-
sal unclassified information provided by NATO 
headquarters where the Committee was briefed 
as well as the current edition of the authorita~ 
tive Military Balance of the International Insti-
tute for Strategic Studies, whose figures for 
Warsaw Pact forces the Committee has norm-
ally found to be slightly lower than those 
provided in unclassified NATO briefings. 
2.7. The following table, showing balance of 
ground forces in the Southern Europe area as a 
whole, is ~erived from the current IISS Military 
Balance; It shows forces available without 
mobilisation, but apparently excludes Soviet 
divisions in the Trans-Caucasus military district 
which is in direct contact with Eastern Turkey. 
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Balance of land forces in Southern Europe1 
(without mobilisation) 
NATO Warsaw (of which Derived Pact USSR) ratio 
Ground forces available m Armoured 52h 6 (2) 1 : 1.06 
peacetime (division equiva- Mechanised infantry 
lents) and airborne 38 113 15 (2) 1 : 0.4 
' Total 44 21 (4) 1 : 0.5 
Operational main battle 
tanks 4,000 6,700 (2,500) 1 : 1. 7 
1. Stated to include Italian, Greek and Turkish land forces; and Category I land forces of Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria 
and Soviet units stationed in Hungary. 
Balance of land forces in Southern Europe 
(all categories of Warsaw Pact divisions including those at cadre strength) 
NATO Warsaw (of which Pact USSR) 
Ground forces available in Armoured 52h 62/J (3) 
peacetime (division equiva- Mechanised infantry etc. 
lents) Airborne 
Total 
2.8. When all categories of Warsaw Pact divi-
sions are counted, together with Soviet divisions 
stationed in the Odessa military district (adjoin-
ing Romania) and in the Trans-Caucasus mili-
tary district (adjoining Eastern Turkey) and 
Northern Caucasus military district (immedi-
ately to the north of the Trans-Caucasus 
district) the numerical balance of divisions 
appears much less favourable to NATO. 
2.9. The areas in the southern region, where 
land combat could occur if hostilities broke out, 
are in the three theatres of North-East Italy; the 
area of Greek and Turkish Thrace and the Tur-
kish Straits; and Eastern Turkey. These are 
widely separated areas with difficult communi-
cations between them for both Warsaw Pact 
and the NATO forces, so that the balance of 
ground forces must really be examined for each 
of them separately. 
2.10. The Warsaw Pact forces to be considered 
a threat to North-East Italy are those based in 
Hungary, from which Italian territory can be 
approached through the Ljubljana Gap in 
Yugoslavia. The distance is some 250 km 
measured in a straight line, and thus plenty of 
warning can be expected of any ground attack 
in this area. 
2.11. According to the IISS, Hungarian land 
forces of all categories amount to one tank and 
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37 113 46 (24) 
44 542h (29) 
five motorised rifle divisions, plus one airborne 
battalion. Stationed in the territory are two 
Soviet tank divisions and two motorised rifle 
divisions. NATO headquarters provide the 
following unclassified figmres for the ground 
force balance in the theatre. 
North-Eastern Italy 
Ratio of Warsaw Pact to NATO 
Manpower and weapons 
1.500 
\ km'? 
Guns 
mll1tary personnel 
personnel earners 
Italy USSR Hungary 
c=J 111111111111111 ~ 
2.12. Since the Committee last reported, War-
saw Pact armour in this theatre has improved 
with the addition of sixty Ql.Odern T -72 tanks to 
the Hungarian inventory, but Italy during the 
same period has increased its holding of Leo-
pard I medium tanks from 600 to 745. 
2.13. In the area of Greek and Turkish Thrace 
and the Turkish Straits, the ground force situa-
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tion is more uncertain. The strip of Greek 
territory between the Bulgarian frontier and the 
Aegean Sea is in parts only 30 km wide. But 
Bulgarian forces amount only to 1213 tank 
divisions and eight motorised rifle divisions of 
all categories; it is cut off from Soviet territory 
by Romania which, in the past, has refused to 
allow Soviet troops to transit its territory and, 
in 1968, refused to allow the Bulgarian batta-
lion involved to cross its territory to participate 
in the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Black Sea 
ferry services have been improved between 
Soviet and Bulgarian ports and the Bulgarian 
battalion involved in 1968 followed this route 
first before crossing Soviet territory to reach 
Czechoslovakia. No Soviet units are stationed 
in either Bulgaria or Romania. On a worst-
case assumption, however, and in the light of 
the extremely important strategic objective 
which the Turkish Straits would represent to 
the Soviet Union, the ground forces of Bulgaria 
and Romania, together with Soviet ground 
forces in the adjoining Odessa military district, 
are taken into account. 
2.14. According to IISS, divisions of all catego-
ries in Bulgaria amount to 1213 equivalent 
tank divisions and eight motorised rifle divi-
sions; in Romania two tank, eight motorised 
rifle divisions, one mountain division and one 
airborne brigade. Soviet forces in the Odessa 
military district amount to six motorised rifle 
divisions and one airborne division. The cor-
responding unclassified information from 
NATO headquarters is presented in the follow-
ing table. 
Army 
mil1tary 
personnel 
Greece 
c=J 
Greece and Turkish Thrace 
Ratio of Warsaw Pact to NATO 
Manpower and weapons 
Tanks Armoured 
personnel 
earners 
Turkey USSR Roman1a [::=J .. ~ 
Guns 
Bulgana 
c::J 
2.15. The manpower ratio in this theatre is not 
unfavourable to NATO, but the overwhelming 
Warsaw Pact superiority in armour is present 
here as in most theatres. Since the Committee 
last reported, the relative armour situation for 
NATO has deteriorated with the appearance in 
Bulgarian tank divisions of 100 modem T-62 
and T-72 medium tanks, and the appearance 
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of some T -72 tanks in Romania. Over the 
same three-year period, Greek armour has 
improved with the addition of 100 AMX-30 
tanks to make a total of 1 70 of this model, but 
all other tanks in service with the Greek and 
Turkish forces are obsolete or obsolescent M-47 
and M-48s. 
2.16. However, because of the geographical 
implantation of ground forces in this theatre, 
considerable warning would be available of any 
preparations for an attack under the worst case 
assumption discussed here. 
2.17. Eastern Turkey, where it borders on the 
Soviet Union, presents a different picture from 
either of the other two theatres. Less warning 
might be expected in the event of an offensive 
being launched by Soviet forces in this area; on 
the other hand, the immediate strategic objec-
tive of such an attack is less evident, and the 
terrain provides opportunity for defending 
forces to trade ground in order to gain 
time. According to the IISS Military Balance, 
Soviet forces in the Trans-Caucasus military 
district, immediately adjacent to Turkey, 
amount to eleven motorised rifle divisions in 
various categories from one to three, repre-
senting different states of readiness, plus one 
airborne division. The unclassified informa-
tion provided by NATO headquarters for the 
ground force balance in this theatre is as 
follows: 
Eastern Turkey 
Ratio of Warsaw Pact to NATO 
Manpower and weapons 
310,000 
Army Tanks Armoured 
mi11tary personnel 
personnel earners 
Turkey USSR 
c::J .. 
(d) Other land forces 
Guns 
2.18. Turkey's South-Eastern frontier also 
adjoins Iran, Iraq and Syria, and is an area of 
extreme instability. Iran and Iraq are currently 
at war. A new friendship treaty between the 
Soviet Union and Syria has been signed. 
Although Turkey is at pains to explain that it 
maintains friendly relations with its neighbours, 
the military balance in the area has to be consi-
dered especially in the light of the modem 
armaments which have been acquired by all 
these three neighbours of Turkey, whose 
military equipment is now far superior to that 
of the Warsaw Pact countries Bulgaria and 
Romania considered above. It is not possible 
to assess reliably the state of the Iranian armed 
forces after the turmoil which followed the fall 
of the Shah's regime. Prior to 1979, Iran was 
stated by the IISS to have three armoured divi-
sions, three infantry divisions and four indepen-
dent brigades, equipped with 875 Chieftain 
tanks, 460 M-60 medium tanks and 400 obso-
lescent M-47 and M-48s. Iraq, prior to the 
outbreak of hostilities with Iran, had four 
armoured divisions, .four mechanised divisions 
and four mountain infantry divisions, equipped 
with 2,500 tanks including some T-62s and fifty 
of the most recent Soviet T-72 tank as well as 
100 French AMX-30 tanks, others of which are 
on order. Since the Committee last reported 
three years ago, the Iraqi tank inventory has 
doubled and the T -72s have entered it. 
2.19. Syria has the equivalent of about four 
armoured divisions and 3.5 mechanised divi-
sions equipped with 2,200 older T -54 and T -55 
tanks, 600 T -62s and 170 T -72s, which latter 
have appeared in the three years since the 
Committee last reported, the total tank inven-
tory having increased by 400 in that period. 
2.20. The terrain of South-Eastern Turkey, 
unlike that on the Soviet frontier, offers good 
going for tanks and modern armour has not yet 
reached the Turkish armed forces. 
(e) Warsaw Pact air forces in the southern region 
2.21. The inherent mobility of air forces and 
widely differing aircraft ranges extending from 
the strategic bomber to the air defence fighter 
makes the choice of aircraft for inclusion in a 
review of the balance of air forces in the sou-
thern region problematical. In the following 
analysis, long-range aviation has been excluded 
because it can be used against any major mili-
tary or civil target anywhere in the NATO 
area. "Forward aviation" carries out close 
support ground attack, local air defence and 
reconnaissance. Within the Soviet Union, air 
defence aircraft are in a special command 
(PVO) separate from the other formations. It 
is the aircraft of the latter two commands which 
are considered here. 
2.22. According to the International Institute 
for Strategic Studies' Military Balance, the 
balance of tactical aviation in the Southern 
European region is as follows: 
NATO Warsaw (of which Pact USSR) 
Fighter/ground 
attack 612 325 (70) 
Interceptors 202 1,000 (400) 
Reconnaissance 106 200 (125) 
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2.23. As for the three theatres of operation 
considered above, Northern Italy is within 
range of aircraft based in Hungary, which include 
20 MiG-23 ground attack fighters plus 150 
MiG-21 interceptor defence ,aircraft. In addi-
tion, one Soviet tactical air army is deployed in 
Hungary. The following table was presented 
to the Committee by NATO· AFSOUTH head-
quarters: 
[]
64 225 
Italy 
Ratio of Warsaw Pact to NATO 
Air 
cl 35 18 lD D* 
Tactical Ded1cated Recon-
naissance 
Med1um, 
f1ghter a1r defence heavy 
bomber 
NATO 
CJ 
f1ghter 
Warsaw 
Pact 
-
"'i::f Some medJUm, heavy bombers from 
Sov1elt long-range a•r army could be 
used aga•nst Italy 
2.24. In the area of Thrace and the Turkish 
Straits, account has to be taken ofthe Bulgarian 
and Romanian air forces. There are no Soviet 
air force units based in these two countries but 
the Soviet tactical aviation in the Odessa mili-
tary district must be included. The Bulgarian 
air force now consists of some 64 MiG-17 
ground attack aircraft plus several MiG-23s. 
Interceptor fighters are made up of 80 MiG-21 s 
and 36 MiG-17s. 
2.25. The Romanian air force consists of 70 
MiG-17 ground attack aircraft and some 240 
MiG-21 interceptor fighters. The following 
table was presented to the Committee by 
NATO headquarters, showing the balance in 
the region: 
Cl 
Tact1cal 
f1ghter 
NATO 
D 
Greece and Tur~ish Thrace 
Ratio of Warsaw Pact to NATO 
Air 
BD 
ell D* 
Oed1cated Recon- Light 
bomber 
Med1um' 
heavy 
bomber 
a•r defence na1ssance 
f1ghter 
Warsaw 
Pact 
-
~ Some med•um heavy bombers from 
"X Sov1et long-range a1r army and 
Black Sea naval a1r force could be 
used agamst Northern Greece and 
!urk1sh Thrace 
2.26. In Turkey's eastern frontier area, account 
has to be taken of the Soviet tactical air army 
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in the Trans-Caucasus and Northern Caucasus 
military districts. The following table was pre-
sented to the Committee, showing the situation: 
f1ghter 
NATO 
c:::::J 
Eastern Turkey 
Ratio of Warsaw Pact to NATO 
Air 
270 
J 
Ded•cated 
a1r defence 
f1ghter 
Warsaw 
Pact 
-
70 
d 10 
* 
0 
Recon L1ght Med•urn/ 
na•ssann" bornbrr heavy 
bomber 
A Some med•um heavy bombers from 
X Sov•el long-range a1r army and 
Bl,wk c;"d naval atr force could be 
used agamst Ll'>lern Turkey 
2.27. Although Bulgarian and Romanian offen-
sive aviation has undergone little modernisation 
since the Committee's last report three years 
ago, it is more difficult to know whether the 
modern aircraft continually being introduced by 
the Soviet air force are assigned to the southern 
region. It is thought that one-third of the 
Backfire medium bombers - i.e. 260 aircraft -
might be so assigned and that one of the tactical 
air armies in the region might be equipped with 
the new Su-19 bomber. But generally speak-
ing it is estimated that only 60 % of the aircraft 
of the Soviet Union and its allies in the south-
ern region represent a major threat because of 
the limits imposed on older types of aircraft. 
However, a new element is the growing number 
of Soviet helicopters in the region - some 4 70 -
capable of supplying close support for the 
army, thus freeing tactical aviation for longer-
range operations. 
(/) Air forces of other countries in the region 
2.28. The Committee's attention was drawn in 
particular to the build-up of military aircraft of 
Soviet origin in Syria and Libya; in the latter 
country, there are now at least one MiG-23 
regiment, one Tu-22 squadron and one Foxbat 
MiG-25 squadron whose crews are believed to 
be Soviet. If ever the many airfields existing in 
Algeria, Libya, Syria and Iraq were made avail-
able to the Soviet Union, the air threat would 
be much greater. But at the present time the 
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Soviet Union has no air bases in these coun-
tries. 
(g) Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean 
2.29. In the Committee's last report, a detailed 
examination was made of the historical pattern 
of Soviet naval deployment in the Mediterra-
nean since the second world war. Virtually nil 
before 1964, the number of Soviet warships has 
risen progressively, reaching a peak on one day 
during the Middle East war in 1973, with 98 
vessels of all kinds. This number fell rapidly 
following the closure of Soviet bases in Egypt, 
which became definite on 15th March 1976 
when President Sadat abrogated the Egypto-
Soviet friendship treaty. Since then, there has 
been a daily average of between 40 and 50 
Soviet naval vessels, a quarter of which are sur-
face combatants. 
Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean 
1964-80 
Year Annual Average 
ship days daily strength 
1964 1,500 5 
1965 2,800 8 
1966 4,400 12 
1967 8,100 22 
1968 11,000 30 
1969 15,000 41 
1970 16,500 45 
1971 19,000 52 
1972 18,000 49 
1973 20,600 56 
1974 20,200 55 
1975 20,000 55 
1976 18,600 50 
1977 17,747 48 
1978 17,320 48 
1979 17,364 47 
1980 17,146 46 
The average daily strength of the Soviet 
Mediterranean Squadron (SOVMEDRON) in 
1980 was made up as follows: 
9 Submarines 
11 Surface combatants 
23 Auxiliary vessels 
3 Intelligence and special purpose vessels 
46 AVERAGE TOTAL 
The following comparative table was pre-
sented to the Committee by NATO head-
quarters: 
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Naval vessels in the Mediterranean 
Soviet United Other France Total Union States NAT02 NATO 
Carriers - 21 2 2 6 
Cruisers 3 1 6 1 8 
Frigates and destroyers 8 14 60 13 87 
Sub-total - Major surface 
combatants 11 17 68 16 101 
Submarines 8 5 37 11 53 
Amphibious vessels 2 6 24 - 30 
Auxiliaries 27 11 70 19 100 
Total 48 391 199 46 284 
I. When only I carrier present in Mediterranean (as on 16th February 1981) the United States total of39 falls to 33. 
2. Total of Greece, Italy and Turkey. 
2.30. As a basis for comparison with the fleets 
of NATO countries as a whole in the Mediter-
ranean, however, consideration should rather be 
given to the entire Soviet Black Sea fleet which, 
including vessels of the Mediterranean squa-
dron, consists of 85 surface combatants and 25 
submarines. 
2.31. However, there are several restrictions on 
operations by the Soviet squadron in the Medi-
terranean. The surface ships are detached 
from the Black Sea fleet, but transit through the 
Straits connecting the Black Sea with the Medi-
terranean is governed by the Montreux Conven-
tion, signed in 1936, which limits to 9 the 
number of foreign ships authorised to use 
the Straits at a given moment. Black Sea 
powers have to give prior notice to Turkey 
when requesting authorisation for naval vessels 
to pass through the Straits, and under the 
convention Turkey prepares an annual report 
on the number of warships having passed 
through the Straits, specifying the name, 
tonnage and date of passage of each ship. 
Transit of submarines through the Straits is 
forbidden, except for repairs outside the Black 
Sea. Soviet submarines in the Mediterranean 
come therefore not from the Black Sea fleet but 
from the Soviet northern or Baltic fleets. 
2.32. The following table showing Soviet naval 
transits of the Straits was drawn up on the basis 
of Turkey's annual reports: 
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Soviet naval transits of the Turkish Straits 
1964-80 
Auxiliary Surface Year combatant Total transits transits 
1964 56 39 95 
1965 80 49 129 
1966 71 82 153 
1967 149 93 242 
1968 113 117 230 
1969 142 121 263 
1970 149 122 271 
1971 154 123 277 
1972 140 114 254 
1973 159 126 285 
1974 145 93 238 
1975 146 79 225 
1976 63 69 132 
1977 103 82 185 
1978 121 107 228 
1979 129 94 223 
1980 124 111 235 
The increase in total transits in the last 
three years reflects not an increase in the Soviet 
Mediterranean squadron, but increased deploy-
ment in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. 
2.33. The Soviet Mediterranean squadron has 
no major support base in this sea. Limited 
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facilities are available at Tartus (Syria) and, 
under commercial agreements, at Bizerta (Tuni-
sia) and Tivat (Yugoslavia). These limited 
support availabilities are not sufficient to allow 
the Soviet squadron to be kept at its pre-197 4 
level. 
2.34. For supplies, the Soviet navy is com-
pelled to anchor in international waters off the 
territorial sea of various states. At various 
times, the following anchorages have been noti-
fied to the Committee: Cythera (Greece), the 
Gulf of Bunbah, the Gulf of Sollum, the Gulf of 
Hammamet, Cape Andreas (Cyprus), Melilla (a 
Spanish enclave in Morocco) and the Spanish 
island of Alboran. There are permanent 
anchorages in some of these places. 
Soviet fleet anchorages-ports typical day 
Port of Annaba . I SS (submarine) 
(Algeria) 2 Auxiliaries (repafr 
ships) 
Hammamet (Tunisia) 
(Chief anchorage) 
Port of Tivat 
(Yugoslavia) 
Port of Syros (Greece) 
Kithira Anchorage 
(Greece) 
Sollum Anchorage 
(Libya) 
Cape Gata (South of 
Cyprus) 
Port of Tartus (Syria) 
2 FF (frigates) 
I AO (tanker) 
I SS 
I Auxiliary (subma-
rine support) 
I AGI 
I SS 
I Auxiliary (subma-
rine support) 
2 Auxiliaries (supply) 
I CG (missile cruiser) 
2 DE (destroyer) · 
I AO 
I AGI 
I CG 
3 DE 
I AO 
3 Auxiliaries (supply) 
I MSF 
I LST 
I Floating dock 
I SS 
4 Auxiliaries (supply/ 
barge) 
I Auxiliary 
2.35. Today, the Soviet Mediterranean squa-
dron is definitely smaller than fleets of the 
NATO countries in the same region. If the 
Soviet Union tried to bring in more surface 
units from its Black Sea fleet, NATO would 
have a few weeks' notice because of the limits 
imposed by the Montreux Convention on 
the number of warships which may transit the 
Straits at the same time. Nor would the Soviet 
Union be able to maintain a large fleet in the 
sea for very long. 
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2.36. However, the situation would be entirely 
different should one of the coastal states again 
make large naval bases available to the Soviet 
Union. 
Ill. The Alliance 
(a) The countries of the Alliance 
3 .I. Four countries, signatories of the North 
Atlantic Treaty, border the Mediterranean -
France, Italy, Greece and Turkey; the United 
States also maintains significant air and naval 
forces in the area based both in NATO coun-
tries and in Spain. The United Kingdom has a 
much smaller permanent presence in the Medi-
terranean area both in the sovereign base areas 
on the island of Cyprus and in Gibraltar; other 
NATO countries undertake limited deploy-
ments in the Mediterranean area from time to 
time, particularly through their contributions to 
the air and land elements of ACE mobile force 
referred to below. 
3.2. Only the air defence forces of Italy, 
Greece and Turkey in the Mediterranean area 
are under NATO command in peacetime. 
The assigned ground and tactical air forces of 
these countries would come under NATO 
command at a specified level of alert; naval 
forces are earmarked for assignment to NATO. 
(i) France 
3.3. Although France withdrew from the inte-
grated military structure of NATO in 1966, and 
had in fact stopped earmarking its Mediterra-
nean naval forces for NATO some two years 
earlier, France never terminated its participa-
tion in other NATO activities. It remains a 
full participant in the North Atlantic Council, 
the supreme political organ of the Alliance, and 
those aspects of the integrated military structure 
in which France does not participate have since 
1966 been dealt with in the NATO Defence 
Planning Committee on which France is not 
represented. France continued to participate 
in subordinate organs of the North Atlantic 
Council concerned, for example, with political 
consultation, infrastructure and the production 
of armaments. The extent of French participa-
tion in allied defence planning is illustrated by 
two items, released for publication, from the 
minutes of the last ministerial meeting of the 
North Atlantic Council on 12th December 
1980 but which were omitted from the official 
communique: 
" Ministers noted the report on the situa-
tion in the Mediterranean prepared on 
their instructions and underlined again 
the necessity of maintaining the balance 
of forces in the whole area. They 
requested the Council in permanent 
session to continue to consult on the 
question and submit a further report at 
their next meeting ... 
Recognising the importance of a co-ordi-
nated air defence programme to the 
defensive posture of the Alliance, Minis-
ters welcomed with satisfaction the estab-
lishment for this purpose of a NATO 
air defence committee under the Coun-
cil. " 
3.4. With 4 % of its GDP devoted to defence, 
France has one of the largest defence budgets of 
any European member of the Alliance. In the 
Mediterranean in particular, French naval 
forces, including maritime patrol aircraft, make 
an important contribution to the balance of 
force in the area. Conditions under which 
French naval forces would operate with NATO 
forces in the event of a French political deci-
sion to do so following the outbreak of hostili-
ties, have been spelt out in detailed agreements 
negotiated with Commander-in-Chief Allied 
Naval Forces Southern Europe in 1972 and 
1976. The Chief of Staff of the French Armed 
Services maintains a military mission at the 
headquarters of Commander-in-Chief Allied 
Forces Southern Europe in Naples which inclu-
des two liaison officers from the French 
Commander-in-Chief for the Mediterranean in 
T oulon, attached to the headquarters of the 
Commander Allied Naval Forces Southern 
Europe also in Naples; inversely that Comman-
der maintains two liaison officers at the French 
T oulon headquarters. 
3.5. In 1980, French naval forces in the 
Mediterranean participated in three organised 
NATO exercises and several dozen minor exer-
cises known as Passex. French maritime patrol 
aircraft co-operate on the same basis as those of 
the other NATO countries concerned with 
Commander Maritime Air Forces Mediterra-
nean in Naples who co-ordinates the pro-
grammes of all allied maritime patrol aircraft in 
the Mediterranean in order to provide conti-
nuous surveillance of Soviet fleet movements. 
3.6. French naval forces in the Mediterranean 
amount to 16 major surface combatants, 
including two aircraft carriers, a cruiser and two 
large destroyers of the Suffren class, and 11 sub-
marines. In an important modernisation pro-
gramme, covering both weapons, data acquisi-
tion and ECM, the two aircraft carriers are 
undergoing refit, partly to receive tactical 
nuclear weapons and the new Super Etendard 
carrier-home strike aircraft. A new class of 
destroyer of the C-70 Georges Leygues class (so-
called corvette) is being built. New versions of 
the Atlantic maritime patrol aircraft are also 
entering service. As with all other navies at 
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the present time, the modernisation programme 
will lead in the course of this decade to a reduc-
tion in the total number of shlips at sea but will 
significantly improve the effectiveness of the 
fleet. 
(ii) Italy 
3.7. Italy makes a major contribution to allied 
defence in the Mediterranean both through the 
size and quaiity of its armed, forces; by its stra-
tegic geographical position in the centre of the 
Mediterranean effectively diyiding it into two 
basins, and by the facilities it provides for 
various NATO military headquarters at three 
separate locations, a vital part of the NATO 
NADGE air defence radar chain. It alsd provi-
des facilities and bases for United States forces, 
which would come under the NATO integrated 
command at specified stages of alert. 
3.8. Italy has revised its defence policy in 
recent years with a reduction in the manpower 
in its armed services, chiefly the army which 
was reduced from 306,000 men five years ago 
to 218,000 in 19 77, but which has increased 
again to the· present 253,000. Three special 
promotional laws were promulgated to provide 
$ 1 billion for the navy and $ 1.3 billion for 
each of the army and air force in an equipment 
modernisation programme including new ves-
sels for the navy, new aircraft such as the Tor-
nado for the air force, and. more new Leopard 
tanks for the army. Inflation has halved the 
funds originally made available and more 
finance will be required to meet the equipment 
modernisation programme and with only 2.3% 
of its gross domestic product spent on defence 
Italy, by this measure, makes the smallest effort 
of any NATO country except Luxembourg and 
Canada1 
3.9. Increasingly aware of the instability of 
the Mediterranean region, Italy, in revising its 
defence policy, has calleq for a new NATO 
strategy to pay more attention to the southern 
flank and to arrange closer links with the Greek 
and Turkish armed forces. The NATO report 
on the situation in the Mediterranean called for 
by the North Atlantic Council has been referred 
to in paragraph 3.3 above. 
3.10. Italy's north-eastern frontier is possibly 
vulnerable to land attack by Warsaw Pact forces 
through the Ljubljana gap in Yugoslavia as 
pointed out above in paragraphs 2.10 et seq. 
which show the balance of force in that area. 
The Italian ground forces amount to some eight 
divisional equivalents including one armoured 
and three mechanised divisions equipped with 
1. See Appendix I, comparative table of defence effort 
1976-80. 
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1,300 modem Leopard I and M-60 tanks and 
550 obsolescent M-47s. 100 more Leopard 
tanks are on order. Nuclear support is pro-
vided with six Lance surface-to-surface missiles 
as well as the nuclear support provided by 
United States army units in Italy referred to 
below. 
3.11. The Italian air force comprises some 
seventeen tactical squadrons, including nine 
fighter ground attack; two reconnaissance and 
six all-weather fighter squadrons equipped with 
F -104 and some G-91 aircraft. 100 T omado 
are on order. 
3.12. The Italian navy comprises thirty-one 
main surface combatants and nine submarines, 
the former including a helicopter cruiser, Vitto-
rio V eneto, and two other cruisers, nine des-
troyers and eighteen frigates. Three maritime 
patrol squadrons, which in Italy come under 
the air force, are equipped with eighteen Atlan-
tic aircraft, others with the S-2 Tracker. 
3.13. Under the bilateral mutual security 
agreement with the United States of. January 
1952, with various subsequent additions, Italy 
provides United States forces with some 58 
different facilities and bases in Italy for pur-
poses direct! y related to allied defence under 
Article Ill of the North Atlantic Treaty. The 
United States army has about one thousand 
men in the Southern European Task Force 
based in Livomo and Vicenza which, on the 
one hand, provide units for tactical nuclear 
support of the Italian ground forces in addition 
to the Lance missiles of the Italian army, and 
also provide basic logistics support facili-
ties. The Italian air force has an important 
base at A viano in North-East Italy from which 
tactical aircraft can operate on a rotational 
basis, from other United States airfields in 
Spain. Sigonella air base in Sicily provides 
most important facilities for the long-range 
Orion maritime patrol aircraft which can oper-
ate the whole length of the Mediterranean from 
this very central position. The United States 
6th fleet has naval facilities at Catania in Sicily, 
at Naples and at Gaeta further north where the 
flagship of the 6th fleet is based. United States 
Task Force 69 of nuclear-propelled hunter-
killer submarines has its headquarters at Naples 
and base facilities provided by a tender on the 
island of La Maddalena to the north-east of 
Sardinia. There is an important electronic intel-
ligence gathering facility at San Vito in South-
East Italy and some fourteen other communica-
tions facilities or stations elsewhere. 
(iii) Greece 
3.14. The Committee welcomed the increased 
cohesion of the Alliance which resulted from 
the accession of Greece to the European 
140 
Community from 1st January this year, and 
most particularly the return of Greek forces to 
the integrated military structure of NATO 
which took effect on 20th October 1980 under 
an agreement in principle that left many details 
to be settled by subsequent negotiations with 
Turkey and the NATO authorities. Previous 
reports of the Committee have recounted in 
some detail the reasons which led Greece to 
withdraw its forces from NATO command in 
1974; it is recalled that there was never a com-
plete withdrawal from the integrated military 
structure of NATO; in particular Greek staff 
officers continued to serve both in some posts 
in the international military staff in NATO and 
in NATO military headquarters other than that 
at Izmir in Turkey. 
3.15. In practice, a great deal of detail concern-
ing Greece's relations with the NATO military 
structure remain to be negotiated as the whole 
NATO command structure in the area is being 
revised, and this aspect is discussed under the 
heading Greek-Turkish relations below. Greece 
will have resumed its reporting to NATO head-
quarters on various aspects of defence policy, 
but after the lapse of seven years, during which 
most of the staff directly concerned both in the 
Greek Ministry of Defence and armed forces, 
and in NATO headquarters, have changed, par-
ticular effort will be needed to re-establish the 
necessary close relations with NATO defence 
planning staff. 
3.16. An indirect effect ofthe 1974 events was 
to stimulate Greek defence expenditure which 
rose from 4.1 % of GDP in 1973 to 6.5% in 
1975 and to a peak of 6.8% in 1977, to fall in 
1980 to 5.2 %, a figure which reflects normali-
sation of relations with Turkey rather than a 
reassessment of the Soviet threat or of the dan-
ger of hostilities breaking out in the unstable 
Eastern Mediterranean area. The reappear-
ance of Greek (and Turkish) defence statistics 
in the table at Appendix I, after a four year 
absence, is one direct and welcome conse-
quence of the normalisation of Greek relations 
with NATO. 
3.17. The Greek equipment modernisation 
programme has included the acquisition of 
AMX-30 tanks and Milan anti-tank guided 
weapons, fast patrol boats with Exocet anti-ship 
missiles and aircraft such as the A-7 and Mir-
age F -1. Greek armed forces provide a total of 
some 17 divisions, including one armoured 
division, but about 11 of these are at cadre 
strength. Pending deliveries of further 
AMX-30 tanks, the present establishment is 60 
of these, together with 500 M-48s and 300 
obsolescent M-47s. There are two Honest John 
battalions with eight missiles for tactical 
nuclear support. The navy provides seven 
submarines and some fifteen major surface 
combatants, together with coastal patrol vessels 
and a growing number of fast patrol craft, and 
fourteen amphibious landing ships. The air 
force comprises three strike squadrons with 57 
A-7 aircraft, five fighter-bomber squadrons with 
50 Phantoms and 33 F-104s, five interceptor 
squadrons with 43 F-5s and 38 Mirage F-ls. It 
was pointed out to the Committee that the large 
Greek merchant fleet represented a valuable 
asset for NATO to which 1,700 ships can be 
assigned in war. 
3.18. As well as providing the important links 
in the NATO NADGE air defence chain, 
which has five early warning sites in Greece, 
the country makes another most important 
contribution to the defence of the Alliance 
through the excellent facilities provided at the 
NATO air missile firing installation near 
Chania in Crete, which was visited by the 
Committee. Originally established in June 
1964 under a multilateral agreement signed by 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, 
the Netherlands, Norway and the United States, 
the installations since 1971 have been run by 
the five present user countries, Denmark, 
France and Norway having withdrawn over the 
previous twelve months. The installations pro-
vide training principally for Hawk and some 
Nike surface-to-air missile units from the user 
countries, but in addition anti-aircraft guns, 
surface-to-surface missiles, naval missiles of 
various types as well as air-to-air and air-to-
surface missiles have been tested on range 
which has also occasionally been used by Bri-
tish and Italian forces. 
3.19. Greece has a long, exposed frontier with 
Bulgaria in the north, with very little depth of 
territory between it and the Aegean Sea, as has 
been pointed out in describing the balance of 
force in the area of Thrace and the Turkish 
Straits in paragraph 2.13 above. In peacetime, 
Greek forces alone may provide an adequate 
balance with those of Bulgaria, particularly 
since improved relations with Yugoslavia have 
led to a mutual reduction of forces on each side 
of the Greek-Yugoslav frontier. In any period 
of tension, however, in which a concerted 
attack by reinforced Warsaw Pact forces on 
Thrace and the Turkish Straits became likely, 
external reinforcements would be vital to 
defend the area. The ACE mobile force of bri-
gade size constituted from specially equipped 
bat~alions made available by Belgium, Ger-
many, Italy, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom 
and the United States, with associated artillery 
and logistics support units can deploy fairly 
rapidly in the area supported by the air element 
comprising squadrons of tactical aircraft sup-
plied also by Canada and the Netherlands. 
This is essentially, however, a token force to 
demonstrate the cohesion of the Alliance. 
3.20. Under a bilateral United States-Greek 
military facilities agreement of 12th October 
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19 53, supplemented by several subsequent tech-
nical implementing agreements, the United Sta-
tes has a number of defence bases and installa-
tions in Greece for the purposes of NATO 
defence under Article 3 of the North Atlantic 
Treaty. These include an important n,aval 
base for the 6th Fleet in Suda Bay on Crete; the 
airfield at Chania and Iraklion in Crete, and 
Hellenikon near Athens; some eight major 
communications facilities, including the Nea 
Makri naval communications facility; an elec-
tronic intelligence gathering facility at Iraklion, 
Crete, and nuclear weapons storage installations 
for support of both United States and Greek 
forces. 
3 .21. For several years, Gree~e and the United 
States have sought to renegotiate the terms of 
the 1953 agreement. In Apnl 1976, a number 
of " principles to guide future US-Greek 
defence co-operation " were signed by the two 
countries as a basis for negotiations, which were 
completed with the initialling of a mutual 
defence agreement on 28th July 1977. Linked 
by Greece with negotiations on the return to 
the NATO structure, however, that agreement 
never entered into force and bilateral negotia-
tions were resumed in Athens on 28th January 
this year. Greece is understood to insist that 
all bases should be under Greek command and 
should be used for purposes " limited to obliga-
tions arising out of the North Atlantic Treaty " 
with a Greek right to close bases in certain cir-
cumstances. Greece is understood to have 
wished to see the text of a comparable United 
States-Turkey mutual defenqe agreement signed 
in March 1980 and to want a guarantee that 
United States military assistance to Greece and 
Turkey shall be in the ratio bf 7: 10 respectively 
and that American assurances be provided to 
ensure a military balance in the Aegean. The 
United States, particularly in the light of its 
current plans for a rapid d~ployment force for 
the Middle East or Soutb-East Asian area, 
would prefer that bases be available more gen-
erally for mutual defence purposes as agreed 
between the two governments. Greece has 
urged that agreement be concluded before the 
Easter recess of parliament in the third week of 
April, failing which negotiations might be post-
poned until after the general elections which 
must be held by November 1981 at the latest. 
3.22. The Committee visited Greece from 
18th-21st February where it was most cour-
teously received by the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs, the Minister of Defence, the General 
Staff, the Commander of the NAMFI installa-
tion referred to above, and also held a most 
useful discussion with the defence committee of 
the Greek Chamber of R~presentatives under 
the Chairmanship of Admiral Mineos. The 
Committee was most impressed by the realistic 
Greek assessment of the defence problems in 
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the area, the invaluable contribution which the 
Greek armed forces make to mutual defence 
and the willingness of the country to co-operate 
fully with NATO mutual defence plans. It can 
only regret, however, that whereas mutual 
defence arrangements within the framework of 
the Alliance enjoy the support of a broad spec-
trum of political opinion in all allied countries, 
in Greece the opposition Pasok party should 
have called for withdrawal from NATO. 
While the Committee welcomes very much the 
improved prospects of agreement between 
Greece and Turkey on outstanding issues, dis-
cussed below, and the realistic attempts by both 
governments to reach agreement in a spirit of 
mutual understanding, it regrets at the same 
time a highly distorted view of Turkish policy 
that appears to be held by certain politicians 
and even in certain military quarters in Greece, 
and for which it is unable to find any basis in 
reality. 
(iv) Turkey 
3.23. The Committee noted in its last report 
the trend of Turkish defence policy under the 
then government of Mr. E<;evit, a trend which 
had had its roots in events related to Cyprus in 
1964 and 1974 followed by the United States 
arms embargo which led Turkey actively to 
seek to diversify sources of military equip-
ment. At the same time, without ever contem-
plating withdrawal from NATO, Turkey sought 
to improve relations with the Soviet Union; in 
April 1978 there was the first visit to Turkey 
for forty-five years of the Soviet Chief of 
Staff. Under Mr. Demirel's Justice Party 
government which took office in November 
1979, however, faced with a rapid succession of 
disturbing, destablising events on or near its 
eastern frontiers including the fall of the Shah's 
regime, the final collapse of the Central Treaty 
Organisation!, a resurgence of Muslim funda-
mentalist movements, which inevitably found 
some echo in certain sections of Turkish soci-
ety, the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet 
Union, the new friendship treaty between the 
Soviet Union and Syria and finally the outbreak 
of hostilities between Iraq and Iran, Turkey has 
again moved to place emphasis on the NATO 
Alliance and the need for cohesion in allied 
policies in the area. This trend has been 
unaffected or even strengthened since the milit-
ary authorities assumed power in September 
1980. Turkey pursues an active foreign policy 
aimed at maintaining friendly and mutually 
beneficial relations with all neighbouring coun-
tries. Thus it purchases electricity in the fron-
tier areas from both Bulgaria and the Soviet 
Union, is particularly distressed by the Iran-
I. CENTO. 
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Iraq conflict with both of which countries it has 
a common frontier and remains strictly neu-
tral in the conflict. Turkey is critical of 
certain aspects of Israeli policy and supports the 
participation of the PLO in peace negotiations, 
on an equal footing with other interested 
parties. 
3.24. With 4.7% of its GDP devoted to defence, 
the Turkish defence effort is one of the lar-
gest of any European country, and can be held 
to be proportionately the largest when it is 
recalled that the GDP per capita is the smallest 
of any NATO country. The Turkish armed 
forces are large and well trained but lacking in 
modern equipment which the country cannot 
afford to procure. The army provides 23 divi-
sion equivalents including some three armoured 
division equivalents and two mechanised infan-
try divisions. It is equipped with some 3,000 
largely obsolete M-47 tanks and 500 M-48s, 
while 193 Leopard medium tanks are on order. 
Tactical nuclear support is provided with 
four battalions of eighteen Honest John surface-
to-surface missiles. Some Tow anti-tank guided 
weapons have been procured and more Tow 
and Milan are on order. The Turkish first 
army is deployed in the area of Turkish Thrace 
and the Straits; the third army in the mountai-
nous north-eastern area adjacent to the Soviet 
frontier, and the second army in the flatter, 
open terrain of South Turkey adjacent to Iraq 
and Syria. 
3.25. The Turkish air force comprises a total 
of eighteen squadrons distributed between the 
first tactical air force at Eskisehir in north-
western Turkey and Diyarbakir in eastern 
Turkey respectively. The fighter ground attack 
squadrons are equipped with some 70 Phan-
toms and 46 F-5As, 50 F-100s and 26 F-
1 04s. The interceptor squadrons are equipped 
with 20 F-5As and 20 F-104s. The Turkish 
navy provides fourteen submarines and some 
fourteen major surface combatants, together 
with fast attack craft. 
3.26. One most important contribution which 
Turkey makes to allied defence is through the 
exercise of its responsibilities under the 1936 
Montreux Convention 1 to regulate the passage 
of warships through the Turkish Straits between 
the Black Sea and the Mediterranean - the 
Soviet Union accounts for 90% of all transits 
by naval ships through these Straits. Soviet 
demands in 1946 for drastic revision of the 
Convention, to give the Soviet Union effective 
control over the Black Sea exits, were rejected 
by Turkey and have not been revived. The 
Convention prohibits the passage of submarines 
I. The parties are Bulgaria, France, Greece, Romania, 
Turkey, the USSR and Yugoslavia. Japan ceased to be a 
party after the second world war. 
(except for repair outside the Black Sea); limits 
the number of foreign naval vessels that may be 
in the Straits at any one time to nine (but crui-
sers must pass through singly); and requires 
eight days prior notice of passage to be given to 
the Turkish authorities. Turkey prepares an 
annual report on all such passages through the 
Straits and information from past reports has 
been quoted in paragr~ph 2.32 above. 
3.27. Turkey applies this Convention in a 
flexible manner which takes account of deve-
lopments in naval architecture. Questions 
have been raised when the first of the Soviet 
helicopter carriers, Moskva and Leningrad, 
passed through the Straits, and more recently 
when the vertical take off aircraft carriers of the 
Kiev class were allowed to pass - the conven-
tion prohibits the passage of all ships designed 
for the operation of aircraft at sea, but the des-
cription " cruiser " applied to the vessels by the 
Soviet Union was accepted by Turkey. Some 
question has also arisen over the passage of 
Soviet vessels equipped with missiles of various 
sorts because the Montreux Convention makes 
no reference to such weapons which, of course, 
were unknown at the time of its signature. 
Although the convention places more severe 
restrictions on the passage of naval vessels of 
non-Black Sea powers into the Black Sea, such 
passage is not a fundamental NATO require-
ment, and on balance the convention, as cur-
rently applied by Turkey, offers many advant-
ages to NATO, both through the prohibition of 
movements of Soviet submarines from the 
Black Sea fleet into the Mediterranean and 
through the considerable delay it would impose 
on any attempted sudden large-scale transfer of 
naval vessels out of the Black Sea. 
3.28. Under a number of secret and public 
bilateral agreements between Turkey and the 
United States, the most important of which was 
the military facilities agreement of June 1954, 
subsequently codified in the Defence Co-
operation Agreement of 3rd July 1969, the 
United States maintained a number of military 
installations in Turkey, use of which was seve-
rely restricted by Turkey during the period of 
the United States arms embargo from 1974 to 
1978, the agreement being denounced by Tur-
key on 5th July 1975. On 29th March 1980 a 
new economic and defence co-operation agree-
ment was signed under the terms of which the 
United States provides military and economic 
aid reported to have been $ 450 million in 
1980; the United States assists Turkey to pro-
duce military equipment and to sell it to the 
allies; Turkey makes available to the United 
States a major air base at lncirlik in southern 
Turkey (the most easterly available for the for-
ward deployment of United States tactical air 
support on a rotational basis from T orrejon in 
Spain), four interception installations Pirinclik, 
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Sinop, Kargabarun and Belbasi (the latter is a 
seismic station near Ankara for detecting Soviet 
nuclear explosions) and seven communications 
centres. All installations remain under Tur-
kish command and their use is restricted to 
NATO purposes. Nuclear weapons are stored 
in Turkey for the use of both Turkish and 
United States forces. 
3.29. The very large Turkish defence effort in 
relation to its economic resources has been 
noted above. But the very serious economic 
situation in the country deserves to be empha-
sised. Inflation in the twel~e months prior to 
the provisional assumption of power by the 
military authorities was 150 % and the present 
target for the next twelve months is to reduce 
that rate to " only " 40 %. The population has 
grown more rapidly than that of any other 
European country; at 45 millions today it is 
two and a half times the size at the end of the 
second world war. The population growth has 
more than absorbed the limited growth of the 
Turkish economy and now poses problems for 
the principle of universal military service refer-
red to below. The Committee stresses the vital 
need for substantial economic assistance in the 
framework of the Alliance and the European 
Community, and the impprtance of Turkey 
enjoying for its exports to the European Com-
munity no less favourable treatment than that 
received by other countries having association 
agreements. 
3.30. Turkey is a country of great cultural 
diversity and in a report devoted to defence it is 
worth pointing out that the armed services still 
play an important educational and vocational 
training role in Turkey as they have done since 
the days of Atatiirk. Universal military service 
is not a political issue in the country, except for 
a few fringe elements of politics, nor is it rejec-
ted by the youth of the country to the extent 
that it may be in some Western European 
countries. Up to one-third of those called up 
in some areas may still be illiterate, although 
their proportion is falling, and basic education 
as well as technical instruction is part of initial 
training; there is a deliberate policy of posting 
after initial training to enable servicemen to 
serve away from their home towns - those from 
the east serving in western Turkey and vice-
versa. 
(v) The political situation in Turkey 
3 .31. The Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments in a report devoted to security 
in the Mediterranean is not primarily concern-
ed with the political situation in the country, 
but at the same time a report considering the 
mutual defence arrangements of an alliance of 
democracies cannot ignore the political basis of 
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Turkish participation in the Alliance. Secon-
dly, because of the identity of the national par-
liamentary delegations to the Assemblies of 
WEU and the Council of Europe, members 
cannot be unaware of other issues which pro-
perly belong to the Council of Europe, espe-
cially since the Committee's Turkish hosts dur-
ing its visit to that country from 21st to 25th 
February were clearly at pains to receive the 
Committee at the highest level and to state 
their case with other matters in mind besides 
those to which the Committee was officially 
addressing itself. 
3.32. The Committee had the honour of being 
received by General Kenan Evren, the present 
Head of State and President of the National 
Security Council, who delivered an address 
on the internal situation in Turkey before and 
after 12th September 1980, the date on 
which the present regime assumed power. The 
Committee was also received most courteously 
by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Minister 
of Defence, and the Turkish General Staff, all 
of whom answered the Committee's questions 
at the conclusion of briefings. The Committee 
also welcomed the frank exchange of views it 
held first with Mr. Demirel, former Prime 
Minister, in the presence of many other distin-
guished former parliamentarians of the Justice 
Party, and secondly with Mr. Ustiindag, acting 
president of the Republican People's Party, and 
with many equally eminent former parliamen-
tarians of that party; these two separate meet-
ings were arranged by the Office of the Clerk 
and the members of the parties concerned 
without objection from the Turkish authorities. 
The names of everyone the Committee met 
are included in the introductory note to this 
report; the texts of General Evren's address to 
the Committee and of a briefing on the extent 
of terrorism in Turkey are attached at Appen-
dix 11. 
3.33. The Committee was provided with consi-
derable statistical and other information by the 
Turkish authorities on the internal situation 
before and after 12th September 1980, the vali-
dity of which was not challenged by anyone the 
Committee met. The most tragic feature of the 
internal situation was the extent of terrorism 
which had led, in General Evren's words, to an 
atmosphere of anarchy, and which, during the 
twenty-one months preceding 12th September, 
in the twenty-one provinces then under martial 
law, had led to 25,350 incidents leading to 
3, 710 killed, culminating in a last violent week 
of 639 incidents which left 71 dead, the vast 
majority being civilians. In the five months 
since the military authorities assumed power, 
terrorist incidents throughout the 67 provinces 
of Turkey, to all of which martial law was 
extended, fell to 3, 771 accounting for 306 
dead. On the basis of daily average killing, the 
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figures fell from 6 tor the twenty-one months 
before the military intervention, to 1.9 in the 
five subsequent months, falling again to 1.2 in 
the week immediately preceding the Com-
mittee's visit. After 12th September, over 
160,000 pistols and rifles of all types were sur-
rendered to the military authorities and a fur-
ther 18,000 were confiscated by them. The 
Turkish authorities claimed that there are links 
between elements of the large population of 
emigrant Turkish workers in certain Western 
European countries, and terrorist organisations 
in those countries. 
3.34. At the same time as the level of terrorism 
was growing, the Turkish economy was coming 
near to collapse with 150 % inflation during the 
twelve months before 12th September. The 
party balance in parliament and the state of 
relations between the two main parties was 
such that although martial law was operating in 
twenty-one provinces, agreement could not be 
reached on certain extensions to martial law 
powers, nor was a majority secured for the elec-
tion of a new President of the Republic in the 
course of more than 100 separate rounds of 
voting. The military authorities now claim 
that government officials and the police had 
become polarised by the two political parties 
who, when in office, had sought to appoint 
their own proteges. 
3.35. The authorities informed the Committee 
that at the time of the visit there were 5,788 
persons detained in Turkey, 15,929 under arrest 
of which 78 % were characterised as extreme 
leftists, 12% as extreme rightists, and 10% 
separatists. These numbers included 33 former 
parliamentarians (10 Nationalist Movement, 16 
National Salvation Party, 7 Republic People's 
Party) and 302 Trade Unionists (290 from the 
Communist Union DISK, 12 independants). 
Some cases of torture by the police since the 
military takeover were not denied, but many 
allegations were said to be exaggerated. Of 58 
cases involving 84 persons, 32 cases were under 
investigation and 26 had been settled, leading to 
26 convictions and one acquittal. 
3.36. On 12th September 1980, the military 
authorities constituted the National Security 
Council which assumed both legislative and 
executive power in the country, exercised 
however in accordance with the rule of the law, 
albeit martial law in many cases. The declared 
intention of the new authorities is to stamp out 
terrorism and to transfer the political and admi-
nistrative powers which they have provisionally 
assumed to a democratically-elected new 
administration. General Evren has announced 
that a Constituent Assembly will be set up 
between 30th August and 29th October 1981. 
Its members will be eo-opted by the National 
Security Council and it will be empowered to 
propose legislation subject to amendment and 
approval by the National Security Council. 
The tasks of the Constituent Assembly will be 
to prepare a new constitution, a new electoral 
law and a new law on political parties. In his 
speech announcing this on 15th January 1981, 
General Evren added: 
"We shall not choose as members of that 
Assembly persons belonging to the tradi-
tional political parties. When the parlia-
mentary system is able to function again, 
we shall not allow the fate of Turkey to 
be put back into the hands of those who 
got the country into the present situa-
tion ... " 
3.37. Clearly, the military authorities had come 
to believe that the functioning of the political 
parties in Turkey, the state of relations between 
the two main parties, and the parliamentary 
majorities produced by the electoral system did 
not permit the effective working of parliament-
ary democracy in the country. There is a long 
tradition of military intervention followed by 
the orderly return of power to a parliamentary 
government in Turkey. 
3.38. In this report on security in the Medi-
terranean, the Committee does not make formal 
recommendations concerning the internal poli-
tical situation in Turkey. Following its visit to 
the country, however, it feels able to record the 
following conclusions: there is no reason at the 
present time to doubt the sincerity of the Natio-
nal Security Council in its statement that it will 
transfer its responsibilities to a democratically 
elected new administration, and the Committee 
was particularly struck by a remark made to it 
by the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs to the 
effect that there was no comparison at all bet-
ween the regime of the Greek Colonels and that 
of the Turkish Generals. The de facto situa-
tion is accepted at present by the two main 
political parties and apparently by the vast 
majority of the Turkish population. However, 
the Committee is concerned to note that no 
time-table has been put forward for the return 
to parliamentary democracy, and that it is enti-
rely unclear how the proposed Constituent 
Assembly will be composed or how representa-
tive it will be. 
3.39. Turkey is a land of great cultural diver-
sity; of extremes of wealth and poverty. In the 
longer term, the root causes of terrorism will be 
eradicated only by further progress in modern-
ising the social and economic structure of the 
country. Historically the armed services have 
played, and they will continue to play, a role in 
this process. But the task can only be fully 
accomplished by democratic government based 
on strong parliamentary institutions. 
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3.40. At the present time, 
1 
the Committee 
believes that as long as the process which 
should lead to the creation of1 new democratic 
parliamentary institutions is not placed in 
doubt, the best interests, both of Turkey and 
the Alliance, will be served by 
1 
maintaining and 
strengthening the links which now exist 
between Turkey and the vari<J>us Atlantic and 
European institutions. 
(vi) Greek- Turkish relations 
3 .41. The Committee has reported no fewer 
than five times1 on the state of Greek-Turkish 
relations following the events of 1974, which 
the Committee deplored in themselves and 
which led to a breakdown in relations between 
the two countries with a severely detrimental 
effect on Alliance defence arrangements in the 
area. Greek forces were withdrawn from 
NATO command; Greek offers were withdrawn 
from the NATO headquarters in Izmir; and 
there was a corresponding limitation on Tur-
kish reporting to certain NATO headquar-
ters. For a number of years thereafter a chief 
defence preoccupation of these two countries 
became the perceived threat from the other. 
The following table of defence expenditure as 
percent of gross domestic product reflects 
reduced tension between the two countries in 
the last three years, not a reduction in the 
threat from Warsaw Pact forces: 
Percentage 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 198C 
Greece 4.1 4.2 6.5 5.9 6.8 6.6 5.~ 5.2E 
Turkey 4.1 3.9 n.a. 6.2 5.8 5.2 4.6 4.7l 
e =estimate ; n.a. =not available. 
3.42. Izmir houses two NATO headquarters, 
which, since their establishment in 19 52 and 
1953, were designed to control Greek and Tur-
kish land and air forces and other reinforce-
ment forces, chiefly United States, that were 
assigned to NATO. LANDSOUTHEAST is a 
principal subordinate command coming directly 
under CINCSOUTH in Naples which, on alert 
or in hostilities, would have assumed command 
of the First Hellenic army with its headquarters 
in Larissa, Greece; the Turkish first army, 
headquarters Istanbul, the Turkish third army, 
with headquarters in Erzincan; and Turkish 
second army, with headquarters in Konya. 
1. Document 651, 14th November 197 4, Rapporteur Mr. 
Critchley; Document 671, 29th April 1975, Rapporteur for 
Chapter IV Mr. Duvieusart; Document 682, lOth 
November 1975, Rapporteur Mr. Critchley; Document 708, 
19th May 1976, Rapporteur Mn Buck; Document 776, 
31st May 1978, Rapporteur Mr. Grant. 
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The air headquarters - 6th Allied Tactical 
Air Force - comes directly under AIRSOUTH, 
a principal subordinate command of CINC-
SOUTH, also located in Naples. This would 
have assumed command of the Hellenic 28th 
Tactical Air Force with headquarters in Larissa; 
the Turkish First Tactical Air Force, with 
headquarters at Eskisehir; and the Turkish 
Second Tactical Air Force, with headquarters at 
Diyarbakir. Like other NATO air headquar-
ters, it is in permanent command of air defence 
in peacetime as well. 
3.43. With the withdrawal of Greek forces 
from the NATO structure in 1974, the two 
Izmir headquarters, each with an American 
commander, were in an anomalous situation in 
that only Turkish forces were assigned to 
them. By 1978 it had become accepted that 
arrangements for the return of Greek forces to 
NATO, which were then being negotiated, 
would have to involve the establishment of a 
"Greek-NATO" headquarters at Larissa in 
Greece. Accordingly, the Izmir headquarters 
became "Turkish-NATO" headquarters and 
Turkish generals were appointed to command 
them from 1st July 1978. 
3.44. Successive SACEURs had been involved 
with negotiations with the Greek and Turkish 
military authorities to secure the return of 
Greece and Greek forces to the integrated milit-
ary structure and, while a number of details 
remain to be negotiated, these efforts were fin-
ally successful with the acceptance by the 
NATO Defence Planning Committee of arran-
gements for the reintegration of Greece into the 
integrated military structure of NATO on 20th 
October 1980. When the subsequent detailed 
negotiations have been completed, it is under-
stood that these arrangements will provide for 
the establishment at Larissa in Greece of the 
"Greece-NATO" headquarters LANDSOUTH-
CENTRE to command the Greek land forces 
previously under LANDSOUTHEAST; and 7th 
AT AF commanding the Hellenic 28th T AF. 
3.45. The events of 1974 had led virtually to 
the closure of Aegean air space to civilian air 
traffic with the issue of NOT AM 714 by Tur-
key on 4th August, requiring aircraft flying in 
the eastern half of the Aegean to report their 
locations to Turkish air traffic control, while 
Greece issued a NOT AM 1157 on 13th Sep-
tember, declaring the Aegean a danger zone and 
virtually forbidding air movements in the area. 
The Committee's previous report• described 
the history of demarcation lines between the 
Hellenic 28th Tactical Air Force and the Tur-
kish 1st Tactical Air Force which, in 1964, had 
been moved from the line down the centre of 
the Aegean to coincide with the civil aviation 
I. Document 776, paragraph 3.49 et seq. 
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flight information region boundary between 
the Athens and Istanbul FIR. As all islands in 
the Aegean, with the exception of two at the 
entrance to the Turkish Straits, are Greek terri-
tory, the international boundary hugs the Tur-
kish Aegean coast. While both Greek and 
Turkish air forces were under the same NATO 
command prior to 1974, this demarcation of 
military air space did not present problems for 
Turkey. In the new situation following 1974, 
however, Turkey found the civil FIR boundary 
unacceptable for military aircraft. 
3.46 It is understood that the establishment of 
a new air headquarters, 7th AT AF, will not 
involve a " new geographic boundary " between 
6th and 7th AT AF, but instead an integrated 
system for the defence of the whole area based 
on the technical capabilities of the Greek and 
Turkish air forces and facilities assigned. The 
splitting of the previously integrated command 
into two is obviously unfortunate from a milit-
ary standpoint, but has become necessary for 
political reasons. The military authorities are 
anxious to ensure the closest possible relation-
ships between 6th and 7th AT AF with the 
exchange of liaison officers, and arrangements 
for " cross-tasking " of sorties which will not 
take account of theoretical geographical boun-
daries. 
3.4 7. The establishment of a separate land 
force headquarters of course does not present 
anything like the same problems because the 
land forces in any case are operating in distinct 
theatres, except for the small region in the area 
of Thrace. The two naval commands in the 
region have always been separate - COMED-
EAST, with headquarters in Athens, covering 
part of the Ionian Sea, and the Crete and the 
Aegean seas; and COMEDNOREAST, a Tur-
kish command with headquarters in Ankara 
covering the Black Sea and the Turkish Medi~ 
terranean seaboard. 
3.48. Apart from the problems of military co-
operation, a number of concrete points can be 
cited showing the general improvement in 
Greek-Turkish relations since the Committee 
last reported in 1978. On 22nd February 
1980, the Turkish government withdrew 
NOT AM "/ 14 referred to above and Greece 
lifted in turn the corresponding NOT AM 
1157. As a consequence, limited civil air 
traffic was resumed across the Aegean there-
after. On 6th March 1981, Greece announced 
a number of further measures to facilitate air 
traffic over the Aegean, in particular the elimi-
nation, except for special occasions, of the air 
corridor W -14 which Greece had established 
between the Dodecanese and northern Greece, 
and which had previously obstructed Turkish 
access to the international Aegean airspace 
from the Turkish mainland. Six other air 
corridors were re-opened to Turkish traffic and 
a large area around Lemnos island was returned 
to international air space. Arrangements also 
were announced for co-ordinating with Turkey 
the use of part of the Aegean international 
airspace for air exercises. 
3.49. Gradual progress appears to be being 
made in Greek-Turkish relations through the 
periodical meetings between the Secretaries-
General of the two foreign ministries, Mr. 
Stavros Roussos of Greece and Mr. Kamuran 
Giiriin of Turkey. Their last meeting in 
Ankara lasted from 16th to 20th March 1981 
when it was agreed that the air traffic services 
of the two countries would meet to discuss a 
letter of agreement to regulate the exchange of 
flight data on civil air routes between the two 
countries. In the field of cultural relations, a 
number of topics were agreed on for future dis-
cussions. 
3.50. But on the remaining central issue, the 
sharing of the rights to the Aegean seabed, it 
does not appear that substantive progress has 
yet been made and the Committee concludes 
from the talks its members had in the two capi-
tals that this problem appears to be the most 
difficult to solve. The Greek authorities do 
not consider the Aegean to be a " Greek sea " 
as Turkey at one time had come to fear. The 
territorial sea claimed by Greece (and, in the 
Aegean, by Turkey) extends to 6 nautical miles 
around its coast and all Greek islands; the 
remaining waters being international. As far as 
economic rights to the seabed are concerned, 
Greece has consistently sought to submit the 
matter to international arbitration of the Inter-
national Court of Justice whereas Turkey has 
always maintained that the Aegean is a special 
case which should be settled through bilateral 
political negotiations on the basis of equity. 
3.51. It is hoped that at the meeting between 
the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers arran-
ged for early May in Rome further progress 
may be made, although the attitude of the 
Greek opposition p<J.rty, Pasok, would appear to 
complicate the efforts of the two governments 
to normalise relations. Pasok deputies have 
claimed that Greek air space has been violated 
on a number of occasions - in 1981 - by RAF 
maritime patrol aircraft on 20th and 21st 
February (described by Lady Fleming as " pro-
vocations which reveal further designs for the 
violation of Greek sovereign rights ") and by 
Turkish military aircraft on 8th April (des-
cribed by Mr. Papandreou as "provocative" 
when he called for the talks between the Greek 
and Turkish air traffic services fixed for 13th 
April to be postponed). In the European Par-
liament on 1Oth April, 12 Pasok members 
voted for a resolution, adopted by 51 votes to 
45 with 8 abstentions, calling for European 
Community association agreement with Turkey 
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to be suspended if the country did not return to 
democracy within two months. 
3.52. Strictly speaking, Greece and Turkey are 
not directly involved in the negotiations bet-
ween the two communities in Cyprus, under 
the auspices of the United Nations Secretary 
General, to establish a new C<Jmstitution settling 
relations between the commuQities. But Greece 
and Turkey are each in a position to exert 
great influence on the community of correspon-
ding culture. This is particularly true of Tur-
key which still has two divisions totalling 
25,000 men and 180 tanks on the island 
supporting the Turkish community; all interna-
tional communications to th~ Turkish commu-
nity are still routed through Turkey. Inversely 
a settlement in Cyprus would greatly improve 
the atmosphere of Greek-Turkish relations. 
3.53. The events of 1974 have left 40% of the 
territory occupied by the . Turkish Cypriot 
community which amounts to only 18 % of the 
total population, and which declared itself to be 
the "Turkish Federated State of Cyprus" in 
1975, with the Greek Cypriot community living 
entirely in the remaining 60 %. If the prin-
ciple of a federal constitution for the whole 
republic, embracing two feperated states, has 
been tacitly accepted, negotiations concern on 
the one hand the precise ailocation of powers 
between a federal government and the two 
states, with the Greek Cypriots calling for 
stronger federal powers than the Turkish 
Cypriots have so far been prepared to concede, 
and on the other the areas of territory to be 
ceded to the future Greek Cypriot state. There 
appear better prospects of a settlement now 
than in the recent past. The Committee 
gained the impression that Athens believes a 
more realistic offer from the Turkish Cypriot 
side is now possible, anq that the present 
Turkish authorities could, in the event, exercise 
a more positive influence than that of the 
previous governments who were in a weak 
political position. 
(vii) United States 
3.54. The United States maintains powerful 
forces in the Mediterranean area including 
considerable nuclear capability both in the 
carrier-borne strike aircraft and in the warheads 
provided for the tactical missile systems of the 
land forces of Italy, Greece and Turkey. 
United States tactical air support is provided by 
the 16th Air Force with 6,650 air force person-
nel. The headquarters is at T orrejon in Spain, 
where a tactical air wing is maintained. This 
is capable of carrying put attack missions 
through forward-staging airfields, chiefly Incir-
lik in Turkey and A viano in Italy, and is equip-
ped with some 200 tactical aircraft with others 
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on early call from the United States. The 
United States 6th Fleet normally comprises two 
aircraft carriers, 12 surface combatants and five 
submarines. Its headquarters flagship is nor-
mally moored off Gaeta in Italy, north of 
Naples, and its chief bases are Suda Bay in 
Crete and Rota in Spain some 70 nautical 
miles west of Gibraltar. The 5 nuclear-
propelled attack submarines have a tender off 
north Sardinia. Long-range Orion maritime 
patrol aircraft based in Rota, Spain, and Sigo-
nella, in Sicily, provide surveillance and anti-
submarine warfare capability throughout the 
Mediterranean and the western approaches to 
Gibraltar. 
3.55. With the increased United States naval 
presence in the Indian Ocean, however, there 
has been a redeployment of one aircraft carrier 
and accompanying surface combatants from the 
6th Fleet to that area. 
3.56. The United States maintains important 
electronic surveillance and communications 
facilities throughout the Mediterranean which 
in practice provide an important backup to the 
NATO communications system. Details of 
United States bases and installations in Spain, 
Italy, Greece and Turkey are described under 
the sections dealing with those countries. 
(vii) United Kingdom 
3.57. The permanent United Kingdom pre-
sence in the Mediterranean has been consider-
ably reduced during the past decade, but naval 
vessels, including an assault ship and frigates, 
make periodical visits and normally participate 
in NATO exercises when they do. The Rap-
porteur visited the through-deck cruiser Invinci-
ble when in port in Toulon. In Gibraltar, a 
British colony, there is a garrison of about a 
battalion with naval personnel who man the 
naval base and air force personnel who operate 
the airfield used for both civilian and military 
aircraft, but operational aircraft and naval 
vessels are no longer maintained permanently 
in Gibraltar although a destroyer or frigate is 
always held on call. Gibraltar houses a subor-
dinate NATO headquarters that would be acti-
vated in war to control the Gibraltar area of the 
Mediterranean. 
3.58. In the British sovereign base areas on the 
island of Cyprus, which were excluded from the 
territory of the Republic of Cyprus when it 
became independent in 1960, there is a major 
airfield and important communications and 
electronic intelligence facilities. The army 
maintains the equivalent of about two batta-
lions and a flight of the army air corps; the 
Royal Air Force maintains helicopters in a 
general support and search and rescue role. 
Cyprus remains strategically important as an air 
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staging base for possible deployment of forces 
anywhere in the eastern Mediterranean or 
Middle East, and as a communications and 
electronic intelligence centre. 
3.59. The United Kingdom also provides 
support for the United Nations force in Cyprus 
(UNFICYP) to which it contributes a contin-
gent of one armoured recce squadron, one 
infantry company and a flight of helicopters. 
The sovereign base areas are also used for 
infantry and air force training for units which 
may come from British forces in Germany or 
from the United Kingdom. 
(ix) Other NATO countries 
3.60. Other NATO countries, apart from the 
six mentioned above, occasionally deploy forces 
for exercise purposes to the Mediterranean area. 
Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg, as well as 
Italy, the United Kingdom and the United 
States, participate in Allied Command Europe 
mobile force land element, and Canada and the 
Netherlands also participate in the air compo-
nent of the mobile force which deploys periodi-
cally in the area of Thrace and in eastern 
Turkey. 
(b) NATO command structure and 
common arrangements 
3.61. The command structure established by 
NATO in the Mediterranean area, and its 
relationship to the overall military command 
and the North Atlantic Council, is shown 
diagramatically at Appendix 11. Responsibility 
for the whole of the NATO area south of the 
Alps to the eastern frontier of Turkey, 
including the land area of Italy, Greece and 
Turkey, and the Mediterranean Sea itself, 
comes under the authority of Commander-in-
Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe with his 
headquarters, and a number of subordinate 
headquarters, located at Naples. Prior to 
visiting Greece and Turkey in February, the 
Committee was briefed at the Naples head-
quarters by AFSOUTH staff and by the staffs of 
the naval and air headquarters located there. 
This proved to be an invaluable introduction to 
the Committee's visit to the eastern Mediter-
ranean. At the conclusion of its visit to 
Turkey, the Committee was again briefed at the 
subordinate NATO headquarters located in 
Izmir. The problem of command in the 
eastern Mediterranean has been referred to 
in paragraphs 3.41 et seq. 
3.62. NATO headquarters forming part of the 
integrated military structure have operational 
control in peacetime only of the assigned air 
defence forces of the member countries. Other 
air forces, and the land and naval forces, are 
under national command in peacetime and 
come under the operational control of the 
NATO command structure only in war or in an 
advanced state of alert. However, the Com-
mander of Maritime Air Forces in the southern 
region, one of the subordinate commands loca-
ted in Naples, co-ordinates in peacetime the 
national patrol programmes of maritime patrol 
aircraft of the member countries and produces a 
co-ordinated picture of all Soviet naval move-
ments in the area. This is one of five NATO 
surveillance co-ordinating centres which cover 
the whole of the NATO area1• 
3.63. Otherwise the peacetime role of NATO 
headquarters is essentially one of planning and 
co-operation with national military authorities 
to ensure that proper states of readiness and 
training are maintained by all assigned forces. 
The organisation and conduct of exercices 
involving forces from several NATO countries 
is one of the more important functions. Lastly, 
the NATO command is involved in the provi-
sion of commonly-financed infrastructure pro-
jects throughout the NATO region. These 
include the early-warning radar systems, with 
associated communications forming the Allied 
Command Europe air defence ground environ-
ment, and the communications systems between 
the NATO headquarters. Other commonly-
financed infrastructure projects include storage 
for fuel and ammunition, including naval facili-
ties, and airfields. 
3.64. There are certain joint forces which have 
been organised in the NATO framework in 
addition to the purely national forces which are 
assigned or earmarked for NATO command. 
These, in the southern region, include the 
naval on-call force in the Mediterranean 
(NA VOCFORMED), composed of one ship 
from each of the contributing countries -
Greece, Italy, Turkey, United Kingdom 
and the United States - which are brought 
together for a period of one month twice every 
year, under a commander appointed by 
SACEUR. NA VOCFORMED will be activated 
for the twenty-first time in the spring of 1981 
under a Greek commodore and will make about 
five port calls in the Mediterranean. This is a 
useful concept for demonstrating NATO soli-
darity in periods of crisis or tension and is a 
force that would be available to the NATO 
commander well before any formal alert had 
been decided on by the North Atlantic Council. 
3.65. The mobile force of Allied Command 
Europe has a land component of brigade group 
size and an air component comprising squa-
drons of tactical aircraft. It comes directly 
1. Others at Kolsas, Norway; Northwood, United King-
dom; Norfolk, Va.; and Lisbon. 
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under SACEUR's command and operates as a 
political deterrent force which can be deployed 
at short notice in a period of tension and would 
demonstrate the solidarity of the Alliance, 
particularly in the areas of the northern and 
southern flanks where forces of only one 
member country might otherwise be exposed to 
a threat. The land component is drawn when 
required from specially traiqed and equipped 
battalions with associated artillery companies 
made available by Belgium,' Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and the 
United States. The air component squadrons 
are supplied also by Canada and the Nether-
lands. This force has been successfully 
deployed on many occasions in the area of 
north-east Italy, in Greek and Turkish Thrace 
and in eastern Turkey, and has acquired 
experience in working in liaison with national 
forces in the area. 
3.66. A number of the NATO commanders of 
American nationality have dual peacetime 
responsibility in that they are simultaneously 
functioning as national American commanders 
of United States forces. Thus SACEUR, in his 
national capacity as Commander of United 
States forces in Europe, exercises operational 
control in peacetime of all American forces in 
Europe, before they come under NATO 
command. In the southern region the Com-
mander of Allied Air Forces Southern Europe, 
a subordinate commander located in Naples, is 
simultaneously commander of the United States 
16th Air Force in peacetime and thus exer-
cises operational control of United States tacti-
cal air forces throughout the Mediterranean. 
The commander of the United States 6th Fleet 
is simultaneously, in his NATO capacity as 
Commander Naval Striking and Support Forces 
Southern Europe, a subordinate of CINC-
SOUTH. 
3.67. The Committee noted a number of weak-
nesses perceived by NATO commanders, in 
addition to the problems of modernisation of 
the equipment of certain countries which have 
been referred to in the foregoing sections. 
It is felt that reinforcemen~ tactical aircraft for 
the region should be availa,ble earlier, and that 
there is a case for longer range aircraft such as 
the F-111 to be allocated to the southern region 
as a way of making more flexible use of 
such aircraft which can still reach central front 
targets from southern region bases. As far as 
commonly-financed NATO projects are con-
cerned, greater priority should be given to the 
communications of the southern region, which 
could be unable to handle all traffic generated 
in a crisis situation. In view of the many 
uncertainties of the Mediterranean region to 
which the Committee draws attention else-
where, it is felt that all-ro1,1nd radar coverage is 
important as well as modernisation of existing 
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systems. Some improvement will be provided 
by the AWACS aircraft when they become 
available. They will provide a flexible extra 
radar coverage which can be quickly re-
allocated to different parts of the NATO front 
to deal with different threats. 
(c) Defence arrangements beyond the NATO area; 
United States policy 
3.68. It is beyond the scope of this report to 
discuss in any detail defence arrangements 
being discussed by the allied powers for the 
region of the Gulf and the Indian Ocean, but 
certain features must be mentioned, especially 
as they interact particularly with defence in the 
Mediterranean area. 
3.69. The new United States administration 
has yet to settle the details of its foreign policy; 
it has shown a tendency, that is not shared by 
all its allies, to see the hand of the 
Soviet Union behind any inconvenient event 
occurring in any part of the world; it may 
already be turning away from its initial reluct-
ance to seek early negotiations with the Soviet 
Union on arms control and other problems, as 
the present attempt to involve the Soviet Union 
in efforts to prevent further escalation of the 
conflict in the Lebanon would suggest. 
Unquestionably, however, the present adminis-
tration attaches less importance to arms control 
proposals, and more to defence spending, than 
its predecessor. In March President Reagan 
sent to Congress a request for a defence budget 
of$ 222.8 billion for next year, compared with 
$ 140.5 billion in 1980. 
3.70. As far as the Gulf and Indian Ocean is 
concerned, an outline of policy was given by 
Mr. Richard Burt, the new director of the 
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in State 
Department, addressing the International Secur-
ity Sub-committee of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee on 23rd March. He said in part: 
" We will make known our view that 
present arms control proposals for the 
Indian Ocean area offer little prospect for 
enhancing security ... Our allies' stake in 
the region is at least as great as our own 
and we are asking them to contribute 
more to its security and stability. For 
obvious reasons we are not seeking a 
formal NATO role. .. . Increased defence 
efforts in Western Europe and Japan can 
improve United States flexibility to meet 
emergencies in South-West Asia 
Force deployments in South-West Asia 
by some European states can be strength-
ened and co-ordinated with United States 
military activities in the region. In 
addition allies with important facilities, 
both en route to and in the region, can 
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ease United States deployments and 
planning by granting us access to these 
facilities as needed. " 
A large politico-strategic theatre was defined as 
"the region bounded by Turkey, Pakistan and 
the Horn of Africa ". 
3. 71. The rapid deployment force established 
by the Carter administration based on an air 
force station in Florida has some 250,000 men 
designated by all four services. It is now 
to be enlarged with the assignment of two air-
borne divisions together with marine, army and 
air force units, and will come under a new uni-
fied command to be established independently 
of the existing United States European and 
Pacific commands, the boundaries of which at 
present meet in the area. The United States 
has secured facilities in Oman, Somalia, Kenya 
and Egypt to permit the rapid deployment of 
the force and is extending its permanent facili-
ties in Diego Garcia by lengthening the runway, 
installing navigational aids and storage. Coun-
tries in the area of the Gulf have made it clear 
that they would not welcome a permanent mili-
tary presence of outside powers. 
3.72. In an interview with Time magazine of 
9th February, the British Prime Minister, Mrs. 
Thatcher, said " I do think that it is time to see 
whether NATO should extend its sphere of 
influence ". She referred to troubles " below 
the NATO belt. Vietnam and Cambodia, Iran 
and Iraq, Ethiopia, Somalia and Angola. Cen-
tral America and the Caribbean.". Speaking 
in a BBC interview in March, Lord Carrington, 
the Foreign Secretary, is reported as saying that 
the 1980 defence white paper had said that the 
government would look into the question as to 
whether it was possible for Britain to equip and 
earmark troops for deployment in South-West 
Asia if requested by the governments concern-
ed, but there had been no talks with the Gulf 
countries on the issue since the force had not 
been set up. The 1981 defence white paper 
issued in April points out that on the outbreak 
of hostilities between Iraq and Iran Britain was 
able to maintain a two ship naval patrol with 
supply ships in the Gulf of Oman, but that 
" 415. The military power which Britain 
alone could bring to bear in any of these 
contingencies is limited. Resource constraints 
and our primary commitment to NATO rule 
out any idea of creating a substantial standing 
intervention force. In any serious overseas 
emergency, we would in any case expect to 
concert our actions with other allies ... we have 
it in mind to establish a special equipment 
stockpile for limited operations overseas and to 
restore a limited parachute assault capability ... 
to drop an entire battalion group if necessary 
within fifteen minutes". In addition to a para-
chute battalion, the 1980 white paper spoke of 
" improvements to the manpower and equip-
' 
ment of the headquarters of the 8th field force 
... which would also be capable if necessary of 
undertaking world-wide tasks". 
3.73. France maintains a permanent naval 
presence of from 10 to 20 vessels of all sizes in 
the Indian Ocean and has an aircraft carrier in 
the area of the Persian Gulf at present. France 
uses afloat support in the area, and still has 
access to the Mayotte harbour and facilities in 
Djibouti. 
3.74. Concerting allied defence arrangements 
outside the NATO area raises problems over 
the proper framework of consultations. It is an 
accepted fact that despite the geographical limi-
tations in the North Atlantic Treaty concerning 
the area within which mutual defence arrange-
ments apply, the North Atlantic Council can 
discuss events anywhere in the world that affect 
the interests of the Alliance -but that consulta-
tion does not extend to defence planning. In 
an interesting policy paper entitled " Western 
security: what has changed? What should be 
done? " published jointly on 25th February 
1981 by the United States Council on Foreign 
Relations, the British Royal Institute of Interna-
tional Affairs, the Institut .fran(:ais des relations 
internationales and the Deutsche Gesel/schafi 
fUr auswiirtige po/itik, the interesting proposal 
is advanced that: 
" The West needs to create new 
mechanisms for truly collective deci-
sion-making and make them efficient. 
This requires sensitivity to the interests of 
all western nations, particularly some 
of the smaller members of the Alliance 
which will not always be included. 
... NATO should not be altered institu-
tionally but should expand the process of 
joint assessments and consultations on 
those third world developments which 
directly affect the security interests of its 
member states. ... The seven nation 
summits1 should from now on be devoted 
as much to political and security 
concerns as to economic ones; .. . The 
primary mechanisms for dealing with 
political/security issues in the third world 
should be a small group of principal 
nations. The organising principle would 
be to include only those countries able 
and willing to accept concrete obligations 
within the troubled area. ... They 
should be flexibly organised and keep 
interested partners informed. They 
should maintain secrecy of discussions, 
but should be visible in practice so that 
western publics and parliaments under-
stand that the responsible nations are 
dealing jointly with political/security 
1. Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United King-
dom, United States. 
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issues outside the NATO area. The 
principal nations will vary according to 
the issue at hand. The core group will 
usually include the United States, Britain, 
France, Germany and Japan. .. . A prin-
cipal nations group should be established 
immediately to deal with developments 
in the Gulf and South-West Asia, 
consisting of the United States, Britain, 
France, Germany and Japan ... ". 
IV. Non-member countr,ies of NATO 
(a) Yugoslavia 
4.1. In its last report1, the Committee 
reported in detail on the situation in Yugosla-
via. In the intervening three years, there has 
been an orderly transfer of power in accordance 
with the constitution on the passing of Presi-
dent Tito, to a collective lea~ership representa-
tive of the six republics and two autonomous 
regions that make up the country. There is no 
evidence of external pressure from the Soviet 
Union to attempt to impose a new leadership 
or to establish any closer relations with the 
Soviet Union. 
4.2. It is to be noted, however, that, in 
the Albanian-speaking autdnomous region of 
Kosovo, demonstrations in favour of a consti-
tuent republic status for Kosovo, independent 
of Serbia led to riots on 1st April in which 11 
people, including two sec1;1rity officers, were 
killed and 57 injured. This led the following 
week to tension with Albania when the 
Albanian party newspaper, Zeri I Popullit, 
called the demands of the1 Albanian-speaking 
demonstrators in Kosovo " legitimate " and 
gave full support to the establishment of a 
Kosovo republic. The Kosovo Albanian lan-
guage paper termed the article a " flagrant 
interference" in Yugoslavia's internal affairs. 
The Yugoslav authorities have made it clear 
that a change in the status of Kosovo would be 
a violation of Yugoslavia's federal constitution 
and lead, in the long run, to the disintegration 
of Yugoslavia. 
4.3. The Council of WEU in its reply to 
Recommendation 313 ado{1ted by the Assembly 
on the Committee's previous report on the 
Mediterranean, declared, as the Assembly's 
recommendation had requested, that " the 
Council support unequivocally the indepen-
dence, territorial integrity and unity of Yugosla-
via and its continued non-aligned status". 
1. Document 776, 31st May 1978, paragraphs 4.1 et seq. 
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(b) Malta 
4.4 A NATO naval headquarters was main-
tained on Malta from 1952 until1971 when the 
Malta La?our Party, under Mr. Mintoff, won 
the electiOns. From March 1972 to 31st 
March 1979, a defence agreement was in force 
between Malta and the United Kingdom where-
by the United Kingdom continued to use mili-
tary facilities in Malta for NATO purposes 
against payment of£ 14 million of which £ 8. 7 5 
million was provided by NATO. Under that 
agreement, Malta undertook not to permit the 
forces of any party to the Warsaw Pact to be 
stationed in Malta or to use the military facili-
ties there. There was no attempt by either side 
to renew the agreement in view of Mr. Min-
totrs declared non-aligned policy, and all Bri-
tish forces were withdrawn from Malta on its 
expiry. 
4.5. The Maltese economy is very dependent 
on external trade and assistance and Malta has 
successfully secured investment from both 
China and Libya, but relations with Libya 
became strained because of disagreement over 
oil in the continental shelf which had also been 
claimed by Libya. In 1980, Italy concluded an 
agreement with Malta whereby Italy provides 
the country with economic development aid 
including the construction of civilian airports 
hospitals and loans to create new employment' 
and provides military guarantees for the neutra~ 
lity and non-alignment of Malta. In return, 
~alta agreed to forbid the use of military bases 
m Malta to any country except Italy, which 
would have the right to use them for the pur-
poses of defending Maltese neutrality. The 
agreement was ratified in the Italian Chamber 
of Deputies in March 1981. 
4.6. On 26th January, however, an agreement 
was signed between Mr. Adela, the Maltese 
Development Minister, and Mr. Guzhenko the 
Soviet Minister for Merchant Marine, all~ing 
the Soviet Union to use half of the Has Saptain 
underground oil storage which had been built 
~s part of the NATO infrastructure programme 
m the 19 50s. The total capacity is reported to 
be 50,000 tons of diesel oil, 90,000 tons of fuel 
oil and 40,000 tons of jet oil. The remaining 
half of storage capacity remains available to an 
Italian company. It is not clear to what extent 
that agreement with the Soviet Union can be 
reconciled with the neutrality agreement 
concluded with Italy. 
(c) Gibraltar 
4.7. Administratively, Gibraltar has been a 
British colony since 1713 but Spanish claims to 
the territory are of long standing. For some 
time the colon~ has had internal autonomy and 
a referendum m September 1967 resulted in 
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12,762 votes in favour of retaining the existing 
links with the United Kingdom, to 44 votes 
against. Successive British governments have 
refused to agree to any change in the status of 
Gibraltar against the wishes of the population 
which numbers 30,000. ' 
4.8. Gibraltar is entirely dependent on 
imports for its food supply and, prior to the 
closure of the frontier with Spain in 1969, 
employed a good deal of Spanish labour, chiefly 
in the dockyard. Since then, however, alterna-
tive labour has been recruited from other 
Mediterranean countries. 
4.9. Since 1978, there have been periodical 
talks between the British and Spanish Foreign 
Ministers on the status of Gibraltar, which have 
been attended also by the Chief Minister of 
Gibraltar, Sir Joshua Hassan, and the leader of 
the opposition, Mr. Maurice Xiberras. In 
Lisbon in April 1980, Spain and the United 
Kingdom reached an agreement whereby the 
Gibraltar-Spanish border would be reopened, 
and the two countries would open negotiations 
on the future of Gibraltar, but since Spain has 
insisted that Spanish nationals should have the 
same rights in Gibraltar as nationals of 
European Community countries, the border has 
remained closed. Members of the British 
House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee 
visited Madrid on 29th April 1981 for talks 
with officials and the Spanish parliamentary 
foreign affairs committee to discuss Gibraltar. 
4.10. As long as Spain continues to provide 
naval base facilities for United States forces in 
Rota, or if Spain acceded to NATO, the milit-
ary significance of Gibraltar itself is not indis-
pensable as far as NATO is concerned, and in 
any case there is no reason to believe that the 
same facilities would not be provided by Spain. 
A negotiated settlement acceptable both to 
the population of Gibraltar and to a democratic 
Spain would be universally welcomed. When 
Spain accedes to the European Community the 
question of rights of Spanish nationals in 
Gibraltar will be automatically settled 
(d) Spain 
4.11. For a number of years now, reports of the 
Committee have drawn attention to the advant-
ages that would result from the accession of 
Spain to NATO once that country had become 
a parliamentary democracy. For some time 
Spanish governments have sought recognition 
of the contribution Spain already makes to wes-
tern defence, in particular through its defence 
agreements with the United States and also with 
other countries of the Alliance, Portugal and 
France. Since the adoption of the new consti-
tution in the autumn of 1978, Spanish acces-
sion has become a political possibility and the 
new Prime Minister, Mr. Calvo Sotelo, in his 
inaugural speech on 19th February 1981, refer-
red to the question of accession to NATO and 
said that consultations with the opposition on 
this subject would be undertaken. Following 
the visit to Madrid by the United States Secre-
tary of State, Mr. Haig, on 9th April this year, 
the press speculated that before the end of 1981 
Spain would make formal application for mem-
bership of NATO so that accession could take 
effect before the parliamentary elections due to 
be held in the beginning of 1983. Mr. Haig 
also had a meeting with Mr. Felipe Gonzales, 
leader of the opposition Spanish Socialist Party. 
The governmel)t parties of the UCD favour 
accession to NATO; it is very likely that there 
would be a majority in parliament, but the 
opposition socialist and communist parties have 
not yet supported accession, although the latter 
at least has supported the defence agreement 
with the United States. 
4.12. At the end of his talks in Madrid, Mr. 
Haig said that negotiations between the two 
countries would begin almost immediately on a 
new bilateral treaty to replace the existing 
treaty of friendship and co-operation between 
Spain and the United States signed in 1976 
which will expire in September 1981. 
4.13. Under that treaty, and previous executive 
agreements dating back to 1953, the United 
States has enjoyed the use of extensive military 
facilities in Spain where the bulk of United 
States shore-based naval and air force personnel 
in the Mediterranean region are stationed. 
The most important facility is the Rota naval 
base, near Cadiz, in which the Polaris and 
Poseidon ballistic missile submarines were 
based until their final withdrawal by 1st July 
1979 under the terms of the 1976 agreement. 
The Rota airfield is the base of United States 
maritime patrol aircraft and anti-submarine 
warfare aircraft. The United States air force 
has airfields at Moron, near Seville, at T orre-
jon, near Madrid, and at Zaragoza, with a fuel 
pipeline running right across Spain from Cadiz 
to Zaragoza. Zaragoza is used chiefly for train-
ing and as a tanker aircraft base for in-flight 
refuelling of aircraft transiting from the United 
States to destinations further east. Torrejon is 
the headquarters of the United States 16th Air 
Force referred to above and the bulk of United 
States tactical aircraft in the Mediterranean 
region are normally based there, but rotate 
periodically to other United States airfields in 
Italy, Greece and Turkey. Moron was used as 
a tanker aircraft base up to 1970 when it was 
reduced to stand-by status. The United States 
has important communications terminals at 
four points on the Spanish mainland and two in 
the Balearic Islands. There are also navigational 
installations. 
153 
DOCUMENT 8 7 6 
4.14. Under the United States-Spanish agree-
ment of 1976, there is a Spanish-United States 
council to monitor the functioning of the treaty 
and a Military Committee on which the United 
States is normally represented by SACEUR in 
his national capacity as Commander of United 
States Forces in Europe. The treaty defines a 
" geographical area of commGm interest " cover-
ing the western Mediterranean, Spain and the 
eastern Atlantic approaches to Spain. This is 
the area within which there is joint planning for 
operations by the armed forces of the two coun-
tries for mutual defence purposes. The United 
States can use the facilities only for purposes of 
" western defence " and Spain denied their use 
for United States support of Israel in the 1973 
Middle East conflict, when in-flight refuelling 
from tankers based in Spain could have assisted 
the United States airlift. 
4.15. The Spanish forces in their own right 
could make a valuable contribution to NATO 
and would be a useful source of external rein-
forcements for the more eXiposed countries at 
the eastern end of the Mediterranean. The 
army of255,000 men is now equipped with 275 
AMX-30 tanks which are now produced under 
licence in Spain as well as 480 older M-47 and 
M-48 medium tanks and 180 M-41 light tanks. 
The navy includes 8 submarines, 1 aircraft 
carrier, 11 destroyers and 16 frigates. The 
navy is now equipped with numbers of United 
States supplied surface-to-surface and surface-
to-air missiles. The air force includes 5 inter-
ceptor squadrons with 36 F-4 aircraft, 26 
Mirage Ills and 24 Mirage ~F-ls. The tactical 
air command has some thirty fighter bombers 
including F-5s and a Sp~nish Super Saeta. 
There is a maritime reconnaissance squadron 
with 6 long-range United States Orion aircraft. 
4.16. The failure of the attempted coup on 
23rd February was a triumph for democracy in 
Spain. The Committee welcomes the decision 
of the Spanish Government to hold consulta-
tions with the opposition parties on accession 
to NATO and looks forward to an application 
being made by that country for accession to 
NATO. Meanwhile, it prpposes that arrange-
ments should be made to permit Spain to parti-
cipate in NATO defence planning and Spanish 
forces to participate in 'appropriate NATO 
exercises. 
(e) The eastern Meliterranean 
4.17. Since 1978, and particularly since the 
Camp David agreements were signed, an addi-
tional division has been added to the age-old 
divisions of the Arab and Moslem world, exem-
plified in the Iraqi-Iranian' war, Lebanon, Syria 
and Jordan. However, contrary to the opinion 
DOCUMENT 876 
expressed by Mr. Haig1, the United States 
Secretary of State, during his visit to the Middle 
East in April of this year, the Palestinian pro-
blem and hence the settlement of the Israeli-
Arab conflict remains at the top of the list of 
priorities for the Arab countries in that part of 
the world. The Soviet threat, in spite of the 
invasion of Afghanistan and its condemnation 
by the Islamabad Islamic Conference of 29th 
January 1980, takes second place among the 
concerns of the Mediterranean and Gulf coastal 
states, which do not want a permanent western 
military presence. 
(i) Iraq 
4.18. Iraq, because it is a neighbour of Turkey, 
although not on the Mediterranean, should 
appropriately be included among the eastern 
Mediterranean countries. Since the election of 
President Hussein in July 1979, in order to 
maintain its leading role, the Arab socialist 
party Ba'ath has had to come to grips with a 
period of agitation and a plot which led to 
violent repression within the party in August 
1979. This agitation, which has grown since 
the Iranian revolution, has demonstrated the 
persistence of internal tension due to the Kurds, 
the communists (the Iraqi Communist Party 
was restrained and then excluded from the 
Progressive National Front in 1979) and the 
Shi'ite population which is in the majority in 
the country. In addition to a regular army of 
242,250 men, who are well indoctrinated and 
armed President Hussein therefore also has a peopl~'s army of 60,000 men to provide an 
effective rampart against any enemy, whether 
internal or external. 
4.19. Iraq, which has been involved since 
September 1980 in a war with Iran, the . end 
of which is not yet in sight, has not obtamed 
the results it expected and has only half-
hearted support from the Gulf coastal states: 
only Jordan and Kuwait grant it full support. 
Its currency reserves ($30,000 million) have 
allowed it to procure and order new 
arms, particularly from Italy for its navy, 
France for its air force and anti-aircraft missiles, 
Egypt for munitions and the Soviet Union for 
tanks (see paragraph 2.18). Before the war 
with Iran, its air force included bombers (12 
Tu-22s, 10 Il-28s) and fighter bombers (80 
MiG-23s 40 Su-7Bs, 60 Su-20s). Four of 
the 60 F-ls ordered from France were deli-
vered as were Alouette, Super Frelon, 
Gazelle Puma and W essex helicopters; its 
I. " The purpose of my trip here is to discuss with our 
friends how we can meet the threat posed by the Soviet 
Union and its surrogates in the entire area... But we are 
equally interested in an exchange of views on how to advance 
the peace process." Tel Aviv, 5th April 1981. 
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Milan and Hot anti-tank missiles (on order) 
and Hunter aircraft are of French and British 
origin. 
4.20. The Soviet Union, Iraq's leading arms 
supplier and partner since the 1972 friend-
ship treaty, and the Unite~ State~, with whi~h 
Iraq has growing economic relations and will 
soon have normal diplomatic relations, have 
kept strictly outside the war. 
(ii) Syria 
4.21. Under President Assad and the Ba'ath 
Party, which has an Alawite majo:ity, the 
Syrian Arab Republic has been subJected to 
violent internal disturbances since 1978-79, 
the connecting thread being the participation 
of fundamentalist Moslems (Moslem Brother-
hood) and recourse to individual ~r mass 
assassination (Aleppo massacres m June 
1979). In March-June 1980, the regime 
took widespread military action to stamp out 
what was in fact a league of all the oppo-
sition elements from the extreme right-wing 
fundamentalists to the progressives. How-
ever, for the time being, the Syrian regime 
seems relatively stable. 
4.22. Militarily, Syria earmarks more than a 
quarter of its budget for defence and has a 
large army (200,000 ground forces, 45,000 
in the air force and 2,500 in the navy), with 
sophisticated Soviet equipment (see para-
graph 2.18). One of its tasks since 1976 is 
to maintain civil peace in Lebanon (between 
20 000 and 30,000 troops). In addition to 
3,000 tanks (paragraph 2.18), its up-to-date , 
Soviet military equipment includes ground 
attack fighters (60 MiG-23s, 30 Su-20s) and 
interceptors (25 MiG-25 Foxbats, 200 MiG-21s 
plus older MiG-17s and Su-7s). However, H~t 
and Milan anti-tank missiles and Gazelle heli-
copters have been procured from France and 
Super Frelon helicopters are on order. 
4.23. The treaty of friendship and co-
operation between Syria and the Soviet 
Union, signed on 8th October .1980 for a 
period of twenty years, followmg on .the 
1979 arms agreements, came at a time 
when Syria was being increasingly isolated in 
the Arab world and subjected to internal 
threats. The acknowledged aim of this co-
operation was to restore a strategic balance 
between Syria and Israel. The signing of the 
treaty allowed the number of Soviet military 
experts to be increased from 2,500 to 3,50~, 
but the Soviet Union has no military bases m 
Syria apart from mooring and repair facilities 
in the military port of Tartus. 
4.24. Despite present appearances, President 
Assad and most of the Ba'ath leaders are 
reputed to be ideologically pro-western and 
anti-communist. In accordance with its policy 
of non-alignment, Syria accepts American 
assistance and has relations with Washington 
in spite of deep disagreement over Camp 
David. 
(iii) Lebanon 
4.25. Lebanon is the point of encounter bet-
ween the twofold confrontation between the 
Arab-Moslem world and Israel on the one 
hand and the most westernised Christian 
communities in the Middle East on the other 
hand. Israel's only real enemy at present -
the Palestinian resistance movement - oper-
ates from southern Lebanon. This was the 
area occupied by the Israelis from 14th to 
19th March in retaliation against an attack. 
On a decision of the Security Council, the 
Israelis were relieved not by UNIFIL but by 
local militia who on the one hand owe alle-
giance to Israel and on the other have links 
with the Lebanese National Front (whose pre-
sent leader is Camille Chamoun) which 
groups the conservative Christian parties in 
Beirut. The rest of the country is divided 
into three zones: progressive-Palestinian in 
the south-west, Christian in the centre 
(including Beirut) and Syrian everywhere 
else. In 1976, certain Arab countries gave 
the Syrian President the task of safeguarding 
the identity of the Lebanese state and con-
taining the separatist factions of the Christian 
activists. The present conflict between the 
32,000 Syrians of the Arab deterrent force and 
the Christian militia (28,000 well-armed men), 
not to speak of the Lebanese army dispersed 
around the country, raises acutely the prob-
lem of Syria's intentions in Lebanon, the 
existence of which it has never truly recog-
nised, the possibility of Israeli raids and the 
occupation of southern Lebanon and an inter-
nationalisation of the crisis demanded by the 
Christians and rejected by the Arab coun-
tries. The very existence of Lebanon seems 
likely to remain threatened as long as a solu-
tion to the Israeli-Arab conflict is not found 
which can be accepted by all the Arab coun-
tries and hence by the Palestinians. 
(iv) Israel 
4.26. Mr. Begin, Prime Minister of Israel 
since 1977 and leader of the Likud, has 
applied the Camp David agreements signed 
by Mr. Sadat, Mr. Carter and himself on 26th 
March 1979. But, where the settlement of 
the Palestinian question is concerned, he has 
been intractable, in particular by pursuing a 
policy of colonising occupied Palestinian terri-
tory. The next 'legislative elections are to be 
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held on 30th June 1981. A labour victory -
which current polls do not foresee - might 
change this policy. 
4.27. In January 1980, Israel's military occu-
pation, in accordance with the Camp David 
agreements, covered only one-third of the 
Sinai Peninsula and the bi~ateral aspects of 
the agreements will be applied in full, or at 
least the first stage (normalisation of relations 
between Egypt and I~rael with an exchange 
of ambassadors, movement of persons, return 
of the Al Tur oil field, respect for a buffer 
zone and limitation of the Egyptian forces in 
the Sinai). The final withdrawal from the 
Sinai is to take place in April 1982. The 
situation is quite different as regards the 
settlement of the Palestinian question, which 
is merely the subject of a joint letter annexed 
to the treaty. The negotiations on the inde-
pendence of the West Bank and Gaza are 
marking time and are at present a stake in the 
Israeli electoral campaign. Egyptian and 
Israeli interpretations have differed comple-
tely over the form of independence and the 
meaning of the five-year interim period lead-
ing up to it. Relations bttween Israel and 
the United States are still close. Thus, Israel 
receives $1 ,400 million of American military 
assistance each year, $500 million of which 
does not have to be reimbursed. However, 
the sale of 60 F-15s by the United States to 
Saudi Arabia and the decision to sell it 5 
AWACS met with opposition from Israel 
which seeks compensation, although the 
Reagan Administration has granted it addi-
tional economic and military assistance of 
$300 million per year in 1983 and 1984 
(plus 25 F-15s) so as to ensure some balance 
between friendly Arab co111ntries and Israel. 
Apart from 1 ,000 British Centurion tanks, 
30 Mirage Ills and 30 Super Frelon and 
Alouette helicopters from France, its military 
equipment (3,050 tanks, 480 combat aircraft, 
numerous anti-tank, surface-to-air and sur-
face-to-surface missiles) is entirely of Ameri-
can origin, nationally produced or of Soviet 
origin from spoils of war. 
(v) Egypt 
4.28. By effectively returning the Sinai to 
Egypt, the Camp David peace agreements 
strengthened Mr. Sadat as' head of state. He 
therefore seized the opportunity to have poli-
tical and constitutional reforms adopted by 
referendum to strengthen democracy in Egypt 
(April 1979), to allow him to be re-elected 
President for an unlimited number of times 
and to impose Islamic law as the main basis 
of legislation (in order to slow down the 
growing opposition of Islamic fundamentalist 
groups) in May 1980. 
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4.29. Mr. Sadat's foreign policy is centred 
mainly on the application of the Camp David 
agreements, including Palestinian indepen-
dence, and thus on Egypt's relations with the 
United States. It is also on a lookout .for any 
opportunity of joining up again with the Arab 
countries, which unanimously rejected it and 
isolated it diplomatically and economically 
after the Israeli-Egyptian peace settlement. 
The United States has therefore consider-
ably increased its military and economic 
assistance since 1978: in 1979, annual eco-
nomic assistance was fixed at $1,250 million 
and military assistance at $1 ,500 million, 
used for the purchase of front-line armoured 
vehicles and 35 Phantom F-4Es. President 
Reagan raised assistance for 1981-82 by 
$1,250 million (for the payment of 244 
M-60 armoured vehicles, 40 F-16 fighters 
and 11 Hawk surface-to-air missile batteries), 
not counting assistance for reconstructing 
Egypt's armaments industry. Military co-
operation consists of American weapons and 
a few hundred troops being stationed perma-
nently in Egypt and manreuvres to test the 
rapid deployment force and intervention faci-
lities in the Middle East. But the Egyptians 
have no wish to be aligned militarily with a 
great power and repeat that there are no 
American bases in Egypt. Hence their oppo-
sition to the Israeli-American proposals 
concerning the international peacekeeping 
force in the Sinai, the final Israeli withdrawal 
being planned for April 1982, and their refu-
sal to allow the Americans to occupy the two 
air bases in the Sinai (which are to be eva-
cuated by the Israelis) or the naval and air 
base at Ras Bana. Finally, Egypt is trying to 
increase its military industrial production in 
conjunction with the United Kingdom (for 
guns) and France (Alpha-Jet) and considers it 
is nearly self-sufficient in light arms and 
munitions (which it exports to Arab and Afri-
can countries, most recently to Iraq). Most 
military equipment is still of Soviet origin for 
which spare parts are in short supply (850 
T -54/55 and 750 T -62 tanks; anti-tank, sur-
face-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles; 
23 Tu-16s, 50 MiG-21 s, 30 MiG-l7s, 60 
Su-7s and 18 Su-20s, 45 MiG-21 intercep-
tors) but it is becoming western (M-113 
front-line armoured vehicles; Milan, Swingfire, 
Tow anti-tank missiles; surface-to-air Hawk 
missiles; helicopters; Mirage Ill and Mirage V 
aircraft). 
(f) North Africa 
(i) Libya 
4.30. Some experts are now worried about the 
possible use of Libyan bases by the Soviet air 
force. Because of this threat of military imba-
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lance in the Mediterranean, the report examines 
Libya's position in an international context, its 
successful military action in Chad having 
brought it into the limelight. 
The domestic situation 
4.31. Libya is almost four times the size of 
France but has only 2,933,000 inhabitants: scat-
tered nomads in the south, villagers more or 
less isolated in oases and city-dwellers in towns 
along the Mediterranean, a fertile strip 
no more than 1 00 km wide stretching from 
Egypt to Tunisia. The " Libyan paradise " 
covers only 5 % of the total area of the coun-
try. It was the discovery of oil in 1959 that 
completely reversed the position of Libya, 
switching it from the poorest state in the Arab 
world to one of the wealthiest. 
4.32. When Kadhafi came to power in 1969, 
his first concern was independence and national 
sovereignty: British training installations and 
the United States air base had to be evacuated 
in 1970, large quantities of military equipment 
were purchased from the Soviet Union and in 
1971 Libya started taking control of its oil 
industry, the process being practically complete 
by December 1973. It thus became the world's 
third producer/ exporter, while reducing quan-
tities and raising prices (1972). The money 
earned serves to finance Kadhafi's external 
policy and also development projects in order 
to have a sound, durable economy in which 
agriculture plays an important part - making 
the desert fertile - and industrialisation is based 
on local resources. However, there are 
two major obstacles: the lack of managerial staff 
and too few workers whether trained or 
untrained, hence the need for foreign co-
operation from both East and West (particularly 
in the army), the accent placed on training 
technicians and experts and the use of Egyptian 
and Tunisian labour since traditionally Libyans 
are neither workers nor peasants (hence the 
desire for a union with Egypt). 
4.33. Politically speaking, Kadhafi does not 
seem particularly vulnerable although there 
were reports of an attempted mutiny involving 
the army in Tobruk in summer 1980. There 
are regular purges and eliminations of " ene-
mies of the Republic", the most recent 
having been in March 1981. It is consequently 
difficult to contemplate a succession (other than 
military) and thus any continuity in external 
policy considering how very personal it is. 
Foreign policy 
4.34. In view of Libya's geographical and histo-
rical position, Kadhafi defined four areas of 
action: the Arab world, which has priority, the 
Moslem world, the African continent and the 
Mediterranean. As soon as he came to 
power, Kadhafi declared himself the champion 
of Arab unity and defender of Islamic socialism, 
rejecting atheist communism and western capi-
talism alike; his many challenges have surprised 
the Arabs as much as the West. Libya projects 
itself on the international screen as " activist "; 
it is highly regarded by minorities among 
Arabs (Palestinians), Moslems (black Moslems 
in the United States) colonial emancipation 
moveme~ts (Angola, Guinea Bissau, Mozam-
bique) and revolutionary freedom movements 
(Eritrea, IRA), all of which organisations 
it finances. 
4.35. For instance, in the last fifteen months, 
Kadhafi has financed an uprising in Tunisia, 
remote-controlled a putsch in Gambia, encour-
aged a conspiracy in Ghana, financed and 
guided a religious riot in Nigeria, hatched a 
plot in Mauritania and invaded Chad. Finally, 
he continues to support the Polisario revolu-
tionaries who are still fighting the Moroccan 
army and is trying to destabilise Egypt, Somalia 
and the Sultanate of Oman. 
Relations between Libya and its geographical 
neighbours 
4.36. From the very beginning Colonel Kad-
hafi's grand design has been Arab unity; as 
early as in 1970 he turned towards the Mashrek 
- the eastern Arab world - relations with the 
Magreb in the West being viewed merely as 
personalised or bilateral contacts depending on 
the political regimes. However, his attempts at 
union with Egypt, Sudan and Syria in 1971 and 
then with Egypt in 1973 and Tunisia in 1974 
all met with failure and since the end of 1974 
his views have left him increasingly isolated 
within the Arab world and have even 
encountered hostility due to his attempts to 
destabilise neighbouring Arab countries (finan-
cing opposition movements and military 
training on Libyan bases). 
4.37. Relations between Libya and Egypt have 
been rather cool, not to say hostile, since the 
failure of the union in 1973. Kadhafi believes 
Sadat supports American imperialism. In July 
1977, there was a three-day conventional war 
between the Egyptian and Libyan armies. 
Recent years have been marked by the severing 
of diplomatic relations in December 1977, 
denunciations of and measures taken by Sadat 
against Libyan military frontier operations (pro-
clamation of a state of emergency in the fron-
tier province; 100,000 Egyptians along the 
frontier). With regard to the proposed merger 
with Chad, Egypt's main concern is the threat 
of the Sudan being destabilised by Libya. 
Egypt considers the Sudan to be part and parcel 
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of its own security arrangements, hence 
the mutual defence pact signed after an attemp-
ted coup d'etat against Nemery in July 1976 
with Libyan backing. However, Egypt does 
not wish to compromise itself in Chad by 
supporting Hiss(me Habre in order to be in a 
better position to launch a diplomatic offensive 
in the OAU. Libya for its part has been trying 
to foster some degree of detente with its neigh-
bours since its intervention in Chad. 
Relations between Libya and the Sudan 
4.38. Diplomatic relations were re-established 
in November but have never been very warm 
(attempted coup d'etat in 1976). Major-
General Nemery has been wary since the inter-
vention in Chad and has in fact accused 
Kadhafi of coveting the Sudan. He has there-
fore closed his frontiers to all foreigners and 
moved in troops to strengthen the frontier with 
Chad. 
Relations between Libya and Tunisia 
4.39. Here the situation fluctuates. Relations 
were strained after the failure of the 1974 mer-
ger, were re-established at economic level with 
the signature of a trade agreement in October 
1977 and were broken off again over the Gafsa 
disturbances in January 1980j when an unsuc-
cessful attempt was made to provoke a 
general uprising. Shortly afterwards there was 
a reconciliation followed by a further develop-
ment in November 1980 wllten the Tunisian 
Secretary-General for Foreign Affairs accused 
the Libyans of an armed intrusion in 
Tunisia. Finally, since January 1981 Tunisia 
and Libya have been moving towards normal 
diplomatic and economic relations, the first 
step having been taken by the Head of the 
Tunisian Government with a view to termin-
ating the almost permanent tension which had 
prevailed along their frontier since 1974. 
Relations between Libya and Algeria 
4.40. Relations are good; there was some reserve 
with a hint of disapproval about the interven-
tion in Chad and recently Algeria has been 
keeping its distances because diplomatic circles 
believe that Kadhafi has been trying to short-
circuit Algeria within the Polisario. 
Relations between Libya and its black African 
neighbours 
4.41. President Senghor and other African Pre-
sidents believe Libya is dreaming of gaining 
political hegemony over the Sahel states and 
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even, if possible, an overall regrouping of the 
Sahara under its direction - hence its 
policy of systematic support for the Islamic 
peoples in the northern parts of these states 
against the black population to the south. Yet 
in 1979 Libya intervened in Uganda to save 
Amin Dada, the result of which was a 
failure. In Central Africa, Libya supplied 
Bokassa with military equipment and instruc-
tors in September 1979. There is a long list of 
Libyan interventions aimed at taking advantage 
of divisions and political vacuums among the 
fragile African regimes. The last striking 
example, a success for the first time, was 
Libya's action in Chad which triggered off a call 
to arms and uneasiness among the African 
states. 
4.42. Moreover, Kadhafi has accused the heads 
of the French-speaking states of taking too 
many orders from the Elysee (May 1980). 
After invading Chad, he said he would stay 
there until the French forces left Central 
Africa and would consider reviewing his pro-
grammes of assistance to any African countries 
which criticised him. 
Immediate neighbours 
4.43. Libya's relatively friendly relations with 
Niger have been broken off. Relations with 
Chad have· been close and eventful since 1969 
with inter alia Libya's annexation of the Aozou 
strip and support for the various leaders of the 
rebellion in Chad. It was under a treaty for 
material and moral support signed with Gou-
kouni in June 1980 that 4,000 to 5,000 Libyan 
soldiers and troops of the Islamic Legion 
entered Chad in November 1980 and conquered 
Djamena. Subsequently the statement of 
intention to merge the two countries pro-
claimed in January 1981 was denied by the 
President of Chad shortly afterwards for lack of 
support in Chad. 
4.44. The future of relations between Libya 
and Chad is therefore uncertain and the conflict 
far from over. Many states accuse the Soviet 
Union of being behind Libya in this successful 
action, in spite of many statements by Kadhafi 
asserting that he receives neither assistance nor. 
advice from Moscow. A first contingent of 200 
Libyan soldiers was withdrawn at the end of 
March 1981. 
Relations with the Soviet Union 
4.45. For some time Libya has been accused of 
offering the Soviet Union a means of wielding a 
tremendous military threat over the Mediterra-
nean area. These accusations are based on cer-
tain statements by Kadhafi who is on good 
terms with the Soviet Union because it supports 
the Arab cause and on bad terms with the Uni-
ted States because of its support for Israel. 
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They are also based on the fact that Kadhafi 
supports the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, 
obtains Soviet logistic support for the regular 
Libyan army and the Islamic Legion, and has 
stocks of Soviet weapons. Since 1970, the 
Soviet Union has been supplying Libya with 
tanks and artillery and shortly afterwards with 
aircraft, missiles and the most sophisticated 
weapons, in all an arsenal worth about $12 
billion. Finally, more than 5,000 military and 
civil personnel from the eastern bloc, including 
Cuba, provide the backbon~ of the army and 
secret service, of which 1,000 to 2,000 are 
Soviet. Between 600 and 1 ,000 Cubans carry 
out military and civil work (roads, buildings) 
and 1 ,500 to 2,000 East Germans are in the 
secret service. Combat aircraft pilots include 
North Koreans (20) and Soviets (for Foxbat), 
with Czech technical staff. 
4.46. Although Kadhafi's policy of destabilis-
ation and struggle against western influence in 
the third world suits the Kremlin, the Soviet 
navy has no bases in Libya. What is to be 
feared rather is the use of Libyan air bases by 
the Soviet Union (there are 19 airfields with 
concrete runways, 2 more than 8 km long), 
which would significantly change the balance of 
East-West forces in the Mediterranean and on 
the African continent. 
Relations with Mediterranean NATO countries 
(Italy, France) 
4.4 7. Libya formerly has mainly had relations 
with France because of its policy of national 
independence, its position towards the Israeli-
Arab conflict and its role in Africa. Kadhafi 
ordered 110 Mirage aircraft from France in 
1972-73 but the once friendly relationship dete-
riorated because of French policy in Africa, 
particularly in Chad. Libya accused France of 
agression in Africa in December 1977 and 
denounced its policy in Africa in June 
1978. In February 1980, the French Embassy 
in Tripoli was broken into and burnt down. 
Referring to the Gafsa incident at the same 
time, Kadhafi spoke of the French invasion of 
Tunisia. The same tension was maintained 
throughout the year and culminated with the 
victory of Libyan troops in Djamena in 
November 1980. 
4.48. France did not intervene in the conflict 
in Chad in November 1980, but after the 
announcement of the prospect of a merger, 
France voiced its opposition in accordance with 
international regulations and the 1979 Lagos 
agreements, placed its Mediterranean fleet in a 
state of alert and sent reinforcements to Africa. 
The government said it would intervene at 
the request of the African nations concerned in 
the event of the Libyan troops stationed in 
Chad making a move to invade another African 
state. 
Relations between Libya and Italy 
4.49. Libya is on good terms with Italy which 
seeks closer economic relations and hopes to 
obtain worthwhile contracts for Italian firms in 
exchange for regular supplies of oil and gas. 
Contracts worth 700 million lire are already 
being carried out and 15,000 Italians are work-
ing in Libya which is Italy's fourth oil supplier 
and has a 9.1 % share in Fiat, rising to 13 .4 % 
in 1982, thus giving it direct access to Italy's 
arms industry. Italy sells Libya warships, guns, 
automatic and light weapons, radar and other 
electronic equipment plus transport and combat 
aircraft. 
4.50. However, certain politicians are worried 
about the strength of the Libyan lobby in Sicily 
(infiltration of the media, political support for 
the socialists) and the percentage of the territory 
of the island of Pantelleria (10 %), mid-way bet-
ween Africa and Italy, owned by Libyans. So 
far, however, there have been no clashes and 
Italy did not show as much concern as France 
about the proposed union between Libya and 
Chad. 
Libyan defence policy 
4.51. The Libyan armed forces have 53,000 
men, 2,400 Soviet medium tanks, including the 
more recent T -62 and T -72, 287 combat air-
craft, including the most recent MiG-23 and 25 
(Foxbat), plus Mirage Ills. Libya thus has the 
best air force in North Africa, but its effective-
ness is doubtful as shown inter alia by opera-
tions in Angola. However, it has an enormous 
stock of modern equipment maintained by East 
German and Czechoslovak technicians. 
4.52. In addition to this army, whose opera-
tional capability is, for the time being, modest 
(it is not considered capable of deploying more 
than 400 or 500 tanks and about 50 aircraft), 
Kadhafi has set up a Pan-African (or Islamic) 
Legion, trained for operations abroad and for-
med of other Arabs and Africans as well as 
Libyans. He intends to increase the number of 
legionnaires to half a million in keeping with 
the arsenal built up since 1969. They played a 
significant role in the victory in Chad. 
4.53. Kadhafi's policy is offensive and subver-
sive rather than defensive and includes assis-
tance to terrorism and the Islamic revolution. 
His army is less dangerous than the ideas he 
proClaims and his indirect support for minori-
ties and opposition movements in Arab and 
African countries or on other continents. 
Colonel Kadhafi is seen by some to be seek-
ing a zone of political influence rather than 
territorial conquest. What preoccupies the 
Committee, and the West, the most is whether 
Libya will remain neutral or one day side with 
the Soviet Union. Following his visit to Mos-
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cow on 28th April, however, there was no 
treaty of friendship with the S~viet Union. 
(ii) Tunisia 
4.54. Since 1980 (and particularly since the 
attack on Gafsa in January 1980), the Tunisian 
political regime, dominated by the historical 
personality of President Bourguiba - elected for 
life - and by the Destour Socialist Party, has 
become progressively more democratic. There 
was provision for democratisation in the 1959 
constitution but little had in fact been done. 
The extraordinary congress of the DSP which 
opened in Tunis on 1Oth April has just given 
the green light to the introduction of a multi-
party system and recognised the de facto right 
of trade unions to be independent. However, 
while strengthening the liberal element in the 
government (formation of the Mazali Govern-
ment in April 1980) and releasing the leaders of 
the Tunisian General Workers' Union (in May-
August 1980), President Bourguiba maintains a 
very firm stand towards Islamic fundamentalists 
and any attempt at subversion. 
4.55. Tunisia's relations with Libya, which had 
already been poor since 1974, grew even worse 
after the attack on Gafsa which, according to 
the Tunisian authorities, was backed and pre-
pared by Libya. This event led to a rappro-
chement between France and Tunisia, which 
subsequently continued, inter alia by the 
sending of French military advisers and trans-
port aircraft, which were withdrawn in 
February 1980. Tunisia also arranged for the 
Americans to speed up deliveries of military 
equipment worth $100 million originally 
planned for 1981. Limited repair facilities for 
unarmed Soviet vessels suoh as support ships 
are offered at Bizerta subject to agreement on a 
case-by-case basis. 
4.56. Tunisia is determined to remain a cross-
roads open to all beneficial influences from the 
West, Africa and the Arab world: the Arab Lea-
gue has had its seat in Tunis since the exclusion 
of Egypt and the Islamic Conference has also 
chosen it for its seat and appointed a former 
Tunisian Foreign Minister as Secretary-
General. It has resumed close contacts with 
Algeria but backs Morocco in the conflict over 
the western Sahara. Its anued forces are the 
smallest of all the Arab countries considered in 
this report (28,600 in all of which 24,000 in the 
army) and have French, A~erican, Italian and 
British equipment. Tunisia has undertaken an 
urgent programme to provide radar coverage of 
the country; it also hopes to acquire anti-tank 
and anti-aircraft missiles, interceptor fighters 
with some retaliatory capability, helicopters to 
improve army mobility, and fast patrol boats to 
secure its coast against possible incursions from 
its neighbours, but will require specially favour-
able financial terms. 
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(iii) Algeria 
4.57. After the death on 27th December 1978 
of Mr. Houari Boumediene, President of 
Algeria for thirteen years, Colonel Bendjedid 
Chadli, member of the Political Bureau, was 
elected President-Secretary General of the 
National Liberation Front on 7th February 
1979 in accordance with the 1976 constitution. 
While respecting the principle of a single 
party system, President Chadli, a moderate, 
confirmed the socialist line but introduced 
gradual liberalisation (freeing of Ben Bella, 
amnesty, a more liberal and private sector 
economy). Finally, internal security problems 
are settled firmly but less drastically than 
before. It therefore seems that the regime in 
Algeria is stable and normally should remain so 
at least until the next presidential elections in 
1984. 
4.58. From a diplomatic point of view, Algeria 
is adhering to President Boumediene's princi-
ples, particularly his twofold African and Arab 
vocation. It is still wearing the laurels won 
during its successful mediation in the affair of 
the American hostages. Three themes domi-
nate this policy: the need to promote non-
alignment at a time of renewed tension between 
the blocs, the development of intra-African 
economic co-operation and the revival of the 
North-South dialogue and, finally, support for 
liberation movements, including the PLO and 
the Polisario in the western Sahara. This ·is 
the framework for its relations with the United 
States and the Soviet Union. From the mili-
tary point of view, Algeria's main supplier is 
the Soviet Union, but diplomatically its leaders 
wish to remain on friendly terms with the 
United States in spite of recent criticism of 
American policy in Africa including sales of 
arms to Morocco. The modem naval base at 
Mers el-Kebir has never been made available to 
the Soviet Union and it is not expected to be. 
4.59. Its armed forces ( 101 ,000 of which 
90,000 in the army) have 600 Soviet tanks, 
including T -62s and T -72s, 50 French 
AMX-13s, 278 combat aircraft of which 90 
MiG-21 interceptors, and 20 Su-20 and 
MiG-23 ground attack aircraft. 
(iv) Morocco 
4.60. Since 1977 and the attempts on his life, 
King Hassan has been pursuing a policy of 
consolidating his power whilst preparing for his 
succession (referendum in • May 1980) and 
controlled political and social liberalisation 
(amnesty of political prisoners, end of cen-
sorship in March 1977). However, Morocco's 
economy and finances have steadily deterior-
ated under the combined effects of the war in 
the Sahara and world inflation: for instance, its 
military budget has been increased threefold 
from 1975 to 1978 ($676 million in 1980). 
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4.61. Strengthened by the success of the 
" green march " and the Madrid agreement 
whereby it was granted half the Spanis}l Sahara, 
Morocco, which had had a good start in 1975, 
is now in a bad position. In the Saharan 
dispute with the Polisario (10-12,000 men) and 
Algeria (Mauritania having withdrawn from the 
dispute in August 1979), it has the military 
backing of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, not to 
speak of sales of arms from France (50 Mirage 
F-ls in 1978, 10 Mirage F-lCHs in 1979 plus, 
according to the Polisario, 250 military 
advisers) and the United States. In fact, after 
much hesitation, in January 1980 the United 
States sold Morocco aircraft and helicopters 
worth $235 million, i.e. 20 F-5E fighters and 10 
OV -10 Bronco reconnaissance aircraft, with a 
clause linking their delivery to the negotiations 
between Morocco and the Polisario. These are 
the arms which President Reagan decided to 
deliver unconditionally in March 1981 with 
108 M-60 tanks in addition, while affirming 
United States neutrality in the dispute. The 
Soviet Union for its part is well aware that 
Libya is supplying the Polisario with Soviet 
arms but it does not recognise the Saharan 
Arab' Democratic Republic. The latter obtain-
ed a simple majority vote of twenty-six 
countries for its admission to the OAU on 4th 
July 1980 and since mid-1980 it has been 
recognised by about forty countries. In the 
United Nations, the resolution naming the 
Polisario front as representative of the Saharan 
people and urging Morocco to negotiate with it 
after evacuating its territory was adopted in 
1980. In any 'event, Morocco will have to 
adopt an official position on the resolutions of 
the OAU Committee, of Wise Men which met 
in Freetown in September 1980 as a result of a 
referendum organised under the auspices of the 
OAU prior to the summit meeting of the 
organisation in July 1981. In the meantime, 
the war is spreading. 
V. Conclusions 
5 .1. In the foregoing sections, the Committee 
has reviewed the balance of force in the areas of 
potential threat from the Warsaw Pact countries 
in the Mediterranean region. While the 
Committee continues to deplore the unabated 
growth in Soviet military expenditure and notes 
with particular concern the appearance of a 
number of new classes of larger Soviet naval 
vessels, it concludes that in the southern region 
the threat of direct conventional military attack 
by Warsaw Pact forces has not significantly 
increased over the three years since the 
Committee last reported. There has been some 
limited modernisation of Bulgarian military 
equipment, but as in the past Soviet forces are 
not stationed in either Bulgaria or Roma-
nia. Present Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces 
could not successfully launch an attack to seize 
the Turkish Straits - the most important 
conceivable Soviet objective in the area -
without a large-scale prior reinforcement with 
Soviet forces from other areas of which the 
Alliance would inevitably have advance warn-
ing. A surprise attack against north-east Italy 
by Warsaw Pact forces from Hungary passing 
through Yugoslavia is a very unlikely scenario 
in the absence of generalised hostilities involv-
ing other NATO fronts. 
5.2. In the Mediterranean itself, the Soviet 
naval squadron maintained there remains out-
numbered and is largely deprived of base facili-
ties. Because of the regulated passages through 
the Turkish Straits, there would be considerable 
advance warning of any attempt to move the 
Black Sea fteet as a whole into the Mediterra-
nean, and in the absence of base facilities it 
could not be maintained there for very 
long. This threat is less today than in the early 
1970s when Soviet forces had access to exten-
sive naval and air bases in Egypt. 
5.3. The Committee is very much more 
concerned at the increased danger of the out-
break of local hostilities which could directly 
involve allied interests in certain parts of the 
eastern, or possibly southern, Mediterranean. 
The situation in these areas remains highly 
unpredictable, characterised in some cases by 
potentially unstable or irresponsible regimes 
which can lead to rapid and unexpected shifts 
of alliances, which, in certain circumstances, 
could again lead to the reappearance of Soviet 
bases in the Mediterranean. The last ten years 
has seen the Soviet Union removed from Egypt 
and Somalia, and installed instead in Ethio-
pia. By no means all potential or actual local 
conflicts, however, are incited by the Soviet 
Union; there are very many local causes of ten-
sion between neighbouring countries in the area 
and the situation has been made more dange-
rous by the unprecedented levels of armaments 
which, in many cases, are more modem and 
sophisticated than those possessed by some 
NATO countries in the area, and which, in 
many cases, have been supplied both by the 
Soviet Union and by several NATO coun-
tries. The large increase in petroleum reve-
nues of oil-producing countries accounts in part 
for the present levels of their armaments. 
5.4. The Committee believes that the solid-
arity and cohesion of the whole Alliance in the 
Mediterranean region is not always sufficiently 
stressed; local mutual defence arrangements 
appear too often to be a purely bilateral arran-
gement between the country concerned and the 
United States. There is a need for all other 
allied countries to be more visibly identified 
with the defence of the area, arrangements 
should be developed to provide other sources of 
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reinforcements for certain contingencies, in case 
currently earmarked reinforcements of . the 
United States in particular should be diverted 
further east. Spain, whose government has 
alluded to the possibility of accession to NATO 
on a number of occasions in recent years, is an 
obvious potential source of extra forces in the 
Mediterranean area and the Committee would 
welcome their participation in NATO exercises 
and defence planning while it is clearly under-
stood that a decision to apply to accede to 
NATO is a matter for Spain alone and one 
which would have to be seen to have the 
approval of the democratically elected Spanish 
parliament. Turkey makes a large and 
valuable contribution to allied defence in the 
eastern Mediterranean region, but will require 
continued bilateral assistance for the modemi-
_gtion of much of its military ~ipment, parti-
cularly amour, anti-armour weapons and vehi.: 
cles to provide better mobility. The impor-
tance of this is clearly seen when present Turk-
ish equipment is compared with that now pos-
sessed by many countries of the eastern and 
southern Mediterranean to which attention has 
been drawn above. 
5.5. NATO communications and air defence 
equipment in the area is in need of modernisa-
tion and, in view of the dangers of unexpected 
events, should be given greater priority. Some 
aspects of air defence arrangements appear to 
the Committee to be based on a Maginot Line 
philosophy, providing a screen in one particular 
direction. Southward-facing protection is also 
necessary to provide all-round defence as an 
insurance against unexpected developments in 
the region. 
5.6. The foregoing conclusions are incorpor-
ated in the draft recommendation attached to 
this report. Further conclusions concerning 
the political situation in Turkey will be found 
in paragraphs 3.39 to 3.41 of this explanatory 
memorandum. 
VI. Opinion of the minority 
6.1. The report as a whole was adopted by 
the Committee by 14 votes to one with one ab-
stention. A minority of the Committee oppo-
sed the report on the grounds that it was too 
oriented to military measures of security instead 
of dealing with the dangers of the arms race and 
the role of the countries which the minority 
held to be responsible for the arms trade. The 
report should have dealt with means of settling 
disputes in the Mediterranean area through 
multilateral agreement and have called for the 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in 
Europe to be responsible for. security in the 
Mediterranean by removing the causes of ten-
sion. The minority did not agree with the 
Committee's conclusions on the political situa-
tion in Turkey. 
DOCUMENT 876 
Defence expenditure (national currency) 
current prices 
Defence expenditure 
(current prices - US S million) a 
COMPARATIVE TABLE OF DEFENCE EFFORT 1976-1980 
A. FINANCIAL EFFORT 
GDP in purchasers' values 
(current prices - US $ million) a Population (thousand) 
Defence expenditure as % of 
GDP in purchasers' values 
Defence expenditure per head 
(current prices - US$) a 
APPENDIX J 
Defence expenditure as % of total WEU I Country National currency unit I 
---------------------l-------------------1~9~7~6~--719=7=7--~~1=97=8~~~1~9=79~~719~8=0-/~ 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980./ 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 e 1916 1977 1978 1979 1980 e 
(15) 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 ef 1916 1977 1978 1979 1980 ef 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 f 
(0) (1) 
Belgium. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Million B. Frs. 
France (b).................. Million F. Frs. 
Germany ................... Million DM 
Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Million Lire 
Luxembourg................ Million L. Frs. 
Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Million Guilders 
United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . Million £ Sterling 
-------=--
TOTAL WEU .....••.. 
Canada ................... . 
Denmark ................. . 
Greece ................... . 
Norway .................. . 
Portugal .................. . 
Turkey ... _ ............... . 
United States .............. . 
TOTAL NON-WEU 
TOTAL NATO ...... . 
Million C. S 
Million D. Kr. 
Million Drachmas 
Million N. Kr. 
Million Escudos 
Million L. 
Million US$ 
--------1 
(- 5) (- 4) (- 3) (- 2) (-l) (l) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (16) (i7) (iS) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) 
---------- --'--'---1----'---'-- --'---'--1-----'---'---1-___:_-'---1--_:__:__ 
81,444 89,480 99,726 106,472 115,437 2,110 
63,899 73,097 84,042 95,481 110,394 13,369 
38,922 40,184 43,019 45,415 48,531 15,457 
3,608 4,533 5,301 6,468 7,450 4,335 
983 1,029 1,154 1,242 1,476 26 
7,662 9,092 9,146 10,106 10,409 2,898 
6,132 6,810 7,616 9,029 11,306 11,075 
1----1----
49,270 
2,497 3,175 3,632 4,013 67,998 79,294 97,223 110,916 120,736 9,818 
14,877 18,623 22,443 26,530 351,067 382,733 472,771 571,312 664,233 52,893 
17,308 21,417 24,778 27,171 445,918 515,591 638,879 758,952 826,170 59,564 
5,137 6,246 7,785 8,885 188,225 215,419 261,966 323,395 393,034 56,156 
29 37 42 51 2,533 2,823 3,497 4,210 4,572 361 
3,705 4,228 5,038 5,307 90,837 106,512 130,200 149,052 160,842 13,770 
9,830 9,841 9,849 9,876 
53,079 53,278 53,478 53,665 
59,462 59,409 59,461 59,156 
56,446 56,697 56,888 57,110 
362 362 364 364 
3.1 
3.8 
3.5 
2.3 
1.0 
3.2 
5.0 
3.1 
3.9 
3.4 
2.4 
1.0 
3.5 
4.8 
3.3 
3.9 
3.4 
2.4 
1.1 
3.2 
4.7 
3.3 
3.9 
3.3 
2.4 
1.0 
3.4 
4.8 
3.3 215 254 323 369 406 
4.0 253 280 350 420 494 
3.3 260 291 360 417 459 
2.3 77 91 110 137 156 
1.1 72 80 101 115 140 
3.3 210 267 303 359 377 
5.2 198 213 262 342 464 11,887 14,619 19,155 25,943 222,309 247,473 309,529 398,009 500,725 55,959 
-----l--~---l---~-l--~-l--~--ll--~--l----l---~-l-~--
13,853 13,937 14,030 14,069 
55,919 55,902 55,952 55,952 
---'----1----1------ ----------- --------- -------
55,440 68,345 82,873 97,900 1,368,887 1,549,845 1,914,065 2,315,846 2,670,312 248,521 248,951 249,426 250,022 250,192 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.7 198 223 274 331 391 
4.28 4.50 4.64 4.38 4.10 
27.14 26.84 27.25 27.08 27.10 
31.37 31.22 31.34 29.90 27.75 
8.80 9.27 9.14 9.39 9.08 
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
5.88 6.68 6.19 6.08 5.42 
22.48 21.44 21.39 23.12 26.50 
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
===1===1 ------------------===1====1===1=== === 
3,589 
5,680 
48,466 
5,333 
18,845 
40,691 
91,013 
4,124 4,662 4,825 5,130 3,640 3,878 4,087 4,119 4,406 195,679 199,155 204,801 225,932 246,834 23,025 23,280 23,499 23,691 24,027 
6,343 7,250e 7,990 . . 940 1,057 1,315e 1,519 . . 42,221 47,195 56,960 66,229 67,977 5,073 5,089 5,105 5,117 5,134 
65,800 76,106 82,301 90,000 1,325 1,786 2,077 2,219 2,161 22,553 26,157 31,589 38,308 41,621 9,167 9,268 9,360 9,450 9,517 
5,934 6,854 7,362 8,248 977 1,115 1,307 1,454 1,677 31,285 35,979 40,495 46,266 55,992 4,026 4,043 4,060 4,074 4,083 
22,082 27,354 34,343 42,159 624 577 623 702 854 15,474 16,256 17,794 20,330 24,763 9,694 9,773 9,820 9,867 9,971 
49,790 66,239 94,034 169,469 2,535 2,766 2,728 3,026 2,375 41,051 47,789 52,468 66,135 50,434 41,039 42,078 43,144 44,236 45,227 
1.9 
2.2 
5.9 
3.1 
4.0 
6.2 
5.4 
1.9 
2.2 
6.8 
3.1 
3.5 
5.8 
5.3 
2.0 
2.3 
6.6 
3.2 
3.5 
5.2 
4.7 
1.8 
2.3 
5.8 
3.1 
3.5 
4.6 
5.2 
1.8 
5.2 
3.0 
3.4 
4.7 
5.5 
158 
185 
145 
243 
64 
62 
423 
167 
208 
193 
276 
59 
66 
465 
174 
258 
222 
322 
63 
63 
499 
174 
297 
235 
357 
71 
68 
554 
183 
227 
4II 
86 
53 
632 100,925 109,247 122,279 140,513 91,013 100,925 109,247 122,279 140,513 1,695,526 1,889,157 2,112,365 2,353,175 2,538,605 215,152 216,880 218,717 220,584 222,327 
-------l-------1------l--------l------ll------l--------l------l-------l --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
101,054 112,104 121,384 135,318 . . 2,043,789 2,261,688 2,516,472 2,816,375 3,026,226 307,176 310,411 313,705 317,019 320,286 4.9 5.0 4.8 4.8 
l=1=5=0.=3=24=l==1=67=.=544=l==1=89=,=72=9=l==2=1=8=,1=91=1i==.=. ==l=3,=4=12=,6=7=6l 3,811,533 4,430,537 5,132,221 5,696,538 555,697 559,362 563,131 567,041 570,478 4.4 4.4 4.3 4.3 
Note a: GDP and defence expenditures are calculated in national currency and converted to United States$ at the rates shown below. Figures in columns (1) to (10) and (21) to (30) are affected by 
change in exchange rates and are not therefore always comparable between countries, whereas figures of defence expenditures as % of GDP in columns (16) to (20) do not involve currency 
conversion. 
Prior to 1977, tables of defence statistics published in reports of the Committee used gross national product (GNP) as a measure of national wealth. In line with the practice of other international 
organisations, the tables are now given in terms of GDP which is somewhat higher than GNP. Consequently, the figures for defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP are slightly lower 
than the percentages of GNP previously published. 
For the period 1976-1980 the following rates of exchange have been applied: 
Country Unit US 8 per unit Units per US S 
Belgium and Luxembourg 
- 1976 
- 1977 
- 1978 
- 1979 
- 1980 
Canada 
- 1976 
- 1977 
- 1978 
- 1979 
- 1980 
DeniT/Qrk 
- 1976 
- 1977 
- 1978 
- 1979 
- 1980 
France 
- 1976 
- 1977 
- 1978 
- 1979 
- 1980 
Fed. Rep. of GeriT/Qny 
- 1976 
- 1977 
- 1978 
- 1979 
- 1980 
Greece 
- 1976 
- 1977 
- 1978 
- 1979 
- 1980 
Franc 
Canadian Dollar 
D. Krone 
Franc 
Deutschmark 
Drachma 
0.02590 
0.02790 
0.03184 
0.03411 
0.03476 
1.01416 
0.94034 
0.87664 
0.85371 
0.85883 
0.16543 
0.16658 
0.18134 
0.19008 
0.17988 
0.20922 
0.20352 
0.22159 
0.21517 
0.24032 
0.39714 
0.43070 
0.49785 
054559 
0.55987 
0.02734 
0.02714 
0.02729 
0.02696 
0.02400 
38.60 
35.84 
31.41 
29.32 
28.77 
0.98604 
1.06345 
1.14073 
1.17136 
1.16437 
6.0450 
6.0032 
5.5146 
5.2~10 
5.5594 
4.780 
4.913 
4.513 
4.252 
4.161 
2.52 
2.32 
2.01 
1.83 
1.79 
36.58 
36.84 
36.65 
37.10 
41.66 
Country 
Italy 
- 1976 
- 1977 
- 1978 
- 1979 
- 1980 
Netherlmuls 
- 1976 
- 1977 
- 1978 
- 1979 
- 1980 
Norway 
- 1976 
- 1977 
- 1978 
- 1979 
-1980 
Portugal 
- 1976 
- 1977 
- 1978 
- 1979 
- 1980 
Turkey 
- 1976 
- 1977 
- 1978 
-1979 
- 1980 
United Kingdom 
- 1976 
- 1977 
- 1978 
- 1979 
- 1980 
Note b: France is a member of the Alliance without belonging to the integrated military structure; the relevant figures are indicative only. 
e = Preliminary estimate. 
f = Forecast. 
GDP (p.v.) = Gross domestic product in purchasers' values, current prices. 
So11rce: Defence expenditures (NATO definition), from NATO press release M-DPC-2(80)26. 
Unit 
1,000 Lire 
Guilder 
N. Krone 
Escudo 
T. Lira 
£ 
US 8 per unit 
1.20151 
1.13329 
1.17832 
1.20357 
1.19261 
0.37822 
0.40745 
0.46224 
0.49849 
0.50982 
0.18327 
0.18785 
0.19076 
0.19747 
0.20329 
0.03309 
0.02613 
0.02276 
0.02044 
0.02025 
0.06229 
0.05555 
0.04118 
0.03218 
0.01401 
1.8062 
1.7455 
1.9195 
2.1216 
2.2946 
Units per US S 
0.83229 
0.88239 
0.84866 
0.83086 
0.83850 
2.64 
2.45 
2.16 
2.01 
1.96 
5.46 
5.32 
5.24 
5.06 
4.92 
30.22 
38.28 
43.94 
48.92 
49.39 
16.05 
18.00 
24.28 
31.08 
71.36 
0.354 
0.573 
0.521 
0.471 
0.436 
329 361 387 427 
271 300 337 385 
162 
7.39 
1.91 
i69 
1.98 
1.27 
5.14 
184.72 
7.00 
1.91 
3.22 
2.01 
1.04 
4.99 
182.04 
5.98 
1.92 
3.04 
1.91 
0.91 
3.99 
159.85 
4.97 
1.83 
2.68 
1.75 
0.85 
3.65 
147.55 
4.50 
2.21 
1.71 
0.87 
2.43 
143.53 
205.10 
305.101==30=2=.2=1I==2=77=.=60=I==2=6=3=.2=8II==.=. = 
202.21 177.60 163.28 
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B. MANPOWER EFFORT -1980 
Period of compulsory' Total in armed forcesz 
military service military personnel 
(months) (thousands) 
Army Navy Air force (e) 
Belgium 103 103 103 109 
France 12 12 12 575 
Germany 15 15 15 495 
Italy 12 18 12 500 
Luxembourg voluntary 1 
Netherlands 14 14-17 14-17 107 
United Kingdom voluntary 328 
TOTAL WEU 2,115 
Canada voluntary 80 
Denmark 9 9 9 35 
Greece 24-32 24-32 24-32 495 
Norway 12 15 15 39 
Portugal 16 24 21-24 83 
Turkey 20 20 20 717 
United States voluntary 2,047 
TOTALNON-WEU 3,496 
TOTAL NATO 5,611 
Sources: 
I. IISS Military Balance, 1980-81. 
2. NATO press communique, M-DPC-2 (80) 26, 9th December 1980. 
3. Eight months if served in Germany. 
e = estimate. 
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Total armed forces2 
~itary and civilian) 
as pe tage of active population 
I 
(e) 
I 
2.8 
3.1 
I 2.5 I 2.5 
0.9 
2.7 
2.2 
2.6 
1.0 
1.7 
6.4 
2.6 
2.2 
4.3 
2.9 
: 
3.2 
I 
I 
2.9 
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APPENDIX 11 
Documents concerning the political situation in Turkey 
(i) Address to the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments by General Kenan 
Evren, Turkish Head of State 
Ankara, 24th February 1981 
I am pleased to receive here today the 
honourable members of the Western European 
Union Assembly's Defence and Armaments 
Committee. There is no doubt that the 
honourable members, while visiting Turkey, on 
one hand complete their information with 
regard to defence requirements and problems of 
the eastern Mediterranean member countries in 
general, on the other hand show interest to 
Turkey's unique situation and problems in 
particular. 
In yesterday's meetings and discussions all 
your questions were answered and all technical 
data were given. My colleagues and members 
of the cabinet will certainly continue today to 
provide you with additional information. 
I, here today, will touch briefly on Tur-
key's internal situation before and after 12th 
September 1980, which you also know to a 
great extent. 
As a matter of fact, it is quite impossible to 
claim that there existed a real democracy in 
Turkey before 12th September. In those days 
vicious disputes and its inciting effect upon well 
organised and armed terrorist sources resulted 
in the culmination of a complete anarchy 
atmosphere in the country. It was unthinkable 
to mention democracy in such an atmosphere 
where even individuals' right of living was not 
secure. After 12th September we have inten-
sified all our efforts to speedily establish a 
medium in which real democracy, which we for 
a very long time yearned for, shall be recon-
structed and revitalised. 
In a country, if the citizens fear for their 
lives, if they do not have most basic rights like 
working and travelling, if they feel the fear of 
death while going from their homes to their 
jobs, then to talk about human rights would not 
be anything more than to force one's imagina-
tion. This was the situation in Turkey before 
12th September. We, today, have completely 
reversed this situation and made a great pro-
gress in bringing back all the rights of the citi-
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zens. We are determined, as we have promised 
from the very first day, to bring a complete 
democratic life to this country and no one 
should doubt that we will fulfil our pledge and 
transfer our duty to a democratically elected 
new administration. We pursue our efforts in 
accordance with a plan and programme and 
determine the timing within them. 
We follow with interest the activity and 
declarations of some parliamentarians within 
the Council of Europe and European countries' 
parliaments with regard to the situation in Tur-
key. We receive with profound regret the alle-
gations of some of the parliamentarians; such as 
human rights and freedoms in Turkey are res-
tricted or detainees are tortured. What I would 
like to emphasise to you is that all our actions 
are carried out within the context of supremacy 
of law. Our constitution and rules of law cate-
gorically prohibit torture. Allegations to this 
effect are accepted as informing and inquiry is 
initiated without waiting for the complainants' 
application. The last example of this is the 
relevant authorities' investigation, on their own 
initiative, of the allegations with regard to an 
ex-mayor of one of our major cities. During 
the investigation which public opinion closely 
followed tl}rough mass media, the said person 
openly declared that he was not subjected to 
any torture and indicated that such allegations 
were manufactured intentionally by certain per-
sons in his circle. Consequently, the real 
context of a completely baseless issue born out 
of ill-intended allegations which occupied some 
foreign press for a long time has come to day-
light. 
During our investigations of allegations 
with regard to torture, it has been ascertained 
that some are unfortunately true and legal 
action has immediately been initiated against 
the responsibles. 
We wish our friends to trust us and help 
Turkey in her endeavour to return demo-
cracy. Turkey is an indivisible and inseparable 
part of democratic and free Europe and wishes 
to stay so. However, I am sure you will 
appreciate that this cannot be realised solely 
with our efforts and you will direct your acti-
vities in an objective and constructive manner. 
I wish that your visit to our country will be 
fruitful and useful. 
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(ii) Briefing on terrorism 
in Turkey given to the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments by Colonel Ozalp 
of the Turkish General Staff 
Ankara, 13rd February 1981 
Table 1 shows anarchist and terrorist inci-
dents. 
In the first column, you see the number of 
terrorist incidents in a period of 21 months, in 
20 provinces under martial law, before the 12th 
September operation conducted by the Turkish 
armed forces. 
In the second column, the total number 
and daily averages of the terrorist incidents are 
seen in the 5 month period in 67 provinces. 
If you compare the daily averages, you 
easily see the drop in the number of incidents. 
On the right of the table, you find the total 
number of incidents and the daily averages in 
the week before 12th September and the last 
week for the purpose of comparison; in each 
group of incidents, a sharp drop is obser-
ved. Against 220 armed assaults, the daily 
average of which was 31.4, we have 16 inci-
dents in the last week, the daily average is 
1.6. A 95% decrease is observed in this type 
of incident. Certainly, the total number of 
incidents in the last week involves the whole of 
Turkey, whereas the week compared involves 
only 20 provinces under martial law at the 
time. 
In explosive throwings (bombing assaults), 
we have again a 95% decrease. 
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In graffito and leaflet distribution, the 
decrease is 84 %. 
In armed robberies (usurpation), we have a 
49% drop. I 
The total number of incidents had a drop 
of86 %. 
In the first column of Table 2 we see the 
total number of dead and injured in the terro-
rist incidents during the martial law implemen-
tation in 20 provinces in~' 21 months. 3, 710 
individuals lost their lives in terrorist incidents 
during this period. 3,39 civilians died; in 
other words, 3,399 families were left in distress 
and sorrow. 
On the right of Table 2, the total number 
of dead and injured are Sfen in the 5 months 
after the 12th September pperation in 67 pro-
vinces. 
I 
A sharp drop in the number of dead and 
injured is observed in this period. 
If you compare the daily averages in these 
two periods, you easily ob~rve that the number 
of terrorists that died has ~ncreased three and a 
half times. That proves tne effectiveness of the 
state security forces in the period after 12th 
September. In this period, as a total the daily 
averages of deaths dropped from 6 to 1.9, and 
of those injured from 17 to 3.2. Instead of 5.5, 
only 0.9 civilians died daily in this period. 
You still observe the ~rop in the number of 
dead and injured when you compare the num-
bers of the week before 12th September and the 
last week. The effectiveness of the state 
security forces is increasing. To sum up, ins-
tead of 10.2 people daily, 1.2 die nowadays, 
including terrorists. 
TABLE 1 
Anarchist and terrorist incidents 
In In In the week i 
20 provinces 67 provinces before 
In t* last in 21 months in 5 months 12.9.80 wee in The decrease 
Terrorist incidents 26.12.78 12.9.80 in 67 pr vinces in the number 
to 11.9.80 to 16.2.81 20 provinces of incidents 
% 
Total Daily Total Daily Total Daily Total Daily 
average average average average 
Armed assault 9,085 15 464 2.9 220 31.4 11 I 1.6 95 
! 
Explosive throwing 6,365 10 311 2 127 18.1 6 0.9 95 
Graffito and leaflet distri-
bution 6,893 11 ~,300 14.6 225 32,1 37 5.2 84 
Armed robbery 3,014 5 696 4.4 67 9.6 34 4.8 49 
TOTAL 25,357 41 ~,771 23.9 639 91.2 88 12.5 86 
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TABLE 2 
In 20 provinces In 67 provinces In the last in 5 months in 20 months 12.9.80 week in 
Deaths 26.12.78 to 11.9.80 to 16.2.81 67 provinces 
Total Daily 
average 
State security forces 164 0.3 
Terrorists 147 0.2 
Civilians 3,399 5.5 
TOTAL 3,710 6 
Wounded 10,417 17 
At the top of Table 3, you see the number 
of detainees, arrested and sentenced in the 
periods before and after 12th September. 
In the last week, 1 ,588 people were detain-
ed, 1,180 arrested. The number sentenced is 
227. 
TABLE 3 
In In 
20 provinces 67 provinces In 
n 20 month in 5 months the last 
26.12.78 12.9.80 week 
to 11.9.80 to 16.2.81 
Detained 62,100 46,833 1,588 
Arrested 21,205 14,505 1,180 
Sentenced 6,097 3,480 227 
At present: 
Detained 5,788 Extreme leftists 78% 
Extreme rightists 12 % 
Arrested 15,929 Separatists 10% 
Parliamentarians 33 
Arrested 
Unionists 302 
In the week Total Daily Total Daily before 12.9.80 average average 
Total Daily 
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average 
6 0.9 42 0.3 - -
5 0.7 115 0.7 4 0.6 
60 8.6 149 0.9 4 0.6 
71 10.2 306 1.9 8 1.2 
142 20.3 507 3.2 13 1.9 
At present, we have 5,788 detainees and 
15,929 under arrest. 78% of these are extreme 
leftists, 12 % are extreme rightists and 10 % 
separatists. 
The number of arrested parliamentarians 
is 33 (10 Nationalist Movement, 16 National 
Salvation Party, 7 Republican People's Party). 
302 unionists have been arrested because of 
their involvement with the extreme leftists and 
rightists (290 DISK, 12 Independents). 
TABLE 4 
Allegations of torture and violence 
Number of Cases 58 
People involved 84 
Number of cases under investigation 32 
Number of cases decided on 26 
No need for initiating criminal pro-
ceedings 13 
Criminal proceedings initiated 13 
Number of people prosecuted 27 
Arrested 11 
Summoned 15 
Acquitted 1 
APPENDIX 11 
In Table 4, you see that the number of tor-
ture and violence allegations reached 58. Of 
these cases, 32 are under investigation, 26 have 
been decided on. The Public Prosecutor ruled 
that there was no need to initiate criminal pro-
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ceedings on 13 cases. Criminal proceedings 
have been initiated on the other 13 cases; 
because of their involvement, 27 people have 
been prosecuted. Of these, 11 were arrested, 
15 summoned, I found notl guilty. 
TABLE 5 
Handed over to Confiscated by the authorities the authorities 
Weapons and explosives In the period In the period i In the last between between 
12.9.80 and 17.10.80 12.9.80 and 16.2.81 week 
Pistols 
Automatic pistols 
Rifles 
Ammunition 
Explosives (in kg) 
Hand grenades, bombs 
Powder (in kg) 
Ignition cords (in m) 
Fuses 
Mortars 
Cutting and prodding weapons 
In the first column of Table 5, you see the 
number of weapons and explosives handed over 
to the authorities by the people in observance 
of a law passed after 12th September concern-
ing the weapons and explosives without a 
warranty. 
In the second cplumn, you observe the 
number of weapons and explosives confiscated 
after 12th September. 
On the right, you may observe the number 
of weapons and ammunition confiscated in the 
last week. 
You can easily equip an army with the 
weapons, ammunition and explosives on this 
chart. 
The aims of the anarchist and terrorist acti-
vities in Turkey is to weaken and divide the 
country, to separate it from NATO and join it 
with another bloc. 
132,552 12,633 1,485 
2,474 220 14 
25,144 3,883 181 
635,707 425,784 23,410 
2,977 3,338 592 
21 - -
2,110 - -
I ,569 - -
18,647 - -
I I -
17,495 653 14 
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Anarchy and terroristq in Turkey to a great 
extent are being fed and l~d by similar organi-
sations outside of Turkey. The similar terro-
rist organisations aiming at the destruction of 
the country are formed in the countries where 
the majority of the Turkish workers live. 
These organisations h~ve been formed with 
the financial support of !the similar interna-
tional terrorist organisations and continue their 
activities with their help.· Certainly, they are 
under the directions of these international terro-
rist organisations in return. 
The Turkish workers and their families and 
the students, the majority of whom live in the 
Federal Republic of Germfiny, the Netherlands 
and Belgium, are being ir)doctrinated in these 
countries by the terrorist organisations and sent 
to Turkey for terrorist activities. The terrorists 
who have committed crimes and are pursued by 
the Turkish security forces are being protected 
and solicited by these organisations outside of 
the country. 
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Unfounded or small-scale terrorist inci-
dents in Turkey have been exaggerated by 
similar terrorist organisations and world public 
opinion has been deceived. 
The leaflets and documents aimed at terro-
rist activities have been smuggled into the 
country by these organisations. Subversive 
propaganda broadcasts have been directed to 
Turkey by their radios. For examples, Radio 
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Moscow, the Voice of Turkish Communist 
Party Radio Tiran, Communist Bizim Radio 
located in the German Democratic Republic 
have 86 hours of Turkish broadcasts monthly. 
It is a pity that some documents and letters 
confiscated from the terrorists show some kind 
of a tie between some parliamentarians of the 
European countries and the terrorists in Tur-
key, especially in the field of allegations of 
torture and violence. 
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APPENDIX Ill 
NATO military command structure -Elements in the Mediterranean and adjoining area 
North Atlantic Council (Brussels) and Defence Planning Committee 
I 
Military Committee and International Military Staff (Brussels) 
I 
I I I 
Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, 
SACLANT (Norfolk, Virginia) 
Commander Iberian 
Atlantic Area, 
COMIBERLANT 
( Oeiras, Portup;al) 
Island Commander 
Madeira 
Gibraltar 
Mediterranean Area, 
GIBMED 
(Gibraltar) 
I 
Commander Allied Naval 
Forces Southern Europe, 
COMNA VSOUTH 
(Naples) 
I 
Commander Naval 
Striking and 
Support Forces 
Southern Europe 
(Naples) 
Western Mediterranean 
Area, MEDOC (formerly 
Toulon, now 
exercised by 
NAVSOUTH directly) 
Key : chain of command 
-------new commands 
being negotiated 
------eo-located headquarters 
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Supreme Allied Commander Europe, 
SACEUR (Casteau, Belgium) 
Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces 
Southern Europe, 
CINC~OUTH (Naples, Italy) 
Commander Land 
Forces Southern 
Europe (Verona) 
COMLANDSOUTH 
Commander 5th ATAF 
(Vicenza) 
I 
Commander Air l•'orce,; 
Southern Europe 
COMAIRSOUTil 
(Naples) 
Commander 6th A'J.lAF 
(Izmir) 
I 
Commander Lanu 
Forces South-Eastern 
Europe,· 
COMLANDSOUTHEAST 
(Izmir) 
I 
Central Mediterranean 
Area, MEDCENT 
(Naples) 
North Eastern 
Mediterranean Area, 
MEDNOREAST 
(Ankara) 
Maritime Air 
Mediterranean, 
MARAIRMED 
(Naples) 
Eao~tern Mediterranean 
Area, MEDEAST 
(Athens) 
South Eastern 
Mediterranean Area, 
MEDSOUEAST 
(formerly Malta, now 
exercised 
hy NAVSOUTH directl,y) 
Submarines 
Mediterranean 
SUBMED (Naples) 
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Document 876 
Amendments 1, 2, 3 and 4 
European security and the Mediterranean 
AMENDMENTS 1, 2, 3 and 41 
tabled by Mr. Dejardin 
1. Before paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert: 
15th June 1981 
" (i) Reaffirming its unswerving attachment to the values of parliamentary and pluralist demo-
cracy, the result of free elections by universal suffrage, and to the fundamental freedoms set out 
in the European Convention of Human Rights;". 
2. Replace paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation by the following: 
"(vi) Believing that the maintenance and the strengthening of present links between Turkey 
and the various Atlantic and European institutions depend on true and steady progress being 
made towards the early restoration of democracy in Turkey in the interests of that country and 
of the Alliance,". 
3. Leave out paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper and insert: 
"2. To increase mutual assistance for the modernisation of the military potential of the 
Alliance in the eastern area of the Mediterranean with particular regard to the quality and level 
of armaments of neighbouring countries ; ". 
4. Delete paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper. 
1. See 3rd Sitting, 16th June 1981 (Amendments negatived). 
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Signed: Dejardin 
Document 876 
Amendment 5 
European security and the Mediterranean 
AMENDMENT 51 
tabled by MM. Gessner, Stoffelen and Urwin 
15th June 1981 
5. In paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out" and defence planning". 
Signed: Gessner, Stoffelen, Urwin 
1. See 3rd Sitting, 16th June 1981 (Amendment agreed to). 
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Document 876 
Amendment 6 
European security and the Mediterranean 
AMENDMENT 61 
tabled by Mr. Cavaliere 
6. After paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, insert a new paragraph: 
"To concert allied policy on the supply of armaments to third countries;". 
1. See 3rd Sitting, 16th June 1981 (Amendment agreed to). 
172 
15th June 1981 
Document 876 
Amendment 7 
European security and the Mediterranean 
AMENDMENT 71 
tabled by MM. Urwin, Stoffelen and Hardy 
15th June 1981 
7. In paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave o111t "even the streng-
thening". 
Signed: Ur[win, Stoffelen, Hardy 
1. See 3rd Sitting, 16th June 1981 (Amendment agreed to). 
173 
Document 876 
Amendments 8, 9 and 10 
European security and the Mediterranean 
AMENDMENTS 8, 9 and 10 1 
tabled by MM. Bernini, Martino and Antoni 
15th June 1981 
8. After paragraph (iv) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert a new paragraph: 
" Considering that the serious bombardment of the nuclear plant in Iraq by the Israelis is an 
act to be condemned and which increases the danger of war in the Middle East and that the 
justifications invoked by the Israeli authorities are unfounded ; ". 
9. After paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, insert: 
"To encourage international and regional agreements, with the partiCipation of the great 
powers, to restrict and control sales of arms to countries in the area, particularly those at war, 
to facilitate the peaceful settlement of disputes between states, respecting their independence 
and interests and guaranteeing mutual security;". 
10. After paragraph 7 of the draft recommendation proper, insert: 
"To support the immediate resumption of negotiations on the Middle East which have become 
even more urgent after the Israeli attack on the nuclear plant in Iraq, in order to find a fair 
solution to the crisis based on sure and guaranteed frontiers for all states, including the state of 
Israel, on the right of the Palestinian people to a homeland and on the unity and independence 
of Lebanon ; ". 
I. See 3rd Sitting, 16th June 1981 (Amendments negatived). 
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Signed: Bernini, Martino, Antoni 
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Draft Resolution 
on the revision of the Charter and of the Rules of Procedure 
of the Assembly 
The Assembly, 
DECIDES 
To adopt the revision of the Charter and of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly as set out in 
Document 877 presented by the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges. 
1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Grieve (Chairman); 
MM. Cornelissen (Alternate), Stotfelen (Alternate) (Vice-
Chairmen); MM. Battaglia, Bozzi (Alternate: Grussen-
meyer), Brasseur, Edwards (Alternate: Cox), Giust, Glesener, 
Lord Hughes (Alternate: Durant), Mr. van Hulst, Mrs. 
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Knight (Alternate: Osborn), MM. Lagourgue, Michel 
(Alternate: Tanghe), Mondino, Pignion, Schmidt (Alternate: 
Vohrer), Schulte, Spies von Biil/esheim, Sterpa, Unland, 
Voogd. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are 
printed in italics. 
DOCUMENT 8 77 
Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Grieve, Chairman and Rapporteur) 
1. The provisions of Article Ill, paragraph 
(a), of the Charter and of Rule 2, paragraph 3, 
of the Rules of Procedure, which link WEU 
Assembly sessions with those of the Parliament-
ary Assembly of the Council of Europe, have 
become obsolete. 
2. The same is true of the provisions of 
Article V, paragraphs (d) and (e), of the Charter 
and Rule 27, paragraphs 1 and 3, of the Rules 
of Procedure on certain time limits. 
3. The Committee considered that Rules 26 
and 27 on the order of debates and the debate 
on the annual report should be revised in the 
light of current procedure. 
In practice, the general debate does not 
precede but follows examination in Committee. 
4. The revision of the Rules of Procedure 
includes a more detailed definition of the rules 
relating to amendments (Rule 29) and proce-
dural motions (Rule 32). 
Rule 29 
5. This rule has been completely rewritten 
but the new text contains only two additions of 
substance: 
- it is specified that amendments shall 
relate to only one paragraph at a time 
(paragraph 3); 
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- the notion of amendments to amend-
ments is introduced and rules given 
(paragraph 7). 
Rule 32 
6. This rule has been completely rewritten. 
The new text contains the following changes: 
- the previous question and points of 
order are defined and rules given; 
- in addition to matters previously 
provided for, procedural motions may 
also be tabled to move the suspension 
of the sitting and reference back to 
Committee; 
- it is specified that no procedural 
motion may be moved more than once 
during the course of a debate. 
7. Most of the other changes adopted are 
purely matters ofform or are self-explanatory. 
8. In the new text, the word "Represen-
tative" is used only in the strict sense. When-
ever appropriate, the te"t uses the expression 
"Representative or Substitute". 
9. Finally, for the sake of clarity, the 
expression "absolute majority of Represent-
atives" has been replaced by the full definition 
of this majority. 
-..1 
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CHARTER OF THE ASSEMBLY 
(Articles Ill and V) 
Ill. Sessions of the Assembly 
(a) The Assembly shall meet in Ordinary Session as 
often as the fulfilment of its functions may require, and 
not less than once in the course of any calendar year. 
The dates and duration of sessions shall be fixed, 
wherever possible, either immediately to precede or 
immediately to follow the sessions of the Consultative 
Assembly. 
(b) The Assembly may be convened in Extraordinary 
Session by the President, either on his own initiative or 
following a request by the Council or by not less than a 
quarter of the Representatives. 
V. Powers of the Assembly 
(a) The Assembly may make Recommendations or 
transmit Opinions to the Council on any matter conson-
ant with the aims and falling within the terms of refer-
ence of Western European Union. Resolutions may 
be adopted in cases where this form is considered more 
appropriate. When so directed by the Assembly, the 
President shall transmit such Resolutions to interna-
tional organisations, Governments and -national par-
liaments. 
(b) The Assembly shall consider reports transmitted 
to it by the Council, in particular concerning the acti-
vities of the Agency for the Control of Armaments and 
of the Standing Armaments Committee. 
CHANGES PROPOSED 
Paragraph (a), second sub-paragraph, read: 
" The dates and duration of sessions or part-sessions 
shall be fixed by the Presidential Committee and imme-
diately brought to the attention of Representatives and 
Substitutes. " 
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(c) The report from the Council on the activities of 
Western European Union in other spheres dealt with in 
the annual report transmitted to the Consultative 
Assembly shall be considered by the Western European 
Union Assembly in cases where this is considered 
necessary. 
(d) The Clerk shall communicate the reports men-
tioned in paragraph (b) above, together with the neces-
sary documentation relating to the detailed subjects with 
which they deal, to all Representatives at least six weeks 
before the opening of the session at which they are to be 
considered. 
(e) Meetings of the appropriate Committees shall be 
held four weeks before the opening of the Session. 
These Committees may formulate questions, which shall 
be transmitted by the President of the Assembly to the 
Council. 
A reply may be postponed or omitted for reasons of 
European public interest. The text of the questions put 
to the Council and of the replies thereto shall be 
included in the preliminary reports of the Committees 
to the Assembly. 
(f) T~e Chairman of the Council shall be invited by 
the Prestdent to make an oral presentation of the report 
to the ~ssembly. ~fter presentation of the report, Rep-
resentatives may ratse matters in the course of debate to 
which the Chairman of the Council may reply. ' 
(g) The reply of the Assembly to the report shall be 
adopted by simple majority. It may include Recom-
mendations to the Council. 
Paragraph (d), read: 
" (d) The Clerk shall send a copy of the Annual 
Report of the Council of Western European Union to 
each Representative and Substitute, together with 
related documents. " 
Paragraph (e), read: 
" (e) Meetings of the appropriate Committees shall be 
held before the opening or resumption of the Session. 
These Committees may formulate questions, which 
shall be transmitted by the President of the Assembly to 
the Council. The text of the questions put to the 
Council and of the replies thereto shall be included in 
reports of the Committees to the Assembly. 
If a reply is postponed or omitted for reasons of 
European public interest, the question shall be pub-
lished with a statement of the reasons given by the 
Council which deferred or prevented the publication of 
a reply." 
(h) A motion to disagree to the content of the report, 
or to a part of the report, shall be tabled in writing by at 
least ten Representatives. 
The adoption of such a motion, which shall not be 
put to the vote until at least 24 hours after it has been 
tabled, shall require a majority of the Representatives to 
the Assembly. 
(i) In addition to the provisions laid down in para-
graph (f) above Representatives may, through the Presi-
dent, put questions in writing to the Council on any 
matter relevant to the Brussels Treaty, to the Protocols 
thereto and on any matter submitted to the Assembly 
for an Opinion. The text of such questions and of the 
replies thereto shall be printed and circulated as Assem-
bly papers. 
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RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE ASSEMBLY 
PART I 
Composition of the Assembly 
RULE 1 
1. The Assembly shall be composed of Representa-
tives of the Brussels Treaty Powers to the Consultative 
Assembly of the Council of Europe. 
2. In accordance with Article 26 of the Statute of the 
Council of Europe, seats are allocated in the Assembly 
as follows: 
Belgium: 
France: 
Federal Republic of Germany: 
Italy: 
Luxembourg: 
Netherlands: 
United Kingdom: 
PART 11 
Sessions of the Assembly 
RuLE 2 
Date and duration of Sessions 
7 
18 
18 
18 
3 
7 
18 
1. The Assembly shall meet in Ordinary Session as 
often as the fulfilment of its functions may require, and 
not less than once in the course of any calendar year. 
2. An Ordinary Session may be divided into two or 
more parts. 
CHANGES PROPOSED 
Paragraph 1, first line, read: 
" ... composed of the Representatives ... ". 
Second line, read: 
"Parliamentary" instead of "Consultative". 
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3. The dates and duration of sessions or part-sessions 
shall be fixed, wherever possible, either immediately to 
precede or immediately to follow the sessions of the 
Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. 
4. The Bureau shall inform Representatives and Sub-
stitutes of the dates of the opening or resumption of an 
Ordinary Session not less than six weeks beforehand. 
RULE 3 
Extraordinary Sessions 
The Assembly may be convened in Extraordinary 
Session by the President, either on his own initiative or 
following a request by the Council or by not less than a 
quarter of the Representatives. 
RULE 41 
Seat of the Assembly 
(a) The seat of the Assembly is at Paris. 
(b) Sessions of the Assembly shall be held at the seat 
of the Assembly unless the Bureau of the Assembly 
decides otherwise. 
RULE 5 
Provisional President 
1. At the beginning of each Ot-dinary SessiGn the 
oldest Representative present shall discharge the duties 
of President until the election of the President has been 
announced. 
1. Rule amended on 4th December 1963 (Resolution 22 of the 
Assembly). 
Paragraphs 3 and 4, read: 
"3. The dates and duration of sessions or part-
sessions shall be fixed by the Presidential Committee 
and immediately brought to the attention of members of 
the Assembly. 
4. The Presidential Committee shall inform Repre-
sentatives and Substitutes of the dates of the opening or 
resumption of an Ordinary Session not less than six 
weeks beforehand." 
Paragraph 1. second line, read: 
"oldest Representative or Substitute present shall ... ". 
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2. No discussion may take place while the oldest 
Representative is in the Chair unless it is concerned 
with the election of the President, or with the election 
or the report of the Credentials Committee. 
RULE 61 
Ratification of Credentials 
1. In a session beginning after that of the Consultative 
Assembly of the Council of Europe, the credentials of 
Representatives and Substitutes shall be attested by the 
statement of the ratification of credentials formally 
communicated to the President of the Assembly by the 
President of the Consultative Assembly. 
2. In a session beginning before that of the Consul-
tative Assembly, the credentials shall be ratified by the 
Assembly subject to conformity with the subsequent 
ratification by the Consultative Assembly, on the basis 
of the official documents supplied either by the Presi-
dent of the Consultative Assembly or by the Govern-
ments of Member States. 
3. A Committee of five Representatives chosen by lot 
shall examine these credentials and shall report at once 
to the Assembly. 
1. Rule amended on 5th July 1958 (Resolution 10 of the Assembly). 
English only, paragraph 2, second line, read: 
"Representative or Substitute is in the Chair ... ". 
Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, read: 
"1. The credentials of Representatives and Substitutes 
shall be attested by the statement of the ratification of 
credentials formally communicated to the President of 
the Assembly by the President of the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe. 
2. If the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe has been unable to ratify the credentials, the 
WEU Assembly shall ratify them on the basis of the 
official documents supplied either by the President of 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
or by the Parliaments or Governments of member States 
subject to conformity with the subsequent ratification by 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. 
3. A Committee of five Representatives or Substitutes 
chosen by lot may examine these credentials and report 
at once to the Assembly." 
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4. Any Representative or Substitute whose credentials 
are contested may take his seat provisionally with the 
same rights as other Representatives and Substitutes 
until the Assembly has made a decision on his case. 
RULE 71 
Substitutes and Alternates 
1. Any Representative prevented from attending a 
sitting of the Assembly may be replaced by a Substitute. 
2. Substitutes duly registered in accordance with Rule 
24 have the same rights as Representatives in the 
Assembly. 
Substitutes may not, however, be elected to the 
Bureau of the Assembly .. 
3. A Substitute who is a Committee Chairman or 
Rapporteur may speak in that capacity, even if he is not 
sitting in place of a Representative. In the latter case, 
however, he shall not be entitled to vote. 
4. Representatives and Substitutes may sit on 
Committees either as titular members or as alternates. 
Any titular member who is prevented from attending 
a meeting may appoint an alternate from among the 
alternate members of the Committee of the same natio-
1. Rule amended on lst December 1980 (Resolution 65 of the 
Assembly). 
Add at the end of paragraph 4: 
" ... Alternates may not however be elected to the Bureau 
of a Committee." 
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nality as himself. With the consent of the Chairman of 
the Committee, he may also be replaced by any other 
Representative or Substitute of the same nationality as 
himself. 
The alternate so appointed shall have the same rights 
as the titular member. 
Duration of term of office of Representatives 
and Substitutes 
1. The term of office of Representatives and Substi-
tutes shall take effect from the date of the communica-
tion of the statement of the ratification of the credentials 
by the President of the Consultative Assembly, or from 
the date of their appointment by Member States if the 
Session of the Assembly precedes that of the Consul-
tative Assembly and subject to the ratification of the 
credentials by the Consultative Assembly. 
2. The term of office shall end in accordance with the 
rules of the Consultative Assembly whether a seat is 
vacated through parliamentary elections or through 
death, or resignation or through invalidation by the 
Consultative Assembly. 
3. The Presidential Committee may, during the 
periods between sessions or part-sessions, provisionally 
fill the seats which have fallen vacant in committees 
with Representatives or Substitutes. These appoint-
ments must be ratified at the first session of the 
Assembly. 
I. Rule amended on 5th July I 958 (Resolution 10 of the Assembly). 
Paragraph 1, fourth, sixth and eighth lines, read: 
"Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe" 
instead of "Consultative Assembly". 
Paragraph 2, second line, read: 
"Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe" 
instead of "Consultative Assembly". 
-00 
Vl 
RULE 9 
Bureau of the Assembly 
1. The Bureau of the Assembly shall consist of the 
President and six Vice-Presidents. 
2. The Bureau shall be elected after the credentials of 
the Representatives and Substitutes have been examined 
in accordance with the provisions of Rule 6. 
RULE 10 
Election of the Bureau 
1. The Bureau shall be elected once a year at the 
beginning of each Ordinary Session. 
2. No Representative may stand as a candidate for the 
offices of President or Vice-President unless a proposal 
for his candidature has been sponsored in writing by 
three or more Representatives. 
3. The President and Vice-Presidents shall be elected 
by secret ballot. Two tellers chosen by lot shall count 
the votes cast. 
4. The President shall first be elected. If after two 
ballots no candidate has obtained an absolute majority 
of the Representatives to the Assembly, the candidate 
who on the third ballot receives the greatest number of 
- votes -Shall be -declared elected. In the event of a tie, 
the candidate senior in age shall be declared elected. 
5. As soon as the President has been elected, the 
oldest Representative shall leave the Chair. 
6. The six Vice-Presidents shall then be elected on 
the same ballot paper. Those who on the first ballot 
Add at the beginning of paragraph 3: 
"Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 4 and 6 
below, ... " 
Add at the end of paragraph 4: 
"If there is only one candidate and there are no objec-
tions, the single candidate shall be declared elected." 
English only, paragraph 5, second line, read: 
"oldest Representative or Substitute shall leave the 
Chair." 
obtain a majority of the Representatives to the Assem-
bly shall be declared elected. If the number of those 
elected is less than the number of vacancies to be filled, 
a second ballot for the candidates not elected shall be 
held following the same procedure. If a third ballot is 
necessary, those candidates who then receive the greatest 
number of votes cast shall be declared elected to the 
vacancies still to be filled. In the event of a tie, the 
candidates senior in age shall be declared elected. 
7. The Vice-Presidents shall take precedence in 
accordance with the order in which they have been 
elected and, in the event of a tie, by age. 
8. The President and Vice-Presidents shall remain in 
office until the opening of the next Ordinary Session. 
9. (a) Should it be necessary for the President or a 
Vice-President to be replaced when the Assem-
bly is in session, his successor shall be elected 
in accordance with the above provisions. 
(b) Should it be necessary for the President or a 
Vice-President to be replaced when the Assem-
bly is not in session, the following procedure 
shall be followed until the election provided for 
in sub-paragraph (a) can take place. 
If it is the chairof the President of the Assem-
bly which becomes vacant, the senior Vice-
President shall exercise the functions of the 
President. 
The national group of Representatives to which 
the Representative who has ceased to be the 
President, or a Vice-President, belonged shall 
be invited to nominate a candidate of the same 
political tendency as his predecessor. This 
candidature shall be ratified by the Presidential 
Paragraph 6, ninth and tenth lines, delete: 
"to the vacancies still to be filled". 
At the end of paragraph 6, add: 
"If the number of candidates does not exceed the 
number of posts to be filled and there are no objections, 
the candidates shall be declared elected." 
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Committee, which shall for this purpose 
include the Chairmen of the political groups 
which have been formed in accordance with 
the provisions of Rule 38. After such ratifica-
tion, the Representative in question shall 
become a member of the Bureau and shall sit 
with the same rights as a Vice-President of the 
Assembly. 
10. Representatives who are members of Govern-
ments are not eligible for nomination for the Bureau. 
PART Ill 
Duties of the President and maintenance of order 
RULE 11 
President 
1. The duties of the President shall be: to open, 
suspend and close sittings, to propose at the end of each 
sitting the date, time and Orders of the Day of the next 
sitting, to guide the debates of the Assembly, to ensure 
the observance of the Rules, to maintain order, to call 
on speakers, to close debates, to put questions to the 
vote and announce the result of votes, and to refer 
communications to the appropriate committees. 
2. The President shall neither speak in debate nor 
vote; his Substitute may sit, speak and vote in his place. 
3. When so directed by the Assembly, the President 
shall transmit Resolutions to international organisa-
tions, Governments and national parliaments. 
Paragraph 10, read: 
"10. Representatives who are members of Govern-
ments shall not be members of the Bureau." 
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RULE 12 
Vice- Presidents 
1. If the President is absent or unable to discharge his 
duties, he shall be replaced by one of the Vice-
Presidents. 
2. The Substitute of the Vice-President who is acting 
as President may sit in the Assembly and speak and 
vote in his place. 
RuLE 13 
Maintenance of Order 
1. The President shall call to order any Represen-
tative who departs from it. 
2. If the offence is repeated, the President shall again 
call the Representative to order and cause the fact to be 
recorded in the Minutes of Proceedings. 
3. In the event of a further offence, the President may 
exclude the offender from the Chamber for the remain-
der of the sitting. 
4. In serious cases the President may propose that the 
Assembly pass a vote of censure, which shall involve 
immediate exclusion from the Chamber for a period 
from two to five days. The Representative upon whom 
a vote of censure is proposed shall always have the right 
to be heard. 
5. The vote of censure shall be taken without debate. 
6. It shall be forbidden to make use of words or 
expressions which are contrary to the good conduct of 
debates. Without prejudice to his other rights for the 
maintenance of order, the President may cause such 
Paragraph 1, end of first line, read: 
" ... Representative or Substitute who ... ". 
Paragraph 2, second line, read: 
"call the Representative or Substitute to order ... ". 
Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5, read: 
"3. In the event of a further offence (other than an 
offence to which Rule 31 (4) applies), the President may 
exclude the offender from the Chamber for the 
remainder of the sitting. 
4. In serious cases the President may propose that the 
Representative or Substitute who committed the offence 
be censured and excluded from the Chamber for a 
period not exceeding four days. The Representative or 
Substitute upon whom a vote of censure is proposed 
shall always have the right to be heard. 
5. After the Representative or Substitute concerned 
has been heard, if he has exercised his right, the vote of 
censure shall be taken without debate." 
-00 
1.0 
words to be deleted from the Official Report of 
debates. He shall have similar power as regards any 
intervention by a Representative who has not obtained 
prior permission to speak or who exceeds the time that 
may have been allotted to speakers. 
RULE 14 
The Presidential Committee 
1. The Presidential Committee shall consist of the 
President of the Assembly, who shall be Chairman ex 
officio, former Presidents of the Assembly who are 
Representatives to the Assembly, the Vice-Presidents, 
and the Chairmen of the permanent Committees. If 
absent, or unable to discharge his duties, the President 
may be replaced by one of the Vice-Presidents of the 
Assembly, and the Chairman of a permanent Commit-
tee by a Vice-Chairman of that Committee. The Presi-
dent may invite the Chairmen of the political groups to 
attend meetings of the Presidential Committee1• 
2. In between sessions or part-sessions and subject to 
subsequent ratification by the Assembly, the Presidential 
Committee shall take all such measures as it considers 
necessary for the activities of the Assembly to be pro-
perly carried on2. 
RULE 15 
Public order in the Chamber and Galleries 
1. No person shall enter the Chamber for any reason 
except Representatives and Substitutes, Ministers who 
I. Paragraph amended on lOth December 1969 (Resolution 44 of 
the Assembly). 
2. Paragraph added on 5th July 1958 (Resolution 10 of the 
Assembly). 
Paragraph 6, third line before the end, read: 
"by a Representative or Substitute who has not ... ". 
Paragraph 1, fourth line, read: 
"Representatives or Substitutes to the Assembly, ... ". 
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are members of the Council of Western European 
Union, other Ministers of Member States and officials 
whose duties require their presence there. 
2. Only persons provided with a card granting right of 
access duly issued by the Clerk may be admitted to the 
Galleries. 
3. Members of the public admitted to the Galleries 
shall remain seated and in silence. Any person 
expressing approval or disapproval shall be ejected at 
once by the ushers. 
PARTlY 
Agenda of Sessions 
RULE 16 
Register of items submitted to the Assembly 
1. There shall be a Register of the Assembly which 
shall contain the following items: 
(a) The Reports of the Council of Western European 
Union; 
(b) Communications from the Council; 
(c) Communications addressed to the Assembly by 
national. supranational or international organisa-
tions; 
(d) Motions accepted for inclusion in the Register in 
accordance with the provisions of Rule 28 below. 
2. Any item referred to a Committee shall also be 
included in the Assembly's Register. 
3. Subject to the provisions of Rule 26 below, the 
Presidential Committee shall refer the documents men-
tioned in paragraph 1 of this Rule to the appropriate 
Committee for examination ; the President shall submit 
Paragraphs 2 and 3, read: 
"2. Any item referred to a Committee by decision of 
the Assembly or of the Presidential Committee shall 
also be included in the Assembly's Register. 
3. The Presidential Committee shall refer the 
documents mentioned in paragraph 1 of this rule to the 
appropriate Committee for examination. Such docu-
ments may be referred to any other Committee for an 
opinion." 
such reference for ratification by the Assembly at its 
next sitting. Such documents may be referred to any 
other Committee for an opinion. 
4. The Assembly may, at the request of the Commit-
tee concerned, remove an item from its Register. 
5. The Assembly shall determine its agenda, having 
due regard to the provisions of Article I of the Charter. 
RULE 17 
Settlement of the Agenda 
1. The Bureau shall prepare for each Session or part-
Session a draft Agenda which it shall submit to the Pre-
sidential Committee. 
2. Any item on the Assembly's Register may be 
placed on the draft Agenda. 
3. On the basis of the draft prepared by the Bureau, 
the Presidential Committee shall adopt the Agenda for 
the next Session or part-Session and fix the date of the 
opening or resumption of the Session. The Agenda 
shall be communicated to Representatives and Substi-
tutes at the same time as the date of the opening or 
resumption of the Session. 
4. The Agenda thus adopted may only be altered in 
accordance with the provisions of Rule 43 below. 
RULE 18 
Order of business 
1. So far as circumstances permit, the Bureau shall 
draw up a draft order of business for each Session or 
part-Session showing at which sittings the various items 
on the Agenda will be discussed. 
English only, paragraph 5, first line, read: 
"Register" instead of "agenda". 
Delete paragraphs 1 and 2. 
Paragraph 3 becomes paragraph 1 and reads: 
"1. Taking into consideration the register of items 
submitted to the Assembly, the Presidential Committee 
shall adopt the Agenda for the next part-session and 
have it communicated to the Representatives and 
Substitutes forthwith." 
Paragraph 4 becomes paragraph 2 and reads: 
"2. The Agenda thus adopted may be altered by the 
Presidential Committee prior to the opening of the 
session or by the Assembly during the session in accor-
dance with Rules 32 and 43 below. Any change in the 
Agenda made before the opening of the session shall be 
brought immediately to the attention of Representatives 
and Substitutes." 
Paragraph 1, read: 
"1. So far as circumstances permit, the Presidential 
Committee shall, not less than two weeks before each 
session or part-session, draw up a draft order of 
business showing at which sittings the various items on 
the Agenda will be discussed." 
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2. The draft order of business shall be sent to Repre-
sentatives and Substitutes and shall be submitted to the 
Assembly at its first Sitting. 
PART V 
Use of languages and publicity of debates 
RuLE 19 
Languages of the Assembly 
1. (a) Speeches in the Assembly may be made in the 
official languages of Member States. The 
Secretariat shall provide simultaneous interpre-
tation of these speeches into the other official 
languages. 
(b) Speeches in Committee may be made in the 
official languages of Member States. The 
Secretariat shall provide simultaneous interpre-
tation of these speeches into French and 
English. 
2. Documents of the Assembly and its Committees 
shall be published in French and English. 
3. Documents of the Assembly and its Committees 
possessing exceptional public interest shall be published 
in languages other than French and English, if the 
Assembly so decides. 
RULE 20 
Publicity of Debates 
Debates of the Assembly shall be held in public, 
unless the Assembly decides otherwise. 
RULE 21 
Minutes of Proceedings 
1. The Minutes of Proceedings of each sitting con-
taining the decisions of the Assembly and the names of 
Paragraph 2, read: 
"2. The draft order of business shall be sent immedi-
ately to Representatives and Substitutes and shall be 
submitted to the Assembly at its first sitting for its 
approval, with or without amendment." 
Delete paragraphs 1 and 2. 
---· 
speakers shall be distributed at least half-an-hour before 
the opening of the following sitting. 
2. At the beginning of each sitting the President shall 
lay before the Assembly the Minutes of Proceedings of 
the preceding sitting. The Minutes of Proceedings of 
the last sitting of a session shall be submitted to the 
Assembly for approval before the ~lose of the Session. 
If no objection is raised to the Minutes of Proceed-
ings, they shall be declared agreed to. 
3. If the Minutes of Proceedings are challenged, the 
Assembly shall, if necessary, vote on the changes 
requested. Should any such change be agreed to, a 
statement shall be made thereof in the Minutes of 
Proceedings of the current sitting. 
4. The Minutes of Proceedings shall be printed, 
signed by the President and the Clerk and preserved in 
the archives of the Assembly. 
RULE 22 
Reports of Debates 
1. A report of debates at each Sitting shall be com-
piled in French and English and distributed within as 
short a period as possible. A speech delivered in 
French or English shall be reproduced verbatim in the 
report compiled in the language in which the speech 
was delivered~ a sum_mary report of the simultaneous 
interpretation of the speech shall be incorporated in the 
report compiled in the other language. When a speech 
is delivered in an official language of a Member State 
other than French or English, a summary report of its 
simultaneous interpretation shall be incorporated in the 
reports compiled in French and English. 
New paragraph 1, read: 
"1. As soon as convenient after the opening of each 
sitting, the President shall submit to the Assembly the 
Minutes of Proceedings of the preceding sitting contain-
ing the decisions of the Assembly and the names of 
speakers. If no objection is raised to the Minutes of 
Proceedings, they shall be declared agreed to." 
Former paragraph 3 becomes paragraph 2. 
New paragraphs 3 and 4, read: 
"3. The Minutes of Proceedings of the last sitting of 
a session shall be submitted to the Presidential Commit-
tee at its next meeting for approval. 
4. The Minutes of Proceedings shall be printed and 
preserved in the archives of the Assembly." 
2. Speakers are required to return the reports of their 
speeches to the Office of the Clerk not later than the 
day after that on which the reports were communicated 
to them. 
3. After each Session or part-Session the reports of 
debates shall be published in full in French and English. 
PART VI 
Holding of Sittings and Rules concerning the Proceedings 
RuLE 23 
Time-table of Sittings and Orders of the Day 
1. Unless the Assembly shall otherwise decide, 
morning sittings shall be opened at ten o'clock and 
closed not later than one o'clock, and afternoon sittings 
shall be opened at three o'clock and closed not later 
than half-past six. 
2. At the end of each sitting, the Assembly shall, on 
the proposal of the President, fix the date and the 
Orders of the Day of the next Sitting. 
3. The Orders of the Day of such sittings shall be 
determined having regard to the priority of questions 
included in the Agenda of the Session, unless the 
Assembly applies urgent procedure in accordance with 
the provisions of Rule 43 below. 
RULE 24 
Register of Attendance 
Each Representative shall sign the register of atten-
dance at each sitting before taking his place. 
Paragraph 1, third line, read: 
" ... closed at one o'clock" instead of " ... closed not later 
than one o'clock". 
Fourth line, read: 
" ... closed at half-past six" instead of " ... closed not 
later than half-past six". 
Delete paragraph 3. 
Rule 24, read: 
"At each morning and afternoon sitting, each Repre-
sentative or his Substitute shall sign the register of atten-
dance in accordance with Rule 7 before taking his 
place." 
RULE 25 
Communications to the Assembly 
Immediately after the adoption of the Minutes of 
Proceedings of the previous sitting, and before passing to 
the Orders of the Day, the President shall inform the 
Assembly of any communications which concern it. 
RULE 26 
Order of Debates 
1. Unless the Assembly decides otherwise, the exami-
nation of a particular matter in Committee shall be 
preceded by a general debate. 
2. The general debate shall deal with the matter as a 
whole and with the principle involved only. 
3. At the end of the general debate, or after having 
decided not to hold such a debate, the Assembly shall 
refer the matter to the competent Committee, together 
with any motions relating thereto. Should the Assem-
bly decide, after taking a vote by roll-call, that a matter 
shall not be referred to a Committee, consideration 
thereof shall lapse. 
4. After a matter has been referred to a Committee, 
no text relative thereto may be adopted by the Assembly 
except on the basis of the teKt of the Committee to 
which the matter has been referred. 
5. An examination of the text in detail shall take 
place on the Report of the Committee to which the 
matter has been referred. It shall not begin sooner than 
one clear day after the distribution of the Report unless 
Delete: 
"Immediately after the adoption of the Minutes of 
Proceedings of the previous sitting, and" 
Rule 26, read: 
"1. A general debate and the examination of a text 
shall take place on the Report of the Committee to 
which the matter has been referred and not sooner than 
twenty-four hours after the distribution of the Report 
unless the Assembly decides to apply the provisions of 
Rule 43 below. 
2. When examination of and voting on a text as a 
whole have been concluded and the results announced, 
Representatives or Substitutes may present explanations 
ofvotes lasting not more than three minutes." 
the Assembly applies the provisions for urgent proce-
dure contained in Rule 43 below. 
6. When the examination of the text has been con-
cluded, only explanations of vote may be made before 
the vote is taken on the text as a whole. 
~ 
RuLE 27 
Debate on the Annual Report 
1. The Clerk shall send a copy of the Annual Report 
of the Council of Western European Union to each 
Representative and Substitute, together with related 
documents, not later than forty-eight hours after its 
publication by the Council and at least six weeks before 
the opening or resumption of the Session. 
2. The Presidential Committee shall refer the Annual 
Report, if necessary by chapters, to the competent 
Committees. 
3. Meetings of the appropriate Committees shall be 
held four weeks before the opening or resumption of the 
Session. 
These Committees may formulate questions, which 
shall be transmitted by the President of the Assembly to 
the Council. The text of the questions put to the 
Council and of the replies thereto shall be included in 
preliminary reports of the Committees to the Assembly. 
If a reply is postponed or omitted for reasons of 
European public interest, the question shall be pub-
lished, with a statement of the reasons given by the 
Council which deferred or prevented the publication of 
a reply. 
4. The Chairman of the Council shall present the 
Report verbally to the Assembly, and a general debate 
Paragraphs I and 2, read: 
"1. The Clerk shall send a copy of the Annual 
Report of the Council of Western European Union to 
each Representative and Substitute, together with 
related documents. 
2. The Presidential Committee shall refer to the 
competent committees the relevant chapters of the 
Annual Report of the Council of Western European 
Union." 
Paragraph 3, first sub-paragraph, second line, delete: 
"four weeks". 
Second sub-paragraph, fifth line, delete: 
"preliminary". 
English only, paragraph 4, read: 
"4. The Chairman of the Council may present the 
Report orally to the Assembly, and a general debate ... " 
take place on the Annual Report and on the message of 
the Chairman of the Council. 
5. At the end of the general debate, the Assembly 
shall refer the Annual Report, if necessary by chapters, 
to the competent Committees, which shall make a final 
report thereon to the Assembly as soon as possible, and, 
at the latest, before the end of the Session 1• 
6. An examination in detail of the texts submitted by 
the Committees shall begin not earlier than one clear 
day after the distribution of their reports. 
7. A motion to disagree to the content of the Annual 
Report, or any part of the Report, must be signed by at 
least ten Representatives. The adoption of such a 
motion, which shall not be put to the vote until at least 
twenty-four hours after it hl).s been tabled, shall require 
support from a majority of the Representatives to the 
Assembly 2• 
RULE 28 
Motions 
1. Motions may be tabled by Representatives on any 
matter within the aim and scope of the Assembly as 
defined in Article I of the Charter. 
2. Motions must embody a concise summary of the 
subject raised and take the form of a Recommendation, 
Opinion or Resolution. They may be accompan1e(f by 
an Explanatory Memorandum. They shall be submit-
ted in writing, and be signed by at least ten Representa-
tives. 
1.- Paragraph amended on 14th October 19 57 (Resolutron 7 of the 
Assembly). 
2. Former paragraph 8 (see Resolution 7 of the Assembly). 
Delete paragraph 5. 
Paragraph 6 becomes paragraph 5 and, in second line, 
read: 
"twenty-four hours" instead of "one clear day". 
Paragraph 7 becomes paragraph 6 and reads: 
"6. A motion to disagree to the content of the 
Annual Report, or any part of the Report, must be 
signed by at least ten Representatives or Substitutes. 
The adoption of such a motion, which shall not be put 
to the vote until at least twenty-four hours after it has 
been tabled, shall require support from a number of 
Representatives or Substitutes equal to more than half 
the number of the Representatives to the Assembly." 
Paragraph 1, first line, read: 
" ... by Representatives or Substitutes" instead of "by 
Representatives". 
Paragraph 2, read: 
"2. Motions must embody a concise summary of the 
subject raised and take the form of a Recommendation, 
Opinion or Resolution. They shall be submitted in 
writing and be signed by at least ten Representatives or 
Substitutes." 
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3. The President shall decide whether such motions 
are in order. He may, if he thinks fit, refer the matter 
to the Assembly or to the Presidential Committee. 
Motions which are in order shall be printed and 
distributed immediately. 
4. When the question of including such a motion in 
the Register is put to the Assembly, the following only 
shall be heard: one speaker for the motion, one speaker 
against and the Chairman of any Committee con-
cerned 1• 
RULE 29 
Amendments 
I. Any Representative may propose and speak to 
amendments. 
2. Amendments shall relate directly to the text which 
it is sought to alter. The President shall decide whether 
they are in order. Amendments should relate only to 
the substantive text; they must be signed by their author 
and, unless proposed in the course of a debate, laid on 
the Table of the Assembly so as to leave sufficient time 
for them to be printed and distributed before they are 
discussed. 
3. Amendments shall have priority over the text to 
which they relate and shall be put to the vote before the 
text itself. 
4. If two or more contradictory amendments relate to 
the same paragraph, the amendment which differs most 
from the text of the Committee's Report shall have 
priority over the others and shall be put to the vote first. 
I. Paragraph amended on lOth December 1969 (Resolution 44 of 
the Assembly). 
English only, paragraph 4, third line, read: 
"may be heard" instead of "shall be heard". 
Rule 29, read: 
"I. Any Representative or Substitute may propose 
and speak to amendments. The President shall decide 
whether they are in order. 
2. Amendments must be signed by their author. 
Amendments tabled before the end of a sitting to a text 
which is to be debated on a future day shall be printed 
and distributed at the beginning of the next sitting. 
Amendments to a text which is to be debated or is being 
debated during the sitting of the day on which they are 
tabled shall be printed and distributed, if time permits, 
before they are due to be considered. The President 
shall have the power not to select amendments for 
consideration if, in his opinion, there has not been 
adequate time for members of the Assembly to study 
such amendments. 
3. Amendments shall relate directly to the text which 
it is sought to alter. They shall relate to only one 
paragraph at a time. 
4. Amendments shall be put to the vote before the 
text to which they relate. 
If it is agreed to, the other amendments shall be 
considered as having been thereby negatived; if it is 
negatived, the amendment next in priority shall be put 
to the vote and likewise for each of the remaining 
amendments. If the degree of priority is in doubt, the 
President shall give a ruling. 
5. Reference back to Committee may always be 
requested and shall be obligatory if requested by the 
Chairman or Rapporteur of the Committee. 
6. The reference of an amendment to Committee shall 
not necessarily interrupt the debate. The Assembly 
may fix a time-limit within which the Committee shall 
report its conclusions on the amendments which have 
been referred to it. 
RULE 30 
Orders of the Assembly 
1. Any Representative or Substitute may lay on the 
table of the Assembly a motion for an Order of the 
Assembly. The President shall decide whether such 
motions are in order. 
2. Such a motion may be put to the vote without 
being referred to Committee. 
5. If two or more amendments relate to the same 
paragraph, the amendment which differs most from the 
original text shall be put to the vote first. 
6. When several contradictory amendments are 
tabled, the President may rule that they be debated 
together, their authors speaking in turn before the 
amendments are put to the vote one by one. 
7. Amendments to amendments are in order only if 
they do not contradict the amendment; they may not 
be amended. They shall be debated after and put to 
the vote before the amendment to which they relate. 
8. Reference back to Committee may always be 
requested and shall be obligatory if requested by the 
Chairman or Rapporteur of the Committee. 
9. The reference back of an amendment to Commit-
tee shall not necessarily interrupt the debate. The 
Assembly may fix a time-limit within which the 
Committee shall report its conclusions on the amend-
ments which have been referred to it." 
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RuLE 31 
Right to speak 
1. No Representative may speak unless called upon 
to do so by the President. Representatives shall speak 
from their place and shall address the Chair; the Presi-
dent may invite them to come to the rostrum. 
2. Representatives wishing to speak shall either enter 
their names before the opening of the sitting in a 
register provided for the purpose or ask for the right to 
speak in the course of the sitting. The President may, 
in the interests of the debate, depart from the order in 
which Representatives have entered their names or have 
asked to speak. As far as possible he shall endeavour 
to call alternately upon speakers for and against the 
matter under discussion. Once begun, a speech may 
not be interrupted and resumed at the following sitting. 
3. A speaker may not be interrupted except on a 
point of order. He may, however, with the permission 
of the President, give way during his speech to allow 
another Representative to put to him a question on a 
particular point in his speech. 
4. If a speaker is irrelevant, the President shall call 
him to order. If a speaker has already been called to 
order twice in the same debate, the President may, on 
the third occasion, forbid him to speak during the 
remainder of the debate on the same subject. 
5. Members of the Council and Rapporteurs on a 
question under discussion shall be allowed to speak 
whenever they wish. 
Paragraph 1, read: 
"1. No Representative or Substitute may speak unless 
called upon to do so by the President. Representatives 
or Substitutes shall speak ... " 
Paragraph 2, first line, read: 
"2. Representatives or Substitutes wishing to ... ". 
Sixth line, read: 
"which Representatives or Substitutes have ... ". 
Paragraph 3, fourth line, read: 
"another Representative or Substitute to put... ". 
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6. A Representative who wishes to make a personal 
statement shall be heard, but only at the end of a sitting. 
7. No Representative may speak for more than five 
minutes on any of the following: explanations of vote, 
personal statements, comments on the adoption of the 
Minutes of Proceedings of the preceding sitting, deter-
mining of the Orders of the Day of a sitting and all 
questions of procedure. 
RULE 32 
Procedural Motions 
1. A Representative shall have a prior right to speak 
if he asks leave: 
(a) to call the attention of the Chair to a breach of 
order or an abuse of the Rules of the Assembly; 
(b) to move the previous question or a dilatory 
motion; 
(c) to move the adjournment of a debate; 
(d) to move the closure of a debate. 
2. The above matters shall take precedence over the 
main question, the discussion of which shall be sus-
pended while they are being considered. 
Paragraph 6, first line, read: 
"6. A Representative or Substitute who wishes ... ". 
Paragraph 7, first line, read: 
"7. No Representative or Substitute may speak ... ". 
Rule 32, read: 
1. A Representative or Substitute shall have a prior 
right to speak if he asks leave: 
(a) to move the previous question which, if adopted, 
results in the subject of the debate being removed 
from the agenda and from the register of the 
Assembly; 
(b) to move the suspension of the sitting or the 
adjournment of the debate; 
(c) to move the closure of the debate; 
(d) to move reference back to Committee. 
-previous -questions shall be notified to the President 
before the opening of the sitting and put to the vote 
immediately after the presentation of the relevant 
Committee report. 
None of these procedural motions may be moved 
more than once during the course of a debate. 
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3. In debate on the above matters, the following only 
shall be heard: the proposer of the motion, one speaker 
against the motion, the Rapporteur and the Chairman of 
any Committee concerned. 
RULE 33 
Organisation of debates 
1. The Bureau may at its discretion propose to the 
Assembly a programme and time-table for a specific 
debate. 
2. The Assembly shall vote on such proposals 
without debate. 
2. The above matters shall take precedence over the 
main question, the debate on which shall be suspended 
while they are being considered. 
3. In debate on the above matters, the following 
only shall be heard: the proposer of the motion, one 
speaker against the motion, and the Rapporteur or the 
Chairman of any Committee concerned. 
4. In addition, a Representative or Substitute shall 
have a prior right to speak if he asks leave to raise a 
point of order. A point of order must be confined to 
raising questions of procedure for a ruling from the 
Chair. 
Paragraph 1, read: 
" l. The President may, at his discretion, propose to 
the Assembly a programme and time-table for a specific 
debate or time limits on speeches. " 
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PART VII 
Voting 
RULE 34 
Methods of voting 
1. Normally the Assembly shall vote by sitting and 
standing. 
2. Whenever ten or more Representatives so desire, 
the vote shall be taken by roll-call. 
The roll shall begin with the names of those reques-
ting a roll-call vote. Should there be less than seven of 
them present to answer when their names are called, the 
roll-call shall be stopped and the vote taken by sitting 
and standing t. 
3. The vote on the draft reply to the Annual Report, 
on a motion to disagree to the Annual Report, or to any 
part of it, and on a draft Recommendation or Opinion 
considered as a whole, shall be taken by roll-call. 
4. The roll shall be called in alphabetical order, 
beginning with the name of a Representative drawn by 
lot. Voting shall be by word of mouth and shall be 
expressed by "Yes", "No", or "I abstain". Only affir-
mative and negative votes shall count in calculating the 
number of votes cast. The President shall be respon-
sible for the counting of votes and shall announce the 
result. The votes shall be recorded in the Minutes o( 
Proceedings of the sitting in tne alphabetical order of 
Representatives' names. 
5. Voting on nominations shall take place by secret 
ballot. Only those ballot papers bearing the names of 
1. Paragraph amended on 1st December 1980 (Resolution 66 of the 
Assembly). 
Paragraph 2, first line, read: 
" 2. Whenever ten or more Representatives or Substi-
tutes so desire, ... ". 
Paragraph 4, first line, read: 
"4. Subject to the second sub-paragraph of paragraph 
2 above, the roll shall be called ... " 
N 
0 
"'"' 
persons who have been duly entered as candidates shall 
be taken into account for the purpose of calculating the 
number of votes cast. 
RULE 35 
Majorities 
The majorities required are the following: 
(a) for the amendment of the Charter and for the 
adoption of a motion to disagree to the Annual Report, 
or to any part of the Report: a majority of the Repre-
sentatives to the Assembly; 
(b) for any other decision: an absolute majority of the 
votes cast; 
(c) for appointments, subject to the provisions of Rule 
10 above: an absolute majority of votes cast at the first 
ballot and a relative majority at the second ballot. 
RULE 36 1 
Quorum 
1. The Assembly shall not take any decision by roll-
call unless more than half the Representatives or their 
Substitutes have signed the Register of Attendance 
provided for in Rule 24 above. 
2. All votes other than votes by roll-call shall be 
valid, whatever the number of Representatives present, 
unless, before the voting has begun, the President has 
been requested to ascertain the number of those Repre-
sentatives or their Substitutes who have signed the 
Register of Attendance provided for in Rule 24 above. 
I. Rule amended on I st December 1980 (Resolution 66 of the 
Assembly). 
Rule 35, sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c), read: 
" (a) for the amendment of the Charter and for the 
adoption of a motion to disagree to the Annual 
Report, or to any part of the Report: a number 
of Representatives or Substitutes equal to more 
than half the number of the Representatives to 
the Assembly; 
(b) for any other decision: a majority of the votes 
cast; 
(c) for appointments other than those provided for 
in Rule 10 above: an absolute majority of votes 
cast at the first ballot and a relative majority at 
the second ballot; " 
New sub-paragraph (d) 
" (d) only affirmative and negative votes shall count 
in calculating the number of votes cast. " 
Paragraph 2, last line, delete: 
" ... provided for in Rule 24 above. " 
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3. A vote by roll-call shall in no circumstances be 
valid, nor the result be made public, if the vote shows 
that a majority of the Representatives or their Substi-
tutes has not signed the Register provided for in Rule 24 
above. 
4. In the absence of a quorum, the vote shall be 
postponed until a subsequent sitting of the same part-
session. Any matter on which it has not been possible 
to vote before the end of the said part-session in the 
absence of a quorum shall be referred to the Presidential 
Committee, which shall decide whether the text should 
be put to the vote at the next part-session of the 
Assembly or referred back to Committee. 
RuLE 37 
Right to vote 
I. The right to vote is an individual one. Voting by 
proxy is prohibited. 
2. A Substitute authorised to sit in place of a Repre-
sentative who is absent or prevented from taking his seat 
shall vote in his own name. 
PART VIII 
Political Groups and Committees 
RuLE 38 
Political groups 
1. Representatives may form political groups. 
2. Such groups shall be formed after the President of 
the Assembly has received a declaration that the group 
Paragraph 3, last line, delete: 
" ... provided for in Rule 24 above. " 
Paragraph 2, read: 
"2. A Substitute, duly registered in accordance with 
Rules 7, 24 and 36 above, shall vote in his own name. " 
Paragraph 1, first line, read: 
" 1. Representatives and Substitutes may ... ". 
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has been formed. This declaration shall contain the 
title of the group, the signature of its members and the 
names of the members of its Bureau. 
3. A Representative may belong to one group only. 
4. A group shall consist of not less than nine 
Representatives. 
RULE 39 I 
Appointment of Committees 
1. At the beginning of each Ordinary Session the 
Assembly shall set up the following permanent commit-
tees: 
(i) Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments; 
(ii) General Affairs Committee; 
(iii) Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospac~ Questions; 
(iv) Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Adminis-
tration; 
(v) Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges. 
2. The first and second of the permanent committees 
shall be composed of twenty-seven members divided as 
follows: Belgium (3); France (5); the Federal Republic of 
Germany (5); Italy (5); Luxembourg (1); the Netherlands 
(3); the United Kingdom (5). 
The third, fourth and fifth permanent committees 
shall be composed of twenty-one members divided as 
follows: Belgium (2); France (4); the Federal Republic of 
Germany (4); Italy (4); Luxembourg (1); the Netherlands 
(2); the United Kingdom (4). 
I. Rule amended on 13th June 1967 (Resolution 32 of the 
Assembly). 
Paragraph 3, read: 
"3. A Representative or Substitute may belong to 
one group only." 
Paragraph 4, last line, read: 
" Representatives or Substitutes. " 
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3. The Assembly may set up special Committees 
during the session, which may be re-appointed at the 
beginning of subsequent sessions. The Assembly shall 
fix the total number of seats in such Committees and 
the number of seats to be allotted to each Member State. 
4. When setting up Committees in accordance with 
the provisions of the preceding paragraph, the Assembly 
shall have regard to the activities of other European 
organisations. 
5. With the approval of the Council, the Assembly 
may appoint Committees of investigation as provided 
for in Article VII (f) of the Charter, the composition, 
terms of reference and duration of which shall be 
defined in a Resolution. 
6. Candidatures for membership of Committees shall 
be addressed to the Bureau which shall submit to the 
Assembly, or in the cases provided for in Rule 8, para-
graph 3, to the Presidential Committee, proposals for 
their composition taking into account the representation 
of political tendencies. The President of the Assembly 
may invite the Chairmen of the political groups to 
attend the appropriate meetings of the Bureau. The 
Assembly, or the Presidential Committee, shall decide 
by secret vote disputed nominations for one or more 
seats in a Committee 1• 
7. The Bureau of each Committee shall be composed 
of a Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen. Representa-
tives of die Assembiy who are members of Governments 
are not eligible for membership of the Bureau of a 
Committee. 
1. Paragraph amended on 5th July 1958 (Resolution 10 of the 
Assembly). 
Paragraph 7, third and fourth lines, read: 
" shall not be members " instead of " are not eligible for 
membership ". 
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RULE 40 
Powers of Committees 
1. Committees shall examine questions and docu-
ments which are referred to them by the Assembly. 
2. Committees shall also examine the action taken on 
Recommendations and Resolutions adopted by the 
Assembly. 
3. Should a Committee declare itself not competent 
to consider a question, or should a conflict arise over 
the competence of two or more committees, the ques-
tion of competence shall be submitted to the Assembly. 
4. Committees of the Assembly may request the 
Council to communicate documents or information 
necessary for their enquiries. 
5. A Committee may, with the approval of the 
Bureau of the Assembly, appoint one or several of its 
members to undertake a mission for purposes of infor-
mation or study. 
RULE 41 
Procedure in Committees 
1. A Committee shall meet when convened by its 
Chairman or at the request of the President of the 
Assembly, either during or between sessions. 
2. A Committee may, in the interest of its work, 
appoint one or more sub-committees, of which it shall 
at the same time determine the composition and 
competence. 
Add at the end of paragraph 2: 
" ... on their reports. " 
Paragraph 3, fourth line, read: 
" competence shall be submitted to the Presidential 
Committee or the Assembly." 
Add at the end of paragraph 2: 
" However, the number of members of a sub-Committee 
may not exceed a third of the membership of the full 
Committee. " 
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3. Any two or more Committees or sub-committees 
may hold a joint meeting for the examination of subjects 
coming within their competence, but may not reach a 
joint decision. 
4. The Rules adopted for the Assembly concerning 
the election of the President and Vice-Presidents (Rules 
5 and 1 0), the Minutes of Proceedings (Rule 21 ), 
amendments (Rule 29), the right to speak (Rule 31), 
procedural motions (Rule 32), and methods of voting 
(Rule 34), shall apply to the proceedings of committees, 
subject to the following provisions: 
(a) A Committee shall vote by show of hands, unless 
any Representative requests a vote by roll-call. 
The vote on any text which is to be tabled in the 
Assembly shall be taken by roll-call. The roll 
shall be called alphabetically beginning with the 
letter "A". Election shall take place by secret 
ballot. The formal proposal of candidates is 
optional. 
(b) Voting in committee shall be by absolute majority 
of the votes cast; provided that election shall be 
by relative majority at the second ballot, if 
necessary. 
(c) A Committee may deliberate when one-third of its 
members are present, but the vote on a report as a 
whole shall not be valid unless the majority of the 
_me:rnl>ers of the Committee are present. 
5. The Chairman of the Committee may take part in 
discussions and may vote, but without having a casting 
vote. 
6. Committee meetings shall be held in private. 
Unless a Committee decides otherwise, Representatives 
Paragraph 4, sub-paragraph (a), second line, read: 
" any Representative or Substitute requests ... " 
At the end of sub-paragraph (b) add: 
" ... In the event of a tie, the candidate senior in age 
shall be declared elected. " 
N 
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and Substitutes may attend meetings of that Committee 
even though they are not members, but they may not 
take part in its discussions. 
A Representative or Substitute who has moved a 
motion which has been referred to a Committee may, 
however, be invited by that Committee to take part in 
its discussions in an advisory capacity. 
7. The conditions in which any person who is not a 
Representative or Substitute may be heard by a 
Committee shall be decided by that Committee. If 
the Committee agrees, such a person may take part in 
the discussions at the discretion of the Chairman. 
8. The conditions in which the officials of W estem 
European Union and experts are heard by a Committee 
shall be determined in each case after agreement with 
the Council. 
9. Minutes of Proceedings shall be drawn up for each 
Committee meeting. In addition, a Summary Report of 
proceedings shall be compiled, to which any Represen-
tative may have access, but which he cannot take away. 
10. Unless a Committee decides otherwise, and 
subject to the confidential character of information 
communicated by the Council, the only texts which 
shall be made public shall be the reports that have been 
agreed to, or statements issued on the responsibility of 
the Chairman. 
RULE 42 
Reports of Committees 
I. The Committees shall each appoint a rapporteur 
for each subject, who shall be responsible for the prepa-
Paragraph 9, read: 
"9. Minutes of Proceedings shall be drawn up for 
each Committee meeting. " 
English only, paragraph 1, first line, read: 
" The Committees shall appoint ". 
ration of the report of the Committee and for intro-
ducing it to the Assembly. The final report of a 
Committee shall comprise an explanatory memorandum 
and a substantive text. 
2. The explanatory memorandum shall, in particular, 
state the result of the vote taken in Committee on the 
report as a whole and, if the Committee's opinion is not 
unanimous, it must also state the opinion of the 
minority. 
3. Only the substantive text is voted upon by the 
Assembly. It must be presented in the form of a draft 
Recommendation or Opinion addressed to the Council, 
a draft Resolution or a draft Order of the Assembly. 
RuLE 42 bis 1 
Committee for Relations with Parliaments 
1. At the beginning of each ordinary session, the 
Assembly shall also set up a Committee for Relations 
with Parliaments composed of 14 members (2 for each 
member country). 
2. The provisions of paragraphs 6 and 7 of Rule 39 
on candidatures for membership of committees and the 
composition of their bureaux shall apply to this 
Committee. 
3. From the texts adopted by the Assembly, this 
Committee shall select those which, in its opinion, 
should be debate<! in the parliaments. 
4. It shall make all necessary arrangements with a 
view to calling the parliaments' attention to the work of 
the Assembly and inviting them to follow up this work. 
I. New Rule adopted on 21st February 1969 (Resolution 40 of the 
Assembly). 
English only, paragraph 3, last line, delete: 
"of the Assembly". 
N 
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5. It may invite to its meetings the administrative 
secretaries of national delegations. 
6. It shall submit to the Assembly, twice each year, a 
report on its activities. 
PART IX 
Urgent Procedure 
RULE 43 1 
Urgent Procedure 
1. At the request of the Council, of the Committee 
concerned, or of ten or more Representatives, a debate 
may be held on an item which has not been placed on 
the Agenda. 
2. As soon as a request for urgent procedure is 
received, the President shall communicate it orally to 
the Assembly. The request shall then be posted up and 
the relevant text circulated. The Assembly shall decide 
on the request for urgent procedure at the earliest after 
the first vote included in the Orders of the Day of the 
sitting at which the request for urgent procedure was 
communicated to the Assembly. 
3. The debate on a request for urgent procedure shall 
not enter into the substance of the question other than 
to justify the request or to reject the urgent proce-
dure. In connection with a request for urgent proce-
dure, the following only shall be heard: one speaker for 
the request, one speaker against, the Chairman of the 
Committee concerned and a representative of the 
Bureau speaking in its name. 
I. Rule amended on lOth December 1969 (Resolution 44 of the 
Assembly). 
Paragraph 1, second line, read: 
"concerned, or of ten or more Representatives or 
Substitutes, a debate ... ". 
Add at the end of paragraph 2: 
" ... and at the latest at the beginning of the next 
sitting. " 
English only, paragraph 3, fifth line, read: 
" may be heard " instead of" shall be heard ". 
Seventh line, read: 
"one representative" instead of" a representative". 
4. If the Assembly decides against urgent procedure, 
another request concerning the same question may not 
be placed before it during the same part-session. 
5. If urgent procedure is adopted, the Assembly may, 
notwithstanding the provisions of Rule 26 (5), decide 
that the debate on the substance of the text shall be held 
on an oral report of the appropriate Committee, either 
at the beginning of the Orders of the Day of the next 
sitting or at a later date during the current part-session. 
6. Exceptionally, when urgent procedure is adopted 
by an absolute majority of representatives to the 
Assembly, the motion may be debated without prior 
reference to a Committee. 
PART X 
Relations between the Council and the Assembly 
RULE 44 
Access of Ministers to the Assembly 
and its Committees 
Ministers who are members of the Council or any 
other Minister of the Government of a Member State 
shall have the right of access to the Assembly and its 
Committees. They may not vote. 
RULE 45 
Written Questions 
1. Any Representative may put written questions to 
the Council. The text of such questions shall be 
transmitted by the President to the Chairman of the 
Paragraph 6, read: 
"6. Exceptionally, when urgent procedure is 
adopted by a number of Representatives or Substitutes 
equal to more than half the number of the Representa-
tives to the Assembly, the motion may be debated 
without prior reference to a Committee. " 
Paragraph 1, read: 
" 1. Any Representative or Substitute may put 
written questions to the Council in accordance with 
Article V (i) of the Charter. The text... ". 
Council. Questions and answers shall be published by 
the Clerk of the Assembly. 
2. All questions governed by this rule to which an 
answer has not been given within a period of one month 
shall be published, together with a statement that no 
reply has been received. 
PART XI 
Petitions 
RULE 46 
Admissibility and examination of petitions 
1. Petitions must be addressed to the President. 
2. To be in order they must: 
(a) show the names, attributes and domicile of each of 
the petitioners. The petitioners must cause their 
signatures to be authenticated in accordance with 
the internal legislation of the State in which they 
reside; 
(b) bear on questions which fall within the compe-
tence of Western European Union. 
3. The Bureau of the Assembly shall examine the 
admissibility of petitions with the Clerk of the 
Assembly. 
4. Petitions which are in order shall be referred to the 
competent committees. 
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PART XII 
The Office of the Clerk of the Assembly 
RULE 47 
Office of the Clerk of the Assembly 
1. The Clerk shall be appointed by the Assembly, on 
the proposal of the Bureau. He shall provide the 
Assembly and its Committees with such Secretariat and 
other assistance as they may require. 
Upon appointment, the Clerk shall make a solemn 
declaration before the Assembly that he will perform his 
duties in complete independence and uninfluenced by 
national considerations, that he will neither seek nor 
receive indications concerning the performance of his 
duties from any Government or authority other than the 
Assembly, and will refrain from any action incom-
patible with his position as a European civil servant. 
2. The Clerk shall, in consultation with the Bureau, 
appoint officials on a permanent or temporary basis as 
members of the Office of the Clerk. 
3. The Clerk shall establish close co-operation with 
the Secretary-General of Western European Union, the 
secretariat of the Standing Armaments Committee and 
the Agency for the Control of Armaments. 
N 
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PART XIII 
Budgetary questions 
RULE 48 
Draft Budget 
1. Each year, following a report of the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration drawn up in 
collaboration with the Presidential Committee, the 
Assembly shall approve a provisional statement of its 
expenditure, divided into Heads and Sub-Heads. 
2. The Assembly may, if necessary, approve supple-
mentary estimates of expenditure. 
3. The President shall communicate these documents 
to the Council. 
4. The President of the Assembly shall be responsible 
for authorising expenditure on behalf of the Assembly 
within the limits of the credits specified in the budget, 
once the latter has been approved by the Council. 
5. In the course of its first session following the end 
of each financial year, the Assembly shall express its 
approval or disapproval of the accounts for that year, on 
a motion tabled by a member of the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration. 
RULE 49 
Budget of Western European Union 
The Assembly shall express its views in the form of 
an Opinion or Recommendation on the annual budget 
of Western European Union as soon as it has been 
communicated. 
PART XIV 
Other provisions 
RULE 50 
Waiver of the Immunity of Representatives 
and Substitutes 
1. Any request addressed to the President by the 
competent authority of a Member State for the waiver 
of the immunity of a Representative or Substitute shall 
be transmitted to the Assembly and then referred 
without prior discussion to the Committee on Rules of 
Procedure and Privileges. 
2. The Committee shall immediately consider the 
request, but shall not make any examination of the 
merits of the case in question. The Representative or 
Substitute concerned may, if he so wishes, be heard by 
the Committee. The Report of the Committee shall 
conclude with a draft Resolution for the retention or the 
waiver of the immunity. 
3. The report of the Committee shall automatically 
be included as the first item of the Orders of the Day for 
the first day on which the Assembly sits after the report 
has been laid upon the Table of the Assembly. 
4. The debate on the report shall be confined to 
arguments for or against the waiver of the immunity. 
5. The President shall immediately inform the autho-
rity which submitted the request of the decision of the 
Assembly. 
N 
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RULE 51 
Revision of the Rules of Procedure 
1. Motions to amend the Rules of Procedure must be 
supported by ten or more Representatives. They shall 
be referred without debate to the Committee on Rules 
of Procedure and Privileges, which shall report on them, 
as provided by Rule 42 above. 
2. The examination of the Report of the Committee 
shall be included in the Orders of the Day in accordance 
with the provisions of Rule 1 7 above. 
3. The debate shall be concerned only with the 
relevant texts. 
Paragraph 1, second line, read: 
"supported by ten or more Representatives or Substi-
tutes. They shall be ... ". 
Document 877 
Amendment 1 
Revision of the Charter and of the Rules 
of Procedure of the Assembly 
AMENDMENT 11 
tabled by Mr. Voogd and Mr. Stoffelen 
16th June 1981 
1. In Rule 14, third line, leave out " former Presidents of the Assembly who are representatives to 
the Assembly". 
l. See 6th Sitting, 18th June 1981 (Amendment withdrawn). 
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Signed: Voogd, Stoffolen 
Document 878 21st May 1981 
Presentation of the economic study1 
of the armaments sector of industry 
in the WEU member countries 
Introduction 
A. Presentation 
1. The present report, which deals with the 
economic study of the armaments sector of 
industry in the WEU member countries, is 
based on a definition of the terms "armaments" 
and "armaments industry" which is common to 
the SAC and the Independent European Pro-
gramme Group (IEPG). It has been drawn up 
in accordance with the Council's wishes. 
2. It contains budgetary and economic 
information,. divided into two chapters. The 
first is devoted to general considerations on 
defence, armaments, research and development 
and maintenance expenditure. The second 
contains economic data on armaments produc-
tion, manpower, exports and imports. Finally, 
general conclusions set out some considerations 
in the form of a synthesis. 
B. Terminology 
3. "The armaments industry" or, more 
precisely,· "the armaments sector of industry" 
coVers all the industrial units adapted and/or 
designed for the study, development, produc-
tion, trials and repair by industry of specifically 
military equipment. It is obvious that this 
definition refers to a theoretical requirement, 
and, in real economic terms, it is often difficult, 
if not impossible, to dissociate production 
intended for the military sector from that 
intended for the civilian sector. 
4. According to the above definition, the 
term "military equipment" or "armaments" 
designates all equipment which is specially 
designed for military application. It excludes 
civil or commercial-type equipment or supplies 
used by the services, such as clothing, food, 
medical supplies, fuel, commercial vehicles and 
civil-type aircraft. On the other hand, mili-
tary equipment for the "gendarmerie" must be 
included when it comes under the Ministry of 
Defence, as it does in France. 
5. A fundamental aspect of this part of the 
study must be stressed: all the information 
I. Standing Armaments Committee Document SAC (81) 
IA-D/20 dated 8th May 1981. 
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contained therein comes from available official 
sources. 
6. The data collected are not always 
complete or homogeneous between one country 
and another; this makes comparisons between 
countries difficult. For these reasons, the study 
generally gives only the situation for the WEU 
member countries as a whole. It should also 
be noted that the financial year coincides with 
the calendar year for all the member countries 
except the United Kingdom, where it covers the 
period from 1st April to 31st March of the 
following year. 
7. According to NATO documents, the defi-
nition of defence expenditure is as follows: 
"National military expenditures are current and 
capital expenditures to meet the needs of the 
armed forces". They include military assis-
tance to foreign countries and the military 
components of nuclear, space, and research and 
development programmes. By custom and 
accounting practice, national military budgets 
usually do not include expenditures for veter-
ans' benefits, interest on war debts, civil defence 
and outlays for strategic industrial stockpiling. 
Adding these items to regular defence budgets 
would greatly enlarge the total of annual public 
expenditures which are military-related, but 
adequate information to determine precisely 
how such costs affect various national expendi-
tures and their overall size worldwide is not 
available at present. There are also substantial 
social costs which are extra-budgetary, includ-
ing manpower, under-priced because of 
conscription. As national accounting systems 
differ in their treatment of military budgets, 
adjustments are required to bring national 
figures to the standard concept. 
8. Estimates based on national data are 
generally lower than those published by 
NATO, which are calculated according to its 
own criteria and which take account of, in 
particular: 
- military aid expenditure, including 
equipment; 
- the contribution of the member coun-
tries to the NATO civil.budget; 
- military retirement pensions; 
- the funds allocated to the national 
gendarmerie for frontier duties and to 
various other departments. 
This type of expenditure is not normally 
included in the defence budgets of member 
countries. On the other hand, these budgets 
include other data which vary from country to 
country. 
Research and development 
9. Within the scope of this study, the term 
"research and development" only includes 
government funds assigned to programmes for 
the research and development of military 
equipment which are conducted by the govern-
ment alone or with the help of private industry 
or research institutes. At this stage it was not 
possible to obtain information on the amounts 
spent by private firms from their own funds for 
military research and development. In certain 
countries these amounts could be considerable. 
Production 
10. The methods of drawing up statistics of 
military production vary from country to coun-
try, which means that it has not always been 
possible, according to the definition given 
above, to dissociate armaments production from 
the overall production of military equipment 
and supplies. In addition, it will be noted that 
certain countries have no statistics on their 
armaments production. 
Maintenance 
11. For most of the member countries, this 
term covers all the operations which help to 
keep the equipment of the armed forces in good 
condition for fulfilling their role, together with 
the purchase of the spare parts required in these 
operations. Conversely, in the United King-
dom, military maintenance also includes 
supplies of fuels and lubricants. 
12. There are two forms of maintenance: 
servicing and industrial maintenance. Indus-
trial maintenance normally occurs - except for 
accidents - at a certain period in the lifetime of 
the equipment. It aims at renewing or parti-
ally or completely rebuilding certain types of 
equipment. The cost is generally high because 
large technical facilities are required and it is 
carried out in private industry or in government 
establishments or workshops. With regard to 
normal servicing, it is based on the manufac-
turer's specifications and is carried out directly 
by the users or in unit workshops for repairs 
which do not require large-scale facilities. 
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13. In view of the subject of the study, the 
present report only deals with industrial 
maintenance. 
Manpower 
14. In some cases, the information obtained 
includes all personnel employed in the arma-
ments sector of industry (research and develop-
ment, production and maintenance); in others, 
the corresponding figures ~are confined to the 
public sector only. Certaitl approximations are 
due to the fact that, in general, it has been 
difficult to distinguish the number of persons 
employed in the armaments sector from those 
employed in civil production. 
Exports and imports 
15. Where statistics are available - which is 
not the case for all the member countries - on 
exports of military equipment, they are not all 
drawn up on the same basis. For most of the 
countries, the data in question concern deliver-
ies actually made, whereas for some others only 
export licences granted are taken into account, 
which do not seem to be too far removed from 
actual deliveries. Since no statistics on the 
export of military equipment are kept in certain 
countries, the information studied is the result 
of bringing data together from various sources. 
16. With regard to imports, direct exchanges 
between industries are not always listed. 
17. Moreover, it is impossible to distinguish 
transfers, whether exports or imports, carried 
out in the framework of co-operative program-
mes, since transnational co-operation is not 
usua1ly singled out in the statistics. 
18. In addition, the information on exports 
and imports for the member countries as a 
whole covers transactions carried out within 
WEU, since these could not be individually 
identified. Consequently, , it is impossible to 
add up the national data and hence to know the 
transfers of military equipment between WEU 
taken as a whole and the outside world. 
* 
* * 
N.B. National data have been converted 
into European currency units in order that they 
may be added up and have been deflated by the 
GDP price index (1972:= 100) to arrive at 
constant prices. 
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CHAPTER I 
Presentation of budgetary data 
(a) Defence expenditure 
19. The definition of defence expenditure on 
which the NATO studies are based offers the 
advantage of giving harmonised data. On the 
other hand, it differs considerably from national 
definitions. The data may vary considerably 
from the corresponding data in national budget 
documents on account of differences between 
national definitions and the NATO definition 
of defence expenditure. 
20. Calculated in 1972 prices and exchange 
rates, defence expenditure for WEU as a whole, 
according to NATO estimates, has increased at 
a fairly moderate rate. According to these 
calculations, in 1977 (i.e. at the end of the 
study period), WEU defence expenditure was 
9.5% higher than in 1972, a total which corres-
ponds to an annual growth rate of 1.8 %. It 
should be stressed that, in addition to personnel 
expenditure, defence expenditure includes items 
subject to specific inflation which is well above 
that of the GNP (fuels, servicing of sophisti-
cated equipment, infrastructure, re-equipment, 
etc.). This remark is all the more meaningful 
since the period in question (1972-77) is 
marked by the steep rise in the cost of fuels and 
raw materials in general. 
21. Tables I(a) and I(b) annexed to the 
present document show that the situation varies 
for the different countries. The figures for 
France, Belgium and Luxembourg show a 
steady increase in defence expenditure at con-
stant prices. The average annual growth rate 
for France was 3.6% between 1972 and 
1977. In Belgium, defence expenditure showed 
an average growth rate of 5.5% for the same 
period, and in Luxembourg 7.0 %; in Belgium 
and Luxembourg these growth rates are chiefly 
due to the funding of special programmes in 
1975 and 1976. In ()ther countries, the effects 
of the economic recession of 1974 and 1975 are 
clearly reflected in the figures. In the United 
Kingdom, there was an almost complete stagna-
tion in defence expenditure in the period under 
consideration (annual rate + 0.5 %). In the 
Federal Republic of Germany, defence expendi-
ture increased by an annual average rate of 
2.0 %, although this levelled off from 1974. In 
Italy, there was a definite drop between 1972 
and 1976; 1977 was higher but did not, how-
ever, reach the 1972 level and the average 
annual rate for the period was, therefore, 
negative (- 0.6 %). Defence expenditure in the 
Netherlands showed an average annual growth 
of3.9% between 1972 and 1977. 
222 
22. In most countries, the ratio between 
defence expenditure and gross domestic product 
has remained fairly constant. In 1977, this 
ratio varied approximately from 1 to 5 %, 
according to the countries concerned. 
23. According to national budgets, the evolu-
tion of defence expenditure at constant prices 
for the whole of WEU is nearly the same as 
that based on the NATO figures. In the single 
case of Italy, however, there was a 13.6% 
reduction in defence expenditure in real terms 
in 1977 as compared with 1972. As far as the 
other countries are concerned, the average 
annual growth rate for the period 1972 to 1977 
was as follows: Federal Republic of Germany 
1.3 %; the Netherlands 3.9 %, and between 
2.7% and 3.2% in the other member countries 
(see Tables 11 (a) and 11 (b)). It is obvious that 
these differences are mainly due to carrying out 
large armament programmes which are, how-
ever, rarely implemented at the same time. 
(b) Expenditure on major equipment 
24. In its statistics, NATO identifies expend-
iture on major equipment and particularly 
expenditure on weapon systems. These statis-
tics, based on NATO definitions and calculated 
in 1972 prices and rates of exchange, show that, 
for the totality of the WEU countries, excluding 
France, expenditure on major items of equip-
ment amounted to about 17 % more in 1977 
than in 1972 (see Table Ill). This is mainly 
due to the increasing complexity of such 
equipment. 
25. Although national data cannot be 
compared with NATO information, they 
confirm this development. One may therefore 
conclude that the percentage expenditure on 
major equipment tends to increase in the 
defence budgets of most member countries. 
This is mainly due to the increasing complexity 
of such equipment and to the choice of new 
major programmes. The difference in percen-
tages between the various WEU countries 
remains considerable. 
26. In 1977, the contribution of France, the 
Federal Republic of Germany and the United 
Kingdom to the total defence expenditure of the 
WEU member countries came to 86.4% and 
this figure remained fairly stable over the whole 
period under consideration. The rest was 
divided between Italy, the Netherlands and 
Belgium with Italy alone accounting for a good 
half (see Tables IV (a) and IV (b)). It may also 
be noted that, according to national budgets, 
the percentage of these three countries in total 
defence expenditure is greater than their 
percentage of armaments expenditure for the 
whole of WEU. 
(c) Research and development 
27. Research and development expenditure 
comprises only public funds devoted to 
programmes carried out by the state on its own 
or with the help of private industry and 
research institutes. The SAC does not have 
any exact information concerning the expendi-
ture of firms in this area. 
28. A comparison between this expenditure 
and total defence expenditure shows that the 
member countries are divided into two catego-
ries. The Governments of the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany, France and the United 
Kingdom are the most active in the area of 
research and development. They devote the 
highest amounts, in relation to total defence 
expenditure, to research and development and 
to armaments production (respectively 5 %, 
10 % and more than 13 % of the total defence 
expenditure; these figures hardly varied at all 
during the period covered by the study). In the 
other member countries, these ratios are rela-
tively low (compare with Tables V (a) and 
V (b)). 
(d) Maintenance 
29. Maintenance is an important factor in the 
total defence expenditure of all the member 
countries. Compared with armaments expen-
diture, the proportion varies from one quarter 
to more than a half. 
30. The ratio of maintenance to armaments 
expenditure shows a downward trend in most of 
the countries. In constant prices, this expendi-
ture even seems to have declined in some coun-
tries (see Tables VI (a) and VI (b)). 
31. The very nature of military requirements 
explains why users of equipment demand high 
reliability which might lead to heavy mainte-
nance costs and regular servicing. In certain 
cases, these costs can be explained by the 
sophistication of the military equipment used, 
in others by its wear-and-tear or age, by the 
lack of centralised stocks of spares or mainte-
nance workshops, or the poor distribution of 
technicians. 
CHAPTER 11 
Presentation of economic data 
(a) Production 
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with some caution because the deflator, which 
is based on the evolution of the GDP price 
index, only enables an approximate correction 
to be made to the data in c;urrent prices in the 
sector under consideration (see Table VII). 
33. Taking account of the above, armaments 
production at constant prices was approxi-
mately 32 % higher in 1977 than in 1972 for 
the WEU countries as a whole (average annual 
rate 5.7 %). 
34. However, the ratio of armaments produc-
tion to that of the whole of the manufacturing 
industry is small: between about 2 and 8 % for 
the different member countries. These ratios 
generally show a relative upward trend as 
between "armaments" and the manufacturing 
industry as a whole, for a variety of reasons. 
35. According to data expressed in constant 
prices, France, the United Kingdom, the 
Federal Republic of Germany and Italy alone 
cover about 95% of WED's, armaments produc-
tion. 
(b) Manpolller 
36. The statistical data on manpower 
comprise in certain cases all the people 
employed in the armaments sector of industry 
and in other cases only those working in the 
public sector. According to these estimates, 
the armament industries of the member coun-
tries offer about one million jobs, this figure 
being based on full-time labour. 
3 7. The number of people employed in the 
armaments sector of industry is low in compa-
rison to production. The ratio of manpower 
used in the armaments sector to that of industry 
as a whole is, in all member countries, less than 
that of production of armaments to production 
by manufacturing industry as a whole. 
(c) Exports 
38. At 1972 prices and exchange rates, 
armaments exports have pvogressed to a some-
what different extent in all the member coun-
tries. In the WEU member countries taken 
together, these exports, including intra-Euro-
pean exchanges, increased by an average rate of 
16.5% per year between 1972 and 1977. At 
this rate of growth, armaments exports increa-
sed in more or less the same way as the total 
exports of the member countries, so that 
their share in the export market has hardly 
32. During the period under study (1972-77) changed, since a drop in certain countries was 
armaments production increased in all the compensated for by a rise in others. The share 
member countries. This is true if 1972 prices of armaments exports in the commerce of the 
and exchange rates are applied. The evolution countries concerned remains low [1 to 5 % of 
of the data in constant prices can be adopted total exports, depending on the country]. 
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39. Among the member countries, France, 
the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the 
United Kingdom are by far the biggest expor-
ters of armaments. These four countries cover 
about 9 5 % of the armaments exports of the 
WEU countries, which corresponds to their 
share of production (see Table VIII). 
40. The ratio of armaments exports, inclu-
ding co-operation, to armaments production 
varies according to country and year. It repre-
sents between 20 % and 60 % of the total 
production of military equipment. These rates 
are mainly due to the fact that export data 
include exchanges carried out in the context of 
co-operation and compensation between coun-
tries, together with other intra-European 
exchanges. 
41. In relation to the total export of goods, 
the proportion of armament exports for the 
whole of the WEU countries varies between 
1 % and 5 %. This ratio is, therefore, even 
lower than that of armaments production to the 
total production of the manufacturing industry. 
42. It must once more be stressed that this 
information should be used with caution, since 
national statistics on foreign trade do not allow 
comparisons in the strict sense of the word. 
This quantified information is not always 
uniform on account of differences in the defini-
tions and the ways of drawing up statistics. 
(d) Imports 
43. While underlining the nature of the 
statistical information on foreign trade (see 
paragraph 42 above), it should be noted that, as 
far as imports are concerned, the data are even 
less comparable than those relating to exports. 
The definitions used are not the same in all 
the member countries, nor do they correspond 
with those used for exports. This is why it is 
impossible to compare export and import 
figures. They may or may not include figures 
on compensation and co-operation, as the case 
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may be, and it is impossible to determine to 
what extent they include armaments imports in 
·the form of semi-finished products. 
44. If these restrictions are kept in mind, 
import figures at constant prices (1972 = 1 00) 
show a fairly irregular evolution, with a down-
ward trend for the WEU member countries as a 
whole in the period under study. In 1977, 
armaments imports in the WEU member coun-
tries were about 10 % lower than in 1972, using 
constant prices and exchange rates as a basis for 
comparison (see Table IX). 
Conclusions 
45. It may be noted from the economic study 
that, during the reference period, both defence 
expenditure and the armaments sector of indus-
try steadily developed in all the WEU member 
countries, although at a moderate pace. Pro-
duction and exports also followed this trend. 
These general conclusions are chiefly confirmed 
by budgetary and economic observations. 
46. From 1972 to 1977, defence expenditure 
in the WEU member countries increased in real 
values and at an average rate of 2.0 %. With 
regard to major equipment, the increase equals 
2.1 %. 
47. As far as the evaluation of armaments 
production is concerned, it is characterised by 
an annual average rise of 5.7% during the refer-
ence period. This production provides work 
for about one million salaried employees in the 
seven WEU countries. 
48. The available data on armaments imports 
and exports do not allow accurate conclusions 
to be made. Statistics do not single out, with 
any certainty, exchanges between WEU mem-
ber countries, particularly where co-operative 
armaments production is concerned. Conse-. 
quently, the foreign armaments trade of WEU, 
taken as a whole, cannot be estimated. 
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ANNEX 
Statistics 
I (a) Total defence expenditure in European currency units of the WEU member countries 
according to the statistics published by NATO. 
I (b) Total defence expenditure of the WEU member countries expressed in percentages according 
to the statistics published by NATO. 
11 (a) Total defence expenditure in European currency units of the WEU member countries 
according to their national budgets and statistics. 
11 (b) Total defence expenditure of the WEU member countries expressed in percentages according 
to their national budgets and statistics. 
Ill. Major equipment expenditure in European currency units according to the statistics 
published by NATO. 
IV (a) Total armaments expenditure in European currency units of the WEU member countries 
according to their national budgets. 
IV (b) Total armaments expenditure of the WEU member countries expressed in percentages 
according to their national budgets. 
V (a) Research and development expenditure in the WEU member countries taken from their 
national budgets and expressed in European currency units. 
V (b) Research and development expenditure in the WEU member countries taken from their. 
national budgets and expressed in percentages. 
VI (a) Maintenance expenditure in the WEU member countries taken from their national budgets 
and expressed in European currency units. 
VI (b) Maintenance expenditure in the WEU member countries taken from their national budgets 
and expressed in percentages. 
VII. Armaments production in European currency units for the totality of the WEU member 
countries. 
VIII. Armaments exports in European currency units for the totality of the WEU member 
countries. 
IX. Armaments imports in European currency units for the totality of the WEU member 
countries. 
X. GDP price indices (at market prices). 
XI. Rates of exchange in European currency units (ECU). 
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Country 
Belgium 
France 
Federal Republic of Germany 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
TABLE I (a) 
Total defence expenditure in European currency units 
of the WEU member countries according to the statistics published by NATO 
1972-77 
(at 1972 prices and exchange rates) 
1972 1973 1974 1975 
A B A B A B A B 
894 100 929 103.9 971 108.6 1,051 117.6 
6,716 100 6,940 103.3 7,064 105.2 7,289 108.5 
8,030 100 8,424 104.9 8,796 109.5 8,692 108.2 
3,304 lOO 3,271 99.0 3,301 99.9 3,065 92.8 
10 lOO 11 110.0 11 110.0 13 130.0 
1,382 lOO 1,401 101.4 1,467 106.2 1,527 110.5 
7,257 100 7,331 101.0 7,533 103.8 7,342 101.2 
1976 
A B 
1,138 127.3 
7,576 112.8 
8,706 108.4 
3,014 91.2 
14 140.0 
1,518 109.8 
7,576 104.4 
WEU total 27,593 100 28,307 102.6 29,143 105.6 28,978 105.0 29,542 107.0 
A - in millions of European currency units (ECU). 
B- 1972 = 100. 
1977 
A B 
1,170 130.9 
8,028 119.5 
8,675 108.0 
3,202 96.9 
14 140.0 
1,677 121.3 
7,444 102.6 
30,210 109.5 
0 § 
~ 
00 
-.J 
00 
---~-- -,.. -
Country 
Belgium 
France 
Federal Republic of Germany 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
WEU total 
C - percentage (WEU = I 00). 
D -annual percentage variation. 
TABLE I (b) 
Total defence expenditure of the WEU member countries 
expressed in percentages according to the statistics published by NATO 
1972-77 
(at 1972 prices and exchange rates) 
1972 1973 1974 1975 
c D c D c D c D 
3.3 - 3.3 + 3.9 3.3 +4.5 3.6 + 8.2 
24.4 - 24.5 + 3.3 24.2 + 1.8 25.2 + 3.2 
29.0 - 29.8 + 4.9 30.3 +4.4 30.0 - 1.2 
12.0 - 11.6 - 1.0 11.3 +0.9 10.6 - 7.1 
0.0 - 0.0 + 10.0 0.0 +0.0 0.1 + 18.2 
5.0 - 4.9 + 1.4 5.0 +4.7 5.2 + 1.3 
26.3 - 25.9 + 1.0 25.9 +2.8 25.3 - 2.5 
100 - 100 + 2.6 100 +3.0 lOO - 0.6 
1976 1977 
c D c D 
3.9 +8.3 3.9 + 2.8 
25.6 +3.9 26.6 + 6.0 
29.5 +0.2 28.7 - 0.4 
10.2 - 1.7 10.6 + 6.2 
0.1 + 7.7 0.1 + 0.0 
5.1 +2.2 5.5 + 10.5 
25.6 + 3.2 24.6 - 1.7 
100 +2.0 lOO + 2.3 
TABLE 11 (a) 
Total defence expenditure in European currency units 
of the WEU member countries according to their national budgets and statistics 
1972-77 
(at 1972 prices and exchange rates) 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
N 
N 
00 
Country 
A 
Belgium 719 
France 5,600 
Federal Republic of Germany 6,792 
Italy 2,886 
Luxembourg 10 
Netherlands 1,382 
United Kingdom 6,351 
WEU total 23,740 
A - in millions of European currency units (ECU). 
8- 1972 = 100. 
---~-- _ ..... 
8 A 8 
lOO 697 96.9 
lOO 5,774 103.1 
lOO 7,069 104.0 
lOO 3,137 108.7 
100 10 100 
lOO 1,401 101.4 
100 6,649 104.7 
100 24,737 104.1 
A 8 A 8 A 8 
719 lOO 770 107.1 812 112.9 
5,833 104.1 6,020 107.5 6,200 110.7 
7,374 108.5 7,225 106.4 7,242 106.7 
2,748 95.2 2,420 83.9 2,469 85.6 
10 lOO 11 110 12 120 
1,467 106.2 1,527 110.5 l ,518 109.8 
7,505 118.2 7,555 119.0 7,569 119.2 
25,656 108.1 25,528 107.6 25,822 109.1 
1977 
A 8 
843 117.3 
6,398 114.2 
7,241 106.6 
2,494 86.4 
13 130 
1,677 121.3 
7,374 116.1 
26,040 109.9 
Country 
Belgium 
France 
Federal Republic of Germany 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
WEU total 
C -percentage (WEU = I 00). 
D- annual percentage variation. 
TABLE 11 (b) 
Total defence expenditure of the WEU member countries 
expressed in percentages according to their national budgets and statistics 
1972-77 
(at 1972 prices and exchange rates) 
1972 1973 1974 1975 
c D c D c D c D 
3.0 - 2.8 -3.1 2.8 + 3.2 3.0 + 7.1 
23.6 - 23.3 + 3.1 22.7 + 1.0 23.6 + 3.2 
28.6 - 28.6 +4.1 28.8 + 4.3 28.3 - 2.1 
12.1 - 12.7 +.8.7 10.7 - 12.4 9.5 - 12.0 
0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 + 10.0 
5.9 - 5.7 + 1.4 5.7 + 4.7 6.0 + 4.1 
26.8 - 26.9 +4.7 29.3 + 12.9 29.6 + 0.6 
100 - 100 +4.2 100 + 3.7 100 - 0.5 
1976 1977 
c D c D 
3.2 + 5.5 3.2 + 3.8 
24.0 +.2.9 24.6 + 3.2 
28.0 +0.2 27.8 - 0.1 
9.6 +2.0 9.6 + 1.0 
0.0 +9.1 0.0 + 8.3 
5.9 -0.6 6.5 +. 10.5 
29.3 +.0.2 28.3 - 2.6 
100 + 1.2 100 + 0.8 
N 
w 
0 
TABLE Ill 
Major equipment expenditure in European currency units 
according to the statistics published by NATO 1 
1972-77 
1972 
Country 
A 
Belgium 102 
France 2 
Federal Republic of Germany 988 
Italy 558 
Netherlands 148 
United Kingdom 3 1,350 
Total 3,146 
A - in millions of European currency units (ECU). 
B - 1972 = 100. 
B 
lOO 
lOO 
lOO 
lOO 
lOO 
lOO 
(at 1972 prices and exchange rates) 
1973 1974 
A B A B 
78 76.5 86 84.3 
l ,019 103.1 1,047 106.0 
497 89.1 502 90.0 
158 106.8 194 131.1 
1,415 104.8 1,296 96.0 
3,167 100.7 3,125 99.3 
I. Based on national data and definitions relative only to equipment considered to be major. 
2. The figures for France are not given in the statistics published by NATO and are not available. 
3. Financial year: from 1st April to 31st March. 
1975 
A 
96 
1,026 
426 
240 
I ,417 
3,205 
1976 
B A B 
94.1 125 122.5 
103.8 l ,149 116.3 
76.3 395 70.8 
162.1 231 156.1 
105.0 I ,561 115.6 
101.9 3,461 110.0 
1977 
--
A B 
139 136.3 
1,084 109.7 
490 87.8 
345 233.1 
1,638 121.3 
3,696 117.4 
> z 
z 
tTl 
;>< 
Country 
Belgium 
France 
Federal Republic of Germany 
Italy 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
WEU total 
TABLE IV (a) 
Total armaments expenditure in European currency units 
of the WEU member countries according to their national budgets 
1972-77 
(at 1972 prices and exchange rates) 
1972 1973 1974 1975 
A B A B A B A B 
105 lOO 81 77.1 89 84.8 102 97.1 
2,304 100 2,350 102.0 2,364 102.6 2,238 97.1 
2,348 100 2,422 103.2 2,409 102.6 2,350 100.1 
560 lOO 657 117.3 530 94.6 488 87.1 
193 100 192 99.5 217 112.4 267 138.3 
2,147 lOO 2,605 121.3 2,332 108.6 2,173 101.2 
7,657 lOO 8,307 108.5 7,941 103.7 7,618 99.5 
A - in millions of European currency units (ECU). 
B - 1972 = 100. 
Sources: National budgets. 
1976 1977 
A B A B 
133 126.7 144 137.1 
2,218 96.3 2,333 101.2 
2,466 105.0 2,466 105.0 
539 96.3 624 111.4 
264 136.8 393 203.6 
2,458 114.5 2,565 119.5 
8,078 105.5 8,525 111.3 
N 
w 
N 
Country 
Belgium 
France 
Federal Republic of Germany 
Italy 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
WEU total 
I 
C - percentage (WEU = I 00). 
D - annual percentage variation. 
Source: National budgets. 
TABLE IV (b) 
Total armaments expenditure of the WEU member countries 
expressed in percentages according to their national budgets 
1972-77 
(at 1972 prices and exchange rates) 
1972 1973 1974 1975 
c D c D c D c D 
1.4 - 1.0 -22.9 1.1 + 9.9 1.3 + 14.6 
30.1 - 28.3 + 2.0 29.8 + 0.6 29.4 - 5.3 
30.6 - 29.2 + 3.2 30.3 - 0.5 30.9 - 2.5 
7.3 - 7.9 + 17.3 6.7 -19.3 6.4 - 7.9 
2.5 - 2.3 - 0.5 2.8 + 13.0 3.5 +23.0 
28.0 - 31.3 +21.3 29.3 -10.5 28.5 - 6.8 c 
100 - 100 + 8.5 100 - 4.4 100 - 0.4 
1976 1977 
c D c D 
1.6 +30.4 1.7 + 8.3 
27.5 - 0.9 27.4 + 5.2 
30.5 + 4.9 28.9 0.0 
6.7 + 10.5 7.3 + 15.8 
3.2 - 0.1 4.6 +48.9 
30.5 + 13.1 30.1 + 4.4 
100 + 6.0 100 + 5.5 
TABLE V (a) 
Research and development expenditure in the WEU member countries taken from 
their national budgets and expressed in European currency units 
1972-77 
(at 1972 prices and exchange rates) 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Country 
A 
Belgium 0.2 
France 633.4 
Federal Republic of Germany 364.0 
Italy 23.9 
Netherlands 12.5 
United Kingdom 891.0 
WEU total 1,925.0 
A - in millions of European currency units (ECU). 
B- 1972= 100. 
B 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
A B A 
0 - 0 
699.8 110.5 669.9 
361.5 99.3 346.4 
35.8 150.9 29.6 
12.6 101.1 13.4 
991.2 111.3 968.9 
2,100.9 109.1 2,028.2 
B A B A B 
- 0.8 309.8 0.4 148.4 
105.8 642.9 101.5 643.6 101.6 
95.2 334.9 92.0 358.7 98.5 
124.1 43.0 180.0 52.4 219.3 
107.8 13.8 110.7 15.3 122.3 
108.8 977.9 109.8 993.4 111.5 
105.4 2,013.3 104.6 2,063.8 107.2 
1977 
A B 
1.1 437.7 
649.6 102.6 
343.9 94.5 
19.4 81.3 
14.5 116.3 
1,002.4 112.5 
2,030.9 105.5 
TABLE V (b) 
Research and development expenditure in the WEU member countries taken from 
their national budgets and expressed in percentages 
1972-77 
(at 1972 prices and exchange rates) 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Country 
Belgium 
France 
Federal Republic of Germany 
Italy 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
WEU total 
C - percentage proportion (WEU = I 00). 
D - percentage annual variation. 
c D 
0.0 -
32.9 -
18.9 -
1.3 -
0.6 -
46.3 -
lOO -
c D 
0.0 -
33.3 + 10.5 
17.2 - 0.7 
1.7 +50.9 
0.6 + 1.1 
47.2 + 11.3 
100 + 9.1 
c D c D c D 
0.0 - 0.0 - 0.0 -52.1 
33.0 - 4.3 31.9 - 4.0 31.2 + 0.1 
17.1 - 4.2 16.7 - 3.3 17.4 + 7.1 
1.5 -17.8 2.1 . +45.1 2.4 +21.8 
I 
0.7 + 6.6 0.7 + 2.7 0.8 + 10.5 
47.7 - 2.2 48.6 + 0.9 48.2 + 2.5 
100 - 4.5 lOO - 0.7 lOO + 2.5 
1977 
c D 
0.1 +295.0 
32.0 + 0.9 
16.9 - 4.1 
1.0 - 62.9 
0.7 - 4.9 
49.3 + 0.9 
100 - 1.6 
§ 
g 
00 
-..) 
00 
Country 
Belgium 
France 
Federal Republic of Germany 
Italy 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
WEU total 
TABLE VI (a) 
Maintenance expenditure in the WEU member countries taken from 
their national budgets and expressed in European currency units 
1972-77 
(at 1972 prices and exchange rates) 
1972 1973 1974 1975 
A B A B A B A B 
36.6 lOO 37.4 102.2 36.2 98.8 41.6 113.5 
966.0 100 990.6 102.5 1,008.5 104.4 1,026.8 106.3 
756.3 100 761.6 100.7 719.6 95.2 694.8 91.9 
134.5 100 151.7 111.3 133.3 99.1 127.0 94.4 
110.2 100 99.4 90.1 101.5 92.1 94.5 85.7 
919.9 100 1,006.8 109.4 1,238.5 134.6 1,156.1 125.7 
2,932.5 100 3,047.5 103.9 3,237.6 110.4 3,140.8 107.1 
A - in millions of European currency units (ECU). 
B- 1972= 100. 
1976 1977 
A B A B 
40.9 111.6 44.1 120.3 
1,053.7 109.1 1,053.0 109.0 
682.5 90.2 673.2 89.0 
129.2 96.0 133.7 99.5 
90.8 82.4 90.0 81.6 
1,080.3 117.3 1,020.2 110.9 
3,077.4 104.9 3,014.2 102.8 
Country 
Belgium 
France 
Federal Republic of Germany 
Italy 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
WEU total 
C - percentage proportion (WEU = I 00). 
D - percentage annual variation. 
TABLE VI (b) 
Maintenance expenditure in the WEU member countries taken from 
their national budgets and expressed in percentages 
1972-77 
(at 1972 prices and exchange rates) 
1972 1973 1974 1975 
c D c D c D c D 
1.2 - 1.2 + 2.2 1.1 - 3.3 1.3 + 14.8 
32.9 - 32.5 + 2.5 31.2 + 1.8 32.7 + 1.8 
25.8 - 25.0 + 0.7 22.2 - 5.5 22.1 - 3.5 
4.6 - 5.0 + 11.3 4.1 -10.9 4.1 - 4.7 
3.7 - 3.3 - 9.9 3.1 + 2.2 3.0 - 6.9 
31.3 - 33.0 + 9.4 38.3 +23.0 36.8 - 6.7 
100 - 100 + 3.9 100 + 6.2 100 - 3.0 
1976 1977 
c D c D 
1.3 - 1.7 1.5 +7.9 
34.2 +2.6 34.9 -0.1 
22.2 - 1.8 22.3 - 1.4 
4.2 + 1.7 4.5 +3.6 
3.0 -3.9 3.0 -0.9 
35.1 -6.6 33.8 -5.6 
lOO -2.0 100 -2.1 
ANNEX 
TABLE VII 
Armaments production in European currency units 
for the totality of the WEU member countries 
1972-77 
(at 1972 prices and exchange rates) 
WEU total 1972 1973 1974 
A 9,167 10,263 10,171 
B 100 112.0 111.0 
c - + 12.0 -0.9 
A - in millions of European currency units (ECU). 
B- 1972 = 100. 
C - annual percentage variation. 
Sources : National information. 
TABLE VIII 
1975 
10,404 
113.5 
+2.3 
1976 
11,138 
121.5 
+ 7.1 
Armaments exports in European currency units 
for the totality of the WEU member countries 
(including intra-WEU exchanges) 
1972-77 
(at 1972 prices and exchange rates) 
WEU total 1972 1973 1974 
A 1,998 2,589 2,983 
B 100 129.6 149.3 
c - +29.6 + 15.2 
A - in millions of European currency units (ECU). 
B- 1972 = 100. 
C - annual percentage variation. 
1975 
3,405 
170.4 
+ 14.1 
1976 1 
(3,542) 
(177.3) 
. (+4.0) 
1917 
12,053 
131.5 
+8.2 
1977 1 
(4l322) 
(216.3) 
(+ ;22.0) 
I. These figures do not include data from one of the member countriesi whose 
proportion of the total varied from 2.2% to 3.7% between 1972 and 1975. 
Sources : National information. 
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TABLE IX 
Armaments imports in European currency units 
for the totality of the WEU member countries 
(including intra-WEU exchanges but not including co-operative projects) 
1972-77 
(at 1972 prices and exchange rates) 
WEU total 1972 1973 1974 
A 1,247 1,176 1,075 
B lOO 94.3 86.2 
c - - 5.7 ~ 8.6 
A - in millions of European currency units (ECU). 
B- 1972 = 100. 
C - annual percentage variation. 
Sources : National information. 
TABLE X 
1975 
1,169 
93.7 
+ 8.7 
GDP price indices (at market prices) 
Country 1972 1973 1974 
Belgium lOO 106.7 119.7 
France lOO 107.7 119.8 
Federal Republic of Germany lOO 105.9 113.3 
Italy lOO 111.8 132.0 
Luxembourg lOO 111.4 129.3 
Netherlands 100 108.4 118.4 
United Kingdom lOO 106.7 123.0 
1976 1977 
1,315 1,127 
105.5 90.4 
+ 12.5 -14.3 
1975 1976 
134.8 145.0 
135.5 149.1 
120.9 125.0 
154.8 183.0 
132.1 141.7 
131.8 143.1 
156.7 180.3 
1977 
155.0 
161.9 
129.5 
216.4 
148.7 
153.4 
204.1 
Source. OECD national accounts 1972-77 (volume figures based on 1975 readjusted to a 1972 base). 
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National 
currency 1972 
B.Frs 49.3611 L.Frs 
F.Frs 5.65717 
DM 3.57681 
L.lt. 654.264 
HFL 3.59991 
£ 0.448941 
Source: Eurostatistics. 
TABLE XI 
Rates of exchange in European currency units (ECU) 
(Yearly averages) 
1973 1974 1975 
47.8009 46.3994 45.5690 
5.46775 5.73386 5.31923 
3.27644 3.08352 3.04939 
716.460 775.743 809.545 
3.42853 3.20224 3.13490 
0.502321 0.509803 0.560026 
1976 1977 
43.1654 40.8026 
5.34486 5.60607 
2.81545 2.64831 
930.150 1006.785 
2.95515 2.80010 
0.621578 0.653701 
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Draft Recommendation 
on talks on the reduction of lqng-range theatre nuclear forces in Europe 
The Assembly, 
(i) Believing that the broad economic and cultural interdependence of Europe and the United 
States, and their shared concept of an open society, make a frank dialogue be~ween the two both 
possible and desirable, especially on mutual security; ' 
(ii) Considering it desirable for the European countries of the Alliance to adopt a common cons-
tructive position in that dialogue, the better to influence the United States, in p~rticular on security 
matters such as long-range theatre nuclear forces; 
(iii) Noting with concern the vast modernisation of Soviet forces, both conventional and nuclear, 
and in particular the continued deployment of SS-20 missiles at the rate foreseen in Recommendation 
360; 
(iv) Reiterating its support for the twofold NATO decision of 12th December l979 on LR TNF as 
a realistic basis for negotiating seriously on reductions in the levels of these weapons; 
(v) Believing that such negotiations should provide the political impetus for broad negotiations on 
the limitation and reduction of all nuclear weapons, strategic and tactical, long-l'ange and battlefield 
so as to forestall an unrestricted nuclear arms race in an already too dangerous world; 
(vi) Stressing the urgent need for the LRTNF negotiations with the Soviet Union to begin and to be 
pursued in the general SALT framework, taking into account the whole continuum of nuclear 
weapons on which deterrence depends, with a view to securing agreement on broad parity with 
reduced levels of all such weapons in an overall military balance; 
(vii) Aware of the Warsaw Pact superiority in conventional forces on the centra~ front; 
(viii) Aware that all defence policy must rely on the trust and support of properly-informed public 
opinion, that that opinion is both concerned and confused about nuclear weapons and calling there-
fore for objective comparable information to be published on the nuclear balance as a whole as per-
ceived both by NATO and the Warsaw Pact; 
(ix) Welcoming the decision of the United States to embark on negotiations on LRTNF with the 
Soviet Union before the end of the year ; 
(x) Welcoming in particular the readiness of the United States to consult its allies on nuclear poli-
cy, in particular in the framework of the Nuclear Planning Group, the Special Consultative Group, 
and the High Level Group, which enable their European members to participate constructively in 
formulating nuclear strategy and in the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Call on member governments to urge the North Atlantic Council: 
1. To ensure that negotiations on LR TNF reductions in the framework of SALT begin without 
further delay; 
2. To call for the earliest resumption of negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms as a whole 
with a view to securing broad parity at lower levels of the nuclear weapons concerned ; 
3. To call meanwhile for the continued mutual respect of the SALT 11 limits and of the SALT I 
agreement and ABM treaty; 
4. To call subsequently for negotiations to secure a balance at lower levels of battlefield nuclear 
and conventional weapons ; 
5. To provide an objective and comparable assessment of the nuclear balance as a whole. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Mommersteeg, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1.1. In submitting this short report, the Com-
mittee is acting on its intentions noted by the 
Assembly in Recommendation 360, adopted on 
3rd December 1980: "To follow closely the 
SALT process and report regularly to the 
Assembly on this vital subject ", with particular 
reference to the problems of long-range theatre 
nuclear forces. In that recommendation 1, the 
Assembly inter alia considered " the twofold 
decision of the special meeting of NATO 
Foreign and Defence Ministers of 12th Decem-
ber 1979 to be a realistic basis for negotiating 
reductions of long-range theatre nuclear forces 
with the Soviet Union ... ", noted that "the 
Soviet Union is now deploying SS-20 missiles 
at a rate which would provide 250-300 with 
750-900 warheads by the end of 1981... ", wel-
comed " the opening of preliminary bilateral 
talks on LR TNF reductions ... ", expressed its 
belief that SALT 11 was " to the mutual 
advantage of both NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact " and called on member governments " to 
urge the North Atlantic Council to call for the 
observance of the SALT 11 limits and the 
earliest resumption of the SALT process ". In 
its earlier Recommendation 345, adopted on 
2nd June 1980, the Assembly had called for 
reliance to be placed " on the whole range of 
existing weapons systems based in Europe, at 
sea and in the United States to counter the 
threat posed by present levels of Soviet 
weapons". 
1.2. Regrettably, at the time that this report is 
drafted, over five months since the adoption of 
Recommendation 360 by the Assembly, no 
reply to it has been received from the Council, 
although in reply to Recommendation 359, 
adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 
1980: 
" The Council note with satisfaction the 
close and fruitful consultations which 
have taken place among the allies who 
participated in the decision of 12th 
December 1979 on theatre nuclear forces 
(TNF) . .. The Council welcome the fact 
that, as a result of the continuous imple-
mentation of both elements of the 
December decision, serious preliminary 
discussions towards agreed limitations of 
TNF could be started between the Soviet 
Union and the United States and will be 
resumed at a date to be set through 
I. Text at appendix. 
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mutual consultations. These discussions 
serve to continue the SALT process 
which is of great importance for the 
achievement of a stable balance in the 
nuclear field and for the stabilisation of 
East-West relations in general. " 
1.3. The present report summarises events 
since the Committee adopted its previous report 
" SALT and the British and French nuclear for-
ces" (Document 859) on 17th November 1980, 
on the basis of which Recommendation 360 
was subsequently adopted by the Assem-
bly. As they affect LRTNF in particular, these 
events concern: the evolution of the policy of 
President Reagan's administration in the United 
States; the evolution of Soviet policy and the 
proposed moratorium on the deployment of 
nuclear weapons in Europe; the change in 
levels of nuclear forces and the problems 
encountered in developing the new United 
States LR TNF; the growth of opposition in 
Europe to the principle of nuclear weapons 
deployment. 
1.4. The report concludes by calling for an 
early resumption of the SALT process, includ-
ing LR TNF talks, and stresses that it must be a 
continuing process. 
11. Trends of United States and NATO policy 
2.1. As the Committee pointed out in its pre-
vious report 1, President Reagan, in the course 
of his election campaign in 1980, had first 
opposed SALT 11, but later committed himself 
to continuation of the SALT process. In 
November he was quoted as saying about the 
SALT dialogue: 
"We could open it by telling them that 
we have to renegotiate SALT 11. We 
could take what is usable out of SALT 
11 and then tell them that we are not 
going to ratify the treaty the way it 
is... There has to be linkage between 
arms control and other areas of diffe-
rence ... " 2 
Since taking office, the new administration has 
given priority to economic policy, and has been 
slow to formulate foreign policy and arms 
control policy; at times it has appeared publicly 
divided on these latter issues. 
I. Document 859. 
2. Sunday Times, 9th November 1980. 
2.2. General Edward Rowny, a former joint 
representative on the SALT negotiations team, 
has been appointed chief negotiator for SALT, 
reporting directly to Mr. Eugene Rostow, Head 
of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. 
On 3rd March, following a statement by 
Mr. John Lehman, the new Navy Secretary, to 
the effect that the United States should not feel 
bound by SALT I and SALT 11 limitations, the 
State Department's spokesman, Mr. William 
Dyess, issued an official statement: 
" This administration is reviewing its 
overall SALT policy. No decision has 
yet been taken on our adherence to exist-
ing SALT agreements. John Lehman's 
statements on SALT, as reported in the 
press, were not authorised, nor did they 
reflect administration policy. While we 
are reviewing our SALT policy, we will 
take no action that would undercut exist-
ing agreements so long as the Soviet 
Union exercises the same restraint. " 
It is not to be excluded that the United States, 
when ready to embark on a renegotiation of 
SALT 11, will decide to seek reductions in the 
SALT 11 ceilings. 
2.3. On 31st March, after pressure from seve-
ral European members, the NATO Special 
Consultative Group (on LR TNF arms control 
policy) finally met in Brussels under the chair-
manship of Mr. Lawrence Eagleburger, the 
new United States Deputy Secretary of State for 
European Affairs. The group came to the 
conclusion that Mr. Brezhnev's proposed mora-
torium was unacceptable, despite the clarifica-
tion provided by Mr. Arbatov in Bonn referred 
to below, but decided to continue its work ener-
getically. The United States was urged by its 
partners to resume the LR TNF negotiations 
with the Soviet Union, which had been mori-
bund since the first exploratory round under 
the Carter administration from mid-October to 
mid-November 1980 in Geneva. The half-
yearly meeting of the United States-Soviet 
Union Standing Consultative Commission on 
SALT opened in Geneva on 27th May 1981. 
2.4. On his return from a visit to Moscow on 
2nd and 3rd April, the German Foreign Minis-
ter, Mr. Genscher, reported that the Soviet 
Union, as already reported during Chancellor 
Schmidt's visit to Moscow in June 1980, was 
ready to enter into talks on reduction of 
LR TNF without preconditions - prior to Chan-
cellor Schmidt's visit, the Soviet Union had 
ruled out talks on the reduction of such wea-
pons unless NATO rescinded its decision of 
December 1979 on deployment. Partly as a 
result of its consultations with its United States 
European allies, both bilaterally and multilate-
rally, the United States has undertaken to begin 
formal negotiations with the Soviet Union on 
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LR TNF reductions before the end of the year. 
This decision was announced in the final 
communique of the minist~rial session of the 
North Atlantic Council on 4th and 5th May: 
" The allies who participated in the 
December 1979 NATO decision on 
LR TNF modernisation and arms control 
reaffirmed their commitment to that deci-
sion. They emphasised that in light of 
increasing Soviet LR TNF deployments 
which in the case of the SS-20 already 
exceed the total LR TNF deployment 
planned by NATO, the modernising of 
NA TO's LR TNF is more essential than 
ever, and offers the only realistic basis for 
parallel TNF arms 1control. Since the 
December 1979 decision, Soviet threats 
and efforts to divide the allies have only 
strengthened their resolve to take the 
steps necessary to maintain deterrence, 
redress the imbalance in LR TNF, and 
ensure their security. The latest Soviet 
proposal for a moratorium on LR TNF 
deployments is wholly unacceptable to 
these allies. It would freeze them into 
inferiority by blocking the NATO moder-
nisation programme 
1 
altogether. More-
over, the proposal · would permit the 
Soviets to increase the threat to NATO 
by failing to limit ,systems capable of 
striking allied territory from east of the 
Urals. 
These allies welcomed the intention of 
the United States to begin negotiations 
with the Soviet Union on TNF arms 
control within the SALT framework by 
the end of the y()ar. The American 
Secretary of State intends to discuss the 
timing and procedures for these negotia-
tions with Foreign Minister Gromyko in 
September at the United Nations. These 
negotiations will rely on an updated 
Alliance threat assessment and a study of 
functional requirements for NATO TNF 
to be undertaken within the framework of 
the Special Consultative Group and the 
High Level Group as matters of imme-
diate priqrity. " 
2.5. In a press conference in Rome on 5th 
May, the United States Secretary of State, Mr. 
Haig, is quoted as comm~nting on the North 
Atlantic Council agreemen:t as follows: 
" I would anticipate some preliminary 
talks at the ambassadorial level designed 
to put together a framework which would 
permit the meeting of the foreign minis-
ters in the fall to proceed promptly to the 
agreement for negotiations - formal nego-
tiations - with the Soviet Union by the 
end of the year. " 
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It emerged from the Council meeting that Presi-
dent Reagan had written a personal letter to 
Mr. Brezhnev confirming United States readi-
ness to negotiate directly with the Soviet Union 
on specified issues, but details of that letter 
have not been disclosed. At the same press 
conference, asked whether there was a timetable 
for SALT negotiations with the Soviet Union, 
Mr. Haig said: 
"No ... Clearly President Reagan has 
reiterated his willingness and desire to 
engage in a full range of negotiations that 
are necessary to provide equitable balan-
ced reductions in nuclear weaponry, and 
I emphasise reductions. 1 This is a prob-
lem associated with a host of technical 
issues associated with the arms control of 
central strategic systems themselves, but 
it is also clearly related to Soviet interna-
tional behaviour and overall relationships 
between East and West. And I do not 
foresee in the immediate future a 
resumption of those talks. " 
2.6. Mr. Haig here is calling, albeit in vague 
terms, for the concept of linkage between SALT 
and Soviet behaviour in international relations 
as a whole. In the opinion of your Rappor-
teur, such linkage is a vague concept which can 
be interpreted in various ways. The Assembly, 
in adopting Recommendation 360 on 3rd 
December 1980, expressed itself in the follow-
ing terms: 
" (ix) Considering that despite an inevit-
able interaction between Soviet actions 
and arms control negotiations in many 
fora, there should be no formal linkage 
with specific agreements when these are 
to the mutual advantage of the parties; " 
2.7. Noting that the North Atlantic Council 
communique referred to " negotiations with the 
Soviet Union on TNF arms control within the 
SALT framework ... ", Mr. Haig said: 
" It suggests that all nuclear systems 
represent somewhat of a continuum whe-
ther they be theatre based - and to our 
European partners it makes very little 
difference whether it is a theatre system 
or a central strategic system - theatre 
missiles from the Soviet side represent a 
strategic importance to our Western 
European partners. So it suggests a 
continuum and, if you will, confirms that 
there are no separate theatres of nuclear 
concern. ... Second, clearly the inter-
relationship between theatre systems -
LR TNF - and central strategic systems is 
blurred and a grey area in many res-
pects. So coherent arms control nego-
I. Rapporteur's italics. 
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tiations in the theatre area should always 
be conducted in the light of strategic 
balances and long-term objectives in arms 
control in that regard. It does not mean 
that the resumption of the initiation of 
our talks with the Soviet Union and for-
mal negotiations by the end of this year 
would have to bring with it discussions of 
central strategic systems in the American 
sense - they can proceed separately but 
in full cognisance of the interrelationship 
one with the other. " 
2.8. A very positive feature of new United 
States policy is the undoubted commitment to 
closer consultations in the Alliance. 
Ill. Trends of Soviet policy 
3.1. In his address to the 26th Congress of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union on 23rd 
February 1981, Mr. Brezhnev spoke at some 
length on the problems of arms control. Ex-
tracts from the speech, which merit examina-
tion, are at Appendix 11. In particular, he said: 
" The limitation and reduction of 
strategic armaments 1s a paramount 
problem. 
For our part we are prepared to 
continue the relevant negotiations with 
the United States without delay, preser-
ving all the positive elements which have 
so far been achieved in this area. 
It goes without saying that the negotia-
tions can be conducted only on the basis 
of equality and equal security. We will 
not consent to any agreement that gives a 
unilateral advantage to the United 
States. There must be no illusions on 
this score. In our opinion, all the other 
nuclear powers should join these negotia-
tions at the appropriate time. 
The USSR is prepared to negotiate the 
limitation of any type of weapon. At 
one time we offered a ban on the deve-
lopment of the naval Trident missile sys-
tem in the United States and of the cor-
responding system in our country. The 
proposal was not accepted. As a result 
the United States has built the new Ohio 
submarine fitted with Trident I missiles, 
while an analogous system, the Typhoon, 
was built in our country. So who has 
gained? ... 
Now, about the nuclear missile weapons 
in Europe ... 
We suggest coming to terms that already 
now a moratorium should be set on the 
deployment in Europe of new medium-
range nuclear missile weapons of the 
NATO countries and the Soviet Union, 
that is to freeze the existing quan-
titative and qualitative level of these wea-
pons, naturally including the United 
States forward-based nuclear weapons in 
this region. 
The moratorium could enter into force at 
once, the moment negotiations begin on 
this score, and could operate until a 
permanent treaty is concluded on limi-
ting or, still better, reducing such nuclear 
weapons in Europe. In making this pro-
posal we expect the two sides to stop all 
preparations for the deployment of 
corresponding additional weapons, inclu-
ding United States Pershing 11 missiles 
and land-based strategic cruise missiles. " 
3.2. On the question of nuclear balance, Mr. 
Brezhnev said: 
" The military and strategic equilibrium 
prevailing between the Soviet Union and 
the United States, between the Warsaw 
Treaty and NATO, is objectively a safe-
guard for world peace. We have not 
sought, and do not now seek, military 
superiority over the other side. That is 
not our policy. But neither will we 
allow such superiority over us to be built 
up. Attempts of that kind, and talking 
to us from positions of strength, are abso-
lutely futile. 
Let us look at the true state of affairs. 
Whether we take strategic nuclear 
arms or medium-range nuclear weapons 
in Europe, in both cases there is approxi-
mate parity between the sides. In the 
case of some weapons, the West has a 
certain advantage, and we have in the 
case of others. This parity could be 
more enduring if appropriate treaties and 
agreements were to be concluded. " 
3.3. Mr. Brezhnev's proposals for a morato-
rium were briefly elaborated by Mr. Georgij 
Arbatov, Director of the Soviet institute for the 
study of the United States and Canada, speak-
ing in Bonn in mid-March, who said the pro-
posals were intended to bring about an agree-
ment on the employment of medium-range 
nuclear missiles and not a total halt in western 
production of these weapons; the moratorium 
was not intended to " freeze for ever " Soviet 
superiority in such weapons 1• 
3.4. The Brezhnev speech was followed by 
unpublished messages from the Soviet leader to 
I. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 17th March 1981. 
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most NATO governments, 1 which were com-
pared and studied in NATO without revealing 
more than was contained in the speech. 
IV. Perceptions of the hue/ear balance 
4.1. In its previous report 1 , the Committee 
examined the nuclear balance as it existed in 
mid-1980. Since Mr. Brezhnev called for a 
moratorium, there have been comments from 
both the East and West on Qifferent perceptions 
of the nuclear balance, with· particular reference 
to the problem of nuclear weapons in Europe. 
4.2. The communique issued after the minis-
terial meeting of the NATO Nuclear Plan-
ning Group in Bonn on 7th and 8th 
April 1981 made the following point : 
" Ministers reiterated their regret that the 
Soviet superiority in the long-range thea-
tre nuclear forces cdntinues to grow by 
increases in the already large numbers of 
SS-20 multiple warhead missiles and 
Backfire bombers. Due to their extend-
ed range, up to 5,0QO km, Soviet SS-20 
missiles deployed in some areas of the 
non-European part of the Soviet Union 
nevertheless threaten NATO Europe. 
While still maintainjng some 380 SS-4 
and SS-5 missiles, the Soviet Union pre-
sently deploys about 220 launchers for 
SS-20 MIRVed missiles. With their 
SS-20 missiles alone, the Soviets have 
already deployed some 660 warheads -
more warheads than are planned for 
NA TO's long-range nuclear force moder-
nisation programme '(the first systems of 
which will not begin to be deployed until 
late 1983). They are continuing these 
deployments at a rapid pace. 
In addition, Ministers also noted this 
situation has been exacerbated by the 
development of sevenal new shorter-range 
missile systems with nuclear warheads 
and further by the fact that Soviet tactical 
nuclear-capable air forces were being 
substantially modernised with the pro-
duction in 1980 alone of over 1,000 air-
craft of the new Su-17, Su-24, MiG-23 
and MiG-25 varieties. " 
4.3. These NATO figures show further reduc-
tions in the number of SS-4 and SS-5 missiles 
from 440, reported by the Committee last year, 
to 380 today, while deployment of the SS-20 
has continued rapidly. However, although the 
NPG communique makes' the point that some 
SS-20 missiles in non-European parts of the 
Soviet Union can threaten NATO Europe, as 
the Committee pointed out about one-third of 
the total of SS-20 missiles are deployed against 
I. Document 859. 
DOCUMENT 8 79 
China so that probably only 150 are in range of 
Europe, although with three warheads each this 
represents 450 warheads which, combined with 
the 380 remaining SS-4s and SS-5s, represents 
some increase in the threat from this type of 
weapon system compared with the 700 SS-4s 
and SS-5s which were operational ten years 
ago. Western sources have frequently drawn 
attention to the Backfire bomber in the context 
of the nuclear balance in Europe but produc-
tion of this swingwing strategic aircraft, a proto-
type of which was first seen in 1970, and which 
began to enter service in 1974, is limited 
by SALT 11 to 30 a year. The last figure 
published by IISS for the nuclear-capable Back-
fire bombers is 145 including naval aviation. 
4.4. For the first time, the NPG communique 
draws attention to the production figures for the 
latest Soviet tactical nuclear-capable combat 
aircraft. Not all of those produced in 1980 
have been deployed against Europe; in addition 
to those deployed in the Far East, a number are 
known to have been exported to third world 
countries. The IISS Military Balance for 
1980-81 shows a slight NATO superiority in 
the fighter/ground attack combat aircraft in 
northern and central Europe with 1 ,602 NATO 
aircraft compared with 1,350 for the Warsaw 
Pact, but not all of these aircraft on either side 
will be nuclear-capable. The overwhelming 
Warsaw Pact superiority in tactical combat air-
craft is in defensive interceptor aircraft where 
the corresponding numbers are 386 for NATO 
compared with 2,050 for the Warsaw Pact. 
The considerable improvement in Warsaw Pact 
air defence capability, both in interceptors and 
in air defence missiles, of course reduces the 
effect of NATO numerical superiority in attack 
aircraft. 
4.5. Comments by Lieutenant General N. 
Petrov quoted by Novosti 1 deal with Soviet per-
ceptions of the balance: 
"If they install another 572 new Ame-
rican medium-range nuclear missiles in 
Europe, the West will have a superiority 
of more than 1.5 times over the Warsaw 
Pact countries, both in delivery vehicles 
and in nuclear warheads. The leaders of 
the United States and the NATO coun-
tries know this well. On the other hand, 
it can be asserted that the Soviet SS-20 
missiles do not disturb the balance of 
force because they are opposed by NATO 
medium-range weapons and by American 
forward-based systems. 
At the present time, there is in the 
neighbourhood of the Soviet Union a 
large number of United States and 
NATO nuclear missiles which can reach 
I. See Actuallles Sovzetiques published by the Soviet 
Information Bureau in Paris, 29th April 1981. 
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Soviet territory and that of its allies. 
These are the nuclear-capable aircraft 
based on airfields in certain Western 
European countries. They are the car-
rier-borne nuclear-capable aircraft on 
American aircraft carriers. They are the 
long-range land-based ballistic missiles. 
They are missile-carrying submarines, 
etc. 
It would be na'ive to think that the Soviet 
Union does not take account of all these 
nuclear capabilities which influence the 
strategic system in Europe and which 
directly concern the security of the Soviet 
Union and its allies. The fuss made by 
the West about Soviet SS-20 missiles is 
intended to deceive public opinion. The 
Soviet Union is merely undertaking a 
modernisation as the United States and 
NATO have done more than once. 
Each new SS-20 missile replaces several 
obsolete missiles which are withdrawn 
from service... For ten years the number 
of medium-range nuclear delivery vehi-
cles has not increased by a single missile 
or a single aircraft in the European part 
of the Soviet Union. On the contrary, 
the number of medium-range missile 
launchers, and the yield of the nuclear 
warheads which they carry, has even 
been slightly reduced.". 
4.6. Some of these assertions, although at first 
sight apparently totally at variance with 
NATO claims, can in fact be justified if parti-
cular definitions of weapons systems are adop-
ted. Thus, as pointed out above, the number 
of Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe, on 
the basis of NATO figures, has fallen from the 
700 SS-4s and SS-5s in service ten years ago to 
600 for the total of SS-20s, SS-4s and SS-5s 
cited in the Nuclear Planning Group communi-
que above. Similarly, the yield of the war-
heads has also fallen from 1 megaton for the 
SS-4 and SS-5 to 150 kilotons for each of the 
three warheads fitted to the SS-20. These 
figures of course mask the increase in total 
number of warheads over the same time from 
700 to about 830 today if missiles deployed 
against Europe are counted. 
4. 7. Meanwhile, a study published by the 
United States General Accounting Office on 5th 
March 1981 revealed that development of 
the Pershing 11 ballistic missile and the ground-
launched cruise missiles for deployment in 
Europe were subject to " many critical un-
known factors". There had been insufficient 
test firings of Pershing 11 to determine whether 
it could meet performance objectives for initial 
deployment in December 1983 as scheduled. 
And the terrain-following guidance system of 
the GLCM " must still be demonstrated in a 
realistic operational environment". 
V. Conclusions 
5.1. There is growing opposition to nuclear 
weapons in Europe, which is no! analys~d in 
this report because of t.he short. tl!fie. a~atlable 
for its preparation. This analysis IS limited to 
the most recent events. Growing opposition to 
LR TNF deployment led Chancellor Schmidt, 
before leaving for talks in Washington where 
LR TNF was a major issue, to threaten to resign 
if he did not receive wholehearted support for 
the double NATO decision of December 
1979. The communique issued on 22nd May 
after his talks with President Reagan said in 
part: 
"The President and the Federal Chancel-
lor affirmed ... their resolve to implement 
both elements of the NATO decision of 
December 1979 and to give equal weight 
to both elements. The Federal Chancel-
lor welcomed the United States decision 
to begin negotiations with the Soviet 
Union on the limitation of theatre 
nuclear weapons within the SALT frame-
work by the end of this year. He also 
welcomed the fact that the United States 
Secretary of State has initiated prepar-
atory discussions O?- the~tre nucl~ar 
forces with the Soviet Umon, looking 
toward an agreement to begin formal 
negotiations. The President and the 
Federal Chancellor agreed that TNF 
modernisation is essential for alliance 
security and as a basis for parallel nego-
tiations leading to concrete results on 
limitations of theatre nuclear forces. 
They further agreed that the preparatory 
studies called for in the Rome commu-
nique 1 should be undertaken as matters 
of immediate priority by the relevant 
NATO bodies. " 
5.2. On returning from Washington, Chance~­
lor Schmidt called on the newly-elected Presi-
dent Mitterrand on 24th May when, according 
to German sources, they reached " total and 
clear agreement " on Euromissiles, considering 
that " the balance of forces " should be re-
established in Europe, but that simulta~eously 
negotiations should be undertaken With the 
Soviet Union to ensure that the level would be 
as low as possible. President Mitterrand said 
that " problems of armament, disarmament, the 
control of armaments around the well known 
questions raised by the installation of Euro-
missiles " had been discussed, and French 
sources noted that the joint position referred to 
by German sources corresp<?nded to Presid~nt 
Mitterrand's remarks dunng the electiOn 
campaign. 
1. See Appendix Ill (b), North Atlantic Council commu-
nique, 5th May 1981, paragraph 12, last sentence. 
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5.3. On 25th May, Chancellor Schmidt 
reported to the Bundestag on his talks with 
President Reagan and President Mitterrand, and 
an SPD-FDP resolution confirming the double 
NATO decision of December 1979 secured a 
majority of 254 votes to 236 - six SPD 
members voted against a~d four. abstai~ed. 
The opposition CDU, wllllst votmg agai~st. 
the SPD-FDP resolution, supported the pnn-
ciple of LR TNF deployment 
5.4. Some reports from Washington suggest 
that the Reagan administration would prefer to 
seek reductions of nuclear weapons rather than 
limitations, and rename the talks SAR T accor-
dingly. A senior official briefing the press on 
22nd May, on the meeting between President 
Reagan and Chancellor Schmidt said the Presi-
dent had referred to " arms neduction talks " 1• 
5.5. It goes without saying that sufficient 
political support for the allied decision to 
deploy theatre nuclear weapons in Eu.rope has 
to be based on informed debate. It Is regret-
table that full information about the state of the 
overall nuclear balance is n(>t released officially 
in properly comparable rorm: The .soviet 
Union of course never provldes m formatiOn on 
Soviet weapons systems. · Individual NATO 
governments do provide considerable informa-
tion on both NATO and Warsaw Pact weapons, 
but NATO collectively has not attempted to 
publish properly comparable figures on the 
balance of nuclear weapons systems. The 
Committee concludes that there should be a 
detailed NATO statement of the present 
balance of nuclear forces ranging from the 
longest-range strategic forces to ~attlefi~ld 
weapons, including those such as tactic~l stnke 
aircraft and carrier-borne <fircraft which the 
Soviet Union obviously takes into account, as 
well as those which NATO chooses to take into 
account. 
5.6. Obviously, any agreement on reducing 
theatre nuclear weapons will be an extremely 
complex undertaking because percepti~ms on 
both sides differ significantly concernmg the 
weapons systems which must be taken into 
account. The first objective of LR TNF nego-
tiations must be an attempt to define weapons 
systems to be included i~ any ~egi.onal interim 
agreement· it must be stnctly Withm the SALT 
process b~cause, as the Committee has ?ften 
stressed there could be no question of seekmg a 
theatre 'balance of nuclear weapons independ-
ently of United States strat~gic weapo~s. 
Otherwise essential linkage With the mam 
deterrent would be lost and the danger of 
nuclear war in Europe would increase. Deter-
rence relies on a continuum of weapons 
systems. 
1. International Herald Tribune, 25th May 1981. 
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5. 7. By the end of this year two years will 
have elapsed since the December 1979 decision 
without any effective negotiations beginning 
with the Soviet Union. The Committee regrets 
this delay. The preliminary talks in Geneva in 
October and November last year with an out-
going United States administration could not be 
expected to make much progress. The Com-
mittee reiterates the view expressed in several 
previous reports that the SALT 11 limits are to 
the mutual advantage of both NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact. It is important that the SALT 
negotiations as a whole be resumed urgently 
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and proceed in parallel with negotiations on 
theatre nuclear weapons. The Committee calls 
for the limits laid down in SALT 11 to be res-
pected by the signatories as they have been so 
far, and for the SALT I agreements including 
the anti-ballistic missile treaty, which is due for 
review in 1982, to be maintained. The only 
alternative would be a massive arms race into 
totally new weapons systems by both the Uni-
ted States and the Soviet Union, the outcome of 
which cannot be predicted, but which cannot 
be expected to provide any greater security for 
either side. 
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RECOMMENDATION 360 1 
on SALT and the British and French nuclear forces 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Believing that armaments and arms control-disarmament are two sides of ope coin: security; 
(il) Noting that its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments intends to follow closely the 
SALT process and report regularly to the Assembly on this vital subject; 
(iii) Considering the twofold decision of the special meeting of NATO Foreign and Defence 
Ministers of 12th December 1979 to be a realistic basis for negotiating reductions of long-range 
theatre nuclear forces with the Soviet Union; 
(iv) Noting that the 572 United States missiles to be deployed from 1983 will be accommodated 
within the reduced ceiling of United States nuclear warheads in Europe resulting from the unilateral 
reduction of 1 ,000, whereas the Soviet Union is now deploying SS-20 missiles at a rate which would 
provide 250-300 with 750-900 warheads by the end of 1981; 
(v) Welcoming the opening of preliminary bilateral talks on LRTNF reductions, believing that 
they should aim to establish a balance at the lowest possible level, as part of the global strategic 
nuclear balance; 
(vz) Stressing that nuclear forces are only a part, although a very important part, of the deterrent 
and that sufficient conventional forces form an equally essential part; 
(vii) Recalling that the 1974 Ottawa declaration recognised that the British and French nuclear 
forces were " capable of playing a deterrent role of their own contributing to the overall strengthening 
of the deterrence of the Alliance", and noting that, if there is no reduction, in the conventional 
defence, the view is held in the Alliance that the independent centres of decision add to the uncer-
tainty facing Soviet planners, which is an essential factor of deterrence; 
(viii) Believing SALT 11 to be to the mutual advantage ofboth NATO and the Warsaw Pact; 
(ix) Considering that despite an inevitable interaction between Soviet actions and arms control 
negotiations in many fora, there should be no formal linkage with specific agreements when these are 
to the mutual advantage of the parties; 
(x) Recalling paragraph B.2. of Recommendation 346, urging member governments to submit 
annually to their parliaments reports on the arms control implications of all new defence equipment 
programmes, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Call on member governments to urge the North Atlantic Council: 
1. To call for the observance of the SALT 11 limits and the earliest resumption of the SALT 
process; 
2. To recommend that any modernisation plans for British and French nuclear forces should not 
lead to the diversion of resources from conventional defence; 
3. To call on the governments of NATO countries, in consultation with their national parlia-
ments, to study the possibility: 
(a) of improving nationally as well as in the framework of NATO methods of linking both 
armaments and arms control with security planning; 
(b) of arrangements for continuously informing and consulting parliam~nt, on a confidential 
basis where necessary, on these two sides of security planning and on progress of arms 
control negotiations. 
l. Adopted by the Assembly on 3rd December 1980 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session 
(13th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Mommersteeg on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments (Document 859). 
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Address by Mr. Brezhnev to the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 1 
23rd February 1981 
(Extracts) 
" 
Military expenditures are rising in an un-
precedented way. 
A considerable portion of these tremen-
dous sums is being spent on the crash develop-
ment of new types of strategic nuclear wea-
pons. Their appearance is accompanied by the 
creation of military doctrines dangerous to 
peace, like the notorious Carter doctrine. 
They want people to believe that nuclear war 
can be limited, they want to reconcile them 
with the idea that war of that kind is tolerable. 
But that is out-and-out deception of the 
peoples! A ' limited ' nuclear war as conceived 
by the Americans in, say, Europe would from 
the outset mean certain destruction of Euro-
pean civilisation. And, of course, the United 
States, too, would not be able to escape the 
flames of war. Clearly, such plans and ' doctri-
nes ' are a grave threat to all nations, including 
the people of the USA. They are being 
condemned all over the world. The peoples 
say an emphatic ' No ' to them. 
In our relations with the United States we 
have all these years, as previously, followed a 
principled and constructive line. It is only to 
be regretted that the former administration in 
Washington put its stakes on something other 
than developing relations or on mutual under-
standing. Trying to exert pressure on us, it set 
out to destroy the positive elements that had 
been achieved with no small effort in Soviet-
American relations over the preceding years. 
As a result, our bilateral ties in a number 
of fields were flung back. The entry into force 
of the SALT 11 treaty was deferred. 
Unfortunately, since the change of leader-
ship in the White House as well, openly belli-
cose calls and statements have resounded from 
Washington, specially designed, as it were, to 
poison the atmosphere of relations between our 
countries. We would like to hope, however, 
that those who are shaping United States policy 
today will ultimately manage to see things in a 
more realistic light. The military and strategic 
I. Soviet News, 24th February 1981. 
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equilibrium prevailing between the USSR and 
the USA, between the Warsaw Treaty and 
NATO, is objectively a safeguard for world 
peace. We have not sought, and do not now 
seek, military superiority over the other 
side. That is not our policy. But neither will 
we allow such superiority over us to be built 
up. Attempts of that kind, and talking t~ us 
from positions of strength, are absolutely futtle. 
Let us look at the true state of affairs. 
Whether we take strategic nuclear arms or 
medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe, in 
both cases there is approximate parity between 
the sides. In the case of some weapons the 
West has a certain advantage, and we have in 
the case of others. This parity could be more 
enduring if appropriate treaties and agreements 
were to be concluded. 
There is also talk about tanks.· It is true 
that the Soviet Union has more of them. But 
the NATO countries, too, have a large num-
ber. Besides, they have considerably more 
anti-tank weapons. 
The tale of Soviet superiority in the 
strength of armed forces does not match the 
facts either. Combined with the other NATO 
countries, the United States has even slightly 
more troops than the Soviet Union and the 
other Warsaw Treaty countries. 
So, what talk can there be of any Soviet 
military superiority? 
A war danger does exist for the United Sta-
tes, as it does for all the other countries of the 
world. But it originates, not from the Soviet 
Union, not from any mythical Soviet superio-
rity, but from the arms race and from the ten-
sion that still exists in the world. We are prepa-
red to combat this true and not imaginary dan-
ger hand in hand with the United States, with 
the countries of Europe, with all countries in 
the world. To try to outstrip each other in the 
arms race, or to expect to win a nuclear war, is 
dangerous madness. 
It is universally recognised that in many 
ways the international situation depends on the 
policy of the USSR and the USA. As we see 
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it, the state of relations between them at present 
and the acuteness of the international problems 
requiring a solution necessitate a dialogue, and 
an active dialogue, at all levels. We are prepa-
red to have this dialogue. 
Experience shows that the crucial link here 
is meetings at summit level. This was true 
yesterday and is still true today. 
The USSR wants normal relations with the 
USA. There is simply no other sensible way 
from the point of view of the interests of both 
our states, and mankind as a whole. 
Let me begin with the problem of limiting 
nuclear armaments, which are the most danger-
ous to mankind. All these years the Soviet 
Union has worked perseveringly to put an end 
to the race in such armaments and to stop their 
further spread across the world. A tremendous 
amount of work has been done, as you know, in 
preparing a treaty with the United States on 
limiting strategic arms. Much has been done 
during the negotiations with the United States 
and Britain on the complete prohibition of 
nuclear weapon tests. We made an important 
move by declaring and reaffirming that we 
would not use nuclear weapons against non-
nuclear countries that did not permit their 
deployment on their territories. But we have 
also offered something more: to stop manufac-
turing nuclear weapons and to begin reducing 
the stockpiles of those weapons until they are 
completely eliminated. 
The Soviet Union has also actively sought 
the prohibition of all other types of weapons of 
mass destruction. And we have managed to 
achieve a few things in this field during the 
period under review. 
The Soviet Union and the other Warsaw 
Treaty countries have come forward with a 
number of concrete proposals on military 
detente in Europe. 
The Soviet Union and its allies have pro-
posed that a European conference be convened 
to discuss and settle questions of military detente 
and disarmament in Europe. That question 
is in the centre of attention at the Madrid 
conference. 
Nor have we slackened our efforts to secure 
progress at the Vienna negotiations on reducing 
armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. 
In recent years, as you know, flashpoints 
of military conflict, often threatening to grow 
into a major conflagration, flared up, now in 
one and now in another region of the world. 
Experience has shown that it is not easy to 
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extinguish them. It would be far better to take 
preventive measures, or forestall them. 
In Europe, for example, this purpose is to 
some extent served -and fairly well on the 
whole- by the confidence-building measures 
carried out in the military field by decision of 
the European conference. They include ad-
vance notification of military exercices of 
ground troops, and the inviting to them of 
observers from other countries. At present, 
these measures apply to the territory of the 
European states, including' the western regions 
of the USSR. We have already said that we 
are prepared to go further and to give notice of 
naval and air exercises. We have proposed -
and propose again - that there should also be 
advance notification of large-scale troop move-
ments. 
And now we want to propose that the zone 
for these measures should be substantially 
extended. We are prepared to apply them to 
the entire European part of the USSR, provided 
the western states extend the confidence zone 
accordingly. 1 
There is a region where the working out 
and use of confidence-building measures 
-naturally, with due consideration for its speci-
fic features- could not only defuse the situation 
locally, but also contribute very usefully to the 
consolidation of the pillars of world peace. 
That region is the Far East, where such powers 
as the Soviet Union, China and Japan border 
on each other and where there are also US 
military bases. 
The Soviet Union would be prepared to 
hold concrete negotiations on confidence-
building measures in the Far East with all 
interested countries. 1 
Once again, we insistently call for restraint 
in the field of strategic atrmaments. It should 
not be tolerated that the nations of the world 
live in the shadow of the threat of nuclear war. 
The limitation and neduction of strategic 
armaments is a paramount problem. 
For our part, we are prepared to continue 
the relevant negotiations with the United States 
without delay, preserving all the positive ele-
ments which have so far been achieved in this 
area. 1 
It goes without saying that the negotiations 
can be conducted only on the basis of equality 
and equal security. We will not consent to any 
agreement that gives a unilateral advantage to 
the USA. There must be no illusions on this 
1. Soviet News italics. 
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score. In our opinion, all the other nuclear 
powers should join these negotiations at the 
appropriate time. 
The USSR is prepared to negotiate the 
limitation of any type of weapon. At one time 
we offered a ban on the development of the 
naval Trident missile system in the United Sta-
tes and of a corresponding system in our coun-
try. The proposal was not accepted. As a 
result, the United States has built the new Ohio 
submarine armed with Trident-! missiles, while 
an analogous system, the Typhoon, was built in 
our country. So, who has gained? 
We are prepared to come to terms on limi-
ting the deployment of the new submarines- the 
Ohio type by the USA, and similar ones by the 
USSR. We could also agree to banning the 
modernisation of existing and the development 
of new ballistic missiles for these submarines. 1 
Now about the nuclear-missile weapons in 
Europe. An ever more dangerous stockpiling of 
them is in progress. A kind of vicious circle 
1. Soviet News italics. 
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has arisen, with the actions of one side precipi-
tating counter-measures by the other. How is 
this chain to be broken? 
We suggest coming to terms that already 
now a moratorium should be set on the deploy-
ment in Europe of new medium-range nuclear-
missile weapons of the NATO countries and the 
Soviet Union, that is, to freeze the existing 
quantitative and qualitative level of these wea-
pons, naturally including the US forward-based 
nuclear weapons in this region. 1 
The moratorium could enter into force at 
once, the moment negotiations begin on this 
score, and could operate until a permanent 
treaty is concluded on limiting or, still better, 
reducing such nuclear weapons in Europe. In 
making this proposal, we expect the two sides 
to stop all preparations for the deployment of 
corresponding additional weapons, including 
US Pershing 11 missiles and land-based strategic 
cruise missiles. 
" 
1. Soviet News italics. 
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Extracts from recent NATO communiques 
(a) Final communique of the 
NATO Nuclear Planning Group 
Bonn, 8th Apri/1981 
The Nuclear Planning Group (NPG}, 
which is the principal NATO forum for the 
development of Alliance nuclear defence pol-
icy, held its twenty-ninth ministerial meeting in 
Bonn on 7th and 8th April 1981. 
After receiving a briefing on the status of 
nuclear forces by the United States Secretary of 
Defence, ministers emphasised their concern 
about the unrelenting Soviet build-up and 
improvements in the whole range of their nuc-
lear forces and discussed the consequences of 
these developments for the East-West bal-
ance. Ministers noting the ongoing and newly 
expanded United States efforts to strengthen 
their strategic forces, expressed their support for 
all steps necessary to ensure an adequate bal-
ance of these forces. 
This continued growth in Soviet forces, and 
in particular their preponderance of theatre 
nuclear forces, is potentially destabilising. 
Ministers reiterated their regret that the Soviet 
superiority in the long-range theatre nuclear 
forces continues to grow by increases in the 
already large numbers of SS-20 multiple war-
head missiles and Backfire bombers. Due to 
their extended range, up to 5,000 km, Soviet 
SS-20 missiles deployed in some areas of the 
non-European part of the Soviet Union never-
theless threaten NATO Europe. While still 
maintaining some 380 SS-4 and SS-5 missiles, 
the Soviet Union presently deploys about 220 
launchers for SS-20 MIRVed missiles. With 
their SS-20 missiles alone, the Soviets have 
already deployed some 660 warheads - more 
warheads than are planned for NA TO's long-
range nuclear force modernisation programme 
(the first systems of which will not begin to be 
deployed until late 1983). They are conti-
nuing these deployments at a rapid pace. 
In addition, ministers also noted this situa-
tion had been exacerbated by the development 
of several new shorter-range missile systems 
with nuclear warheads and further by the fact 
that Soviet tactical nuclear-capable air forces 
were being substantially modernised with the 
production in 1980 alone of over 1 ,000 aircraft 
of the new Su-17, Su-24, MiG-23, and MiG-25 
varieties. 
Ministers agreed that the need to restore 
and maintain an overall military balance bet-
ween NATO and the Warsaw Pact is funda-
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mental to the security of tpe Alliance and the 
maintenance of peace. The primary aims of 
TNF policy are deterrence and stability based 
on the NATO triad of forces, the coupling bet-
ween them and on the important political prin-
ciple of the strategic unity of the Alliance. 
Ministers reiterated the necessity for NATO 
to maintain strong, diverse i and flexible theatre 
nuclear forces as part of this triad and thereby 
to ensure deterrence. Mlinisters emphasised 
that NATO will move ahead with its planned 
schedule of long-range theatre nuclear force 
modernisation while at the same time making 
efforts to reach balanced, equitable, and veri-
fiable arms control agreements limiting such 
forces, as was decided on 12th December 
1979. They expressed the hope that the 
balance could be achieved at lower levels of 
armaments. Ministers stressed the importance 
of meaningful strategic arms limitations and, in 
the same vein, reiterated the value of continued 
close consultation within NATO including 
NA TO's Special Consultative Group, which 
had recently met in Brussels. This meeting 
was part of the process of implementation of 
the 12th December decision, as a step towards 
further United States-Soviet exchanges on 
LRTNF. 
Ministers emphasised that the recent Soviet 
proposal for a moratorium would not address 
the fundamental problems caused by the 
momentous build-up of S<1>viet arms, especially 
in long-range theatre nuclear forces, this is even 
more true today than in 1979. While recogni-
sing an expressed Soviet interest in arms 
control, ministers noted that this proposal could 
only perpetuate an imbalance unacceptable to 
the Alliance contrary to the principle of equa-
lity established in the December decision as 
essential to LR TNF arms control. 
Ministers discussed the ongoing work of the 
High Level Group, which is responsible to the 
Nuclear Planning Group for nuclear aspects of 
the long-term defence programme. They re-
iterated the importance of the High Level 
Group's contribution to the task of examining 
the precise nature, scop~ and basis of the 
adjustments which would be required by the 
LR TNF deployments, as well as the possible 
implications for the balance of roles and 
systems in NA TO's nuclear armoury as a 
whole. Ministers received with appreciation 
an invitation by the Secretary of State for 
Defence, Mr. John Not~, to hold the 30th 
meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group in the 
United Kingdom in autumn 1981. 
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(b) Final communique of the North Atlantic 
Council 
5th May 1981 
1. The strength and cohesion of the Alliance 
remain indispensable to guarantee the security 
of its members and thereby to foster stable 
international relations. This stability requires 
that all nations act with restraint and responsi-
bility. Claims by the Soviet Union that it too 
subscribes to such policies are not borne out by 
Soviet deeds. The more constructive East-
West relationship which the allies seek requires 
tangible signs that the Soviet Union is prepared 
to abandon the disturbing build-up of its mili-
tary strength, to desist from resorting to force 
and intimidation and to cease creating or ex-
ploiting situations of crisis and instability in the 
third world 
4. In this situation, the allies will strengthen 
their capability to deter aggression and act, 
individually or collectively, to encourage Soviet 
restraint and responsibility in international 
affairs with the goal of laying a stable basis for 
East-West relations. In pursuance of the estab-
lished policies of the Alliance they will seek 
these objectives in particular in the following 
~reas: 
6. In the area of military capability, the 
increase in Warsaw Pact military power has 
created a disturbingly adverse trend in the 
military balance between East and West, parti-
cularly in Europe. The allies agree that 
assuring an overall military balance between 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact is fundamental to 
the security of the Alliance, the enforcement of 
restraint and the maintenance of peace. They 
are resolved to make available all the resources 
needed to provide the requisite strengthening of 
their deterrent and defence forces. 
9. Arms control and disarmament, together 
with deterrence and defence, are integral parts 
of Alliance security policy. The allies support 
negotiations to achieve meaningful restraints on 
Soviet military power and to improve secu-
rity. The object of this policy is a stable mili-
tary balance, if possible at reduced levels of 
forces. The allies stress the value of stabilising, 
equitable and verifiable arms control through 
limitations on Soviet and United States strategic 
arms. They recognise that arms control nego-
tiations can only lead to fruitful results in an 
international climate of confidence. 
12. The allies who participated in the Decem-
ber 1979 NATO decision on LRTNF moderni-
sation and arms control reaffirmed their com-
mitment to that decision. They emphasised 
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that in light of increasing Soviet LR TNF 
deployments which in the case of the SS-20 
already exceed the total LR TNF deployment 
planned by NATO, the modernising of 
NATO's LRTNF is more essential than ever, 
and offers the only realistic basis for parallel 
TNF arms control. Since the December 1979 
decision Soviet threats and efforts to divide the 
allies h~ve only strengthened their resolve to 
take the steps necessary to maintain deterrence, 
redress the imbalance in LRTNF, and ensure 
their security. The latest Soviet proposal for a 
moratorium on LR TNF deployments is wholly 
unacceptable to these allies. It would freeze 
them into inferiority by blocking the NATO 
modernisation programme altogether. More-
over the proposal would permit the Soviets 
to i~crease the threat to NATO by failing 
to limit systems capable of striking allied 
territory from east of the U rals. 
These allies welcomed the intention of the 
United States to begin negotiations with the 
Soviet Union on TNF arms control within the 
SALT framework by the end of the year. The 
American Secretary of State intends to discuss 
the timing and procedures for these negotiations 
with Foreign Minister Gromyko in September 
at the United Nations. These negotiations will 
rely on an updated Alliance threat assessment 
and a study of functional requirements for 
NATO TNF to be undertaken within the frame-
work of the Special Consultative Group and 
the High Level Group as matters of immediate 
priority ... 
(c) Final communique of the Defence Planning 
Committee 
13th May 1981 
3. For their part, Defence Ministers agreed 
that the past decade has seen an unrelenting 
build-up of Soviet military strength across the 
complete spectrum of capabilities encompassing 
the strategic, theatre nuclear and conventionnal 
fields. This is in contrast to numerous Soviet 
statements advocating peace and disarma-
ment. This disturbing growth in military 
strength allows the Soviet Union to exert pres-
sure in many parts of the world, particularly 
through the increasing global mobility of its for-
ces and the development of a major maritime 
capability. All this has been in parallel with 
continuing improvements in the forces confron-
ting the Alliance in Europe and the Atlantic. 
These steady increases in Soviet military power 
over the past decade, despite unreciprocated 
Alliance restraint, have created for NATO a 
situation demanding intensified action to ensure 
an adequate future deterrence. The prospects 
for continued peace and stable political rela-
tions between East and West depend on the 
requisite strengthening of NA TO's deterrent 
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and defence forces and on the maintenance of 
an overall military balance, if possible at a 
lower level, between NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact. 
7. NATO will continue to seek to negotiate 
equitable, militarily significant, binding and 
fully verifiable arms control agreements in 
order to achieve a balance of forces at lower 
levels and provide better security. The allies 
recognise that arms control negotiations can 
only lead to fruitful results in an international 
climate of confidence. 
12. There is a continuing necessity for NATO 
to maintain strong, diverse and flexible nuclear 
forces as part of the NATO triad and thereby to 
ensure deterrence. NATO will move ahead 
with its planned schedule of long-range theatre 
nuclear force (LR TNF) modernisation whilst at 
the same time making efforts to reach balanced, 
equitable and verifiable arms control agree-
ments limiting such forces as was decided on 
12th December 1979. In this respect, Minis-
ters welcomed the intention of the United 
States to begin negotiations with the Soviet 
Union by the end of the year on theatre nuclear 
force arms control within the SALT framework 
as declared in Rome, and endorsed plans for 
the High Level Group and the Special Consul-
tative Group to undertake urgently the agreed 
studies ... 
(d) Communique of the Military Committee 
14th May 1981 
The growing Warsaw Pact threat 
The changes toward increased modernisa-
tion and improvement of the effectiveness of 
Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces which occurred 
in the decade between 1970 and 1980 did not 
abate perceptibly in 1981. Although it has 
been noted that the nations of the Warsaw Pact 
declined in their economic growth rate as the 
1970s progressed, and economic experts project 
an even lower growth rate during the 1980s, 
most knowledgeable observers come to the 
conclusion that the Warsaw Pact, as a whole, 
will be able to support a continued real growth 
in defence spending for the foreseeable 
future. For example, the defence growth rate 
of the USSR, in real terms, has been about 4 % 
annually during the 1970s and, during that 
period, absorbed from 11 to 13 % of the gross 
national product. By 1980, because of the 
decline of GNP, this figure has increased to 12 
to 14 %. It is generally conceded that because 
the USSR has a large number of weapons 
development and deployment programmes 
already underway, together with continuing 
capital investment in defence industries as well 
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as the increased costs related to the complexity 
of advanced military hardware, defence spen-
ding in the USSR will continue to grow at 
approximately the same rate of the 1970s at 
least up to 198 5. This fadtor alone will result 
in a continuing improvement of military 
capabilities. 
Despite the trends noted in Soviet and 
Warsaw Pact military capabilities, Soviet 
published military doctrine has not accepted 
the western concepts of deterrence, and in both 
public and private commentary it is noted that 
the Soviets continue to reject western notions of 
strategic sufficiency and the concept of mutual 
assured destruction. Instead, they have indica-
ted that they prefer a strategic relationship in 
which the outbreak of war or its escalation is 
deterred by Soviet possession of war-winning 
capabilities. 
The Soviet Union's progressive tactical 
aviation modernisation pJ1ogramme continues 
unabated. Not only has there been a signi-
ficant increase in numbers: the introduction of 
modern aircraft has more than tripled range 
and payload of fighter and ground attack air-
craft and has greatly boosted the combat poten-
tial of Soviet frontal aviation. The so-called 
third generation of Soviet fighter aircraft, the 
Foxbat, the Flogger, the Fitter and the Fencer 
(of which the last 3 are nuclear-capable) are all 
being produced at a remarkable pace. The 
Fencer, which is the first modern Soviet fighter 
designed specifically for ground attack, has 
range capability which enables it to reach any 
target in Central Europe fvom readily-available 
forward deployment bases. Upgraded avionics 
make ordnance deliveries very accurate. The 
continued production and deployment of the 
Backfire provides the Soviets with a strategic 
and tactical offensive weapon directed at 
NATO in Europe, and against maritime rein-
forcement routes across the Atlantic. The 
Pacific Ocean too is subject to Backfire 
coverage. 
The strategic missile capability of the 
Soviets continues the long-term trend toward 
improvement in capability and modernisation 
and most authorities accept that within a short 
period the older missile systems will be re-
placed by new, multiple re-entry vehicle 
systems. More than half of the ICBM force of 
about 1 ,400 missiles is now less than 10 years 
old. In particular, the rapid deployment of the 
SS-20 system with over 220 missiles, each with 
three warheads, has been noted and published 
reports indicate that the SS-20 has been 
deployed faster than the older SS-4 and SS-5 
have been phased out. This polyphased action 
has produced a redundancy effect which, while 
it exists, greatly increases the warhead total... 
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Amendments 1, 2, 3 and 4 
Talks on the reduction of long-range theatre nuclear forces in Europe 
AMENDMENTS 1, 2, 3 and 41 
tabled by MM. Hardy, Bahr and Stoffelen 
15th June 1981 
1. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " earliest " and insert " urgent ". 
2. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from "at" to the end of the 
paragraph and insert "greatly reduced levels of nuclear weapons". 
3. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, after" at" insert "much". 
4. After paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph: 
"6. To call for immediate pursuit of the proposal for a disarmament conference for Europe." 
I. See 3rd Sitting, 16th June 1981 (Amendments agreed to). 
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Signed: Hardy, Bahr, Stoffelen 
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Amendment 5 
Talks on the reduction of long-range theatre nuclear forces in Europe 
AMENDMENT 51 
tabled by Mr. van den Bergh and others 
5. In the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out paragraph (iv). 
16th June 1981 
Signed: van den Bergh, Konings, Tummers, Sto.ffelen 
1. See 3rd Sitting, 16th June 1981 (Amendment negatived). 
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Political activities of the Council -
Reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee2 
by Mr. Page, Rapporteur 
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Draft Recommendation 
on the political activities of the Council -
reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council 
The Assembly, 
Considering that the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council demonstrates its wish to inform 
the Assembly of co-operation between member states in foreign policy matters even when such co-
operation has been pursued outside the framework of WEU ; 
Considering that the dialogue between the Council and the Assembly has improved in recent 
years; 
Considering however that in several areas the Council does not provide the Assembly with the 
information to which it has a right, particularly on questions connected with the actual work of some 
organs of the Council ; 
Considering that for the Assembly's work to be effective it must be able to have a genuine dia-
logue with the Council at all times ; 
Considering that the efforts to rationalise the organs of WEU undertaken by the Council, 
together with its efforts to limit non-essential expenditure, must in no case compromise the future of 
an organisation which may be called upon to play an essential role for the security of Europe, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
1. Reduce the time taken to prepare texts for transm1ss1on to the Assembly, be it the 
annual report or replies to recommendations and written questions ; 
2. Improve the clarity of the drafting of its annual report by including in an appropriate manner 
the texts referred to in the report ; 
3. Ensure a high-level ministerial presence on each day of sessions and arrange for Ministers to 
give collective views on the texts which are being debated ; 
4. Communicate to the Assembly as full information as feasible about the activities of all the 
organs of WEU; 
5. Strengthen its arrangements for giving the media regular information on its activities; 
6. Ensure that in everything it undertakes, while rationalising the work of WEU and 
maintaining the budget of the ministerial organs within acceptable limits, the present and future 
opportunities for action by WEU are in no way compromised; 
7. Ensure that budgetary preoccupations, however legitimate they may be, in no way diminish 
the means available to the only European assembly with responsibility in defence questions. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Page, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. In answering the twenty-fifth annual 
report of the Council last year, your Rappor-
teur underlined that at its half-way stage, as 
foreseen by the modified Brussels Treaty, the 
WEU Council was faced with the need to adopt 
a clear approach to determine what it could 
and should be and do in the coming years, even 
if it is not evident that such an approach must 
be maintained for the whole of the next twenty-
five years. Indeed, circumstances may lead it 
to choose another type - and above all another 
level - of activity in due course. Moreover, it 
says this itself in the introduction to Chapter 11 
of the twenty-sixth report. 
2. In many respects, the twenty-sixth annual 
report of the Council meets the wish expressed 
by the General Affairs Committee since, for the 
first time, the report seems to take account of 
the fact that the Council is no longer playing a 
major role in Europe and that its res-
ponsibilities have not changed. For the latter 
reason, WEU remains the guarantor of the 
future shape of Europe in the foreign policy 
and defence fields and also of the fact that its 
Council can, if circumstances require, consti-
tute the recourse referred to by several govern-
ments in answer to written questions put by 
members of the Assembly. It must therefore 
retain the ability to resume the activities 
whose exercise it left to other organisations 1• 
3. Thus the WEU Assembly, which all the 
governments recognise as fulfilling satisfactorily 
the role assigned to it under the treaty, must 
take account of the way the Council intends to 
fulfil its own role to maintain a dialogue which, 
in present circumstances, is a central aspect of 
WED's activities. However, certain govern-
ments attribute considerable importance to the 
Assembly in present-day Europe, as instanced 
by the Italian Government when Mr. Speranza, 
Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
speaking on behalf of the Minister of Defence 
on lOth January 1981, answered a written 
question put by Mr. Maravalle, Vice-President 
of the WEU Assembly : 
. 1_.. _In particular, the exercice of WEU's military respon-
Sibilities passed to NATO under Article IV of the modified 
~r_ussels Treaty, that of its cultural and social responsibi-
lities transferred to the Council of Europe and its economic 
responsibilities left to the EEC following the accession of 
the United Kingdom and the practice of holding nine- and 
subsequently ten-power political consultations which has 
developed in the last ten years. 
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" The Italian Government is aware of the 
importance of the role of the WEU 
Assembly, which exercises specific and 
exclusive responsibilities in military and 
other matters connected with European 
defence. Moreover, the Assembly has 
always shown the keenest interest in 
international political events and, as a 
forum for discussion, is appreciated by 
members of parliament and representa-
tives of governments in the seven 
member countries. 
Because of the Assembly's defence and 
security responsibilities under the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty and taking due 
account of its past and present activities, 
Italy, inter alia by taking steps to streng-
then the role of the organisation, has 
taken every opportunity of confirming its 
interest in the WEU Assembly whose 
usefulness it appreciates, in particular as 
a parliamentary institution in which it is 
possible to go into proposals in detail and 
reflect upon forms of co-operation 
designed to allow Europe to assume its 
own defence as fully and directly as 
possible. 
The Italian Government has constantly 
done its utmost in the WEU Council of 
Ministers and confirms its determination 
to establish increasingly direct relations 
with the Assembly to ensure that it is kept 
regularly informed of matters within its 
competence, with due respect for appro-
priate procedures... the Italian Govern-
ment reiterates its conviction that it is 
necessary to adapt the instruments and 
procedures governing replies to Assembly 
recommendations and questions, the 
annual report of the Council to the 
Assembly and statements by representa-
tives of member states taking part in the 
Assembly's plenary sessions and informal 
joint meetings. 
Finally, Italy will certainly not fail to 
follow with the greatest attention the 
proposals made for promoting a reform 
of the structure of WEU with a view to 
strengthening the organisation's duties by 
adapting them to the present need to 
intensify European co-operation. " 
4. Hence the work actually accomplished by 
the Council is obviously out of step with the 
activities exercised by the Assembly with the 
agreement and support of the governments. 
Both sides should take account of this and for 
the first time the twenty-sixth annual report of 
the Council seems to have faced up to the main 
consequences of this situation. 
5. This on the whole favourable opinion, 
not of the Council's activities but of its annual 
report, calls for two immediate reservations. 
6(z) The fact that the full annual report did not 
reach the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly 
until 1st April placed the General Affairs 
Committee in an embarrassing situation. 
Whereas it had been planned for your Rappor-
teur to prepare his report during the second 
half of March, he was unable to do so because 
of this delay and, as prior commitments preven-
ted him from devoting the necessary time in 
April, the Committee, which has to fix the 
dates of its meetings a long time ahead because 
of its members' many commitments, was un-
able to examine the present report until 4th 
June, i.e. the eve of the Assembly's session. 
7. Considering that the annual report of the 
Council is an important part of the dialogue 
with the Assembly which the Council claims to 
want, such delays are a serious drawback in 
that they slow down considerably the tempo of 
exchanges between the two WEU bodies. 
8. It should be recalled that usually replies 
to recommendations only reach the Assembly 
five or six months after the recommendations 
were adopted and that the time-limits laid 
down for the Council to answer written ques-
tions are rarely respected. All this means that if, 
for instance, the Assembly prepares a report on 
a topical subject during one half-year, it is only 
at the end of the following half-year that it 
receives a first reply from the Council. If it 
wishes to pursue the dialogue, it will take many 
months longer for the Council's reaction to 
written questions to reach it. Finally, only in 
April of the following year, which may mean 
almost a year afterwards, can the Assembly 
expect an answer to questions it has studied in 
the context of more general thoughts on 
Western European policy. If all these delays are 
added up, two years may elapse between the 
time an Assembly Committee considers a 
matter and the time it is informed of the 
governments' relevant views. 
9. Although he realises the difficulties 
involved in reaching unanimous agreement bet-
ween representatives of seven governments on a 
specific text, your Rapporteur wishes to draw 
the Council's attention to the inconvenience 
caused by such slowness and urges it to try to 
find a solution. 
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10(ii) The second matter M which your Rap-
porteur wishes to draw the Council's attention 
relates to the style of the annual report and in 
particular Chapter 11 A on the political activi-
ties of the Council. He welcomes the fact that 
this year on four essential questions the Coun-
cil has better succeeded in giving an overall 
picture of European policy as set out or deve-
loped in various forums, while managing to 
refer constantly to WEU's own activities, i.e. to 
the Council's replies to recommendations or 
written questions emanating from the Assem-
bly. 
11. Chapter 11 A should be worthy of atten-
tive study by all members of the Assembly and 
also by the press and public opinion. But since 
it refers to questions or recommendations solely 
by their numbers, which mean little to 
members of Assembly and certainly nothing at 
all to non-members, in order to understand the 
text various documents ha\l'e to be consulted 
which are not always easy to find and conse-
quently it is practically impossible to read the 
text without considerable work. Could the 
Council not be asked -and this is a very speci-
fic suggestion - either to quote in full the texts 
to which it refers or (and this would probably 
be the best solution) to append them to the 
annual report ? This would obviously make the 
report longer but would require far less time to 
read. 
12. Finally, it is recalled that in 1980 the 
Presidential Committee of the Assembly deci-
ded to indicate which patts of the Council's 
annual report should be answered by the Gene-
ral Affairs Committee, thus settling a problem 
which had previously been unclear. On the one 
hand, the General Affairs Committee is respon-
sible, as in the past, for replying to Chapters I 
and 11 A of the annual report, i.e. on relations 
between the Council and the Assembly and on 
the political activities of the Council. But it has 
also been decided to make the General Affairs 
Committee responsible for .replying to Chapters 
V and VI of the annual report on the Public 
Administration Committee and budgetary ques-
tions. This decision should be welcomed insofar 
as it does not compel the General Affairs 
Committee to discuss these parts of the annual 
report each year but implies recognition of the 
political nature of any <llecisions which the 
Council may take in these two fields. 
13. Your Rapporteur will follow this prin-
ciple and not go into the detail of these matters 
since it is quite clear that relations between the 
Council and the Assembly in budgetary matters 
are in fact handled by the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration and he 
will give only a political, and moreover very 
brief, glance at these two chapters. 
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11. Relations between the Council and the 
Assembly 
14. The twenty-sixth annual report of the 
Council rightly underlines a steady improve-
ment in relations between the Council and the 
Assembly in recent years. The standard of the 
dialogue has in fact improved considerably after 
a period of particular difficulty. The reason is 
that a new fact has been recognised by both 
sides, i.e. that the Council was no longer 
playing the role it had prior to the development 
of nine- and subsequently ten-power political 
consultations, but that at the same time the 
Council and the Assembly still retained their 
full responsibilities. This implied a principle 
which the Council recognised but from which it 
did not always draw the full consequences : that 
it had to report on the application of the modi-
fied Brussels Treaty even when this was carried 
out in the framework of institutions other than 
the WEU Council. 
15. It is to be hoped that the twenty-sixth 
annual report will allow the implications of the 
new situation to be spelt out better than in the 
past. This hope seems particularly well-founded 
since, apart from the annual report itself, 
replies to recommendations have been more 
substantial than in recent years and have fre-
quently referred to many factors outside the 
Council's activities. Written questions put by 
members of the Assembly have been numerous 
and generally speaking the Council has answered 
satisfactorily, although it has respected the sta-
tutory time-limits even less than in the past. 
16. The presence of Ministers at Assembly 
sessions has been regular, although it should be 
recalled how much importance the Assembly 
has always attached to the presence of full-
ranking Ministers rather than Secretaries of 
State, particularly because of the question and 
answer period which follows ministerial 
addresses. It is no insult to Secretaries of State 
to say that full-ranking Ministers have greater 
authority to speak of their countries' policies of 
which, because of their duties, they have a 
broader view. The absence of Defence Ministers 
during the Assembly's recent sessions has 
moreover been difficult to accept by an assem-
bly which the Council constantly recognises to 
be the only European assembly with defence 
responsibilities. 
17. Furthermore, the improvement has ex-
tended to most at least of the member 
governments which, in answering the particu-
larly numerous and pertinent written questions 
put recently in several national parliaments, 
have been far more explicit than in the past 
about the policies they intend to pursue in the 
framework of WEU, and these answers throw 
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very precious light on European activities as a 
whole in the political and defence fields. All 
the WEU governments seem more responsive to 
questions put in a national framework than 
they are, collectively, to those put to them in 
the framework of WEU. It is for the Assembly 
to associate its work in the framework of WEU 
more closely than in the past with work in the 
national parliaments. 
18. Nevertheless, relations between the 
Council and the Assembly suffer from the fact 
that in two respects the Council has still not 
met the Assembly's wishes although the ques-
tions are very definitely within WEU's respon-
sibilities. 
19. The first is providing the Assembly with 
information about the study conducted in the 
framework of the Standing Armaments Com-
mittee. It is known that the Standing 
Armaments Committee, as Chapter I of the 
annual report confirms, has already handed the 
Council two main chapters of its study, but also 
that other sections of this study have not been 
completed and it is to be feared that they will 
not be for a long time. Therefore, the Council's 
decision to inform the Assembly of the SAC's 
study only once it was complete might have 
made the Assembly wait even longer before rea-
ding texts which have already been drafted, 
some of them three years ago. It is therefore 
gratifying that in May 1980 the Council deci-
ded to transmit to the Assembly a declassified 
version of the economic chapter of the study. 
20. However, it should be recalled that 
although it is likely that Mr. Plantey's address 
at the Brussels symposium in October- 1979 was 
largely based on the SAC's work in the legal 
field, the Council informed the Assembly that it 
considered the head of the permanent secreta-
riat of the SAC was speaking in a personal 
capacity and this address did not constitute a 
communication of information from the Coun-
cil to the Assembly. The Assembly is there-
fore entitled to expect the Council to send it a 
version - declassified if necessary - of this 
chapter of the SAC's study. 
21. What makes the situation worse is the 
fact that in January 1981 Mr. Davignon, mem-
ber of the Commission of the Communities, 
handed the European Parliament, which has no 
defence responsibilities, as Mr. Davignon 
moreover recalled, a report on " The policy to 
be followed to promote political and technolo-
gical co-operation between the countries of 
Western Europe ", prepared by Professor 
Greenwood, Director of the Centre for Defence 
Studies of Aberdeen University. This means 
that the governments refuse to give the WEU 
Assembly, which they assert to be the 
only assembly with defence responsibilities, 
information which, on the other hand, they 
allow to be given through Community sources 
to the European Parliament which has no such 
responsibilities. Mr. Davignon underlined 
moreover that application of the conclusions of 
this report concerned the SAC or the IEPG and 
not the Communities except from the stand-
point of industrial policy. 
22. Thus it is no longer a matter of how the 
Council reports to the Assembly on questions 
within its competence handled by other organi-
sations but of activities which are specifically 
WEU's and in some respects WEU's only achie-
vement in recent years. Yet this is just where 
the Council is slow in fulfilling its obligation to 
keep the Assembly informed, a task which it 
fulfils only in part. 
23. The second shortcoming is in a related 
field but one which, it must be recognised, the 
Council does not cover, i.e. the work of the 
IEPG. The Assembly has already underlined 
that it could not endorse the Council's view 
that because there were no organic links 
between the IEPG and WEU the Assembly 
could not be informed about the work of the 
IEPG. There are many other European organi-
sations with which WEU does not have organic 
links but regarding which the Council does not 
make this objection. Nor is the argument used 
in the reply to Recommendation 362 of any 
greater value : 
"2. As the Council have in the past 
made clear to the Assembly, not all the 
member states of the IEPG are members 
of WEU. Consequently, it does not seem 
logical to establish the proposed link 
between the IEPG and the Assembly as 
this would imply that the latter would be 
supplied with information by nations that 
are not members of both institutions. 
Such information, therefore, can only be 
transmitted to the WEU parliamentarians 
within a national framework and insofar 
as their governments participate in the 
IEPG." 
24. In fact, if each government has the right 
to inform the parliamentarians of its country of 
the IEPG's work, its share being less than that 
of the governments of seven countries, it is dif-
ficult to see why these seven countries, all 
members of the IEPG, could not together 
inform the WEU Assembly. 
25. Information your Rapporteur has man-
aged to obtain makes him wonder whether 
it is not simply a question of the difficulties 
encountered by the IEPG in its work, precisely 
because of the governments, which make the 
Council evade its duty to inform the Assembly. 
He wonders, too, whether this same reason 
might not explain the Council's elusiveness 
about the SAC since it is known that the SAC 
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depends to a large extent on the IEPG for 
obtaining facts which are essential for conduc-
ting its inquiry. If this is really the case, does 
the Council believe this refusal to provide 
information will for long be able to conceal 
from public opinion a fact which it more than 
suspects? That difficulties exist is quite under-
standable, but it is not the practice of secrecy, 
in violation of the modiijed Brussels Treaty, 
that will do anything at all to arrange matters. 
26. Finally, the so-called "informal" proce-
dure adopted by the Coundl for joint meetings 
seems to correspond quite well to the Council's 
non-activity as a body for European co-
operation, while recognising its role as the 
interlocutor of an assembly with defence and 
foreign policy responsibilities. Here again, there 
would be little to object to if it was not tanta-
mount to the effective failure of the Council to 
fulfil its task of speaking on behalf of seven 
member countries. The informality of its 
meetings often allows the Chairman-in-Office to 
reply spiritedly to questions put by members of 
the Assembly but without it ever being possible 
to know on whose behalf he is speaking. The 
almost total silence of the other members of the 
Council makes one wonder whether these 
meetings are really joint meetings between the 
Council and the Assembly. They would play 
their due role far better if the delegations took 
a more active part in the discussion. 
2 7. Your Rapporteur has been informed that 
at its meeting on 28th April the Committee for 
Relations with Parliamen~s, which is not enti-
tled to adopt recommendations, expressed the 
wish that the General Affairs Committee take 
account, in the recommendation in the present 
report, of the views expressed by Mrs. Knight, 
author of the Committee's information report 
on the WEU Assembly and the press. Your 
Rapporteur is particularly willing to accede to 
this wish since he very largely shares the ideas 
expressed by Mrs. Knight and the Committee. 
28. Without wishing to reproduce Mrs. 
Knight's information report, since it will be 
available to the Assembly, your Rapporteur 
will merely recall here the conclusions concer-
ning the Council's relations with the Assembly : 
(i) In view of the inadequacy of the informa-
tion the Council gives to the press, the Council 
was asked to issue a communique after each of 
its meetings in order to announce its agenda 
and the conclusions reached. 
(ii) On ministerial participation in Assembly 
sessions, the Council was asked : 
(a) to ensure that a cabinet minister 
addressed the Assembly each day of 
the session ; 
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(b) to ask ministers to make their spee-
ches have a direct bearing on one or 
more reports on the agenda of the ses-
sion in question ; 
(c) to concert their views so that, as far as 
possible, the ministers spoke on 
behalf of the Council ; 
(d) in view of the nature of the 
Assembly's responsibilities, to ask 
Ministers of Defence to take part in 
its debates more often. 
29. As the other proposals in Mrs. Knight's 
report concern the Assembly alone there is no 
need for them to be included in a recommenda-
tion for transmission to the WEU Council, and 
the Committee for Relations with Parliaments 
is able to promote them without using the 
General Affairs Committee as an intermediary. 
Ill. Political activities of the Council 
1. Application of the modified Brussels Treaty 
30. The introduction to Chapter 11 of the 
annual report probably gives the clearest 
picture the Council has ever given of how the 
governments of member countries view 
WEU's role at the present juncture. 
31. First, " they are concerned both to ensure 
proper implementation of the obligations and 
responsibilities defined by the treaty", particu-
larly Article V, which "remained one of the 
central elements of the security system of the 
signatory countries ". 
32. Here it should be noted that the French 
Government at least has given its views on how 
Article V should be applied in the answer given 
by its Minister for Foreign Affairs to a written 
question put by a member of the Assembly, Mr. 
Berrier, on 19th December 1980 : 
" 1. The WEU treaty is not automatic 
in the way the honourable member 
would wish in that it is for each high 
contracting party to decide whether the 
conditions of casus foederis exist. This is 
a sovereign decision which France, 
because it has withdrawn from the 
NATO integrated military organisation, 
is now in a position to exercise with full 
independence. 
2. If France considers that the condi-
tions laid down in Article V exist, it 
would be committed, with all the military 
and other means in its power, in accor-
dance with the same article. This is what 
General de Gaulle underlined in 1966 
when expressing France's determination 
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to fight at the side of its allies in the 
event of one of them being the object of 
an unprovoked attack. 
3. France would naturally retain control 
of the procedure whereby these means 
would be implemented by the national 
military authorities concerned. Where 
nuclear weapons are concerned, the 
doctrine and decision governing their use 
are the responsibility of the President of 
the Republic, the supreme head of the 
army. From this point of view, the stra-
tegy of nuclear deterrence raises no new 
problem as regards Article V of the WEU 
treaty. " 
33. Coming from France, whose forces are 
not integrated in the NATO military command, 
this interpretation is of particular importance 
since the modified Brussels Treaty is the most 
binding element of France's commitment to the 
common defence system of the western powers 
in Europe. 
34. It would be interesting and important to 
know whether the other six governments have 
the same view of the obligations imposed on 
each of the signatories under the modified 
Brussels Treaty and in particular to what extent 
the WEU Council's being dormant, as may be 
deduced from the introduction to Chapter 11 of 
the annual report, allows WEU to play its role 
under Article VIII of the treaty since, if the 
automaticity of the alliance created by the 
modified Brussels Treaty is not recognised, the 
Council's role, which is to co-ordinate the 
defence policies of member countries, becomes 
primordial. If the Council fails to play this role, 
it is to be feared that one day it may be realised 
that the various WEU member countries' views 
on the circumstances in which Article V of the 
treaty should be applied will follow divergent 
courses and this would significantly weaken the 
deterrent, not to say military, value of the 
whole treaty. 
35. Secondly, the Council underlines that the 
limitation of its field of action is due to the 
legitimate concern which the Assembly has 
always accepted to avoid the duplication of 
activities between the various bodies for poli-
tical and military co-operation. At the same 
time the Council defines its self-attributed role 
as a forum " for exchanging views on defence 
problems not dealt with elsewhere". But it 
should be noted that although the Council has 
noted the Assembly's wish " that organisational 
measures be considered for possible future tasks 
of the organisation", it fails to give its views on 
this point. 
36. This is particularly annoying since, if in 
due course the Council is to be able to fulfil the 
tasks the governments of member countries 
may intend to assign it, it must retain an effi-
cient structure. Several members of the 
Assembly have expressed concern about this, as 
shown by a written question put in most 
member countries at the suggestion of the 
Committee for Relations with Parliaments in 
connection with Recommendation 358 in the 
report by Mr: von Hassel on the future of 
European security. 
37. So far, only one answer has been brought 
to the attention of your Rapporteur : that of the 
British Government on 2nd March 1981 to the 
question put by Lord Northfield. Lord earring-
ton wrote: 
" All member governments of Western 
European Union are aiming at limiting 
the 1981 budget to zero growth in real 
terms at most. Her Majesty's Govern-
ment believe that it will be possible to 
accommodate this without loss of effi-
ciency and that it will not affect the 
continued implementation of the tasks 
required of WEU under the modified 
Brussels Treaty. " 
38. It would be most desirable for all govern-
ments to give such positive answers about 
WEU's tasks and also to ensure that the princi-
ples set out in this answer are applied in prac-
tice. 
2. East-West relations 
39. East-West relations have for a long time 
been central to the Council's discussions at its 
ministerial meetings, and in 1980 they clearly 
occupied a prominent place in the affairs of the 
western world. The exchange of communi-
cations on bilateral relations and the report 
presented by the German Delegation fully 
accord with WEU's vocation. 
40. One may nevertheless wonder about the 
reality of the determination of the seven 
governments to work for detente "in consul-
tation and jointly with their partners of the 
European Community and the Atlantic Allian-
ce". The reactions of various governments to 
the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet 
Union do not seem to concord with this 
solidarity, at least where economic and other 
sanctions are concerned. Suffice it here to recall 
the spectacular splintering of western positions 
towards the Olympic Games in Moscow. 
41. It is not for the present report to say to 
what extent the Western European countries 
were or were not consulted prior to American 
decisions on sanctions or to what extent they 
refused to hold true consultations or to apply 
the Alliance's decisions, but it is clear that the 
policy of sanctions was a fiasco, particularly 
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since the world economic situation made it 
extremely tempting for sonlle countries to take 
advantage of the deterioration of other coun-
tries' economic relations with the eastern coun-
tries. 
42. Conversely, western solidarity seems to 
have played its part in the framework of the 
CSCE in Madrid with the 'probable result that 
the conference will achieve only very limited 
results, except perhaps for the decision to 
convene without delay a general conference on 
disarmament in Europe since the Soviet Union 
seems to have made a maj<J>r concession in this 
respect by agreeing that the negotiations should 
also cover the Soviet Union's European terri-
tory, which was a prior and basic condition for 
holding such a conference. 
43. However this may be, at the time of 
writing the Polish affair may still undermine all 
the possible results of the Madrid conference 
and here too it is gratifying that the western 
powers have on the one hand proved active and 
united in meeting " the requests for economic 
aid which had been made to them by Poland " 
and, on the other hand, in underlining that if 
the Helsinki final act was' not applied by the 
Soviet Union with regard to Poland, this atti-
tude " would have very serious consequences 
for the future of international relations in 
Europe and throughout the world ". Emphasis 
should be placed here on tfue complete conver-
gence between the views of the General Affairs 
Committee expressed in the draft recom-
mendation in Mr. Hanin's report on deve-
lopments in Poland, to lpe presented to the 
Assembly at its June session, and the views 
expressed by the Council on the same subject. 
3. Afghanistan 
44. Chapter 11 A 2 of the annual report of 
the Council gives a detaile41 picture of measures 
taken by western countries in response to the 
invasion of Afghanistan, although, as your 
Rapporteur noted, it makes no mention of the 
divergences which emerged in the application 
of the principle of sanctiqns, particularly eco-
nomic sanctions, against the Soviet Union. 
Thus, while all member countries agree "that 
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was 
unacceptable", the ways and means envisaged 
for bringing it to an end are far less 
clear. Admittedly, the annual report recalls that 
on 19th February 1980, the Nine, in response 
to a proposal by Lord c._rrington, " gave sup-
port to an arrangement that would allow a neu-
tral Afghanistan to be , outside competition 
among the powers". However, since then 
France has also made proposals, particularly for 
convening a conference ~tween Afghanistan's 
neighbouring countries and a number of other 
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countries directly concerned by the fate of 
Afghanistan. But the indications are that this 
proposal has not met with the unanimous 
approval of the countries concerned nor of 
France's partners and it would be interesting if 
the Council could explain just how far the 
Seven agreed on this question. 
45. Finally, it should be recalled that in 
December 1980 the Assembly adopted Recom-
mendation 361 on the political implications for 
Europe of the Soviet intervention in Afghanis-
tan which recommended inter alia that the 
Council: 
" 10. Examine the possibility of full 
financial assistance and, if necessary, sup-
plies of military equipment to the Afghan 
resistance movements until the USSR 
proves it is ready to negotiate the with-
drawal of its forces from Afghanistan. " 
46. Since then, none of the member countries 
has made a clear statement about the type of 
aid it was prepared to grant Afghanistan, unlike 
the United States Government, since President 
Reagan has announced that he is prepared to 
supply arms to the Afghan resistance move-
ments. Your Rapporteur can but hope that in 
its reply to Recommendation 361 the Council 
will soon inform the Assembly of how far it is 
prepared to go in the direction proposed. 
4. Iran 
4 7. Where Iran is concerned, 1980 was cer-
tainly marked by full western solidarity for 
obtaining the liberation of the American diplo-
mats taken hostage in that country. It cannot 
be said to what extent this solidarity helped the 
diplomats to be freed, but it was probably not 
without avail. Here too the concordance bet-
ween the policy described by the Council and 
that recommended by the Assembly is worthy 
of emphasis. 
48. However, with the hostages freed and the 
war which broke out between Iran and Iraq at 
the end of 1980, the Council should not have 
confined itself to describing its policy on the 
question of the hostages but should also have 
indicated its present policy towards future rela-
tions with Iran and measures to foster the resto-
ration of peace between Iran and Iraq. 
5. Situation in the Middle East 
49. In this chapter too, the views expressed 
by the Council are very close to those of the 
Assembly, particularly as set out in the report 
presented by Sir Frederic Bennett on behalf 
of the General Affairs Committee in June 
1980. In this connection, the Assembly can 
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take credit for indicating the path which was 
followed by the governments of the Seven, 
and even the Ten, thanks to the determination 
of the Assembly and in particular some of its 
members in maintaining a dialogue between the 
two organs of WEU. 
50. Indeed, as a sequel to Recommendation 
341, a number of written questions was put at 
the beginning of 1980, especially by Sir Frede-
ric Bennett, and the Council's answers 
may be considered satisfactory. The fact that 
the convergence between the Council's and the 
Assembly's concerns led to the European Coun-
cil deciding to instruct its Presidency to imple-
ment an action programme based on the princi-
ples set out in the Venice declaration and 
increase its contacts with the parties concerned 
is obviously a sign of Europe's reappearance on 
a stage from which it had been too often 
absent in the past twenty-five years. 
51. The threats now hanging over the Gulf 
area and detente in general must not be allowed 
to obscure the urgency of a global settlement to 
the Palestinian affair, which the Council asserts 
to be one of the essential aims of European 
diplomacy. It is not by maintaining an explo-
sive situation in the Middle East that one can 
hope to maintain peace in the Gulf area. 
IV. Chapters V and VI of the annual report 
52. These chapters deal respectively with the 
Public Administration Committee and budget-
ary and administrative questions. They are 
referred to the General Affairs Committee for 
whatever political implications they may 
have. They are mainly of a technical nature 
and Chapter VI is examined in detail by the 
Assembly's Committee on Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration. There can be no question 
of the General Affairs Committee encroaching 
on its territory. 
53. The point in respect of which political 
questions arise is to be found in two passages in 
these chapters, one in Chapter V, where it is 
indicated that: 
" . . . their concern to beat inflation has 
led most of the governments to adopt a 
policy of reducing public expenditure, 
the effects of which have been felt on the 
personnel front: limitation of appoint-
ments, even a standstill on recruitment or 
reduction of staffs to a greater or lesser 
extent. 
In the administrative field, the need to 
economise public funds is also apparent 
in other areas, depending on the country: 
measures designed to increase the effi-
ciency of the administrative machine, 
efforts to limit the field and extent of 
state intervention ... " 
and in Chapter VI which specifies that: 
" ... The proposed budgets for 1981 have 
not yet been approved and are still a 
matter of discussion in the Council; the 
delay is due to the need which has arisen 
to revise the various budgets in order to 
achieve, wherever possible, maximum 
economy." 
54. It 1s worth considering these two 
passages together, because they show a 
degree of coherence on the part of the 
governments between their general policy and 
the one they pursue in the framework of 
WEU. Apparently in the early months of 
1981 a committee was set up to examine the 
structure of the ministerial organs of WEU with 
a view to rationalising them. However, the 
Council has not yet informed the Assembly of 
its decision or, a fortiori, communicated the 
text of the mandate given to this committee. 
55. In any case, just like any well-organised 
firm, it is normal for the Council to re-examine 
the activities and methods of its dependent 
bodies in order to improve efficiency and to 
take account of requirements for future action. 
It is equally normal for it to do this with a view 
to rationalising its efforts, which does not neces-
sarily mean with a view to making savings in 
the budget, although in the circumstances men-
tioned in the annual report a desire to econo-
mise public funds is perfectly justified. But the 
WEU budget is so small that the European tax-
payer could never notice the effect of any 
reductions that might be made. If savings are 
to be made at the expense of the European 
organisations, the reduction for each one should 
be in direct proportion to the volume of its 
budget. Similarly, budgetary cuts should not 
be allowed to jeopardise the maintenance of the 
activities of each organisation in full. This 
means that in the specific case of WEU cuts 
should in no case be allowed to jeopardise the 
ability of the Council and the organisation as a 
whole to fulfil the tasks incumbent upon them 
under the modified Brussels Treaty. The 
instances of the organisation must therefore 
retain all the means necessary for adapting 
themselves to whatever circumstances may 
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make it necessary for the organisation to 
resume the activities now entrusted to others. 
56. For lack of adequate information, your 
Rapporteur must consider that if the Assembly 
has not been apprised of the instructions the 
Council has given to the committee mentioned 
above, it is because it can but be a step of 
minor importance, i.e. which will have no 
impact on the structure :of the organisation. 
He is encouraged in this sense by what 
he has learnt of the attitude of member govern-
ments towards WEU, as in Lord Carrington's 
answer to Lord Northfie~d mentioned earlier 
and an answer given by Mr. van der Klaauw, 
Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs, to a 
question put on 2nd April last in the First 
Chamber of the States General: 
" In accordance with Article V of the 
Brussels Treaty as amended in 1954, the 
countries of WEU have pledged them-
selves to afford aut?matic aid and assis-
tance should any of the parties be the 
object of an armed attack in Europe. 
In the same treaty (Article IV), the WEU 
countries state that in implementation of 
the treaty they sha!ll work in close co-
operation with NATO. The assistance 
referred to in Article V will therefore be 
effected mainly within the framework of 
NATO. 
The Netherlands Government has noted 
with interest the proposals set out in 
Recommendation 358 of the WEU 
Assembly. The government is of the 
opinion that WEU duly fulfils its tasks as 
laid down in the modified Brussels 
Treaty. The abovementioned close link 
with NATO is a dt1cisive factor in deter-
mining this opinion regarding co-opera-
tion within WEU. " 
57. If it were otherwise, i.e. if the measures 
taken by the Council sought to change the 
structure or tasks of the organisation, the 
Assembly would be unable to understand how 
the Council could not even inform it of its deci-
sion. However this may be, it is determined to 
be informed of the resul~s of the work of this 
committee and to be called upon to give an 
opinion on them as is normal in an institution 
with a parliamentary body. 
Document 881 5th June 1981 
Replies of the Council to Recommendations 355 to 363 
REC0\1\lE~DATIOl\1 355 1 
on the northern flank and the Atlantic and Channel commands 2 
The Assembly, 
(z) Considering that the defence of the northern flank is inextricably linked to the defence of the 
adjoining seas and Atlantic Ocean; 
(ii) Believing that defence of the northern flank must be based on the early arrival of adequately-
prepared reinforcements to meet an attack because geographical and political factors impose an 
imbalance in permanently-stationed forces; 
(iii) Believing further that geographical factors and the present qualities of the naval forces of most 
NATO countries provide a reasonable measure of naval capabilities at the present time, although 
specific deficiencies need to be urgently remedied and future trends in the size of Soviet naval 
ships will require to be offset in long-term NATO naval construction programmes; 
(iv) Calling for better use to be made of existing allied naval resources; 
(v) Noting that the reference to the Tropic of Cancer in Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty 
imposes no geographical limitations on the responsibilities of NATO naval commands; 
(vi) Recalling that by virtue of Article IV of the modified Brussels Treaty the WEU Council 
relies on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information and advice, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Urge the North Atlantic Council: 
I. To improve allied naval capabilities m the Atlantic and Channel areas and in sea areas 
adjacent to the northern flank: 
(a) by calling for long-term national naval construction programmes to maintain the strength 
and average hull age of naval vessels, and to keep abreast of any further increase in Soviet 
naval capabilities; 
(b) by calling for urgent steps to remedy specific deficiencies especially of escort forces, mine 
counter-measure vessels and maritime patrol aircraft, and to improve interoperability of 
weapons and communications and transmission equipment; 
(c) by making better use of existing naval resources forthwith, as recommended by the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments: 
(i) through the improvement of joint naval operations planning and control in the 
Atlantic and Channel areas and the sea areas adjacent to the northern flank; 
(ii) through flexible use of naval forces, irrespective of command boundaries, including 
appropriate German naval forces, to ensure that the necessary ships are available at 
earlier stages of alert; 
(iii) by calling on France to allocate naval forces to SACLANT on the same basis as other 
WEU countries; -
(d) by establishing at appropriate naval headquarters a daily record of the location of all 
Warsaw Pact merchant ships in port or at sea in the NATO area; 
2. To improve the defence of the northern flank: 
I. Adopted by the Assembl~ on I >I December 1980 dunng the Second Part of the Twenty-S1xth Ordmar) Sess10n 
(8th S1ttmg). 
2. Explanator} Memorandum: o;ee the Report tabled b~ Mr Ahrens on behalf of the Commlltee on Defence QuestiOns 
and Armamenb (Document 8)7). 
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(a) by calling on all allied governments to provide political support for the Danish and Norwe-
gian Governments to resist constant pressure from the Soviet Union designed to prevent 
legitimate defence arrangements; 
(b) by calling for mountain and arctic warfare training in the area to be extended to all troops 
likely to be available as reinforcements, and for standardised equipment to be provided 
for units of ACE mobile force; 
(c) by urging the governments concerned to conclude urgently agreements on stockpiling in 
the area ammunition and heavy equipment for reinforcements; 
(d) by calling for those improvements in the direct defence capabilities of indigenous forces 
which are required for the area to be defended until reinforcements ~rrive, and to provide 
for the reception and deployment of these reinforcements; 
(e) by calling for the air defence of Danish territory to be placed on the same basis as that 
of neighbouring allied countries. 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIV 
to Recommendation 355 
1. The Council welcome the report and its recognition of the importance to western defence of 
the northern flank and of the significance of the northern flank for the defence of the Eastern Atlantic 
and the importance of outside reinforcements for the defence of the northern flank in view of the 
imbalance of local forces. Furthermore, the Council acknowledge the vital role of naval forces in the 
defence of this area and welcome the attention which the report focuses on the rapidly-increasing 
maritime capability of the Soviet forces. In response to recommendations of the report, the Council: 
(a) (b) acknowledge the value of long-term national naval construction programmes to the extent 
that resources permit. They also call attention to recent improvements, both in quality and quan-
tity, to the fleets of member countries; 
(c) (l) and (ii) point out that it is inevitable that NATO naval commands in peacetime should take 
account of peacetime requirements. NATO naval forces operate in areas to which their forces are 
best suited by their ships' capabilities and operating characteristics. NATO commanders however 
are currently considering the question of improving flexibility of operations across command 
boundaries; 
(c) (iii) have noted the recommendation that the Council urge the North Atlantic Council to call on 
France to allocate naval forces to SACLANT which is a matter for France but recall that such 
allocation cannot be envisaged because of the step taken by that country in 1966, namely to leave the 
integrated NATO military structure, and to reserve its position in any event on any decision of this 
nature; 
(d) agree that there would be value in the proposal that a daily record should be established of the 
location of all Warsaw Pact merchant ships in port or at sea in the NATO area. 
2. The Council: 
(a) confirm the political support already given by allied governments to the Governments of 
Denmark and Norway to resist the pressures on them from the Soviet Union in the field of security 
policy, just as such support is given to other allied governments coming under such pressure; 
(b) agree that in principle mountain and arctic warfare training should be given to all forces likely 
to be used for reinforcements, but points out the many constraints (financial and physical) on the 
capacity of both the host country and the reinforcing countries to provide the necessary facilities; 
(c) endorse the value of agreements between host and reinforcing governments for stockpiling 
ammunition and heavy equipment but point to the fact that equipment for the United Kingdom/ 
Netherlands amphibious force is already prestocked in Norway and to other achievements in this 
field, in particular the United States/Norwegian stockpiling agreement signed on 16th January; 
(d) have noted the recommendation that the Council urge the North Atlantic Council to call for 
improvements in the direct defence capabilities of the indigenous forces in the area and in the recep-
tion and deployment of reinforcements; 
(e) point out that it is for the Danish Government to decide whether to place the air defence of 
Danish territory under NATO command in peacetime. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 15th April 1981. 
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RECOMMENDATION 356 1 
on nuclear, biological and chemical protection 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Considering that whilst international agreements have banned the production, stockpiling and 
use of biological weapons, few limitations have been imposed on stocks of nuclear and chemical 
weapons; 
(ii) Aware that a complete ban on the use of nuclear weapons may not be att~inable in the short 
term and that it is essential to world peace that NATO nuclear forces should l:lalance those of the 
Warsaw Pact, while negotiations continue to secure mutual reductions in their numbers; 
(iii) Recognising that adequate on-site verification procedures must be an essential part of any 
agreement to eliminate and ban the manufacture, stockpiling or use of chemical weapons, but that 
such procedures still remain to be negotiated with the Soviet Union, and believing that until present 
negotiations reach a conclusion, stocks and types of chemical weapons held by NATO partners 
should be brought up to sufficient levels to provide any necessary deterrent and retaliatory 
capability ; 
(iv) Further believing that the non-use of chemical weapons is best ensured by an equality of 
retaliatory and defensive capability between NATO and the Warsaw Pact whilst awaiting agreements 
to prohibit such weapons; 
(v) Considering that whilst nuclear and chemical weapons remain in existence military personnel 
and civilian populations remain exposed to the threat and consequences of their use ; 
(vi) Convinced that effective NBC defence equipment and procedures for all allied forces can 
drastically reduce casualties ; 
(vii) Believing that whilst allied governments must vigorously pursue mutual and balanced force 
reductions, they also have a moral duty in peacetime to keep their populations objectively informed 
of the consequences of nuclear, biological and chemical attacks and to implement civil defence 
programmes for the survival of their people, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
Urge member governments, acting where appropriate through the North Atlantic Council: 
I. To recognise the full implications of the threat of battlefield chemical and nuclear attacks and 
to take immediate steps : 
(a) to improve protective and decontamination equipment and procedures for military 
personnel, to protect electronic and communications equipment against electromagnetic 
pulse effects, and to remedy the other deficiencies identified by the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments in its report* ; 
(b) to achieve better co-operation for research, development and the production of equipment 
and its interoperability ; 
2. To review existing usable stocks of chemical weapons and to take steps to ensure 
that the NATO deterrent and retaliatory capability is equal to the estimated offensive capa-
bility of the Warsaw Pact; 
3. Actively to encourage bilateral and multilateral negotiations to ban th~ production, stock-
piling, transfer and use of chemical weapons with adequate verification ; 
* Document 838, paragraph 5.8. 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on I st December 1980 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary 
Session (8th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Banks on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments (Document 838). 
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4. To implement urgently a co-ordinated and common •· stay-at-home" civil defence 
programme in peacetime to include essentially the provision of: 
(a) objective information to the public on survival in conventional, nuclear, biological and 
chemical war ; 
(b) an organisation with protected and up-dated communications to provide warning and 
monitoring services for nuclear, biological and chemical attacks, fully co-ordinated within 
NATO; 
(c) plans for the co-ordinated use of military reservists, the police, fire brigade, Red Cross, 
similar organisations, and civilian volunteers in a war alert, attack and post-attack period ; 
(d) fall out shelters in public buildings and in the home ; 
(e) self-help equipment for sale to the public including home shelters, protective clothing, 
respirators, dosimeters, etc. ; 
5. To call' for NATO to publish annually comparable statistics, to an agreed common 
definition, of national expenditure on civil defence. 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 356 
1. With great interest the Council have taken note of the report by the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments on nuclear, biological and chemical protection. 
The report contains an impressive amount of useful material and therefore makes an important 
contribution to the discussion on nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. 
The Council are well aware of the important implications of chemical and nuclear attacks and 
they realise the need for a proper defensive capability in order to deal effectively with these impli-
cations. They agree with the report in the sense that detection, protection and decontamination are 
important elements of this defensive capability. 
Although limited chemical detection equipment is already available, there is an urgent need for 
distant warning devices and more refined equipment. The same holds true for the individual protec-
tion against chemical attacks; this aspect is being given much consideration during the development 
and acquisition of new fighting equipment, e.g. the new Leopard tank offers reasonable protection 
against chemical attacks. New, and more effective decontamination equipment is being developed, 
especially regarding individual decontamination as well as part-decontamination of vehicles. 
The Council are of the opinion that the abovementioned development of new equipment 
deserves their full encouragement, taking into consideration the conclusions of the report by the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. 
The Council share the concern expressed in the report about the protection of electronic and 
communication equipment against electromagnetic pulse effects. On the basis of cost-effectiveness, 
measures are being taken to ensure the protection of the relevant equipment against the effects of 
EMP. 
To ensure co-operation in research, development and the production of interoperable 
equipment is one of the tasks of NATO. In fact co-operation is ensured within NATO. 
2. Though warning devices and equipment giving protection against chemical weapons might 
reduce casualties enormously, foolproof protection is not possible. No member country of WEU is 
in possession of chemical weapons. The Council share the Assembly's concern about the imbalance 
between the chemical weapons capabilities of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, which might have a 
serious impact on the overall balance of forces. 
However, it should be noted that NATO relies principally upon its conventional and nuclear 
forces for deterrence. In the meantime, an effective international agreement to ban the production 
and stockpiling of chemical weapons should be sought with great vigour. 
3. During its 35th Session, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted with consensus 
Resolution 35/144 b. In this resolution it is stated, inter alia, that the General Assembly takes note 
of the joint progress report of the USSR and the United States to the Committee on Disarmament on 
7th July 1980 on their bilateral negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons which have not 
yet led to a result. 
Furthermore, it is stated that the General Assembly of the United Nations urges the Committee 
on Disarmament to continue, as of the beginnning of its 1981 session, negotiations on a multilateral 
convention on chemical weapons as a matter of high priority. 
The Council fully agree with this resolution and member governments attaJCh great importance 
to the bilateral and multilateral negotiations to ban the production, stockpiling and use of chemical 
weapons with effective verification. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on lOth June 1981. 
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4. The Council fully recognise the importance of co-ordination within the Alliance of pro-
grammes in the field of civil defence. The Council recall, however, that whilst the Alliance is 
responsible for co-ordination of the programmes in this area, these programmes are matters falling 
under the national responsibility of each individual member country. 
5. The Council are aware of the attention that should be given to the question of civil defence. 
Therefore, having regard to the considerations set out above, the Council note the Assembly's desire 
for the provision of fuller information on civil defence matters. 
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RECOMMENDATION 357 1 
on improving the status of WEU staff2 
The Assembly, 
Conscious of the fact that despite the many years' existence of the majority of the co-ordinated 
organisations problems affecting the careers of officials in these organisations still remain unresolved ; 
Regretting the necessity to revert to its Recommendation 340 ; 
Regretting also the element of stagnation manifest in the Council's reply to this recommen-
dation and previous recommendations submitted on identical matters, 
I. REQUESTS THAT THE COUNCIL 
I. Appoint an expert, within the framework of the co-ordinated organisations, to study the desi-
rability of setting up ~n independent body for the administration of pensions as a natural follow-on 
from the joint pensions administrative section and to make proposals ; 
2. Continue to review the possibility of creating a single appeals board for pertsions in the light of 
experience in view of the possibly divergent views taken by appeals boards of the various co-
ordinated organisations and the inherent risk of prejudice for officials in these organisations ; 
3. Transmit any conclusions which the various co-ordinating agencies may have come to on the 
problems outlined in paragraph 3 of Recommendation 340 and request these agencies to continue 
their studies and to report without avoidable delay ; 
4. Provide information concerning the number of meetings held by the Co-ordinating Committee 
of Government Budget Experts in 1980, the duration of these meetings, the subjects discussed and the 
positive decisions which resulted ; 
11. Invites the Secretary-General to ensure that notice of all staff vacancies of A, L, B and C grades 
arising in the co-ordinated organisations be circulated to the staff of the others. 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1980 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session 
(I Oth Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Kershaw on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and 
Administration (Document 862). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 357 
1.1. The Council recognise that the setting-up of an independent international body for the 
administration of pensions for the co-ordinated organisations could be desirable in the long term. 
However, the joint pensions administrative section, set up and organised as a result of the 
149th report of the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts, is a purely consultative 
body which only started its operational work on l st January 1980. In accordance with the aim 
which led to its establishment, namely uniformity in the implementation of the pension scheme, 
valuable experience is being gained, the scope of its work expanded and new fields of co-operation 
and exchange explored under the initiative, guidance and supervision of the co-ordinated organi-
sations. 
The Council consider it preferable that during this formative phase, the existing organisational 
structure should be maintained. However, they are following developments closely so as to be able 
to judge, together with the other co-ordinated organisations, if and when they should study arran-
gements for modifying the existing structure of the joint pensions administrative section. 
2. As already explained in the reply to Recommendation 340, the creation of a single appeals 
board to deal with matters concerning pensions depends on the developments referred to in paragraph 
I above. But as things stand at present, namely decisions on the implementation of the pension 
scheme being taken by the Secretary-General of each co-ordinated organisation, the appeals board of 
each organisation should retain its full responsibility, particularly in the matter of pensions. 
This being so, and in keeping with the concern expressed by the Assembly, every effort has 
been made to avoid divergent decisions being taken by appeals boards with respect to similar 
cases. Accordingly, the CAPOC* is generally consulted before the confirmation of any decision that 
might give rise to an appeal and the boards inform each other of their decisions, always providing 
reasons in full. 
3. The Council will keep the Assembly informed of tangible progress made with the matters 
raised under point 3 of Recommendation 340, which are still under discussion between the various 
co-ordinated organisations. 
4. Details of the meetings of the Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget Experts held in 
1980 are provided in Chapter VI of the twenty-sixth annual report. 
11. Notices about staff vacancies are being exchanged with other organisations whenever vacancies 
cannot be filled by promotion from within the organisation concerned. 
* The Administrative Committee on Pensions of the Co-ordinated Organisations (CAPOC) was set up by the Standing 
Committee of Secretaries-General on 11th September 1974 in implementation of Article 52 of the pension scheme rules. The 
CAPOC is assisted in its work by the staff of the joint pensions administrative section. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 20th May 1981. 
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RECOMMENDATION 358 1 
on the future of European security 2 
The Assembly, 
Considering that the joint interest of all its members is to promote collective security so as to 
consolidate peace and promote detente and disarmament; 
Considering that Europe has to face a threat that is now formidable because of the Soviet 
Union's superiority in many fields; 
Considering that the Soviet Union's operations beyond the European continent extend this threat 
to the economic and political fields; 
Considering that Europe's security can be guaranteed only by the cohesion! and strength of the 
Atlantic Alliance and the resolve of its members; 
Considering that the fulfilment of this requirement calls for close agreement between the 
European and American members of the Atlantic Alliance on their joint defence policy; 
Considering that the situation requires the European element of the Alliance to make a greater 
effort to take part in joint defence and disarmament initiatives, particularly with regard to 
conventional weapons; 
Considering that, to be effective, this effort implies close co-operation in the production of 
armaments; 
Considering that the European Community has established solidarity between most European 
members of the Atlantic Alliance so that on many matters they are in a posi~ion to express joint 
views on questions which are outside the Community's purview; 
Considering that the modified Brussels Treaty, with the North Atlantic Treaty, constitutes the 
basis of European security; 
Considering that the European Community is not in a position to replace WEU in exercising 
that organisation's defence and armaments responsibilities but that steps should be taken here and 
now to face up to the requirements of European security, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Set up a working group to examine measures to be taken by all member ceuntries to adapt WEU 
to the present requirements of European defence and instruct it to study in particular: 
(a) the co-ordination of member countries' policies in its areas of responsibility, namely defence, 
armaments and disarmament; 
(b) the participation of Ministers of Defence or their representatives in its meetings when matters 
which concern them are discussed; 
(c) the convening of meetings before those of the North Atlantic Council with a view to 
identifying the joint views of its members on matters relating to Europe's security; 
(d) the question of inviting all countries which are members of the EEC, have applied for 
membership or are European members of NATO to take all steps and measures likely to 
promote the closest possible participation of their activities in the achievement of the aims of 
the modified Brussels Treaty; 
(e) the action to be taken on the study being conducted by the Standing Armaments 
Committee so that the outcome may be a true European armaments policy. 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1980 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary SessiOn 
(I Oth Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. von Hassel on behalf of the General Affairs Committee 
(Document 854). 
277 
DOCUMENT 881 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIV 
to Recommendation 358 
The Council have noted with interest the report on the future of European security presented on 
behalf of the General Affairs Committee, and have examined very attentively the contents of the 
Assembly's recommendation. 
Among the various suggestions put forward by the Assembly in its proposal to set up a working 
group, two are matters of constant concern to the Council : 
- the co-ordination of member countries' policies in its areas of responsibility is one of the 
reasons for the Council's existence. Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty gives the 
Council adequate scope to discuss a wide variety of subjects. The Council continue to be 
flexible and have sufficiently wide powers to embrace any debate relevant to the 
application of the treaty; 
- the question of any follow-up to the study being conducted by the Standing Armaments 
Committee and which is to make a descriptive analysis of the armaments industry in member 
countries has yet to be considered by the Council. In any case, the Council are still willing 
to improve European consultation and co-operation in the sphere of armaments, 
" with a view to finding joint solutions which would assist governments of member countries in 
meeting their equipment requirements" (Article 10 of the decision of the Council of 7th May 
1955 setting up the Standing Armaments Committee). 
The three other suggestions introduce new elements, which the Council analyse as follows : 
- the participation of Ministers of Defence, or their representatives, in Council meetings would 
certainly not be without its value. This would be possible where matters which are the direct 
responsibility of Defence Ministers were to be discussed. Where this is not the case, their 
participation in essentially political discussions would not appear to be strictly 
necessary; 
- the systematic convening of Council meetings before those of the North Atlantic Council 
would scarcely appear to offer any new advantages over the current practice; 
- the participation of other countries in the achievement of the aims of the treaty is in the first 
place a matter for those countries themselves, since the treaty sets out procedures for that 
purpose. 
For all these reasons, the Council consider that the setting up of a working group as recommen-
ded by the Assembly is not a necessity in present circumstances. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 8th May 1981. 
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RECOMMENDATION 359 1 
on the state of European security 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Observing that the trend of the East-West military balance over the last two decades has been 
towards rough equivalence in many sectors following the disproportionately large Soviet allocation of 
technological resources to defence, but that the disturbing superior Soviet concentration of tanks and 
divisions on the central front still exists; 
(ii) Noting that the nature of the Soviet challenge is no longer exclusively a military threat to 
Europe, but has become a world-wide search for influence, backed by the use of military force, either 
directly or by proxy; 
(iii) Deploring the outbreak of hostilities between Iraq and Iran, but noting with satisfaction that 
external powers have refrained from intervening ; 
(iv) Believing that independently of the withdrawal of France from the integrated military structure 
the cohesion of the Alliance has improved over the last two decades with more joint planning and 
better provision for consultation and collective decision-making, but regretting the weakness of allied 
consultation in particular cases ; 
(v) Noting that so far arms control agreements and current negotiations have not reduced levels of 
forces and armaments, but have contributed to better understanding of the military balance in certain 
areas; 
(vi) Believing that European security can be ensured only in the framework of the Atlantic 
Alliance; and that to maintain it continued and equal emphasis must be placed on allocating 
adequate resources to defence, on the one hand, and on pursuing negotiations on arms control and 
disarmament on the other, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
I. Urge member governments to impress on the United States, at the highest level, the need for 
continuous awareness of the allied dimension of all security issues and the overriding need for prior 
consultation in the North Atlantic Council ; 
2. Urge member governments to maintain and improve their contribution td allied defence, with 
particular provisions to enable certain United States resources to be devoted to defensive operations 
outside the Atlantic area from time to time ; 
3. Urge member governments to call in the North Atlantic Council for no less emphasis to be 
placed on arms control and disarmament negotiations with a view to improving security and reducing 
forces and armaments ; 
4. Urge member governments at the Madrid meeting to seek to negotiate the mandate of a con-
ference on disarmament in Europe in the framework of the CSCE. 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1980 during the Second Part of the Twenty-Sixth Ordinary Session 
(IIth Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Brown on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments (Document 858). 
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I. The Council wish to underline their continuous awareness of the allied dimension of all 
security issues. It is their common judgment that the security of Western Europe and North Ame-
rica can be adversely affected by the situation developing outside the NATO treaty area, such as 
Afghanistan and the Middle East. Alliance members have accepted the new challenge, which poses 
a threat to their strategic and vital economic interests. Hence, at their meeting in Brussels in 
December 1980, the ministers of the member countries of the integrated military structure endeavou-
red to draw the consequences applicable as regards the sharing of defence efforts within the zone defi-
ned by the North Atlantic Treaty. The foreign ministers of the Alliance, meeting in Brussels on 
11th and 12th December, recalled that "genuine detente must be worldwide in scope and indivisi-
ble". A still greater cohesion and awareness within the Atlantic Alliance was thus reached and the 
practice of frank and timely consultations on a broad range of issues was strengthened. 
2. The Council, further, wish to emphasise that a number of events, among them the Soviet mili-
tary intervention in Afghanistan, have led the members of the Alliance to agree on several measures 
to strengthen their defence posture. The capability of the Alliance to deter any aggression was 
thereby considerably improved. In particular, NATO members declared their readiness to take the 
necessary steps in case NATO-allocated forces of the United States or other member countries had to 
be diverted elsewhere with a view to safeguarding vital interests of the Alliance outside its treaty area. 
Provisions are being made in order to improve host nation support by member countries and faci-
litate the reception of reinforcement forces. 
3. The Council share in general the intentions and underlying concerns of the Assembly's recom-
mendation. In particular the Council note the importance which the Assembly rightly attached to 
the close and intensive consultations provided for by the allied countries which participated in the 
decision of 12th December 1979 in the field of both defence and arms control and disarmament. 
The cohesion, solidarity and resolve thus achieved in the field of security policy are particularly 
indispensable against the background of the Soviet Union's demonstrated lack of restraint in the use 
of military force and its continued build-up of military capabilities. They represent, at the same 
time, the necessary prerequisite for the success of arms control negotiations, the aim of which is to 
improve security by attaining a stable balance at the lowest possible level. 
In this context, the Council note with satisfaction the close and fruitful consultations which 
have taken place among the allies who participated in the decision of 12th December 1979 on theatre 
nuclear forces (TNF). This decision, combining in a parallel and complementary approach both 
modernisation and an arms control offer, highlights the conviction of member states as enunciated in 
the Harmel report, that peace and stability are best preserved by a policy based on deterrence, 
defence and detente. The Council welcome the fact that, as a result of the continuous implemen-
tation of both elements of the December decision, serious preliminary discussions towards agreed 
limitations of TNF could be started between the Soviet Union and the United States and will be 
resumed at a date to be set through mutual consultations. These discussions serve to continue the 
SALT process which is of great importance for the achievement of a stable balance in the nuclear 
field and for the stabilisation of East-West relations in general. 
In view of the challenge to international peace and security and of the need to preserve the 
basis for detente, member States expressed their particular satisfaction about the new United States 
Administration's resolve to even further intensify and strengthen the machinery of consultation 
between the United States and its European allies, especially on security-related issues. 
4. The Council reaffirm the support given by member governments to the proposal submitted by 
the French Delegation in Madrid on 9th December 1980, which aims at the adoption by the Madrid 
follow-up meeting to the CSCE of a concrete and substantial mandate for a conference on disarma-
ment in Europe to be held in the framework of the CSCE. 
The objective of this conference will be, in a first phase, to agr,ee upon new militarily signi-
ficant, verifiable and binding confidence-building measures, applicable to the whole of the European 
continent from the Atlantic to the Urals and thereby to contribute to the improvement of the security 
of states in Europe. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 29th April 1981. 
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on SALT and the British and French nuclear forces 1 
The Assembly, 
(i) Believing that armaments and arms control-disarmament are two sides of one coin: security; 
(ii) Noting that its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments intends to follow closely the 
SALT process and report regularly to the Assembly on this vital subject; 
(iii) Considering the twofold decision of the special meeting of NATO Fpreign and Defence 
Ministers of 12th December 1979 to be a realistic basis for negotiating reductions of long-range 
theatre nuclear forces with the Soviet Union; 
(iv) Noting that the 572 United States missiles to be deployed from 1983 will be accommodated 
within the reduced ceiling of United States nuclear warheads in Europe resulting from the unilateral 
reduction of 1,000, whereas the Soviet Union is now deploying SS-20 missiles at a rate which would 
provide 250-300 with 7 50-900 warheads by the end of 1981; · 
(v) Welcoming the opening of preliminary bilateral talks on LRTNF reductions, believing that 
they should aim to establish a balance at the lowest possible level, as part of the global strategic 
nuclear balance; 
(vi) Stressing that nuclear forces are only a part, although a very important part, of the deterrent 
and that sufficient conventional forces form an equally essential part; 
(viz) Recalling that the 197 4 Ottawa declaration recognised that the British and French nuclear 
forces were " capable of playing a deterrent role of their own contributing to the t>verall strengthening 
of the deterrence of the Alliance ", and noting that, if there is no reduction in the conventional 
defence, the view is held in the Alliance that the independent centres of decision add to the uncer-
tainty facing Soviet planners, which is an essential factor of deterrence; 
( viii) Believing SALT 11 to be to the mutual advantage of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact; 
(ix) Considering that despite an inevitable interaction between Soviet actions and arms control 
negotiations in many fora, there should be no formal linkage with specific agreements when these are 
to the mutual advantage of the parties; 
(x) Recalling paragraph B.2. of Recommendation 346, urging member governments to submit 
annually to their parliaments reports on the arms control implications of all new defence equipment 
programmes, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Call on member governments to urge the North Atlantic Council: 
I. To call for the observance of the SALT 11 limits and the earliest resumption of the SALT 
process; 
2. To recommend that any modernisation plans for British and French nuclear forces should not 
lead to the diversion of resources from conventional defence; 
3. To call on the governments of NATO countries, in consultation with their national parlia-
ments, to study the possibility: 
(a) of improving nationally as well as in the framework of NATO methods of linking both 
armaments and arms control with security planning; 
(b) of arrangements for continuously informing and consulting parliament, on a confidential 
basis where necessary, on these two sides of security planning and on progress of arms 
control negotiations. 
I. Adopted by the Assembl} on 3rd December 1980 dunng the Second Part of the Twenty-S1xth Ordmary Ses~ion (13th 
Sittmg). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Mommersteeg on behalf of the Comm1ttee on Defence Quest1ons 
and Armaments (Document 859). 
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l. The Council fully support the idea that NA TO's defence and arms control policies should 
complement each other in our efforts to maintain peace and enhance our security. The Alliance has 
long recognised the importance of maintaining deterrence through political determination, adequate 
military strength and cohesion, whilst at the same time pursuing effective balanced and verifiable 
measures of arms control and disarmament. The decision taken on 12th December 1979 at the 
special meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers of member countries of the integrated military 
structure to modernise its long-range theatre nuclear forces whilst offering in parallel to open talks 
with the Soviet Union on arms control involving theatre nuclear forces is an important example of 
this approach. 
2. The Council recall that in addition to the declarations on this subject made individually by the 
seven WEU member governments, the member states of the Alliance stated at the conclusion of the 
meeting on 11th and 12th December last that the Alliance "supports further negotiations and 
remains deeply committed to the SALT process as a way of achieving meaningful mutual limitations 
on United States and Soviet strategic nuclear forces that will help enhance western security and 
preserve East/West stability ". 
3. The Ottawa declaration by heads of government in 1974 recognises that the British and French 
nuclear forces are " capable of playing a deterrent role of their own, contributing to the overall 
strengthening of the deterrence of the Alliance ". The members of the integrated military structure 
agree on the continuing importance of improving the effectiveness of the full spectrum of allied 
forces, i.e. conventional, theatre nuclear and strategic, and of maintaining the essential linkage 
between these elements of the NATO triad. 
At the same time the Council are of the opinion that the arms control policy can also contri-
bute to ensuring a military balance which would enhance international security. 
4. The Council agree with the Assembly that the member countries of the integrated military 
structure should continue to concert their defence and arms control policy, it being noted that 
progress in arms control negotiations is, to a great extent, affected by the actual level of international 
security, the latter being itself enhanced by any progress being made in the context of these 
negotiations. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on lOth June 1981. 
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Considering the invasion of Afghanistan to be a challenge to international' law and a violation 
of the final act of the Helsinki conference, particularly paragraphs 11 and VIII of the declaration on 
principles; 
Considering that security and co-operation in Europe require respect for human rights within 
each of the countries taking part in the conference on security and co-operation in Europe; 
Considering therefore that the verifications to be effected at the meeting of the CSCE in 
Madrid and the decisions it will take must concern to an equal degree the fields of security, economic 
co-operation and guarantees granted to persons; 
Considering moreover that the balance of forces which ensures peace in Europe is threatened 
by the superiority acquired by the Soviet Union in both conventional forces and continental-range 
nuclear weapons, that the limitation of armaments and the reduction of forces and weapons, provided 
this helps to restore the balance, are still an essential means of ensuring Europe's security and that 
realistic proposals made by several countries for limiting or reducing forces and armaments or for 
confidence-building measures should allow significant progress to be made in this field in the coming 
years; 
Considering that application of the right of the Afghan people to self-determination, 
independence and territorial integrity remains a basic aim to which the West must give priority in its 
relations with the Soviet Union, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
I. Urge and remind the governments of member states to emphasise that the presence of Soviet 
troops in Afghanistan is a continuing unacceptable violation of international law and human rights 
and call for the removal of these troops; 
2. Follow attentively developments at the CSCE meeting in Madrid and ensure close consulta-
tions between its members so as to allow substantial and a comparable degree of progress to be made 
with all the various items on the agenda; 
3. Urge all participants in the CSCE to apply the provisions of the Helsinki final act in full; 
4. Endeavour to ensure that the subsequent meeting of a conference on disarmament in Europe 
proceeds without serious delay; 
5. At the same time pursue consideration of developments in the MBFR talks and encourage 
ratification of SALT 11 and the opening of SALT Ill with the aim of achieving true parity of forces 
and armaments in Europe and an overall nuclear balance; 
6. Ask the governments of member countries to respect undertakings they have entered into, 
particularly in the framework of NATO, with a view to improving the West's defensive potential in 
Europe in both conventional and nuclear fields should progress in the achievement of disarmament 
not be made; 
7. Continue and intensify the assistance which the EEC grants Yugoslavia; 
8. Encourage application of the agreements between the Polish state and strikers of September 
1980 by affording Poland economic and food assistance; 
I. Adopted by the A,sembl~ on 3rd December 1980 dunng the Second Part of the Twent~ -S1:1.th Ordmar~ Se"1on (13th 
Sittmg). 
2. bplanatory Memorandum: 'ee the Report tabled b~ Mr. Hard~ on behalf of the General A flair' Comm1ttee (Document 
855). 
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9. Pursue efforts undertaken in the framework of nine-power consultations to promote the 
establishment of a just peace in the Middle East; 
10. Examine the possibility of full financial assistance and, if necessary, supplies of military equip-
ment to the Afghan resistance movements until the USSR proves it is ready to negotiate the with-
drawal of its forces from Afghanistan; 
11. Together with all the arms-exporting countries, seek to confine deliveries of military equipment 
within the obligations of member states under the Charter of the United Nations; 
12. Show its determination to use all necessary means to keep the Strait of Hormuz open to 
shipping; 
13. Do its utmost to circumscribe the conflict between Iran and Iraq, to obtain a cease-fire and to 
seek the conditions for a fair and lasting peace between these two countries; 
14. Maintain its support for the efforts of the United States with a view to obtaining the liberation 
of the American diplomats being held hostage in Tehran. 
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1. The member states of WEU have always considered detente to be a worldwide, indivisible and 
general process implying, inter alia, respect for the principles of internation~l law and peaceful 
coexistence among states. Since the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet troops, they have unceasingly 
and vigorously denounced this act of intervention which has been condemned by the great majority 
of the international community and which constitutes an unacceptable violation of the United 
Nations Charter and the principles enshrined in the final act of Helsinki. The WEU member states 
call for an immediate withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan, and call upon all parties 
concerned to work for the urgent achievement of a political solution and the creation of the necessary 
conditions which would enable the Afghan refugees to return voluntarily to their ,homes in safety and 
honour. The WEU member states reconfirm the right of the Afghan people to determine their own 
form of government and to choose their economic, political and social system free from outside 
intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever. The WEU member states 
repeat that preservation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and neutral 
and non-aligned character of Afghanistan is essential for a peaceful solution of the problem. 
2. The governments of the WEU member states, concerned to seek in the appropriate institutions 
the broadest possible consultations, have on numerous occasions expressed their determination to do 
their utmost to bring about full implementation of the provisions of the Helsinki final act by all the 
signatory countries. During the first phase of the Madrid meeting, devoted to reviewing the 
implementation of the final act in the past two years since the Belgrade review meeting, the 
delegations of the signatory countries of the Paris Agreements made firm statemerl.ts to this effect. 
3. During the second phase devoted to the discussion of new proposals they are striving to bring 
about a substantial and balanced final document with concrete decisions in all spheres of the final act 
and in particular in the field of human rights, human contacts, information and military aspects of 
security. 
4. As to the latter field, they fully support the proposal of one of the WEU member states for a 
conference on disarmament in Europe to negotiate initially militarily significant verifiable and 
binding confidence-building measures applying to the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the 
Urals. 
5. With regard to MBFR, those member countries participating in these ntlgotiations tabled on 
20th December 1979 new constructive proposals for a simplified phase I agreement designed to 
contribute to the early conclusion of such an agreement and thus open the way towards the establish-
ment of parity in military manpower in Central Europe. 
The Council reiterate their support for the SALT process. In this connection, they welcome 
the new United States Administration's intention to continue the SALT process. They also note 
that preliminary conversations took place in Geneva last autumn between the United States and the 
Soviet Union on medium-range nuclear weapons. 
The withdrawal from Europe of 1,000 United States nuclear warheads in, accordance with the 
decision taken at the special meeting of NATO Foreign and Defence Ministers on 12th December 
1979 has been completed. 
6. The Council recall that at the ministerial meeting of the Defence Planning Committee in 
December 1980 NATO clearly showed its will to improve its military potential, particularly 
following the events in Afghanistan and the Gulf. A statement along the same lines was made by 
the North Atlantic Council. It is now recognised by all that the efforts and sa~rifices necessary for 
deterrence and defence at both conventional and nuclear level must be made. On this last point, the 
Council note that the implementation of the modernisation part of the decisior of 12th December 
1979 about theatre nuclear weapons in Europe is being continued by the countries concerned in line 
with the timetable designed to see the entry into service of the first systems by tqe end of 1983. The 
countries concerned again stress the importance of pursuing armaments modernisation and arms 
control negotiations as a parallel and complementary approach. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 8th May 1981. 
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7. The member countries of the European Community intend to maintain and deepen their close 
relations with Yugoslavia, with which they already have links through a trade and co-operation 
agreement. 
8. At the conclusion of the meeting of the European Council in Luxembourg in December 1980, 
the Nine expressed their intention, in their relations with Poland, to conform strictly to the United 
Nations Charter and to the principles of the Helsinki final act. 
In this context, they pointed out that in subscribing to these principles, the states signatory to 
the final act had undertaken in particular to: 
- respect the right of every country to choose and freely develop its own political, social, 
economic and cultural system as well as to determine its own laws and regulations; 
- refrain from any direct or indirect, individual or collective intervention in internal or exter-
nal affairs which fall within the national competence of another signatory state regardless of 
their mutual relations; 
- recognise the right of all people to pursue their own political, economic, social and cultural 
development as they see fit and without external interference. 
The Nine accordingly called upon all the signatory states to abide by these principles with 
regard to Poland and to the Polish people. They emphasised that any other attitude would have 
very serious consequences for the future of international relations in Europe and throughout the 
world. 
They forthwith took a series of measures designed to meet the requests for economic aid which 
had been made to them by Poland. 
9. In accordance with their intention, clearly expressed in their declaration of 13th June 1980, 
issued at Venice, to work more positively for peace and to make the necessary contacts with all 
parties concerned, the Nine entrusted the Presidency of the Council with a contact-making mission 
which was carried out by Mr. Thorn during the second half of 1980. 
A report was prepared in the framework of political co-operation, designed to give a positive 
content to the principles of the Venice declaration, in accordance with the instructions of the Foreign 
Ministers of the Nine, given on 15th September 1980. 
This work was approved by the Foreign Ministers of the Nine in Brussels on 24th and 25th 
November and by the European Council in Luxembourg on 1st and 2nd December. 
To ensure a more thorough consideration of the formulae set out in the report thus approved 
and with a view to encouraging a climate more favourable to negotiations, the European Council 
decided to make further contacts with the parties concerned at the same time as the report was 
considered within their own group. 
The Foreign Ministers of the Ten, meeting in Brussels on 20th January 1981, instructed the 
Netherlands Presidency to continue this European action. 
10. Member countries are aware that the occupation of Afghanistan by Soviet troops brings severe 
hardship to the Afghan people and causes a massive outflow of refugees. They express once again 
their readiness to take and to support any initiative designed to promote a political solution which 
would provide for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan, ensure the free exercise by the 
Afghan people of the right of self-determination and enable Afghanistan to recover its traditional 
position as an independent, neutral and non-aligned state. It is in this spirit that they welcome the 
initiative which formed the subject of the United Nations resolution of 20th November 1980, and 
that recently put forward by France. 
11. Each government intends, for its own part, scrupulously to comply with the provisions of the 
United Nations Charter, including those concerning international security, and binding decisions of 
the Security Council taken in accordance with Chapter VII. 
12. On 23rd September 1980, the Foreign Ministers of the Nine, meeting in New York, in a 
statement on the conflict between Iran and Iraq, emphasised " the vital importance for the entire 
international community of freedom of navigation in the Gulf, with which it is imperative not to 
interfere ". 
13. In the same statement, the Nine expressed their deep concern at the military confrontation 
between Iraq and Iran. Noting the bilateral nature of the current conflict, they emphasised the 
need to avoid any action which could lead to its escalation. In this connection, they trusted that 
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other states, notably the major powers, would continue to show restraint. They endorsed the 
appeal by the Secretary-General of the Islamic Conference for an immediate cease-fire and, with 
reference to the consultations initiated by Mr. Waldheim, Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
declared their willingness to support any international initiative that could lead to a political settle-
ment of the dispute. 
14. On 20th January 1981, the Ten expressed their great satisfaction at the decision of the Iranian 
authorities to free, safe and sound, the members of the staff of the United States1 Embassy in Tehran 
who had been held hostage for more than a year. 
The Ten therefore considered that measures taken against Iran following their declarations of 
22nd April and 18th May 1980 were no longer necessary and that each memqer state should take 
steps it considered appropriate to re-establish satisfactory relations. 
In the same context, the Ten also appealed to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
to hasten the freeing of the four British nationals still held in that country. Three of these hostages 
have subsequently been released. 
287 
DOCUMENT 881 
The Assembly, 
RECOMMENDATION 362 1 
on international industrial consortia 
and collaborative arrangements for the 
production of high technology military equipment 2 
Aware that in spite of repeated political recommendations and constant efforts at an official 
level progress towards the standardisation and interoperability of defence equipment within the 
western Alliance remains inadequate; 
Conscious that as economic recession and the growth in the price of petroleum products limit 
resources for defence and place additional constraints upon national defence budgets, improved cost-
effectiveness in weapon procurement will become even more necessary; 
Believing that collaborative definition, development and production of high technology defence 
equipment can bring substantial benefits of commonality between the procuring services in Europe as 
well as important savings in development costs, and a larger assured market for the participating 
industrial companies; 
Understanding the need to preserve as widely as possible within the European armaments 
industry an independent capability to design, develop and build high technology weapons systems; 
Realising that the impetus towards collaborative defence equipment projects should be 
commercial and industrial as well as military and logistic; 
Considering that differences in operational requirements and procurement time-scales continue 
to be an unnecessarily major obstacle to effective international collaboration in the field of military 
equipment in Europe; 
Convinced that progress towards more effective collaboration in the high technology military 
equipment sector lies not through the evolution of new bureaucratic structures but by a practical and 
pragmatic approach at an industrial level, allied to the closest co-operation between national military 
staffs and above all a common political will shared at the highest level in Europe to see joint 
collaborative solutions to the individual requirements of Alliance nations, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
I. Monitor on a regular basis through the Standing Armaments Committee progress towards 
achieving the interoperability and standardisation of defence equipment within the Alliance, and 
encourage where practical Western European industrial collaboration to achieve these objectives; 
2. Persuade the goverments of the Western European Union countries to establish a link whereby 
the Assembly of Western European Union is kept regularly informed of the work of the Independent 
European Programme Group (IEPG) as this Assembly is the only European parliamentary assembly 
with a locus standi established by treaty on defence matters, and has invaluable connections with 
national parliaments and ministers; 
3. Invite the governments of member countries to convene a West European strategic summit at 
the earliest practical opportunity to seek agreement at the highest political level on the collaborative 
definition and development of the next generation of military projects such as a new European 
combat aircraft (ECA) to replace the Jaguar in the French and British air forces and 
to replace the Phantom in the German air force; 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1980 dunng the Second Part of the Twenty-S1xth Ordmary Session (14th 
S1ttmg). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Wilkmson on behalf of the Comm1ttee on Scientific. Techno-
logical and Aerospace Quest1ons (Document 863). 
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4. Promote a European policy for high technology weapons with a view to ensuring the 
development of a genuinely balanced transatlantic market whereby the standardisation of equipment 
within the North Atlantic Alliance as a whole would be enhanced: such a two-way street on a strictly 
equitable basis between the United States and Western Europe should involve on an increasing scale 
co-operative production programmes and the placing of offset work rather than outright purchases of 
equipment " off the shelf"; 
5. Press the member nations to ensure that when their military staffs issue requests for proposals 
(RFPs) to industrial manufacturers to meet a specified military requirement, they issue RFPs to 
existing industrial consortia as well as to individual firms; 
6. Continue to press member countries working through the Independent European Programme 
Group to harmonise to the maximum extent possible the requirements of their armed forces and the 
joint phasing of their re-equipment plans. 
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1. In view of the specific tasks of WEU and NATO, it would be difficult to entrust the SAC with 
the task of " monitoring " the progress towards achieving the interoperability and standardisation of 
defence equipment within the Alliance. The Alliance, in fact, has its own structures for fulfilling 
this task and they do not need to be "overseen ", as it were, by the SAC. 
2. As the Council have in the past made clear to the Assembly, not all the member states of the 
IEPG are members of WEU. Consequently, it does not seem logical to establish the proposed link 
between the IEPG and the Assembly as this would imply that the latter would be supplied with 
information by nations that are not members of both institutions. Such information, therefore, can 
only be transmitted to the WEU parliamentarians within a national framework and insofar as their 
governments participate in the IEPG. 
3. As the Assembly is aware, the development of co-operative armaments programmes is, more-
over, a long and arduous task requiring, in the countries concerned, consensus with regard to 
industrial, economic, military and political interests. Co-operation in the matter of armaments is 
more readily achieved by pragmatic and patient endeavour than by declarations of principle, whose 
limitations have been shown by past experience. 
4. The " transatlantic dialogue " and the " two-way street " are necessities. In order to 
implement them, two conditions must be met: 
- European co-operation in the matter of armaments must first have acquired sufficient weight 
for the dialogue to be a balanced one; 
- the problem of harmonising the standards in force on both sides of the Atlantic should be 
satisfactorily solved, as recently exemplified by the transfer of the Roland licence to the 
United States. 
It should be emphasised in this context that the IEPG is striving to implement the transatlantic 
dialogue and has recently intensified its efforts in this direction. 
5. The problem of "requests for proposals" issued by military staffs touches on an area of 
national prerogative that is very sensitive. It is up to member countries to decide the ways in which 
requests for proposals are passed on to industry. 
6. The member states are in fact maintaining their efforts through the IEPG to harmonise to the 
maximum extent possible the requirements of their armies and their re-equipment plans. They 
clearly intend to continue these efforts. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 3rd April 1981. 
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RECOMMENDATION 363 1 
on energy and security 2 
The Assembly, 
Convinced that the most important aim of any Europeajl energy policy should be to achieve 
maximum independence from imported oil in the shortest possible time; 
Noting that costly long-term structural changes are needed to make a considerable reduction in 
oil consumption and Western Europe's dependence on imported energy for 63% of its requirements; 
Seriously concerned that since 1973 neither the Western European countries nor the western 
world as a whole has been able to implement proposals and decisions agreed upon either by the 
European Council or by the leaders of the main industrialised countries; 
Endorsing the statement of the Venice summit conference of June 1980 in favour of the 
development of new coal and nuclear energy programmes as the only medium-term solutions to the 
energy problem; 
Aware that while oil and raw materials, sea lanes for their transport and markets are becoming 
increasingly important strategically, Western European economies are becoming ever more dependent 
on trade with the East; 
Conscious of the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz, particularly in the light of the 
war between Iraq and Iran, especially for Western European oil imports from Persian Gulf states, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Urge member governments: 
I. To adopt, in the absence of agreement to implement a stringent Western European policy, 
convergent energy measures, and, together with the United States, Canada and Japan, formulate a 
co-operative global economic strategy, and also provide the necessary financial means for their 
implementation; 
2. To establish and implement common plans for energy self-sufficiency and common guidelines 
for better use and conservation of energy, and to encourage lower oil consumption and the use of 
other energy resources such as coal, nuclear means and renewable energy resources; 
3. To implement the coal objectives formulated by the International Energy Agency coal industry 
advisory board~ 
4. To agree, for Western Europe's electricity requirements, on common plans for better use of the 
scarce uranium resources of the western world through increasingly widespread use of fast-breeder 
reactors which would consequently mean recycling spent fuel elements in order to recuperate 
uranium and to obtain plutonium for fast-breeder reactors or. in a mixture with uranium. for light-
water reactors: 
5. To determine the acceptable threshold of safety and security for imports of energy or rare raw 
materials by the western world from the eastern bloc countries; 
6. To participate in contingency plans for keeping open all international shipping lanes, such as 
the Strait of Hormuz. 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 4th December 1980 dunng the Second Part of the Twenty-S1:>1th Ordmary Session (14th 
Siltmg). 
2 Explanatory Memorandum. see the Report tabled by Mr. Flam1g on behalf of the Comm1ttee on Sc1entlfic. Technological 
and Aerospace Questions (Document 856). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIV 
to Recommendation 363 
The Council share the views expressed and the concern shown by the Assembly in the pream-
ble to Recommendation 363. The following observations can be made about the individual points 
in the recommendation: 
1. The member countries, fully aware of the practical constraints on the development of an 
energy policy common to all western countries, are making the maximum effort, both in the Euro-
pean Community and together with other western countries including the United States, Canada and 
Japan, in the framework of the lEA towards the adoption of convergent energy measures and a 
common economic strategy. In this connection, it is sufficient to quote, in addition to the summit 
meetings of the seven main industrialised countries, the measures agreed by the energy ministers of 
the European Community on 27th November 1980 and those adopted by the International Energy 
Agency on 9th December 1980. 
2. The member states have acknowledged the need to move towards energy self-sufficiency by 
reducing dependence on imported oil, more rational and efficient use of energy, and where possible 
the development of alternative sources such as coal, nuclear energy or other sources of renewable 
energy. To this end, they have agreed energy policy guidelines for the decade to 1990 and they have 
agreed action on energy conservation. Member states are also pursuing research and development 
activity in the energy sector. The key role of economic energy pricing in achieving agreed objectives 
has been recognised. In addition to existing schemes for dealing with a situation of oil supply crisis, 
member states are currently considering the possibility of arrangements which will alleviate difficul-
ties in the event of temporary or less serious oil supply shortfall. 
3. The energy ministers of the member countries of the International Energy Agency (lEA), as 
reported in the communique resulting from their meeting of 9th December 1980, agreed with the 
main conclusions of the Coal Industry Advisory Board (CIAB) and undertook to examine closely the 
recommendations put forward and adopt, if appropriate, the required measures. 
4. In line with the results of the international nuclear fuel cycle evaluation (INFCE) study, which 
highlighted the need to apply techniques leading to the maximum economies in the use of uranium, 
most member countries agreed on the need for wider use of fast-breeder reactors and on making 
provision also for the possibility of thermal recycling of plutonium. The EEC also demonstrated its 
sympathy with this orientation by approving the three-point nuclear plan. 
5. In order to ensure the continuity of supply of energy and raw materials as much as possible, 
the Council consider diversification of sources of supply to be desirable. The question of imports of 
energy from Eastern European countries is to be carefully examined. 
6. The member countries, in the European political co-operation (EPC) framework, and through 
the declaration in New-York by the foreign ministers of the Nine on 23rd September 1980, imme-
diately after the worsening of the dispute between Iran and Iraq and its extension into a general 
conflict, stated the following: 
- deep concern about a military confrontation in a region of vital importance to the whole 
international community ; 
- the need to ensure freedom of navigation in the Gulf; 
- their endorsement of the appeal by the Secretary-General of the Islamic Conference and the 
action of the Secretary-General of the United Nations with a view to an immediate cease-fire 
and avoidance of any escalation of the conflict ; 
- the willingness of the Nine to support any international initiative that could lead to a settle-
ment of the dispute and to assist in the search for a solution. 
The action of the member countries, therefore, appears to have been based so far on two consi-
derations: first, to achieve an early cease-fire that would spare the population both grief and suffering 
and facilitate a negotiated settlement of the conflict in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations ; secondly to safeguard the interests of the entire international community by ensuring free-
dom of navigation in the Gulf, which must not in any way be threatened or impeded. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 29th April 1981. 
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Written Questions 224 and 225 and the replies of the Council 
QUESTION 224 
put by Mr. Wilkinson 
on 25th February 1981 
224. Can the Council confirm that the new 
Social Security Agreement to be signed between 
Western European Union and the United King-
dom Government will allow members of the 
staff to be affiliated with effect from 197 5 to 
Class 1 of the British National Insurance 
Scheme on the same basis as staff of other 
diplomatic missions, that is without contribu-
tions from the member governements as 
employers? 
Can the Council confirm that, in the case 
of Western European Union staff members 
exempted from Class 1 affiliation, the contribu-
tions paid by the employer and employee since 
the introduction of a new scheme in 1975 will 
be refunded ? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 8th May 1981 
224. Western European Union, as an inter-
national organisation comprising the Council, 
its subsidiary bodies and the Assembly, is 
governed by the " Agreement on the status of 
Western European Union, national represen-
tatives and international staff" signed in Paris 
by the member states on 11th May 1955. 
As regards the social security scheme 
applicable to WEU staff serving in the United 
Kingdom, the staff rules, as approved by the 
Council, stipulate that staff members shall 
contribute to the social security scheme of the 
host country " in accordance with the agree-
ments concluded between WEU and the coun-
try concerned ". 
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Following the introduction of a new 
social security scheme in the United Kingdom 
in 1975, on the one hand, and the entry into 
force of the pension scheme rules of the co-or-
dinated organisations, on tllte other hand, nego-
tiations were started, and are still being 
pursued, between the Council and the United 
Kingdom authorities. 
The agreement to be concluded will of 
course be based on the whole of the principles 
enunciated in the aboveme~tioned texts. 
QUESTION 225 
put by Sir Frederic Bennett 
on 3rd Mard 1981 
225. Would the Council indicate what mea-
sures WEU member countries have taken or are 
contemplating taking to assist the Afghan resis-
tance movements ? 
Have some of these countries delivered, 
or are they planning to deliver, the weapons 
which the resistance movements urgently 
require? 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 
communicated to the Assembly 
on 29th April1981 
225. The WEU member l:uuntries recognise in 
the Afghan people's resista11ce an essential fac-
tor in the crisis brought about by the Soviet 
military intervention. Th~y consider that any 
true political settlement of this crisis must take 
this reality into account. 
Naturally, the WEU member countries 
are concerned to act at the level where they 
could be effective, namely by organising inter-
national humanitarian aid to the peoples of 
Afghanistan driven from their country by the 
hunger and fighting. 
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Future of European space activities -
reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council 
REPORT1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions2 
by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur 
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Garrett (Alternate: Gourlay), Hawkins, Konings. McGuire 
(Alternate: Hill), Malvy, Manning (Alternate: Pensky), 
Peronnet, Prussen, Spies von Biillesheim, Topmann, van 
Waterschoot (Alternate: Mrs. Staels-Dompas). 
N.B. The names of those taking part zn the vote are 
printed in italics. 
The Assembly, 
Draft Recommendation 
on the future of European space activities -
reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council 
DOCUMENT 883 
Considering the continous efforts of the Soviet Union and the United States in the field of civil 
and military space research and applications; 
Considering also the growing space budgets of Japan, Brazil, India and other non-European 
countries; 
Concerned about the slow progress in establishing a new European space programme and the 
low total budget proposed; 
Regretting that too many parts of this programme are optional, not mandatory; 
Welcoming the successful test-flight of the shuttle Columbia which will allow full use to be 
made of the European Spacelab; 
Regretting the reluctance to prepare and convene a meeting of the ESA Ministerial Council to 
give political impetus, direction and commitment to the European Space Agency, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
Urge the governments of member states : 
-
1. To elaborate long-term European space planning : to identify a space strategy for Europe and 
the related technical, industrial and commercial objectives to be met; 
2. To ensure that Spacelab's potential is fully utilised for scientific trials and experiments in such 
areas as earth and stellar observation and microgravity research in life sciences and materials proces-
smg; 
3. To pursue the further development of Ariane up to Ariane 4; 
4. To agree on an earth resources satellite programme further to the Meteosat meteorological pro-
gramme and to intensify the telecommunications technology programme; 
5. To promote, in a North Atlantic Alliance context, the exploitation of European military com-
munication and observation satellites and the investigation of the military implications of space tech-
nology; 
6. To mobilise political and public opinion for an expanded European spaoe programme in view 
of the scientific and industrial benefits to be derived from such potential future ,programmes as inter-
planetary missions and manned space flight. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur) 
I. General remarks 
1. Since 1978, the Assembly's reports have 
placed great emphasis on the need to prepare a 
policy defining the medium- and long-term 
goals of the European Space Agency and their 
financial implications. Several times the 
Assembly has recommended setting up a study 
group to define a coherent programme. Now, 
nearly three years later, the authorities have to 
admit that the Agency lacks such goals. There 
are two reasons for this. First, the Agency has 
two major programmes - Ariane and Spacelab -
for which France and Germany respectively 
provide most of the financial backing. In view 
of the high cost of these programmes, consider-
able emphasis has been placed on them~ 
somewhat to the detriment of long-term plan-
ning. The second reason is that one of the 
larger member countries complained that its 
industrial return was not sufficient, and this 
problem was not solved until the beginning of 
1980, thus blocking the definition and elabora-
tion of future goals. 
2. The Assembly has also suggested on seve-
ral occasions that the Agency needed more 
closely involved political guidance and, more 
recently, in its report on a European earth 
resources detection satellite programme, the 
Assembly recommended that the Chairman-in-
Office of the ESA Ministerial Council should 
prepare and convene a Council meeting in the 
near future to establish a European space policy 
since ESA was at a crossroads for its new pro-
grammes. 
3. In its May 1980 proposals for a European 
long-term space policy, Eurospace strongly 
recommended forming a ministerial-level body 
similar to the European Space Conference. It 
proposed that a more effective decision-taking 
procedure should be adopted. Major long-term 
objectives should be proposed and the Chair-
man-in-Office should take the necessary steps 
to obtain general consensus on future plans. 
4. Ministerial backing is of course necessary 
to promote ESA's work and a uniform space 
policy for Europe, but this calls for a minimum 
level of resources for the Agency and here the 
picture is also rather dark. Although it is true 
that at the end of 1980, for the first time in four 
years ESA's budget was approved before the 
new year started, the 1981 budget has been 
reduced from some 730 MAU to some 610 
MAU and further cuts might be imposed by 
ESA's member countries. This, of course, is 
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extremely serious as it will mean reductions in 
ESA's work programme. 
5. The basic reason for the existence of 
ESA was that no European country alone was 
able to invest enough money in space activities 
to play a worthwhile role. Individually, Euro-
pean countries are too small to be able to com-
pete with the two superpowers, but if they are 
not capable of adopting a sufficient number of 
major joint programmes, ESA's very existence 
will be in jeopardy. There is already a split 
within ESA in the telecommunications field, 
with France and Germany versus the other 
countries. If the main European countries 
cannot achieve their ambitions in the frame-
work of ESA they may seek bilateral arrange-
ments or participation in programmes of the 
two world powers. Space is of course not the 
only branch that suffers from a lack of Euro-
pean ambition and organisation ; the same is 
true for nuclear matters, defence research and 
research on computers and telematics. 
6. From the very beginning the European 
countries have had contradictory motives for 
starting space activities and research. In the 
1960s the main motive was science and techno-
logy. However, participation in space research 
very soon became so expensive that govern-
ments could be persuaded to invest only if 
returns could be guaranteed for their industries 
in employment and in balance of payment 
terms. Thus, other motives began playing 
important roles alongside scientific research. 
There was also the political view that Europe 
should not be obliged to use American satellites 
for its scientific research. Moreover, it soon 
became apparent that to gain the maximum 
scientific and technological expertise and to 
exploit it to the full, Europe had to build its 
own satellites. Once this had been decided, the 
question of course arose as to whether Europe 
should build its own launcher. 
7. In the early 1970s it became plain that 
the American Government, although willing to 
let Europe in on the scientific side, was far less 
generous once industrial and economic consi-
derations came into play. This came very 
much to the fore during the Intelsat negotia-
tions. Statements by the Nixon government 
added to the fear that, once the Americans had 
a monopoly, Europe would have to pay a high 
price for American services in telecommuni-
cations, meteorology, earth resources and other 
application satellites. 
8. All these considerations played a role in 
the setting up of ESA. It was decided that all 
member states of the future European Space 
Agency would be obliged to pay their part of 
the budget covering the scientific work and the 
general budget essential to the existence of the 
Agency, i.e. about 27% of the overall budget. 
Apart from that there were three optional 
programmes: one backed by France for the 
European launcher, another backed by Ger-
many - Spacelab - which would assure trans-
atlantic collaboration with the United States, 
and a third backed by the United Kingdom for 
maritime satellites which were of great impor-
tance for the United Kingdom's industry and its 
worldwide communications. 
9. In addition to these three optional pro-
grammes, three other optional programmes 
were agreed to: Meteosat, European tele-
communications satellite system (OTS, ECS), 
and Aerosat in conjunction with the United 
States and Canada. The last was abandoned as 
United States interest waned fast when budget-
ary problems arose in the United States and it 
became clear that North Atlantic air space 
would not become saturated since the introduc-
tion of wide-bodied aircraft had restricted the 
growth of aircraft movements and the introduc-
tion of inertial navigating systems had reduced 
the problems of navigation and transatlantic air 
traffic management. 
10. With the increased success of meteorolo-
gical and telecommunications satellites, an 
additional difficulty arose for ESA because of 
the need to find an outlet for the industrial pro-
ducts it had promoted. Several countries were 
of the opinion that ESA's role lay in research 
and development and not in operating or even 
developing commercial systems. Some of the 
smaller countries were inclined to leave ESA a 
greater role in this field but the more important 
member states believed that, especially when 
export propositions were made, the political 
complications were far too great to be handled 
by such an intergovernmental organisation. 
11. The same difficulty had arisen in NASA 
in the field of telecommunications. Here, too, 
once the satellites were developed NASA was 
requested to hand them over to industry and 
governmental organisations. However, it soon 
became evident that research and development 
in building satellites was extremely expensive 
and as developments in telecommunications 
techniques were so rapid NASA was again 
given a major role in this field. For instance, 
in two years its budget has increased from some 
$275 million to $382 million for space appli-
cations. 
12. There is no doubt that the role of ESA 
will have to be redefined in terms of its contacts 
with the user communities. In certain cases, 
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such as telecommunications, where the national 
states have a monopoly position through their 
postal administrations, user ,communities can be 
clearly established. This is the case with 
Eutelsat. In 1977, an agreement on the consti-
tution of a provisional European telecommuni-
cations satellite organisation "Interim Eutelsat" 
was drawn up. There were twenty-six Euro-
pean signatories to the agteement. The aims 
of the Eutelsat organisatioq were laid down in 
the preamble of the agre~ment which stated 
that it was desirable to establish a provisional 
organisation, pending the working out of the 
final organisation, for operating commercial 
satellite telecommunications systems, including 
all telecommunications services established by 
the European telecommunications administra-
tions. The rights and obligations with regard 
to the Intelsat system, established in 1973, were 
taken into consideration as well as those of the 
Inmarsat system, resulting from the 1976 
convention on the international maritime 
satellite organisation. An arrangement bet-
ween ESA and Interim Eutelsat on the setting 
up of a European regio~al communications 
satellite system, ECS, entered into force on 15th 
May 1979. Special provisions have also been 
adopted with regard to activities relating to the 
orbital test satellite (OTS). 
13. In January 1981, a conference attended 
by the meteorological authorities and/or insti-
tutes of seventeen European countries was held 
to discuss the formation of Eumetsat. In this 
respect your Rapporteur wishes to refer to 
Recommendation 328 in which the Assembly 
recommended the " formation of an organ-
isation by the European meteorological ser-
vices or institutes to start the operational phase 
of a European meteorological satellite system 
' Eurometsat ' similar to the ' Eutelsat ' of the 
European postal authoriti~s; ". The results of 
this meeting have not yet l)een transformed into 
a formal organisation and plan, but it is thought 
that an operational European meteorological 
satellite capability would imply the building of 
four or five meteorological satellites. Here too 
a users' entity ought to be 'established, and ESA 
could play a promotional role. 
14. In the field of earth resources satellites 
users' interests are far more difficult to classify. 
In the framework of the European Commu-
nities the Ispra joint research centre (JRC) is 
doing important work on the applications of 
remote sensing. They are assessing and defin-
ing the scientific and commercial requirements 
of potential user groups in both land and ocean 
resources. However, even in contact with user 
groups, it will be extremely difficult to predict 
the scientific and commercial requirements for 
remote sensing satellite systems over the next 
ten to fifteen years. There is every reason to 
suppose that investment costs and exploitation 
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will rise steeply. Competition will increase, 
especially from the United States where satellites 
are being produced in greater numbers than 
in Europe. ESA is at present working on its 
first remote-sensing satellite ERS-I, intended 
for ocean applications and planned for launch 
in 1986-87. The project will be submitted for 
formal approval in June of this year. 
15. In some ways one might say that Europe 
can learn something from America about users' 
needs and the possibility of meeting them but, 
on the other hand, conditions in Europe are so 
different that European requirements are also 
quite different from those in the United States. 
16. In the field of telecommunications there 
is the language barrier which is an obstacle to 
progress in Europe. For the Americans there 
is no hindrance to heavy traffic between Los 
Angeles and New York, whereas there is har-
dly any traffic between Rome and Oslo. Often 
the language barrier is also a national barrier, 
which means the development of communica-
tions for medium-range or even short dis-
tances. In the United States, for instance, 
there is a free enterprise system for television, 
but the situation in Europe is very different as 
practically everywhere public authorities have 
a monopoly or near monopoly. 
17. Europe should also learn from NASA's 
experiences with the shuttle programme. 
Assuming the shuttle is a success, the United 
States will have a revolutionary means of space 
travel, but for what purpose? NASA developed 
the shuttle1 without a detailed long-range pro-
gramme for its use. In fact, during the decade 
of shuttle development NASA was expressly 
forbidden to commit itself to any specific major 
projects for using the shuttle's special capabi-
lities. 
18. The shuttles will not lack applications 
when they become operational. NASA reports 
that it already has commitments for cargoes on 
the first sixty or so shuttle missions. About 
one-third of these missions have been reserved 
by the United States air force for deploying its 
communications, navigation, weather and sur-
veillance satellites. Most of the other future 
missions have been spoken for by domestic and 
international communications operators, the 
one really profitable activity in space to date. 
19. Even though these activities promise the 
most certain short-term return on investment, 
the shuttle constitutes for them little more than 
a more efficient substitute for conventional and 
expendable rocket launching systems. 
20. One exception is the giant space tele-
scope, which is supposed to be deployed in 
I. See Appendix. 
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earth orbit by the shuttle in 1985. This 
96-inch telescope, operating high above the 
distorting effect of the atmosphere, should 
enable astronomers for the first time to see any 
planets around nearby stars, to observe objects 
I 00 times dimmer than those that can be seen 
through ground-based telescopes and perhaps to 
detect light emanating from the very edge of the 
visible universe. Not only would the telescope 
be larger than anything that could be launched 
by conventional rockets, but its orbital lifetime 
should extend into the next century because of 
periodic visits by shuttle astronauts bringing up 
replacement parts and fuel. 
21. In recent years, since the Apollo pro-
gramme, American scientific space exploration 
has in some respects been more hurt than 
helped by the shuttle. Its development cost of 
$10 billion siphoned ofT money that might have 
gone to new scientific projects, and its many 
delays caused costly postponements in those 
few projects that were initiated. 
11. Military aspects of space 
22. In his book "US-Soviet Military Balance, 
Concepts and Capabilities 1960-1980 ", Mr. 
John M. Collins, a senior specialist in national 
defence at the United States Library of 
Congress, wrote about space defence as follows: 
" The treaty on principles governing the 
activities of states in the exploration and 
use of outer space, including the moon 
and other celestial bodies was signed in 
Washington, London and Moscow on 
January 27, 1967. Article IV obligates 
signatories ' not to place in orbit around 
the earth any objects carrying nuclear 
weapons or any other kinds of weapons 
of mass destruction, install such weapons 
on celestial bodies, or station such wea-
pons in outer space in any other manner ... 
The establishment of military bases, 
installations and fortifications, the testing 
of any type of weapons and the conduct 
of military manoeuvres on celestial 
bodies shall be forbidden. ' 
Whether space really will remain a sanc-
tuary is still to be seen, since both sides 
are experimenting with 'Star Wars' sys-
tems which, if successfully deployed, 
could decisively tip the US/Soviet balance. 
Neither side seems in any position to do 
so soon, but Soviet activities with mili-
tary potential far exceed US programmes. 
The United States only now is beginning 
to develop military space doctrine that 
formulates requirements and recommends 
a structure to organise, train, equip, and 
sustain forces as yet unformed. A major 
military space command appears to be a 
possibility, but lacks a potent sponsor. 
Stress at this stage is on communica-
tions satellites, space sensors, and passive 
protection for such products. Active 
defence is scarcely a concept, except for 
ASA T (anti-satellite satellite}, where one 
or more options being explored may pro-
duce a prototype. Space-based defence 
against ballistic missiles incites mild inte-
rest, but not enough to push the priority. 
The Soviets, who excelled in space until 
Sputnik spurred US science in 1957, still 
suffer from serious technological flaws. 
Once again, however, they are outstrip-
ping the United States in important res-
pects, such as manned flights and space 
medicine. Interceptor satellite systems 
in gestation are attracting US atten-
tion. So are laser and beam weapon 
applications, which could pay off unex-
pectedly. 
Present space trends thus could cause this 
country to play ' catchup ' again with less 
leeway than conditions allowed before, 
unless we take positive steps to stay 
ahead of the Soviet power curve. " 
23. One such step is the development of the 
new space transportation system of which the 
space shuttle is the key element. The develop-
ment of the shuttle has been delayed for about 
three years and further operational test flights 
will now take place in the autumn of 1981. It 
will be the first reusable space vehicle and is 
designed to carry many different types of pay-
load to and from low earth orbit. It will be 
able to retrieve payloads from orbit for reuse, 
service and repair satellites in space and carry 
space laboratories into orbit, operate them and 
bring them back. The shuttle will consist of a 
reusable delta-wing arbiter vehicle with three 
main engines, an expendable propellant tank 
and reusable twin solid rocket boosters. 
24. The shuttle's capabilities will lower the 
costs of space operations and lead to savings in 
the cost of payloads. Anticipated savings 
reside in the repair and reuse of payloads and 
fewer weight and size constraints. 
25. The shuttle development programme is 
making good progress following the vehicle's 
spectacular first test flight from 12th to 14th 
April 1981. The main emphasis now is on 
preparation for the second manned orbital 
flight. 
26. The second arbiter will be virtually com-
pleted this summer and production of the third 
and fourth arbiter vehicles will be stepped up 
for delivery in support of defence missions at 
Vandenberg air force base. 
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2 7. Department of Defence space systems are 
increasingly important for support of United 
States military forces. Evidence of this grow-
ing importance of space activities is seen in the 
fact that annual funding for all space-related 
defence efforts has doubled over the past five 
years and further increases are planned for the 
future. 
28. The space shuttle ~rogramme will be 
used for defence purposes from 1983 onwards, 
with the first operational shuttle launch. The 
transition will be completed in 1986 and from 
then onwards national security space missions 
will become almost totally dependent on the 
shuttle. The main areas of interest are 
communications, navigation, early warning, 
surveillance and weather forecasting. Com-
pared with existing launchers the shuttle will 
offer increased reliability, increased payload 
weight and volume capacity. It will provide a 
capability to recover and refurbish spacecraft or 
experiments and assemble large structures in 
space. The most important advantage of the 
shuttle is increased flexibility. 
29. In fiscal year 1980 the United States 
Defence Department paid some $470 million 
for the shuttle's developmeht, and in fiscal year 
1981 this will be $512 million. The total 
amount for aeronautical research and develop-
ment to be spent by the Department of Defence 
in fiscal year 1981 will be $2,233 million. 
This research and development is concerned 
with technology for tactical and strategic air-
craft, cruise missiles, early warning aircraft, 
ground and ocean surveillance, amphibious and 
air assault mobility and air mobile command, 
control, and communications. The principal 
objectives are to achieve new operational 
concepts and capabilities and to replace and 
modernise the operational aircraft inventory. 
30. Document 773 of 17th May 1978 on 
United States-European co-operation and com-
petition in advanced technology, written after 
the Committee's visit to the United States, 
mentioned new developments in the United 
States defence satellite communication system. 
The system is a high-capacity super-high fre-
quency system intended to satisfy American 
national communications requirements for 
worldwide military command and control, 
intelligence and information transfer. Apart 
from the requirements of the highest civil and 
military authorities, it also covers diplomatic 
telecommunication needs. Since 1968, the 
year in which the syste,-n was approved, a 
whole series of communications satellites has 
been placed in orbit. 
31. The air force satellite communications 
system has been developed gradually and now 
consists of some sixteen satellites, the first of 
which was launched in 1971. The system will 
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be completed in 1983. At the same time a 
memorandum of understanding on satellite 
communications was signed between the United 
States and British Governments and the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation. A number of 
NATO Satcom-111 A and B satellites have been 
launched and incorporated in the American 
system. 
32. The fleet satellite communications system 
which is now in production will improve naval 
communications to meet the needs of the fleet 
in the early 1980s. High frequency radio 
communications have served for years but are 
vulnerable to jamming. Natural phenomena 
can cause interruptions. The new system pro-
vides protection against jamming for fleet 
broadcast transmissions, for instance from shore 
commands to ships, is highly available and 
allows link-ups between ships and other naval 
elements in an ocean area. The fleet satellite 
communications system can also be made to fit 
into the air force system. Terminal equipment 
will be installed on board ships and the installa-
tion programme will continue through the 
1980s. Three satellites were launched in 
1979 and 1980 to provide ultra-high frequency 
service over the continental United States, the 
Atlantic Ocean and Indian Ocean areas. The 
fourth and fifth spacecraft will be launched in 
fiscal year 1981. 
33. The search and rescue mission project is 
based on this type of satellite which has become 
an aid in detecting and locating distress beacons 
carried by aircraft and ships. It is of great 
importance during emergencies and the project 
is planned as an international co-operative 
effort which will include Canada and France, 
and eventually other countries. 
34. The United States depends primarily on 
its satellite early warning system for alert in 
case of a ballistic missile attack. The satellite 
system consists of three satellites deployed in 
orbit over the eastern and western hemispheres 
to cover the Soviet ballistic missile launch 
areas. In 1981 and 1982 the accuracy and 
operational life of the system in orbit will be 
improved. 
35. The defence meteorological satellite pro-
gramme supports a wide variety of defence acti-
vities from special strategic missions to tactical 
air operations and anti-submarine warfare to 
global weather analysis. The programme is a 
joint service programme with the air force 
acting as the executive service. The navy has 
established terminals on all major aircraft 
carriers. Land-based versions of the equipment 
are operating at San Diego and Rota in Spain. 
The two-satellite constellation provides glo-
bal data coverage four times a day. The civil 
and military satellite weather programmes use 
the same basic satellite structure but are main-
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tained and operated separately. The present 
type of satellite can be modified in order to be 
launched by the shuttle. 
36. The development of a long-range world-
wide ocean surveillance capability was begun in 
1980 in order to meet the requirements for glo-
bal surveillance in the 1980s and perhaps the 
1990s. The navy is evaluating the airborne 
warning and control system (AWACS) as a 
complementary ocean surveillance and over-
the-horizon targeting system. 
3 7. The United States is therefore becoming 
increasingly dependent on space systems for the 
effective use of its military forces. The four 
principal elements of the United States space 
development programme are improved space 
surveillance, increased •satellite system surviva-
bility, development of anti-satellite capabilities 
and command, control and communications 
support. 
38. The Soviets liave developed and tested 
an anti-satellite interceptor which may have an 
operational capability against United States 
satellites. These developments represent a 
threat to the continued use of space by United 
States military satellites. The primary United 
States anti-satellite effort is the development of 
a high-technology interceptor using a miniature 
vehicle which directly impacts the satellite. 
The aircraft to be used will be the F -15 
equipped with a two-stage booster to launch the 
vehicle. 
39. The Soviet space programme continues 
to be more military in character than that of 
the United States and it appears to be improv-
ing in operational capability as well as reliabi-
lity. The improvements of the last years repre-
sent significant advances in both technology 
and operations to support their military and 
civilian objectives. They have achieved mature 
operational capabilities in space communica-
tions, meteorology, navigation, surveillance 
and manned orbital flight. 
40. The latest Soviet test of an anti-satellite 
interceptor took place on 14th March 1981 
and, according to the American Defence 
Department, it used a radar seeker to attack the 
target vehicle. The interceptor exploded and 
damaged the target vehicle. The Soviets have 
also used infrared seekers for their anti-satellite 
system. 
41. As soon as the shuttle becomes operatio-
nal the American Defence Department will 
launch an elaborate observation satellite system 
which will be much larger than existing satel-
lites. The satellites, equipped with infrared 
sensors, will be used to monitor Soviet space 
objects. However, until the shuttle has proved 
itself, the Defence Department will probably 
avoid any change in satellite design unless 
called for by a change in military tech-
nology. At present the main problem is that 
nobody can be sure when it will be possible to 
drop designs compatible with conventional 
launchers. 
42. However, if the shuttle proves successful, 
the American military authorities may wish to 
develop and establish a military space station. 
This could be a permanent multi-man 
command centre in orbit, using the shuttle to 
ferry both equipment and personnel. Military 
astronauts could keep track of troopship and 
aircraft movements, monitor missile deploy-
ment and testing, and inspect potentially hostile 
satellites, destroying them if necessary. 
Ill. Aspects of co-operation between the United 
States and Europe 
43. In 1980 the European Space Agency 
spent well over $ 700 million on space applica-
tions and space science programmes, including 
the development and successful first flight of 
the European Ariane launcher. If national 
space programmes are included, Western 
Europe currently spends over $ 1 billion per 
year on space activities. 
44. The result of these substantial and sus-
tained investments is that important space 
capabilities now exist or are rapidly emerging 
in Western Europe. Europe's major invest-
ment in the Ariane launcher was prompted by 
a desire for autonomy vis-a-vis the United Sta-
tes and to be able to offer its satellite customers 
a full service, including a launch capability. 
The question remains as to whether this 
capability can become economically viable 
compared to the space shuttle. 
45. The same enhanced capabilities could 
also make Europe a more productive, co-
operative partner of the United States. For 
example, ESA's considerable and very success-
ful experience with scientific satellites has 
opened the way for United States-European 
joint research projects. A good example of this 
was the international solar-polar mission in 
which ESA and NASA were each to produce 
almost identical spacecraft that would operate 
on the opposite poles of the sun and could be 
of great scientific benefit. This would have 
been the first time the sun would have been 
observed from above its polar regions. The 
mission could have greatly increased knowledge 
of the sun which today is based on observation 
from earth or earth orbit. ESA's contribution 
was estimated at about$ lOO million- a signifi-
cant part of its overall science budget for the 
next few years. 
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46. The joint mission was expected to take 
place in 1985. However, President Reagan's 
new administration reduced the NASA budget 
to $ 6.1 billion which meant that the United 
States solar-polar spacecraft, worth $ 53 million 
in fiscal year 1982, had to be cancelled. The 
estimate for the whole project as far as the 
United States was concerjned was $ 230-280 
million. The financing of other new applica-
tions programmes and space science was also 
suspended or cancelled. 
4 7. ESA had already accepted costly changes 
in other joint programmes and it was therefore 
extremely disappointed in the proposals of the 
new administration. This unilateral American 
action reduces this mission to a single European 
Space Agency spacecraft which will now proba-
bly be launched in 1986 by a shuttle with a 
Centaur upper stage, unless the United States 
authorities reverse their position on the joint 
mission in the near futurte due to concerted 
pressure of ESA and its member states. 
48. The shuttle is the centrepiece of the over-
all space transportation system. Three test 
flights are foreseen for 1981 and one test flight 
in the beginning of 1982. If these are success-
ful, operational flights will start in September 
1982. The space transportation system invol-
ves important direct foreign and especially ESA 
contributions. Again for reasons of economy, 
NASA has decided to canqel the planetary ver-
sion of Boeing's inertial upper stage (IUS), and 
instead proposes to develop General Dynamics' 
Centaur upper stage. NASA's change in pro-
gramme for the upper stage involves several 
changes in mission planning involving revision 
and re-evaluation of the ESA satellite. Design 
changes made early in the programme are rela-
tively easy and cheap, but with the solar-polar 
programme the cost increase will be about $ 20 
million. It might even affect United States-
European space co-operation. 
49. ESA has invested some $ 850 million in 
the development and production of the first 
Spacelab which is now being delivered. Under 
the NASA-ESA memorandum of understanding 
signed in 1973 the United States agreed to buy 
a second flight unit. This was done in January 
1981. For the first time NASA bought an 
important piece of hardware from Europe. Its 
cost is $ 120 million. The first Space1ab flight 
will be a joint ESA-NASA mission and will 
carry scientific experiments presently being 
developed in Europe and the United States. 
Originally it was planned that by 1986 there 
would be approximately twelve flights per year 
for Spacelab experiments. Under President 
Carter's administration this was reduced to four 
or five missions in the 1986 period and the new 
administration is reducing it to as little as one 
or two missions per year in the 1980s. 
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50. On 28th November 1980 the engineering 
mock-up of Spacelab was delivered to NASA. 
This is an engineering model of Spacelab, but 
it is not intended for flight. Europe will deli-
ver flight units 1 and 2, FU-1 and FU-2, in 
June and September 1981 respectively. The 
delivery of the engineering model was the first 
major transfer of Spacelab hardware to NASA 
under the ESA-NASA memorandum of under-
standing signed in 197 3. The first Space lab 
flights are currently scheduled by NASA for 
September 1983 and August 1984. 
51. On a number of occasions in the past, 
NASA has provided ESA with limited technical 
assistance in the development of the Spacelab. 
At one time eleven NASA civil service person-
nel were working on Spacelab in Europe. 
NASA's investment in the Spacelab develop-
ment programme is estimated at some $ 155 
million. The principal elements of this estimate 
are the hardware and software elements to be 
used for mating the Spacelab with the space 
shuttle orbiter, the ground support equipment 
for processing Spacelab between missions, and 
the preparation of procedures and training of 
personnel for operating the system. NASA 
plans to conduct operations with two Space-
labs. The need for more Spacelabs will be eva-
luated when experience has been gained with 
the use of two. 
52. Most probably NASA budgets for the 
next four years will be similarly restricted. 
Only the space shuttle is exempt from signifi-
cant cuts for reasons of national security. Spe-
cific plans are being drawn up for shuttle 
operations related to American national secu-
rity in order to ensure that it is properly 
employed to enhance the defence of the United 
States. One obvious consequence of this drip-
feed funding is to attenuate Spacelab's potential 
value as its construction was considered to be 
Europe's means of becoming a full partner in 
the United States manned space flight pro-
gramme. 
53. Although the future of new co-operative 
efforts with the United States has become dar-
ker, there will still be a growing need for co-
operation between Western Europe and the 
United States in the coming years, especially in 
the light of growing budgetary constraints on 
both sides of the Atlantic. International co-
operation in scientific experiments is moreover 
not only necessary for financial reasons but also 
for the scientific benefits derived which enable 
a country to remain in the forefront of scientific 
developments. 
54. If the decision to abandon its part of the 
solar-polar mission is not reversed either by the 
United States administration or by Congress, 
several questions will have to be evaluated by 
ESA in its consideration of a single probe 
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mtsswn. ESA might also revise its policies 
towards future ESA-NASA co-operative ven-
tures. 
55. The European Space Agency is planning 
a scientific mission for 1985 which calls for a 
European Geos-type spacecraft to be placed on 
a course which will take it to within 1 ,000 km 
of the Halley comet when it next approaches· 
earth. The spacecraft being developed from 
Geos is called Giotto. The Halley comet 
approaches earth once in every 7 5 years, the 
last approach being in 1910. As NASA did 
not have enough financial resources to under-
take the Venus imaging radar mission (another 
inter-planetary mission) as well as the Halley 
observation, it made the proposal to ESA for a 
joint mission. 
56. ESA's science programme committee 
wanted to use Europe's Ariane launcher as the 
NASA proposal to use an American Delta 
launcher could not be made a firm commit-
ment. The United States had asked for 
more than one principal scientist to be chosen 
and the Europeans considered this too large a 
share for the Americans. Nevertheless, the 
United States is still expected to play a role in 
this European venture by providing some scien-
tific experiments and also by renting to ESA 
the tracking and telemetry services of the deep 
space network. 
IV. A European space programme 
for the 1980s 
57. It is clear that space techniques can 
contribute to the fulfilment of European inter-
ests in a great many fields such as warning of 
natural disasters, monitoring world resources, 
pollution and many others. For instance, the 
use of telecommunication satellites and remote-
sensing satellites can help very effectively in the 
fight against poverty and educational problems 
in the third world. The use of Spacelab can 
allow better pharmaceutical products to be pre-
pared, thus helping in the field of medical 
care. Development of direct television satelli-
tes can lead to an increasing awareness of 
belonging to the Western European commu-
nity. Earth resources satellites can clearly help 
in locating mineral resources and profitable 
fishing areas and in monitoring crops. 
58. It is also imperative for Europe to have a 
say in space developments within the United 
Nations and other worldwide forums. Euro-
pean expenditure on space compared to that of 
the United States is 1 to 8 ; total European 
space expenditure - national and through ESA 
- is some $ 1,000 million per year, total Ameri-
can expenditure is eight times this amount and 
that of NASA six times. Europe will therefore 
never be fully competitive with the United 
States but it should aim to reach a competitive 
standard in a number of clearly-defined areas 
and become a qualified partner in specific 
major international ventures. 
59. In order to make the most economic use 
of limited resources, the major portion of the 
totality of the European space budgets should 
be integrated in the ESA budget as stipulated in 
the ESA convention, now ratified, since Octo-
ber 1980, by all ESA member countries. Your 
Rapporteur has the clear impression, however, 
that in several countries there are pressures to 
spend an increasingly high proportion of natio-
nal resources earmarked for space on national 
objectives. It would be extremely dangerous 
for such a trend to develop further. The 
Agency should remain the principal research 
and development organisation for all the main 
activities in the space field and national pro-
jects should be complementary to ESA pro-
grammes. Moreover in many fields, even in 
telecommunications, a central research and 
development organisation remains essential if 
Europe is to compete with the United States 
and Japan. The example of NASA which 
recently has again been given a major role in 
telecommunications should remain uppermost 
in the minds of European governments. 
60. The programme now under discussion in 
ESA is a so-called baseline programme with a 
budget of some 450 million accounting units a 
year1, which is the absolute minimum pro-
gramme to maintain Western Europe as a signi-
ficant space partner in the 1980s. Whether 
even this minimum of 450 million accounting 
units will prove adequate is difficult to judge as 
it depends on how future programmes are 
defined, adopted and executed. 
1. Space transportation systems 
61. In this programme there are two basic 
uncertainties: first, with regard to the space 
transportation system on which no definite 
decisions can be taken as long as Ariane is not 
operational and, second, in respect of Spacelab 
which, because of a two-and-a-half-year delay 
in the shuttle programme, will not be flown 
until 1983. Only experience can teach the 
lessons to be drawn from these two transpor-
tation systems. Whatever the results, prepara-
tory efforts will be necessary to reach a definite 
decision on them by 1984-85. 
62. A further development of the Ariane 
launcher, up to Ariane 4 in 1985-86, seems 
necessary in order to place in orbit new types of 
telecommunication satellites weighing 3,500 to 
I. At 1979 prices. 
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4,000 kilos. The need for Ariane 4 is therefore 
directly related to the size of the communica-
tions platforms envisaged for the 1985-90 
period. 
63. The cost-effectiveness of Ariane will also 
have to be improved in or~er to compete with 
launch vehicles of other countries, especially of 
the United States. 
64. With regard to Spacelab, the main 
emphasis will have to be op the maximum use 
of its potential. Scientific experiments in the 
field of materials and life ~ciences will have to 
be pursued, several of them in co-operation 
with NASA. The Spacelllb user community 
might grow as Spacelab demonstrates its opera-
tional usefulness. 
65. From the very beginning the Spacelab 
development was meant to demonstrate Eur-
ope's ability to collaborate with the United 
States on a permanent basis- in a way, a ticket 
for a place in manned spade flight. This made 
the high cost of Spacelab development accep-
table for several European countries. It would 
be logical to continue the Spacelab develop-
ment in order to achieve a better and more 
sophisticated type of space vehicle to be used 
for various types of missioqs. The length of its 
missions should be extenqed to up to twenty 
days and the second and third steps should seek 
to increase the autonomy! of Spacelab within 
the framework of shuttle missions and, later, 
even lead to autonomous free-flying Spacelabs. 
In this way it would be able to serve as a 
platform for building sections for future space 
stations or service platforms. A long-term 
Spacelab programme, e.g. over a ten-year 
period, seems necessary in the light of the his-
tory of building launchers and spacecraft. 
66. European Spacelab engineering expertise 
should be kept up to scratch and this will 
require continuous participation in the use of 
future Spacelab manned systems. It is note-
worthy in this regard that West European scien-
tists will fly on Spacelab missions, the only 
West Europeans to fly into space other than 
two French military officers scheduled to parti-
cipate in a Soviet Salyut mission. 
67. To remain competitive, European indus-
try should stay in close t<mch with NASA and 
its plans by taking an active part in the activi-
ties of ESA. After 1983 it will be possible to 
draw on the experience of both Ariane and 
Spacelab and major deci~ions could then be 
taken by the governments concerned. 
2. Space sciences 
68. The Agency's science programme has 
been blocked at a certain level of expenditure 
since the early 1970s due to the so-called pack-
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age deal on Ariane, Spacelab and Marecs. 
However, experiments conducted in scientific 
satellites tend to become more expensive and, 
at the same time, new areas of science such as 
microgravity are difficult to accommodate in 
the science budget. 
69. A level of funding has to be reached ade-
quate to support a European space programme 
which will enable related industries to develop 
their technologies while maintaining public 
interest in European space efforts through 
European participation in spectacular missions 
such as planetary missions. Such missions can 
be executed only by ESA as they cannot be 
planned other than at European level. Natio-
nal activities should therefore be such as to 
complement the European programmes. 
3. Microgravity research 
70. Materials processing in space has been of 
special interest since the early Apollo missions. 
For instance, within the framework of the 
Spacelab experiments there will be a fluid expe-
riment to determine density gradients and fluid 
flows during crystal growth, and a solidification 
experiment in which a wide range of controlled 
high temperature melting and freezing experi-
ments will be performed. The main driving 
force is a desire to learn more of the underlying 
mechanisms and phenomena occurring under 
microgravity conditions which are otherwise 
obscured by the ever-present pull of gravity on 
earth. 
71. The Federal Republic of Germany, 
which took the lead in developing and building 
the Spacelab, also committed itself to complete 
a comprehensive round of generic research. 
This will be complemented by low gravity 
materials science research. France also has 
been active in materials research in space 
having flown many experiments aboard the 
Soviet Union's Salyut 6. Many other Euro-
pean countries are also preparing experiments 
to be carried out in Spacelab as many industria-
lists are deeply concerned about their ability to 
keep pace with developments in materials 
science. It is therefore highly important to 
find funds for a microgravity research pro-
gramme, initially for scientific reasons, but later 
for commercial applications also. 
72. Many interesting developments in this 
field are taking place in the United States and 
Japan; in Japan the main interest is in glasses, 
optics and semi-conductors. Therefore no 
future European space programme will be 
acceptable if microgravity research is not 
included. User communities in microgravity, 
as in other fields, should be developed to back 
up the European Space Agency in the technolo-
gical preparation of a number of instruments 
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and support equipment such as ovens for mate-
rials processing and incubators for life sciences 
experiments. 
4. The earth observation programme 
73. In its twenty-sixth annual report the 
Council stated under the sub-heading " Space 
questions " that it considered the European 
remote-sensing programme an important vehi-
cle for European scientific and economic co-
operation and that it should become one of 
ESA's major application programmes in the 
years to come. The Council indicated that the 
political will existed for the development of 
such a programme to be implemented through 
the European Space Agency. The first stage of 
this programme provided for the improvement 
of data-processing techniques at ground stations 
where the Agency would operate through 
Earthnet and the ESRIN data bank at Frascati. 
The governments of the member countries 
would do their best to provide adequate funds 
for ESA's programme, which would include the 
launching of one or two satellites developed 
within ESA such as the projected ERS-1 
remote-sensing satellite system for oceanic 
observation and also ERS-2 for land applica-
tions. There is a growing feeling that a world-
wide earth resources observation programme 
will have to be established in the 1990s. 
74. The Landsat satellites I, 2 and 3 as well 
as the aerial remote-sensing programme have 
already provided the basic research data for a 
more detailed programme for developing and 
developed countries. Space-based observation 
is the only economic approach for fuels and 
minerals exploration and mineral resources 
mapping programmes. It is of great value for 
water management and monitoring the environ-
ment. The long-term scientific aim is to add 
to our basic knowledge of the earth. 
75. The report on a European earth resources 
detection satellite programme 1 described the 
development of experimental preoperational 
satellites for a land applications satellite system 
LASS and a coastal ocean monitoring satellite 
system COMSS. Further details on these can 
be found in the abovementioned report. 
76. A substantial proportion of the ESA bud-
get will be involved in these programmes as 
well as in the continuation of the Meteosat pro-
gramme and a plan to improve arrangements 
for the distribution of meteorological data, 
including the use of a special relay satellite, 
Sirio 11. The ERS-1 programme should be 
started this year and at a later stage a decision 
will have to be taken on the development of a 
1. Document 842. 
large low earth orbit (LEO) platform. This of 
course will also depend on the demands of the 
user community. 
5. The telecommunications programme 
77. The first generation of ESA and national 
communication satellites is now in operation 
and governments as well as industry are con-
vinced that considerable financial rewards are 
to be reaped in this field. The United States 
programme is geared to the development of a 
strong technology basis, particularly in multi-
beam antennae and on-board switching techni-
ques, from which future plans for new capabili-
ties and flight test programmes can be devel-
oped. It will also concentrate on the definition 
of new systems which provide data to users in a 
more timely and usable manner. NASA wants 
to maintain United States leadership in com-
munication satellite systems. Capabilities in 
Europe and elsewhere are growing and the fact 
that Intelsat has already approached other 
nations for hardware supplies has given new 
impetus to communication research and deve-
lopment efforts in the United States. 
78. In developing and developed countries 
alike there is a great interest in new telecom-
munications developments. 
79. Space communications are a priority goal 
of the Japanese who are developing a series of 
satellites for mobile communications and navi-
gation communications techniques for small 
craft ~nd satellites for communicating with 
mobile objects on land or with unmanned 
observation instruments. At the same time 
special attention is being paid to the establish-
ment of inter-satellite communication techni-
ques and to the corresponding improvement of 
telecommunication methods. 
80. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that in 
India there is a national communications satellite 
development programme. It started in 1967 
with an experiment which involved placing 
community television receiving sets in eighty 
villages around New Delhi. This experiment 
showed that the most cost-effective method 
would be one using a satellite for direct broad-
casting to remote villages and also retrans-
mission through ground-based television trans-
mitters. Such a system could provide televi-
sion services for all of India's 560,000 villages. 
The Indian space research organisation will 
set up a national television network based on 
synchronous satellites which will provide bene-
fits by promoting education, agricultural pro-
ductivity, communications, etc. 
81. When the Committee visited Italy in 
March 1981, the Minister for the Co-ordination 
of Scientific Research and Technology, Mr. 
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Romita, said that as far as the growth industries 
were concerned Italy woul<l concentrate on the 
development of new electronic technologies f<;>r 
telecommunications. The visit to Telespaz10 
confirmed that this ind~stry will have an 
important future and that telecommunications 
will benefit greatly from space development. 
82. A new generation of operational systems 
should therefore be prepared and European 
industry should realise tha~ if it wants to take a 
share of the world market for large complex 
communication satellite systems it will have to 
make an important resear<l:h and development 
effort. However, the far-reaching programmes 
·necessary cannot be financed by industry alone 
because of the inherent high risks and cost. 
The national PTT authorities do not consider 
advanced space research and development as 
part of their responsibilities and budget. The 
European Space Agency is therefore the most 
suitable organisation to help industry to m.eet 
competition successfully through the execut10n 
of an appropriate ESA programme, as well as 
through the harmonisation of additional natio-
nal efforts. 
83. The programme should include the 
building of a large multipurpose ~eostat~onary 
platform weighing some two tons m orbtt and 
which "should be launched in the second half of 
the 1980s. Such a platform would allow expe-
rimental applications in aircraft communica-
tions links between satell.tes and direct radio 
' . . . broadcasts and transmtsston expenments. 
84. After the L-Sat pro$ramme, new advan-
ced technologies should be tested by an advan-
ced orbital test system. Here too new commu-
nication systems will be developed between 
satellites and mobile craft. They will result in 
data relay and dissemination systems, land and 
advanced sea mobile systems designed for very 
low-cost terminals and active or passive naviga-
tion systems. During the 1990s large orbital 
assembly systems will presumably provide the 
most cost-effective and attractive support for 
several types of telecommunication missions. 
These systems will consist either of large 
space stations - 3,000 to 6,000 kilos - or will 
be clusters of smaller individual vehicles inter-
connected with radio waves. 
85. A supplementary pr:ogramme will consist 
of a second generation of communication pay-
loads for lnmarsat or Eutelsat. At the same 
time a preparation should be made for Euro-
pean participation in Intelsat VII. 
6. Space research fllld technology 
86. The aims of a space research and techno-
logy programme are to provide a technology 
base which will adequately support current and 
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future space activities and implement means of 
making maximum reductions in the cost of 
future space activities by improving compo-
nents. Such a technology programme should 
provide the basic expertise in the areas 
of materials, structures, sensing and detection, 
guidance and control, data processing and dis-
tribution, chemical and electric propulsion, 
space energy systems and aerothermodynamics. 
87. The technology programme should sup-
port the space programmes in order to ensure 
that the technology required is available in due 
time and to maintain a high level of compe-
tence in space technology in Europe. Techno-
logy utilisation activities are also designed to 
accelerate the transfer to industries, other than 
the aerospace industry, of new knowledge and 
innovative technology. 
88. There will have to be a basic technology 
research programme and a support technology 
programme. The latter, especially geared to 
telecommunications and earth observation pro-
grammes, is also necessary for the science, 
Spacelab and microgravity programmes. 
89. Technology verification missions are 
needed to test the technology in flight before 
incorporation into operational spacecraft. 
90. Of special importance for any technology 
programme are the data management and the 
applications data services. In the 1980s the era 
of exploration will become an era of appli-
cation. A modern data network provid-
ing a common service will be required by mul-
tiple users. 
91. The technological research programme 
should be structured so that the technology can 
be fully used in present and future European 
programmes. 
V. Activities of the Council - scientific, 
technological and aerospace questions 
1. Energy problems 
92. Your Rapporteur appreciates the Coun-
cil's great interest in the reports and recommen-
dations submitted by the Committee. Al-
though many of the replies are substantial, your 
Rapporteur nevertheless has the feeling that dif-
ficult problems are treated so as to give a super-
ficial impression that the problems are close to 
solution. In fact temporary solutions might 
sometimes be found, but a common short- or 
medium-term policy is far from being formu-
lated, let alone executed. This is particularly 
true for energy problems on which the Councils 
of Ministers of the EEC and the OECD have 
been trying to reach agreement since 1973. 
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93. When the Committee met in Italy earlier 
this year the question was asked whether Italy's 
national energy policy would be geared to an 
EEC common energy policy. The competent 
authorities answered that there was no question 
of Italy's energy policy being placed in a Euro-
pean framework since member countries' atti-
tudes were so different that the EEC had not 
been able to implement a common energy 
policy. 
94. The Council however mentioned a list of 
statements, made since 1979 and 1980 at meet-
ings of the European Council or of the EEC 
Council of Energy Ministers, which might give 
the impression that they are following a course 
which might lead to the formulation of a com-
mon policy. This, however, is not the opinion 
of your Rapporteur. At its last session on 3rd 
March 1981 the EEC Council of Energy Minis-
ters failed to agree on a short- or medium-term 
energy programme, but expressed a number of 
vague proposals for an energy policy for the 
1990s. 
9 5. In order to achieve such a policy member 
states are invited to convert their electricity 
power stations now running on oil or gas to 
operate on coal or lignite. The Council has 
also indicated that new sources of energy 
should be developed, but the money to carry 
out these proposals might simply not be availa-
ble. 
96. In this context, your Rapporteur might 
again refer to the Italian authorities who poin-
ted out that the Italian industrial base was be-
coming increasingly vulnerable because of the 
steady rise in oil prices. Even its most modern 
industry had to be subsidised as otherwise it 
would not be able to compete with industries of 
other countries which can rely on cheaper 
energy supplies. Up to 1985, Italy would have 
to pay $ 10 billion in subsidies. This was the 
cost to the nation for not having invested pro-
perly in energy developments. In comparison, 
your Rapporteur would mention that the Japa-
nese government intends to spend $ 12.6 billion 
over the next decade in order to make a signi-
fiant reduction in its oil consumption and this 
sum will be concentrated mainly on research 
into and the development of renewable energy 
sources, solar or geothermal. 
97. Our Committee is convinced that nuclear 
energy should be accorded a large share of the 
appropriations earmarked for energy pro-
grammes but, with the exception of France, 
many governments seem to have not progressed 
beyond studies on how Western Europe is to 
reduce its dangerous dependence on imported 
energy. Only if joint action is taken on 
nuclear power and alternative energy sources 
will it be possible to achieve an effective Euro-
pean energy policy. 
98. On the question of buying natural gas 
from the Soviet Union, the European Commis-
sion declared recently in answer to a question 
by Mr. C. Berkhouwer in the European Parlia-
ment that there was a serious danger here as 
Western Europe became more and more 
dependent on supplies of energy from the 
Soviet Union but it saw no other solution for 
diversifying, geographically speaking, the sup-
ply of gas and oil. It said that diversification 
might have a certain number of advantages, but 
without explaining them further. 
99. This shows clearly how dangerous the 
present situation is, not only economically and 
industrially but also in terms of security. Nor 
did the Council offer any further explanation in 
its reply on 29th April 1981 to Recommen-
dation 363 on energy and security; it merely 
indicated that the question of imports of energy 
from Eastern European countries was to be 
carefully examined. 
2. European aircraft industry 
100. On the civil side of developments in the 
European aircraft industry, your Rapporteur is 
happy to note the steady progress in Airbus 
lndustrie. With the production of the A-300 
now firmly established, its first derivative, the 
A-31 0, will make its maiden flight in May 1982 
and will go into production in September 
1983. A family of aircraft is being developed 
with a stretched version of the Airbus, the 
T A-9 (more than 300 seats) and the foreshor-
tened, narrower Airbus 320-100 (130 seats) 
together with the A-320-200 (160 seats) being 
considered. The latter might replace the 
B-727-200 and the DC-9-80 from 1985 on-
wards if a decision to produce this version is 
taken in 1981. A choice still has to be made 
between engines such as the SNECMA-General 
Electric CFM-56X, the British-Japanese 
RJ-500, the Pratt and Whitney PW-2000 or a 
new General Electric engine. With these new 
developments, Airbus Industrie could offer a 
family of aircraft for short and medium distan-
ces. If so, the European civil aircraft industry 
could again become a growth industry, offering 
jobs for some 40-45,000 people. The civil 
situation might however be prejudiced by the 
decision of the Dutch aircraft company, Fok-
ker, to collaborate with the United States 
manufacturer, McDonnell Douglas, over the design 
of a new 130-150 seat airliner, the MDF-100. 
101. On the military side, your Rapporteur 
refers to the report by Mr. Brasseur on the 
European combat aircraft and other aeronau-
tical developments 1• He wishes however to 
draw attention to the need for all Western 
I. See Document 874. 
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European governments to formulate a long-
term procurement policy to allow their military 
forces to have the equipment they need without 
exceeding the expenditure limits they have 
set. In the United Kingdom there have been 
major defence spending over-runs with conse-
quent cuts in equipment programmes, and in 
Germany the defence ministry budget is largely 
frozen until 1984-85 for the same reason. 
102. The long-term review should consider 
both the equipment needs of the armed forces 
of the countries concerned and the roles, 
missions and strategy of the armed forces in the 
context of European defence as well as of the 
Atlantic Alliance, rather than in the more nar-
rowly national perspective of the current British 
defence review. 
103. The operational needs of the Western 
European armed forces in pursuing a policy of 
deterrence to counter the military threat should 
be planned for a seven to fifteen year period. 
104. The European industrial base should be 
capable of supporting the overall needs of the 
armed forces and management procedures 
should be harmonised within a European 
framework in order to stay within the financial 
constraints imposed by the governments. The 
research and development efforts of each mem-
ber country should be geared to these Western 
European long-term defence procurement poli-
cies. 
105. A symposium on collaborative aeronau-
tical projects, to be sponsored by this Commit-
tee early next year, should contribute to the 
improvement of the European industrial base. 
106. With regard to helicopters, four program-
mes are now being considered and France, Ger-
many, Italy and the United Kingdom are 
consulting each other on future plans and 
developments, and it is important that this 
collaboration be maintained and safeguarded 
from budgetary cuts. For example, on the 
United Kingdom-Italian programme your Rap-
porteur is happy to mention that a basic agree-
ment has been concluded between Fiat A via-
zione and Agusta on the one hand and 
Westland in the United Kingdom on the 
other. The new helicopter project called the 
EH-101 will replace the SH-3 of the Italian 
navy and the Sea King of the Royal Navy, 
designed for anti-submarine warfare. An in-
dustrial company, EH Industries Ltd., has been 
established in London to co-ordinate the 
research, development and production which 
will be executed by , the abovementioned 
companies. There is a further important possi-
bility of collaboration bet!Ween the French aero-
engine company Turbomeca and the British 
company Rolls-Royce to develop a new heli-
copter powerplant for this project. 
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3. Space questions 
107. As your Rapporteur has discussed the 
state of European space activities in earlier 
chapters of his report, he does not wish to go 
into further detail here. 
108. To conclude this chapter, he hopes that 
the Council recognises the importance of conti-
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nuous close co-operation between military and 
civil authorities with regard to meteorological, 
communications and earth resources detection 
satellites in order to ensure an optimal use of 
the satellites and space systems manufactured 
by European industries; in particular, he wishes 
to emphasise the commercial, industrial and 
military benefits from an expanded European 
space programme. 
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APPENDIX 
The space shuttle 
After the series of Apollo spacecraft, 
NASA wanted to create a comfortable work 
place in space. For this it needed a vehicle 
with powerful, yet small, lightweight and dur-
able engines to carry heavy cargo into 
space. The craft needed a lightweight but 
reusable heat shield to withstand temperatures 
in the thousands of degrees Fahrenheit during 
re-entry into the earth's atmosphere. Its sys-
tems had to operate in weightlessness, in the 
thin upper atmosphere and in the denser lower 
atmosphere. Its shape had to fly reasonably 
well in four different aerodynamic regimes : 
acting at launch as a thin projectile; in space as 
a spacecraft; at re-entry as a smooth, blunted 
capsule; and in the atmosphere as a gliding 
aeroplane. The entire machine had to be able 
to " fly by itself", freeing people in space to do 
creative research and eliminating the expense of 
employing hundreds of people back on earth to 
monitor all the systems constantly. 
NASA had to do all this for one-fifth the 
cost of the Apollo moon landing programme, 
and reuse all the equipment 50 to 100 times, 
further cutting the costs of each trip to space. 
Since no one had ever tried to do this, 
NASA started from scratch. 
By far the largest technical challenge were 
the orbiter's three main engines used at lift-
off. The engines, the most powerful most 
fuel-efficient and compact chemical engines in 
the world, represent a major advance in the 
state of the art that will eventually be seen in 
other applications in other fields. 
Super-cold liquid oxygen and hydrogen 
(both minus several hundred degrees) flow to 
the engines from a 154.2 foot (47 metre) exter-
nal tank that forms the backbone of the sys-
tem. Oxygen enters one side of each engine, 
hydrogen, the other; and each gas goes through 
similar processes. 
The engines are designed to produce the 
maximum of power with the minimum of 
weight and size. For example, one scientist 
compared the high-pressure fuel turbopump to 
three 707 aircraft engines compressed into a 
garbage can. The pump weighs only 700 
pounds (317 kilos), but produces 62,000 horse-
power, or 88 horsepower per pound. In any 
other application an engine equivalent to the 
orbiter's would be about ten times larger. 
The heat shield of the orbiter has been an 
enormous challenge. The orbiter re-enters 
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from the cold of space (minus 250°F) and plun-
ges through the atmosphere at speeds up to 
16,820 miles per hour (27 ,069 kilometres per 
hour). Friction with the atmosphere creates 
enormous heat - up to 3,000oF (1,648 oq on 
the leading edges of the wings and on the nose 
cap. The underbelly is a little " cooler ", and 
the upper payload bay doors may be as " cool " 
as 700°F (371 °C). Thus, three types of insula-
tion are required, one for each heating regime. 
The orbiter is 122.17 feet (37.24 metres) 
long with a wing span of 78.06 feet (23.79 
metres). So NASA came up with the idea of 
individual panels or tiles - 35,000 of them, 
each about 6 inches by 6 inches (15.24 centi-
metres by 15.24 centimetres). Each tile can be 
individually replaced if ~amaged during re-
entry, without replacing the entire shield. 
The tiles vary in composition and den-
sity. The hottest portions, such as the leading 
edges of the wings, have material made of an 
extra strong form of carbon. Very lightweight 
ceramic tiles cover areas that do not get as hot, 
such as the underbelly, and a special coated felt 
material covers the " coole8t " areas. The tiles 
vary in weight from 9 to 20 pounds per cubic 
foot. 
Sensors and systems are scattered all over 
the orbiter from the front to the rear. At front 
is the three-storeyed deck, with the cockpit on 
top, the kitchen, bath and sleeping area at mid-
deck, and an equipment area on the lower 
deck. Behind the cockpit is the " trunk " - the 
60 foot (18.2 metre) long cargo bay, covered by 
two doors, which are maqe of graphite epoxy. 
The doors give strength to the otherwise 
flimsy aluminium fuselage and prevent twisting 
and flexing. 
At the rear of the orbiter's wings are the 
elevators. At the rear of the orbiter are the 
engines, above which is the tail with the verti-
cal stabiliser that has a rudder. The wings' ele-
vators, the body flap and the rudder control the 
orbiter's movements in pitch, roll and yaw in 
the atmosphere, whereas engines control the 
orbiter's position in space. 
All of the shuttle's parts and systems are 
totally dependent upon, and controlled by, 
computers. The shuttle can be operated com-
pletely by computers, frollll the checkout of all 
systems on the launch pad, through launch, to 
re-entry and landing. The job of the astro-
nauts will largely be monitoring what the com-
puters are doing through an array of instru-
ments on the cockpit's panel. 
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Although he does not have to, the com-
mander will take over the orbiter's controls 
during the final phase of landing. In front of 
him are computer display screens, television-
like devices called cathode ray tubes that pro-
vide information from the computers. The 
computers will calculate how the commander is 
flying the machine - if he is coming in too fast 
or too slow, and where he is in relation to the 
landing strip. On the cockpit panel are also 
standard aircraft instruments such as altimeters. 
To appreciate the difficulty of landing the 
heavy orbiter, one can compare it with the 
high-performance jet, the F -15, which flies at 
speeds 2.5 times the speed of sound (the shuttle 
re-enters at speeds 25 times the speed of 
sound). The F -15 lands at speeds of 12 5 knots 
(nautical miles per hour). The orbiter lands at 
speeds of 196 knots. The F-15 weighs 13,608 
kilos; the orbiter weighs 97,524 kilos. The 
F-15 stops within 762 metres; the orbiter requi-
res about 3,047 metres. 
The first flight, which took place from 12th 
to 14th April 1981, was the most serious and 
risky as the orbiting vehicle Columbia is the 
first of its kind. 
NASA has scheduled some 1,108 tests for 
four flights. The shuttle will carry about 3,500 
sensors, such as microphones, strain gauges, and 
meters to measure velocities, pressures, tempe-
ratures, noises, gases coming out of the systems, 
and creaks and flexes of the fuselage. 
On the first two flights, the Columbia will 
fly in an orbit that puts less demand on the 
engine at launch. On the third and fourth test 
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flights, the orbit will require more power output 
for the engines. 
The first flight lasted 54 hours and 20 
minutes. The second, in September 1981, will 
last four days, and the last two, in 1982, will 
last seven days each. 
On the first flight the astronauts landed 
Columbia themselves. On the second flight, 
part of the landing will be controlled by the 
computer. On the third and fourth flights, the 
computer will control the vehicle from re-entry 
and landing through " wheels stop ". 
The first flight carried mainly instruments 
to measure the system's performances. The 
second flight will carry scientific instruments 
and will test some aspects of the " space 
arm ". The space arm is a 50 foot ( 15 metre) 
long instrument with shoulder, elbow and wrist 
joints and a " hand " to grapple satellites and 
lift them out of the cargo bay. On the third 
test flight a test arm will actually lift a payload 
out of the cargo bay and then put it back 
inside. 
Two pilots will fly each of the four test 
flights. After that NASA will begin the opera-
tional phase of the shuttle in which it hauls 
satellites and other equipment into space for 
paying customers. At that time the new breed 
of astronauts - the diverse group of men and 
women who have degrees ranging from engi-
neering to medicine - will fly in space. They 
will operate the scientific experiments and the 
space arm and perform many tasks while the 
pilots monitor the orbitor's system. 
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Amendment 1 
Future of European space activities -
reply to the twenty-sixth annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENT 11 
tabled by Mr. Topmann 
1. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper and insert: 
16th June 1981 
"3. To pursue the further development of the Ariane programme, taking into account an 
established demand for it ; ". 
Signed: Topmann 
I. See 4th Sitting, 17th June 1981 (Amendment agreed to). 
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